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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> ARTNER v Austria - 13161/87 [1990] ECHR 31 (5 March 1990) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1990/31.html Cite as: [1990] ECHR 31 |
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF Application No. 13161/87 by Josef ARTNER against Austria The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 5 March 1990, the following members being present: MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President J.A. FROWEIN S. TRECHSEL F. ERMACORA A. WEITZEL J.-C. SOYER H.G. SCHERMERS H. DANELIUS Mrs. G.H. THUNE Sir Basil HALL Mr. F. MARTINEZ Mrs. J. LIDDY Mr. L. LOUCAIDES Mr. J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Having regard to the application introduced on 6 July 1987 by Josef Artner against Austria and registered on 21 August 1987 under file No. 13161/87; Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission; Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 24 September 1989 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant on 13 October 1989; Having deliberated; Decides as follows: THE FACTS The applicant is an Austrian citizen, born in 1953. He was detained in prison in Vienna when he lodged this application. He is represented by Mr. Franz X. Gugg, a lawyer in Vienna. The facts agreed between the parties may be summarised as follows. On 16 December 1986 the applicant was convicted by the Vienna Regional Court (Landesgericht) of two counts of usury (Geldwucher), of partly completed and partly attempted aggravated fraud (schwerer Betrug), of breach of trust (Veruntreuung) and of aggravated theft (schwerer Diebstahl). He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment. The applicant had previously been convicted eight times of similar charges. The conviction of usury in one case was based on the following findings: in the summer of 1982 the applicant advertised in newspapers that he could procure loans. He was contacted by Miss L., who was twenty years old and in financial difficulties. As she could offer no guarantees, the applicant proposed that she take out a loan together with a third person who, at the same time, would act as guarantor. L. accepted and on 24 August 1982 the applicant, L. and one S., a Yugoslav allegedly unknown to the applicant, contacted a credit institute. S. and L. applied for and obtained as joint debtors a loan of 60,000 AS. The money was paid out immediately. L. received 20,000 AS, S. received 30,000 AS and the applicant 10,000 AS. S. later disappeared, while L. was liable for the reimbursement of 60,000 AS. The Court considered that the commission of 10,000 AS received by the applicant was disproportionate to the loan received by L., namely 20,000 AS, and that the applicant had misused L.'s inexperience and rashness. These findings were based on statements made by L. before the investigating judge and read out at the trial and on documentary evidence submitted by L. in connection with the charges she had previously laid against the applicant. In preparation of the trial, the applicant's defence counsel had, on 12 November 1986, requested to hear certain witnesses. Inter alia, he suggested in respect of the charges laid by L. to hear a representative of the credit institute supposed to confirm his allegation that L. first reimbursed during several months the loan without complaining while later she was apparently informed by the credit institute of the "well known practices of credit mediators" which, as the defence put it, might have given certain ideas to her (motivierend wirkte). Meanwhile L. had been summoned to give evidence at the trial as witness for the prosecution. As the summons was returned with the mention that L. had moved and her new whereabouts were unkown the trial court requested the Central Registry of the Vienna Federal Police Directorate on 28 October 1986 for information whether L. was registered under a new address. A new address was in fact obtained and L. was summoned under this address. However, L. did not appear at the trial of 21 November 1986. The applicant denied the respective charges and was not prepared to renounce the hearing of this witness. The trial was adjourned until 16 December 1986 and the police was ordered to see to it that L. attend the new hearing but her whereabouts could not be ascertained. The applicant was so informed at the beginning of the hearing of 16 December 1986. At the end of the hearing his defence counsel maintained all motions for the taking of evidence which had previously been rejected (Verteidiger wiederholt die abgewiesenen Beweisanträge). The evidence given by L. before the investigating judge was then read out. The trial court considered L.'s statement to be credible although initially she had said that the money had been handed over to the applicant while later she said it was given to S. who distributed it. This slight contradiction was considered to be of no importance as uncontestedly all the three had been together at the credit institute and the money was paid out to them. The other usury offence concerned a loan of 40,000 AS with regard to which the applicant had claimed and obtained a commission of approximately 15,000 AS according to the evidence given by the victim at the trial. The applicant's appeal (Berufung) and plea of nullity (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde) were rejected by the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) insofar as they related to the conviction of the two counts of usury. In respect of the applicant's complaint that he was wrongly convicted on the basis of the reading out of L.'s statements made before the investigating judge, the Supreme Court pointed out that the applicant had himself not requested to hear witness L. As it had been impossible to ascertain L.'s whereabouts Sec. 252 (1) No. 1 of the Code on Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung) allowed the reading out of L.'s previous statements even without the accused's consent. This provision reads in its relevant passages: "Records on hearing of witnesses may be read out ... if the witnesses' whereabouts are unknown". Insofar as the applicant complained that L.'s statements were considered by the trial court to be credible, although there had been a certain contradiction, the Supreme Court pointed out that the applicant himself admitted at the trial that he had received a commission both from L. and S. immediately after the loan had been paid out. COMPLAINTS The applicant points out that, under Sec. 162 (2) of the Code on Criminal Procedure, the investigating judge has to invite the accused to participate at the hearing of the witness if it is probable that the record of the hearing will have to be read out later at the trial on one of the grounds stated in paragraph 1 No. 1 of the Section. He considers it to be contradictory to acknowledge the accused's right to be present at the hearing and nevertheless allow the reading out of records in cases where the investigating judge has not, as in his case, invited the accused to participate at the hearing of a witness. In his opinion this practice violates Article 6 para. 3 (d) of the Convention as L. was the only witness against him and as allegedly no serious efforts had been made to obtain the appearance of this witness at the trial. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION The application was introduced on 6 July 1987 and registered on 21 August 1987. On 9 May 1989 the Commission decided to invite the respondent Government to submit observations on the admissibility and merits of the application. The Government's observations were received by letter dated 21 September 1989 and the applicant's observations in reply were dated 13 October 1989. By letter of 11 November 1989 the respondent Government stated that they did not request an oral hearing on admissibility. THE LAW The applicant has complained that his conviction by the Vienna Regional Court on a count of usury was exclusively based on a statement by the alleged victim, witness L., which had been made in his absence before the investigating judge and was read out at the trial because the witness had moved without leaving an address and could not be found by the police. It is true that Article 6 para. 3 (d) (Art. 6-3-d) of the Convention secures to everyone charged with a criminal offence the right to examine witnesses against him. The Government submit that the applicant was not only convicted on the basis of the evidence given before the investigating judge by L. but also on the basis of documentary evidence proving that a loan was obtained for L. and S. and that in a similar case the applicant had asked for and obtained a commission of some AS 15,000 for the procurement of a loan in the amount of AS 40,000. L. was obliged to tell the truth when testifying before the investigating judge while the applicant had not invoked any particular circumstances that could have cast doubts on the evidence given by L., necessitating a further hearing of this witness before the trial court. The applicant submits that it was not necessary for him to apply for the hearing of witness L. because this witness had been summoned by the Public Prosecutor and he could therefore expect that the witness would be heard. He points out that the question whether he requested and received an excessive commission from L. was decided exclusively on the basis of her statements before the investigating judge. The Commission considers that the situation in the present case raises a complex issue under Article 6 para. 3 (d) (Art. 6-3-d) of the Convention which has to be decided on the merits. It follows that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. No other ground of inadmissibility can be established. For these reasons, the Commission DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE without prejudging the merits of the case. Deputy Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission (J. RAYMOND) (C.A. NØRGAARD)