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FORMER
SECOND SECTION
CASE OF
EFIMENKO v. UKRAINE
(Application
no. 55870/00)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
18 July
2006
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Efimenko v. Ukraine,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Former Second Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Mr J.-P. Costa, President,
Mr A.B.
Baka,
Mr I. Cabral Barreto,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr V.
Butkevych,
Ms D. Jočienė,
Mr D. Popović,
judges,
and Mrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 13 December 2005 and on 27 June 2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on the last mentioned
date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 55870/00) against Ukraine
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Ukrainian national, Mrs Svetlana
Aleksandrovna Efimenko (“the applicant”), on 1 September
1999.
- The
Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Mrs V. Lutkovska and Mr Yu. Zaytsev, of the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine.
- The
applicant alleged, in particular, that the domestic courts failed to
decide her property dispute in due time and that she had no effective
remedy in respect of these complaints.
- The
application was allocated to the Second Section of the Court (Rule 52
§ 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the
Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the
Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.
- By
a decision of 13 December 2005, the Court declared the application
partly admissible.
- On
1 April 2006 the Court changed the composition of its Sections (Rule
25 § 1), but this case remained with the Chamber constituted
within the former Second Section.
- The
applicant, but not the Government, filed observations on the merits
(Rule 59 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in the city of
Zaporizhzhya, Ukraine.
- The
facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as
follows.
A. Background of the case
- From
November 1994 until September 1996 the applicant worked as a lawyer
in the Avers Ltd. auditing company (hereinafter – the
“Company”), of which she was a shareholder. Her share in
the Company’s capital was 30 %.
- On
2 September 1996, the applicant handed an application attested by a
notary and dated 12 August 1996 to Mrs. N., director and holder of
70 % of shares in the Company’s capital, notifying the
latter of her decision to withdraw from the Company. The same day,
Mrs N. together with Mrs L. and Mrs K. held a general meeting of
shareholders and decided to admit Mrs L. and Mrs K. to the Company
and to expel the applicant. On 12 September 1996, the Executive
Committee of the Ordzhenikidzevsky District Council of Zaporizhzhya
(hereinafter – the Executive Committee) passed decision
no. 756-P about registration of the changes to the statutory
documents of the Company by which the applicant was expelled from the
Company on the basis of her application of 2 September 1996 and of
the minutes of the general meeting of shareholders of the same day.
- On
31 January 1997 the Company decided that the value of the applicant’s
share was UAH 2,629.20.
The applicant maintained that according to the accounting documents
her share had to be UAH 294,180.
- On
6 November 1997 the Executive Committee passed decision no. 143
on termination of the State registration of the Company on the basis
of the decision of the meeting of shareholders of the Company of
28 October 1997.
- On
23 March 1998 the liquidation commission issued an act on termination
of the liquidation procedure of the Company.
B. First set of proceedings
- On
20 November 1996, the applicant lodged a claim with the
Ordzhenikidzevsky District Court of Zaporizhzhya against the Company
to receive compensation for her share in the Company’s assets.
- On
25 November 1996 the court gave a ruling on attachment of
the defendant’s car and bank accounts to secure the claim.
- On
11 August 1997 the court also ordered the seizure of the
vehicle VAZ 21099 that belonged to the defendant.
- Between
December 1996 and 3 April 2003, the first instance
court scheduled the applicant’s case for hearing twenty-five
times. During the said period only four hearings in the case were
held and on twenty-one occasions the hearings were postponed on
different grounds. Four times the case was transferred from one judge
to another following motions of the applicant or the defendant, or
due to expiry of the judge’s term of office. The case was also
transferred from one first instance court to another at the request
of the applicant. The proceedings were suspended on several occasions
at the applicant’s request.
- On
18 December 1997 the director of the Company informed the
court that by the order of the Executive Committee the Company had
been liquidated.
- On
29 December 1997 the court ordered seizure of office
equipment of the Company.
- In
January 1998 the bailiff informed the court that there was no
property in the Company because it had been liquidated.
- On
26 August 1998 Judge S. upon the applicant’s request
sent letters of inquiry concerning the Company’s debtors.
- On
21 February 2003 the tax authorities, in reply to the
inquiry of Judge M.B., informed the latter that the Company’s
registration had been cancelled in 1999.
- On
28 February 2003 Judge M.B. issued a ruling obliging the
applicant to inform the court about the successors of the Company.
- On
3 April 2003 Judge M.B. discontinued the proceedings in the
case due to the failure of the applicant to appear before the court
and to submit the requested information. The applicant maintained
that she had learned about this decision only from the Government’s
observations on her application before the Court.
- On
20 February 2004, when the applicant changed her original claim by
replacing the defendant Company by the members of the liquidation
commission of the Company, the proceedings were resumed.
- On
5 November 2005 the Leninsky District Court rejected the applicant’s
claim on the ground that the liquidation commission could not be held
responsible for the debts of the Company that it had liquidated.
- On
22 December 2005 the Zaporizhzhya Court of Appeal rejected the
applicant’s appeal for failure to pay the court fee in full.
The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court. The proceedings are
still pending.
C. Second set of proceedings
- On
14 January 1997
the applicant lodged a claim with the Ordzhenikidzevsky District
Court of Zaporizhzhya against the Company and the Executive Committee
to invalidate the decisions of 2 and 12 September 1996 and to
restore her status as a shareholder of the Company.
- From
17 October 1997, the first instance court scheduled the applicant’s
case for hearing seventeen times. During the said period only two
hearings in the case were held and on fifteen occasions the hearings
were postponed on different grounds. Four times the case was
transferred from one judge to another following motions of the
applicant or the defendant, or due to expiry of the judge’s
term of office. The case was also transferred from one first instance
court to another at the request of the applicant. The proceedings
were suspended on several occasions at the applicant’s request.
- On
6 January 1998 the applicant supplemented her original claim by
requesting the court to invalidate the decision of the Company of
28 October 1997 and the decision of the Executive Committee
of 6 November 1997 on termination of the State registration
of the Company.
- On
18 February 1998 Judge S. summoned the head of the
Company’s liquidation committee to appear at the hearing on
24 March 1998.
- On
24 March 1998 the court hearing was adjourned because the
Company’s lawyer requested that certain documents be demanded
and a witness be summoned.
- On
31 March 1998, when the Company was still in the State register of
enterprises, the Ordzhenikidzevsky District Court issued a ruling
prohibiting the Executive Committee from issuing orders to liquidate
the Company.
- On
4 June 1998 the court held a hearing in the absence of both
parties and decided in favour of the applicant and quashed the
decisions of both the shareholders’ meetings and the Executive
Committee.
- On
19 February 1999 the Presidium of the Zaporizhzhya Regional
Court quashed the decision of 4 June 1998 under the supervisory
review procedure and remitted the case to the Ordzhenikidzevsky
District Court for a fresh consideration.
- On
15 September 1999 the case was referred to the Leninsky District
Court of Zaporizhzhya following the applicant’s request. In the
absence of any further information from the parties, it appears that
these proceedings are still pending.
D. Third set of proceedings
- On
28 August 1997 the applicant lodged a claim with the
Ordzhenikidzevsky District Court of Zaporizhzhya against Mr L.A.F. (a
son-in-law of the director of the Company) to invalidate the sales
contract for the car (mentioned in the first set of the proceedings),
concluded between the Company and Mr L.A.F. The same day the court
started the proceedings and ordered the seizure of the impugned
vehicle.
- Since
28 August 1997, the first instance court has scheduled the
applicant’s case for hearing seventeen times, but all of the
hearings were postponed on different grounds. Three times the case
was transferred from one judge to another following motions of the
applicant or the defendant, or due to expiry of the judge’s
term of office. The case was also transferred from one first instance
court to another at the request of the applicant.
- On
17 March 1998 the court passed a ruling on the assignment
of the car to the applicant’s charge pending delivery of a
judgment in the case.
- On
15 September 1999 the case was referred to the Leninsky District
Court of Zaporizhzhya following the applicant’s request.
- On
17 March 2003 the tax administration informed the court that the
Company registration had been cancelled as from 1999.
- On
4 March 2004 the Leninsky District Court invalidated the sales
contract and awarded the car to the applicant. This decision became
final on 5 May 2004.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
1. Constitution of 1996
- Relevant
provision of the Constitution reads as follows:
Article 9
“International treaties that are in force, agreed
to be binding by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, are part of the
national legislation of Ukraine.”
2. Judicial System Act
- Relevant
provisions of the Act read as follows:
Article 73. The status of the qualifications
commission of judges
“... The tasks of the qualifications commission
shall be ... the examination of issues concerning the disciplinary
liability of judges ...”
Article 96. General conditions of the disciplinary
liability of judges
“A judge may incur disciplinary liability in
compliance with the disciplinary procedure on the grounds specified
by the Law of Ukraine "on the status of judges".”
Article 97. Disciplinary proceedings against judges
“...2. The right to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against a judge shall belong to the
following persons: the people’s deputies of Ukraine; the
Ombudsman for Human Rights of the Verkhovna Rada [Parliament] of
Ukraine; the Minister of Justice of Ukraine; the chairman of a higher
specialized court – against a judge of a relevant specialized
court where the judge holds a post, except the initiation of
dismissal of a judge; the chairman of a relevant council of judges,
also members of the Council of Judges of Ukraine.”
THE LAW
I. THE GOVERNMENT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
- The
Government maintained that, in so far as the applicant complained
about the length of the court proceedings, she could introduce a
complaint concerning the delay in the proceedings with the Regional
Court, relying directly on Article 6 of the Convention, and the court
would have to react to it. As an example, the Government furnished a
separate ruling given by a Regional Court within a set of civil
proceedings, where the court, with reference to the provisions of
Article 6 of the Convention, decided to inform the Regional
Qualifications Commission about delays in proceedings caused by a
judge of a first instance court. In the Government’s opinion,
such a decision could entail the disciplinary liability of the judge
who was responsible for the delay in the proceedings.
- The
applicant observed that direct appeal to the provisions of the
Convention before the domestic courts in Ukraine was not a usual
practice, and that the decision of the Mykolaiv Regional Court
submitted by the Government in support of their objection could be
considered as an exception rather than a rule.
- The
Court notes that under Ukrainian law the Convention is part of the
domestic legislation and could be invoked by physical and legal
persons within domestic judicial proceedings. However, in the Court’s
opinion, the mere possibility of raising a complaint under the
Convention before the domestic courts is not sufficient to reach a
conclusion about the effectiveness of a particular domestic remedy.
The relevant domestic authorities in such situations should be
competent to take measures which can either prevent or compensate for
the alleged violation (see, mutatis mutandis, Glova and
Bregin v. Ukraine, nos. 4292/04 and 4347/04, §§ 13 14,
28 February 2006).
- The
Court notes that the Government made a general remark about the
domestic courts’ competence and obligation to react to a
complaint about the length of the proceedings. They did not, however,
give any other explanations, except to refer to the possibility of
having the case judge’s disciplinary liability established by
informing the Qualifications Commission. The Court, therefore, will
proceed with an examination of this particular remedy. It observes
that, as it appears from the relevant legislation (see paragraph 45
above), neither the parties to the proceedings nor even the courts
themselves are competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings against
a judge. Therefore, leaving aside the issue of whether such
disciplinary proceedings in themselves may be said to meet other
criteria of an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 35 § 1
of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Kormacheva v.
Russia, no. 53084/99, § 61-62, 29 January 2004), this
remedy is not independent of discretionary action by the authorities
and is not directly available to those concerned (see Kucherenko
v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 41974/98, 4 May 1999). It could
not, therefore, be considered effective for Convention purposes.
- In
these circumstances, the Court concludes that the applicant was
absolved from pursuing the remedy invoked by the Government and has
therefore complied with the requirements of Article 35 § 1.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Government’s preliminary
objection.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant’s complaint relates to the length of the three sets
of proceedings. The first set of the proceedings began on 20 November
1996 and is still pending. The second set of proceedings began on
14 January 1997 and is still pending. The third set of the
proceedings began on 28 August 1997 and ended on 5 May 2004. The
first set of the proceedings has therefore already lasted eight years
and eight months (the period between 3 April 2003 and 20 February
2004 not being taken into account as the proceedings had been
discontinued), of which seven years and ten months falls within the
Court’s competence ratione temporis (from 11 September
1997 to date). The second set of proceedings has already lasted nine
years and five months, of which eight years and eight months falls
within the Court’s competence ratione temporis (from
11 September 1997 to date). The third set of proceedings lasted
six years and eight months, of which six years and seven months falls
within the Court’s competence ratione temporis (from 11
September 1997 until 5 May 2004).
- According
to the applicant, the length of the proceedings is in breach of the
“reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
- The
Government maintained that the length of the proceedings was caused
by the applicant’s behaviour. The Government submitted that the
applicant instituted several sets of proceedings with mutually
exclusive claims, objected to holding the hearings in the absence of
the defendant, and made several requests for suspension of the
proceedings and for substitution of the case judge.
- The
applicant maintained that the second and third sets of proceedings
were aimed at securing her claim in the first set of proceedings. She
further maintained that she had never objected to holding court
hearings in the absence of the defendant and even requested the court
to hold the hearings despite such absence.
- The
Court notes the dispute between the parties concerning the extent to
which the applicant contributed to the length of the proceedings.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that during the main part of the first
set of proceedings, which lasted well over six years from
20 November 1996 until 3 April 2003, the domestic
courts held only four hearings, at none of which were all the parties
present or the necessary documents available. Moreover, it appears
from the case file that between 1999 and 2003 the proceedings before
the first-instance court were pending although the principal
defendant in the case had ceased to exist. These elements are
sufficient for the Court to find a violation under this head.
- These
arguments are equally pertinent, mutatis mutandis, to the
second and third sets of proceedings.
- The
Court recalls that it has frequently found violations of Article 6 §
1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the present
application (see Svetlana Naumenko v. Ukraine, no.
41984/98, §§ 77-87, 9 November 2004).
- Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing argument
capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the
present case.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1 with respect to
all three sets of proceedings.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained under Article 13 of the Convention of the
alleged lack of an effective remedy in respect of her complaint about
a violation of Article 6 of the Convention.
- Article
13 of the Convention provides:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
- The
Government maintained that no separate issue arose under Article 13
of the Convention and that the applicant had effective domestic
remedies which she had failed to exhaust. In particular, the
applicant could challenge before the Regional Court any procedural
step taken by the first-instance court which in her opinion
contributed to the delay in the proceedings. They also referred to
the remedies invoked in their preliminary objection.
- The
applicant pointed out that she had filed numerous complaints with
different institutions, including higher courts, about the
proceedings, but to no avail.
- The
Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy
before a national authority for an alleged breach of the requirement
under Article 6 § 1 to hear a case within a reasonable time (see
Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 156, ECHR
2000-XI).
- The
Court notes that the reasoning for rejection of the Government’s
preliminary objection is equally pertinent to this complaint of the
applicant. As to the other remedies invoked by the Government, the
Court notes that the circumstances of the present case clearly
demonstrated that any challenge to procedural decisions and to the
case judges led to further delays in the proceedings, and the overall
delay was never acknowledged or compensated. The Court therefore
concludes that in the present case there has been a violation of
Article 13 of the Convention.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1
- The
applicant complained that the domestic courts, by taking an
unreasonably long time to consider her claims, failed to protect her
property rights. She invoked Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which
provides as relevant:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.”
- The
Government maintained that the applicant’s claims before the
domestic courts were so contradictory that the State could not be
blamed for failure to protect her property rights as the applicant
could not formulate with sufficient precision which aspect of her
property rights should be protected.
- The
applicant contended that the steps which she took in the judicial
proceedings had been logical and could be explained by her wish to
secure her property rights to a share in the property and the profits
of the Company.
- However,
having regard to its finding under Article 6 § 1 (see paragraph
58 above), the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine
whether, in this case, there has been a violation of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (see Zanghì v. Italy, judgment
of 19 February 1991, Series A no. 194 C, p. 47, § 23).
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed USD 137,506.00 (the equivalent of EUR 106,697)
in respect of pecuniary damage and USD 60,000.00 (the equivalent of
EUR 46,560.00) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
-
The Government contested these claims.
- The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.
However, ruling on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant EUR
3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant also claimed UAH 2,080, which was approximately equal to
USD 1,040.00 at the material time (the equivalent of about EUR 807),
for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts.
- The
Government maintained that the applicant could not claim before the
Court any expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings. They further
noted that the applicant had submitted supporting documentation only
in the amount of UAH 2,120, and that one of the receipts for UAH 500
is not stamped and therefore should be disregarded. Nevertheless, the
Government left the matter to the Court’s discretion.
- According
to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to
the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court
considers that the sum claimed should be awarded in full.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Dismisses the Government’s preliminary
objection;
- Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 13 of the Convention;
- Holds that there is no need to examine
separately the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 3,000
(three thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 807
(eight hundred and seven euros) in respect of costs and expenses, to
be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at
the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may
be chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 July 2006, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
S. Dollé J.-P. Costa
Registrar President