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FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF ROMANIAK v. POLAND
(Application no. 53284/99)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
24 October 2006
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to
editorial revision.
In the case of Romaniak v. Poland,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza,
President,
Mr J. Casadevall,
Mr M. Pellonpää,
Mr S.
Pavlovschi,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Ms L. Mijović,
Mr J.
Šikuta, judges,
and Mr T.L. Early, Section
Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 3 October 2006,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The case originated in an
application (no. 53284/99) against the
Republic of Poland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Polish national, Ms Wanda Romaniak (”the applicant), on 22
march 1999.
- The applicant was represented before the
Court by Mr T. Gaczyński and Mr M. Szewczyk, lawyers practising
in Warszawa. The Polish Government (“the Government”)
were represented by their Agents, Mr K. Drzewicki and
subsequently by Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
- The applicant complained that the length of civil
proceedings in her case had exceeded a reasonable time.
- The application was allocated to the Fourth Section of
the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within
that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 §
1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.
- On 1 November 2004 the Court changed the composition of
its Sections (Rule 25 § 1). This case was assigned to the newly
composed Fourth Section (Rule 52 § 1).
- By a decision of 9 September 2003 the Court
declared the application admissible.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The applicant, Wanda Romaniak, is a Polish
national, who was born in 1929 and lives in Głosków.
A. Facts prior to 1 May 1993
- On 17 September 1980 M.T. lodged a motion with
the Warsaw District Court, claiming dissolution of a co-ownership
which he shared with the applicant. The land in question consisted of
two adjoining parcels and a building, which had been built as a
result of the petitioner’s and the applicant’s financial
contributions for the purpose of setting up a business.
- On 3 April 1981 the Warsaw Regional Court issued
a decision allowing M.T. to use part of the property pending the
outcome of the proceedings. By the same decision, the court
prohibited the destruction of any of the facilities in the building.
- Subsequently, hearings were held on 1 September
1982, 8 October 1982, 28 January 1983, 13 February 1984, 9 May 1984,
29 October 1984, 19 December 1984 and 2 April 1985.
- By a partial judgment of 29 April 1985 the
Warsaw District Court ruled in favour of the applicant.
- Upon appeal, on 28 April 1986 the Warsaw
Regional Court quashed the decision of 29 April 1985.
- Between 1986 and 1991 three hearings and one
on-site inspection were carried out by the court.
- On 7 July 1990 the Ministry of Justice,
following the applicant’s complaint about the length of the
proceedings, examined the facts and considered the complaint
justified, having found that an expert opinion had not been prepared
within the time-limit fixed and that no efforts had been made by the
court to discipline the experts. Therefore, the Ministry of Justice
took the case under its administrative supervision.
- On 23 April 1992 the Warsaw District Court
issued a decision dissolving the co-ownership of the disputed
property in favour of the applicant. The applicant was, however,
obliged to pay-off the petitioner.
- On 12 October 1992 and on 13 October 1992, the
applicant and the petitioner, respectively, lodged appeals against
the above-mentioned decision.
- On 6 April 1993 the Warsaw District Court issued
a decision forbidding the petitioner from taking down a fence.
B. Facts after 30 April 1993
- By a judgment of 7 May 1993 the Warsaw Regional
Court set aside the decision of 23 April 1992 because of procedural
mistakes committed in the proceedings and remitted the case to the
first-instance court for re examination.
- On 11 October 1993 the Warsaw Regional Court set
aside the decision of 6 April 1993.
- On 16 March 1994 a hearing took place before the
Warsaw District Court.
- On 18 April 1994 the applicant’s lawyer
withdrew from the case.
- On 16 May 1994 new expert evidence was ordered.
- On 15 November 1994 the expert report was
submitted to the court.
- On 3 March 1995 a hearing was held.
- On 7 April 1995 the Warsaw District Court stayed
the proceedings because K.C., another co-owner of the property, had
died and his legal successors had to be identified.
- On 12 September 1995 the information about the
legal successors was submitted to the court. On 29 October 1995 the
District Court dismissed the request to resume the proceedings. On 15
February 1996 the Regional Court quashed this decision.
- On 19 September 1996 the court decided to
stay the proceedings pending the examination of a motion for the
acquisition of the property by prescription, submitted by J.C.
- On 25 November 1996 the court held a hearing in
order to examine the applicant’s claim for the return of a part
of the building already granted to her by previous judgments.
- On 10 December 1996 the Warsaw District Court
issued a decision prohibiting the petitioner from carrying out
reconstruction works.
- On 17 April 1997 the trial court dismissed the
petitioner’s appeal against the decision of 10 December 1996.
- On 20 May 1997 the applicant lodged a motion
concerning two expert opinions and requested the court to resume the
proceedings.
- On 2 July 1997 the Warsaw District Court resumed
the proceedings.
- On 29 September 1997 a hearing took place before
the Warsaw District Court. The court ordered the preparation of an
expert opinion.
- On 18 November 1997 the court held a hearing.
- On 8 April 1998 H.S. submitted his expert
opinion to the court.
- On 14 July 1999, upon the applicant’s
request, the trial court ordered a supplementary opinion to be
prepared by H.S.
- On 3 November 1999 H.S. submitted the
supplementary opinion.
- On 24 November 1999 a hearing was held. Neither
the applicant’s curator nor her lawyer attended the hearing.
- On 15 March 2000 a hearing was held.
- On 29 March 2000 the Warsaw District Court
stayed the proceedings because two of the parties to the proceedings
had died.
- On 29 August 2000 the Warsaw District Court refused to
resume the proceedings because the parties had failed to submit a
decision confirming their inheritance rights. The proceedings were
subsequently resumed on 5 January 2001.
- On 28 March 2001 a hearing was held before the
Warsaw District Court. The court ordered the petitioner to submit,
within 7 days, the decision confirming his right to inherit.
- On 29 June 2001 a hearing was held before the
Warsaw District Court. The court stayed the proceedings as the
petitioner had failed to submit the decision confirming his right to
inherit.
- On 4 March 2003 the court resumed the proceedings.
- On 4 June 2003 the court stayed the proceedings due to
the death of one of the parties.
- On 24 October 2003 a hearing was held and the court
heard witnesses.
- On 2 April 2004 a hearing was held. The court summoned
the applicant to submit her pleadings. On 21 April 2004 the court
appointed an expert to prepare a plan for the division of the
property.
- At a hearing on 3 January 2005 the court heard
witnesses.
- On 12 January 2005 the court delivered a partial
decision by which it partially dissolved the co-ownership of the
property.
- The hearing scheduled for 3 August 2005 was adjourned
due to the absence of the applicant’s curator.
- On 18 November 2005 the parties, including the
applicant, declared their intention to sell the property and to
conclude a friendly settlement. The proceedings were stayed at their
request. Neither of the parties has so far requested that the
proceedings be resumed.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The applicant complained that the length of the
proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time”
requirement, provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which
reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
- The Government contested that argument
- The period to be taken into consideration began only
on 1 May 1993, when the recognition by Poland of the right of
individual petition took effect. However, in assessing the
reasonableness of the time that elapsed after that date, account must
be taken of the state of proceedings at the time.
The period in question had not yet ended with the adoption of a final
judicial decision. It has thus lasted over 13 years for two levels of
jurisdiction.
- The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the
length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the
circumstances of the case and with reference to the following
criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant
and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant
in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v.
France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The Government submitted that the case was complex on
account of the significant number of parties involved in the
proceedings and the need to have recourse to expert reports.
Furthermore, the case did not require to be processed with special
diligence. The Government acknowledged that the applicant and her
curator had not contributed to the delay in the proceedings apart
from their failure to attend the hearing of 24 November 1999. The
Government claimed that the authorities had shown due diligence in
the case. They submitted that the court had been unable to speed up
the submission of certain documents necessary to proceed with the
case and, as a result, the proceedings had had to be stayed for over
three years. The Government further claimed that the periods during
which the proceedings had been stayed should be deducted from the
overall period.
- The applicant argued that the only difficulty in the
case resulted from the fact that there had been several parties to
the proceedings. The applicant claimed that the court had failed to
exercise effective supervision of the experts, which had resulted in
undue delays. She pointed out that the intervals between the hearings
had been too long. Lastly, certain decisions to stay the proceedings
had been erroneous. She recalled that the court had refused the
parties’ request of 12 September 1995 to resume the proceedings
and that this decision had been quashed only on 15 February 1996 (see
paragraph 26 above). Further, the applicant claimed that the decision
of 19 September 1996 to stay the proceedings pending examination
of a motion for acquisition of the land by prescription had been
unsubstantiated, since this property had not constituted a part of
the estate covered by the proceedings at issue.
- The Court notes that the number of parties to the
proceedings and the death of some of them obviously increased the
complexity of the case, but that does not suffice to draw the
conclusion that the excessive length of the proceedings can be
explained by their complexity.
- The Court further reiterates that in civil proceedings
the parties too must show "due diligence" (see the Pretto
and Others judgment of 8 December 1983, Series A no. 71, pp.
14-15, para. 33) and that only delays attributable to the State may
justify a finding of a failure to comply with the "reasonable
time" requirement (see, among other authorities, Proszak
v. Poland, judgment of 16 December 1997, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1997 VIII, § 40; Ciricosta
and Viola v. Italy, judgment of 4 December 1995, Series A
no. 337-A, p. 10, § 28).
- In that connection, the Court considers that the
applicant did not contribute in any substantive manner to the
prolongation of the proceedings.
- As to the conduct of the authorities the Court
observes that in 1990 the Minister of Justice brought the case
under its administrative supervision, finding that the applicant’s
complaint about the length of the proceedings was justified. The
Court further observes that delays in the proceedings often resulted
from the slowness of the process of obtaining expert evidence.
- The Court does not share the Government’s view
that all the periods during which the proceedings were stayed should
be deducted from the overall length of the proceedings. It notes the
applicant’s argument, which the Government did not contest,
that the grounds for staying the proceedings were often
unsubstantiated (see paragraph 57 above). Having regard to the
applicant’s age, the Court cannot accept the Government’s
opinion that special diligence was not called for in the present case
(see, mutatis mutandis, Dewicka v. Poland, no.
38670/97, § 55, 4 April 2000).
- Lastly, the Court is of the view that the State cannot
be held responsible for the period after 18 November 2005, following
the parties’ request to stay the proceedings. Since that date
the domestic court had to abide by the parties’ wish regarding
the further continuation of the proceedings. Therefore, this period
should not be taken into consideration.
- Having examined all the material submitted to it and
having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The applicant claimed PLN 2,032,231
in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.
- The Government contested the claim.
- The Court does not discern any causal link between the
violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore
rejects this claim. On the other hand, the Court considers that the
applicant must have suffered non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an
equitable basis and having regard to its case-law in similar cases,
it awards him EUR 7,000 under that head.
B. Costs and expenses
- The applicant did not seek to be reimbursed for any
costs and expenses occurred in connection with the proceedings before
the Court.
C. Default interest
- The Court considers it appropriate that the default
interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final
in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, EUR 7,000 (seven thousands euros) in respect of
non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Polish zlotys at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be
chargeable;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.]
Done in English, and notified in writing on 24 October 2006, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
T.L. Early Nicolas
Bratza
Registrar President
