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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF
ANGEL ANGELOV v. BULGARIA
(Application
no. 51343/99)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
15
February 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Angel Angelov v. Bulgaria,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr P. Lorenzen, President,
Mrs S.
Botoucharova,
Mr V. Butkevych,
Mrs M.
Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
Mr R. Maruste,
Mr J. Borrego
Borrego,
Mrs R. Jaeger, judges,
and Mrs C. Westerdiek,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 22 January 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on the last mentioned
date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 51343/99) against the Republic
of Bulgaria lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Bulgarian national, Mr Angel Filipov Angelov
(“the applicant”), on 2 June 1999.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr M. Ekimdjiev, a lawyer practising in
Plovdiv. The Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their agent, Mrs M. Karadjova, of the Ministry of
Justice.
- The
applicant alleged, in particular, that he had been denied access to
the review (cassation) proceedings and that the criminal proceedings
against him were excessively lengthy.
- By
a decision of 1 September 2005, the Court declared the application
admissible.
- The
applicant and the Government each filed further written observations
(Rule 59 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Plovdiv.
- On 27 July 1993 the applicant, who was a taxi driver,
hit a pedestrian with his car. The applicant brought the victim to
the nearest hospital, where he died several days later despite the
efforts of the medical doctors.
- On
4 August 1993 or 20 October 1993 the applicant was charged with
involuntary manslaughter.
- On
an unspecified date in the beginning of 1994, after the completion of
the investigation, an indictment was submitted to the Plovdiv
Regional Court. The relatives of the victim joined the proceedings as
civil plaintiffs.
- After
a hearing, on 18 March 1994 the court convicted the applicant and
sentenced him to one year's imprisonment, suspended. The court also
ordered the suspension of the applicant's driving licence for two
years and ordered him to pay damages to the relatives of the victim.
- Upon
the applicant's appeal, on 10 June 1994 the Supreme Court quashed the
lower court's judgment and referred the case back for re examination
at the investigation stage, instructing the competent authorities to
commission a new expert report in order to clarify certain additional
facts.
- The
renewed investigation lasted until 5 December 1995 when a fresh
indictment was submitted to the Plovdiv Regional Court.
- By
judgment of 3 June 1997 the Regional Court convicted the applicant
and sentenced him to one year's imprisonment, suspended. The court
also ordered the suspension of the applicant's driving licence for
one year.
- On
10 June 1997 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of
Cassation.
- On
14 November 1997 the Supreme Court of Cassation, acting as a court of
appeal in a chamber of three judges, dismissed the appeal.
- On
6 May 1998 the applicant filed with the Plovdiv Regional Court a
petition for review (cassation), which would have fallen to be
examined by a five-member chamber of the Supreme Court of Cassation
in the transitional period following the 1998 legislative amendments
(see paragraph 20 below).
- On
an unspecified date the Plovdiv Regional Court transmitted the
petition and the case file to the Supreme Court of Cassation.
- On
24 March 1999 a judge of the Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed as
time-barred the petition for review (cassation) and ordered the
return of the case file back to the Regional Court. The order was
made on a standard form which stated that the petition for review had
been dismissed as time-barred, without mentioning any dates. The name
of the judge who issued the order was not indicated.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
- In
accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure and the practice,
appeals are filed with the registry of the court whose decision is
being appealed against. That court then transmits the appeal,
together with the case-file, to the higher court in which the power
to examine the appeal is vested.
- By
amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure published on 20 February
1998 and in force as of 1 April 1998, the system of appeals against
convictions and sentences was reformed. In accordance with
section 37 § 2 of the transitory provisions to the Act amending
the Code of Criminal Procedure, the time limit
for submission of a petition for review (cassation) against judgments
delivered prior to the amendment's entry into force was six months
from the date on which the judgment had become enforceable. Under
Article 371 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as in force
at the relevant time, appellate judgments upholding the first
instance judgment became enforceable on the date of delivery.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED DENIAL OF ACCESS TO THE REVIEW (CASSATION)
PROCEEDINGS
A. The parties' submissions
- The
applicant stated that the order of 24 March 1999 dismissing his
cassation appeal as time-barred had been erroneous as the appeal had
in fact been submitted within the relevant time-limit. The judge who
decided to dismiss the appeal might have taken into account the date
on which the petition for review had been transmitted from the
Plovdiv Regional Court to the Supreme Court of Cassation and not the
date on which it had been submitted by the applicant to the Plovdiv
Regional Court.
- The
applicant complained that as a result he had been denied access to
the review (cassation) proceedings and that he did not have an
effective remedy in this respect. He relied on Articles 6 and 13 of
the Convention.
- The
Government did not comment on the applicant's assertion that the
order of 24 March 1999 had been erroneous.
- They
stated, however, in submissions on the merits filed after the Court
declared the application admissible on 1 September 2005, that the
applicant had had the possibility to appeal against the order of 24
March 1999 but had failed to do so. The Government explained that in
Bulgarian law every decision terminating or suspending criminal
proceedings was amenable to appeal. It followed that the applicant
had had access to a procedure whereby he could have complained
against the dismissal of his appeal and that, therefore, his
complaints under Articles 6 and 13 of a violation of his right of
access to a court and alleged lack of effective remedies in this
respect were ill-founded.
- In
reply to the Government's objection, the applicant stated that the
order of 24 March 1999 had not been amenable to appeal as it had been
issued in proceedings before a five-member chamber of the Supreme
Court of Cassation, the highest judicial body. The general rule
mentioned by the Government concerned a possibility to appeal to “the
higher court”, whereas no higher authority existed in the case
at hand.
B. The Court's assessment
1. Legal characterisation of the complaint and the
Government's objection
- The
proceedings at issue in the present case concerned the determination
of a criminal charge against the applicant. Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention therefore applied. It is not necessary to establish
whether that provision also applied under its civil limb, the parties
not having clarified whether the applicant's cassation appeal
concerned the civil claim that had been brought in the criminal
proceedings against the applicant (see paragraphs 9, 10 and 16
above).
- As
the Court found in the admissibility decision in the present case
(Anguelov v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 51343/99, 1 September 2005),
the applicant's complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 §
1 of the Convention, the provision which guarantees the right of
access to a court. In so far as Article 13 is invoked in conjunction
with Article 6 (other than as regards its reasonable time
requirement), Article 6 is considered to be the lex specialis
(see, for example, Barry v. Ireland, no. 18273/04, § 29,
15 December 2005).
- In
so far as the Government's objection that the applicant had failed to
attempt an appeal against the order of 24 March 1999 may be
understood as a request to dismiss the application for failure to
exhaust domestic remedies, the Court observes that the Government did
not submit observations at the admissibility stage and raised their
objection for the first time in submissions on the merits. In
accordance with Rule 55 of the Rules of Court, any plea of
inadmissibility must, in so far as its character and the
circumstances permit, be raised by the respondent Contracting Party
in its observations on the admissibility of the application (see K.
and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702/94, § 145, ECHR 2001-VII
and N.C. v. Italy [GC], no. 24952/94, § 44, ECHR
2002-X).
- In
the present case, however, the Court considers that the Government's
objection also goes to the merits of the applicant's complaint as it
is an averment that the order of 24 March 1999 did not bar the
applicant's access to the review (cassation) proceedings, other legal
means to secure such access being allegedly available. The Court will
examine that question below, under Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
2. Merits of the complaint
- Article 6 § 1 of the Convention reads, so far as
relevant:
“In the determination ... of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a]
... tribunal established by law.”
- The Court reiterates that Article 6 of the Convention
does not compel the Contracting States to set
up courts of appeal or of cassation. However, where such
courts do exist, the guarantees of Article 6 must be complied with,
for instance in that it guarantees to litigants an effective right of
access to the courts (see, Brualla Gómez de la Torre v.
Spain, judgment of 19 December 1997, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1997-VIII, p. 2956, § 37 and Kozlica v.
Croatia, no. 29182/03, § 32, 2 November 2006).
- In
the present case the applicant had access to the review (cassation)
proceedings only to be told that his appeal was time-barred. Such
“access” of itself does not exhaust the requirements of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Ashingdane v. the United
Kingdom, judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A no. 93, p. 24, §§
56 and 57).
- By
dismissing the applicant's petition for review (cassation) on formal
grounds, the national court enforced the relevant provision setting
out a time-limit for instituting review (cassation) proceedings (see
paragraph 20 above). The applicant did not question the
time-limit as such but alleged that the judge who issued the order of
24 March 1999 had decided arbitrarily.
- The
Court reiterates at the outset that it is not its task to take the
place of the domestic courts. It is primarily for the national
authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of
interpretation of domestic legislation. The role of the Court is
limited to verifying whether the effects of such interpretation are
compatible with the Convention (see, Miragall Escolano and Others
v. Spain, no. 38366/97, §§ 33-39, ECHR 2000-I).
- The
right of access to a court by its very nature calls for regulation by
the State and may be subject to limitations. Nevertheless, the
limitations applied must not restrict the access left to the
individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence
of the right is impaired. A limitation will violate the Convention if
it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is not a reasonable
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the
aim sought to be achieved (see, among other authorities, Kreuz v.
Poland, no. 28249/95, §§ 52-57, ECHR 2001 VI and
Liakopoulou v. Greece, no. 20627/04, §§ 19-25, 24
May 2006).
- While
time-limits are in principle legitimate limitations on the right to a
court, the manner in which they were applied in a particular case may
give raise to a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see
Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, cited above).
- In
the present case the order of 24 March 1999 dismissing the
applicant's petition for review (cassation) as time-barred did not
contain reasons. It was made on a standard form which did not mention
any dates. In these circumstances, in order to ascertain whether or
not that decision impeded without justification the applicant's right
of access to the review (cassation) proceedings, the Court must make
its own assessment of the relevant facts. It transpires from the
material available to the Court that the relevant time-limit started
to run on 14 November 1997, the date of the appellate judgment, and
expired on 14 May 1998. The applicant filed his cassation appeal on 6
May 1998 (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above). The Court also notes that
in their submissions the Government did not dispute the applicant's
claim that the appeal had been filed in time.
- On
the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds it established with
sufficient certainty that the applicant had in fact submitted his
petition for review (cassation) within the relevant time-limit. The
order of 24 March 1999 dismissing the petition as time-barred cannot,
therefore, be seen as a justified enforcement of a legitimate
procedural limitation on the applicant's right of access to a court.
Moreover, the fact that the order did not indicate the dates on
which, according to the judge deciding the case, the relevant
time-limit had started to run and expired and the date on which the
appeal had been submitted (see paragraph 18 above) is difficult to
reconcile with Article 6 of the Convention, which, according to the
Court's established case-law, embodies as a principle linked to the
proper administration of justice, the requirement that court
decisions should adequately state the reasons on which they are based
(see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, §
26, ECHR 1999 I).
- It
is true that the Government argued that the applicant could have
gained access to the review (cassation) proceedings by filing an
appeal to a higher court against the order of 24 March 1999. The
Government's argument, however, was only based on a general principle
that decisions terminating criminal proceedings in Bulgaria are
amenable to appeal and was not supported by examples of relevant
practice (see paragraph 24 above). The Government did not explain
whether the possibility to appeal was available in respect of orders
issued – as in the applicant's case – by a judge in
proceedings before a five-member chamber of the Supreme Court of
Cassation, the highest judicial body, and did not clarify which was
the body to which the applicant could appeal. Nor did the Government
demonstrate the practicality of such an appeal under the transitory
provisions of the 1998 amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
applicable in the present case (see paragraph 20 above). However, the
right of access to court must not only be entrenched in law as a
principle but also secured with sufficient certainty in practice.
- The
Court finds, therefore, that there has been a violation of the
applicant's right of access to a court under Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention.
II. LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
A. The parties' submissions
- The
applicant stated that the relevant period started on 20 October 1993,
when he had been charged, and ended on 24 March 1999, when his
cassation appeal had been dismissed.
- The
applicant considered that the proceedings had not been legally or
factually complex and that following the judgment of 10 June 1994 the
prosecuting authorities had spent a year and half on the case despite
the fact that their only task had been to commission a fresh expert
report. Furthermore, the second trial had also been excessively
lengthy – one year and a half.
- The
Government stated that the relevant period began on 4 August
1993 when – according to the Government – the applicant
had been charged, and ended on 14 November 1997, the date of the
second appellate judgment.
- The
Government submitted that the preliminary investigation and the first
trial had been expeditious. Furthermore, the overall length of the
proceedings had not been excessive: the case had gone twice through
all stages, numerous acts of investigation had been carried out,
expert reports had been commissioned, other evidence had been
examined and the hearings had been held within reasonable intervals.
B. The Court's assessment
- The
Court observes that the date on which the applicant became aware of
the charges against him is unclear. Neither party has submitted the
relevant documents. The applicant stated that he had been charged on
20 October 1993, whereas the Government indicated that this had
taken place on 4 August 1993. In view of its conclusion below,
the Court considers that it can leave the question open.
- As
to the end of the period to be examined, the Court finds that the
relevant date is 24 March 1999, when the applicant's cassation appeal
was dismissed (see paragraph 18 above).
- The
proceedings thus lasted five years and five months or five years and
seven months and a half. The Court will assess the reasonableness of
the length of the proceedings in the light of the circumstances of
the case and having regard to the criteria laid down in its case-law,
in particular the complexity of the case and the conduct of the
applicant and of the relevant authorities (see Portington v.
Greece, judgment of 23 September 1998, Reports 1998-VI, p.
2630, § 21 and Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96,
§ 124, ECHR 2000-XI).
- On
the basis of the information submitted by the parties, the Court
considers that the case was not particularly complex.
- The
Court observes two periods during which delays imputable to the
authorities occurred. First, it notes that the renewed investigation
by the prosecuting authorities took one year and a half, from July
1994 till December 1995, a period which may be considered
unnecessarily lengthy in view of the fact that the prosecutors' task
during that time was merely to commission a new expert report and to
reassess the evidence on the basis of its conclusions (see paragraphs
11 and 12 above). Secondly, regarding the processing of the
applicant's petition for review (cassation), which was rejected on a
procedural ground without any reasoning nine months after it had been
submitted (see paragraphs 16-18 above), the Court takes into account
the fact that this occurred in a transitional period of procedural
reform (see paragraph 20 above), but considers that at least part of
the delay was imputable to the authorities, which are under a duty to
organise their legal system in such a way that the requirements of
Article 6 of the Convention are met (see Arvelakis v. Greece,
no. 41354/98, § 26, 12 April 2001).
- As
to the second trial before the Regional Court, which took up one year
and a half, until June 1997, the Court is unable to reach safe
conclusions as the parties failed to substantiate the relevant facts.
It notes, nonetheless, that the applicant did not object to the
Government's submission that expert reports had been commissioned,
other evidence had been examined and hearings had been held within
reasonable intervals.
- The
Court further observes that after the institution of the criminal
proceedings in 1993 the case went through the preliminary
investigation stage and two levels of court in a very short time,
until June 1994 (see paragraphs 8-11 above). The authorities
displayed a particular expeditiousness during that period. The
authorities also acted expeditiously in the examination of the
applicant's appeal against the Regional Court's judgment of 10 June
1997: the appellate judgment was delivered five months later, on 17
November 1997 (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above).
- The
Court also notes that the applicant filed his petition for review
(cassation) on 6 May 1998, almost six months after the delivery of
the appellate judgment of 14 November 1997 – a period which
cannot be imputed to the authorities (see paragraphs 15 and 16
above).
-
In sum, assessing all relevant factors, the Court is of the view that
in the circumstances of the present case the cumulative effect of the
delays imputable to the authorities is not sufficient to establish a
breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, the
Court attaches weight to the speedy examination of the case during
the first trial and in 1997 and to the global length of the
proceedings, which was not excessive as such. It thus finds that the
proceedings did not exceed a “reasonable time” within the
meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It follows that
there has been no violation of that provision.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 5,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage resulting from the dismissal of his cassation appeal. He
referred to awards made in other cases and also stated that the Court
should have regard to the fact that the last several years have seen
significant economic growth and concomitant growth in prices and
salaries in Bulgaria, which justified an award higher than the awards
made in similar Bulgarian cases decided several years ago.
- The
Government did not submit comments in one of the Court's official
languages, as required by Rule 34 § 4 of the Rules of Court.
- The
Court accepts that the unjustified denial of the applicant's right of
access to the cassation proceedings warrants an award in respect of
non-pecuniary damage. It considers, however, that the claim is
excessive. Deciding on an equitable basis, the Court awards EUR 800
in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant claimed EUR 1,190 in respect of 17 hours of legal work on
the case at the hourly rate of EUR 70. He also claimed EUR 38 in
postal and copying expenses. The applicant presented a legal fees
agreement between him and his lawyer, a time-sheet and postal
receipts. He requested that the award in respect of costs and
expenses be paid directly to his lawyer, Mr M. Ekimdjiev.
- The
Government did not submit comments in one of the Court's official
languages, as required by Rule 34 § 4 of the Rules of Court.
- The
Court considers that the number of hours claimed, having regard to
the low level of complexity of the case, is excessive. It also takes
into account the fact that no violation of the Convention was found
in respect of one of the two complaints submitted by the applicant.
The Court decides to award EUR 500 in respect of costs and expenses.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Dismisses the Government's preliminary
objection;
- Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (access to a court);
- Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (length);
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts:
(i) EUR
800 (eight hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR
500 (five hundred euros) in respect of costs and expenses, payable
into the applicant's lawyer's bank account;
(iii) any
tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 15 February 2007,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen
Registrar President
