BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you
consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £5, it
will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free
access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!
[New search]
[Contents list]
[Printable RTF version]
[Help]
THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF
YERANOSYAN AND OTHERS v. ARMENIA
(Application
no. 13916/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
20
July 2010
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Yeranosyan and
Others v. Armenia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Josep Casadevall,
President,
Elisabet Fura,
Boštjan M.
Zupančič,
Alvina Gyulumyan,
Ineta
Ziemele,
Luis López Guerra,
Ann Power,
judges,
and Santiago Quesada,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 29 June 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 13916/06) against the Republic
of Armenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by eight Armenian nationals, Mr Vahan Yeranosyan,
Mr Vardan Yeranosyan, Ms Ruzanna Yeranosyan, Mr Taron
Yeranosyan, Ms Syuzanna Yeranosyan, Mr Arsen Grigoryan, Ms Lilit
Grigoryan and Ms Siranush Khachatryan, (“the applicants”),
on 21 March 2006.
- The
applicants were represented by Mr G. Margaryan, a lawyer practising
in Yerevan. The Armenian Government (“the Government”)
were represented by their Agent, Mr G. Kostanyan, Representative of
the Republic of Armenia at the European Court of Human Rights.
- On
28 September 2007 the President of the Third Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicants were born in 1976, 1975, 1971, 2001, 2004, 1994, 1999 and
1978 respectively and live in Yerevan.
- According
to the applicants, they enjoyed a right of use of accommodation in
respect of a house which measured 60.2 sq. m and was situated at 15
Byuzand Street, Yerevan. The house was owned by their family member,
A.Y. The Government contested this allegation and claimed that only
the applicants Vahan Yeranosyan, Vardan Yeranosyan,
Ruzanna Yeranosyan and Siranush Khachatryan enjoyed such a
right, while the remaining applicants, who were minors, were only
entitled to live in the house in question.
- On
1 August 2002 the Government adopted Decree no. 1151-N, approving the
expropriation zones of the immovable property (plots of land,
buildings and constructions) situated within the administrative
boundaries of the Central District of Yerevan to be taken for the
needs of the State for the purpose of carrying out construction
projects, covering a total area of 345,000 sq. m. Byuzand Street was
listed as one of the streets falling within such expropriation zones.
- On
17 June 2004 the Government decided to contract out the construction
of one of the sections of Byuzand Street – which was to be
renamed Main Avenue – to a private company, Vizkon Ltd.
- On
1 October 2004 Vizkon Ltd and the Yerevan Mayor's Office signed an
agreement which, inter alia, authorised the former to
negotiate directly with the owners of the property subject to
expropriation and, should such negotiations fail, to institute court
proceedings on behalf of the State, seeking forced expropriation of
such property.
- It
appears that by a letter of 8 June 2005 Vizkon Ltd informed the
applicants that the house in question was situated within the
expropriation zone of the Main Avenue area and was to be taken for
State needs. It further appears that each applicant was offered USD
2,000 as compensation.
- It
appears that the applicants did not accept this offer.
- On
an unspecified date Vizkon Ltd instituted proceedings against the
applicants on behalf of the State, seeking to terminate their right
of use of accommodation and to have them evicted.
- On
30 June 2005 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan
(Երևան
քաղաքի Կենտրոն
և Նորք-Մարաշ
համայնքների
աոաջին ատյանի
դատարան) granted
the claim of Vizkon Ltd, terminating the applicants' right of use and
awarding each of them the Armenian dram equivalent of USD 2,000 in
compensation. In doing so, the court referred to Article 218 § 1
of the Civil Code.
- On
15 July 2005 the applicants lodged an appeal.
- On
8 August 2005 the Civil Court of Appeal (ՀՀ
քաղաքացիական
գործերով վերաքննիչ
դատարան) granted
the claim of Vizkon Ltd on the same grounds as the District Court.
- On
22 August 2005 the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law which
they supplemented on 19 September 2005.
- On
23 September 2005 the Court of Cassation (ՀՀ
վճռաբեկ դատարան)
dismissed the applicants' appeal.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
- For
a summary of the relevant domestic provisions related to the right of
use of accommodation see the judgment in the case of Minasyan and
Semerjyan v. Armenia (no. 27651/05, §§
36-43, 23 June 2009).
- Article
218 § 1 of the Civil Code, as in force at the material time,
provided that a plot of land might be taken from the owner for the
needs of the State or the community by compensating its value.
Depending on for whose needs a plot of land was to be taken, its
value was to be compensated by either the State or the community.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1
- The
applicants complained that the deprivation of their possessions was
in violation of the guarantees of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which
reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
A. The parties' submissions
- The
Government submitted that the applicants' complaint was incompatible
ratione materiae with the provisions of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1. In particular, the applicants did not have
possessions within the meaning of that Article, since they did not
have a right of ownership in respect of the house in question. The
sole owner of the house was a third person, A.Y., and the applicants
enjoyed only a right of use of accommodation in respect of the house,
which was equal to an entitlement to reside there and could not be
considered equivalent to “possessions”.
- Furthermore,
the applicants Taron Yeranosyan, Syuzanna Yeranosyan, Arsen
Grigoryan and Lilit Grigoryan did not enjoy independently even a
right of use because they were minors and enjoyed only the right to
live in the house together with their parents – the other
applicants – by virtue of Section 16 of the Children's Rights
Act. In sum, the applicants' complaint fell outside the scope of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
- The
applicants failed to submit their observations on the admissibility
and merits within the required time-limit.
B. The Court's assessment
1. Admissibility
- The
Court considers that the Government's objection regarding the
incompatibility of the applicants' complaint with the provisions of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is closely linked to the substance of
their complaint under that Article, and should be therefore joined to
the merits.
- The
Court notes that the applicants' complaint under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning
of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that
it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be
declared admissible.
2. Merits
(a) Whether there was an interference with
the applicants' possessions
- The
Court notes that the Government claimed that the applicants did not
have “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1. The Court points out, however, that it has
already found that the right of use of accommodation constituted a
“possession” within the meaning of that Article (see
Minasyan and Semerjyan v. Armenia,
cited above, § 56).
- As
regards specifically the applicants Taron Yeranosyan,
Syuzanna Yeranosyan, Arsen Grigoryan and Lilit Grigoryan, the
Court observes that the Government's claim has no basis in the
findings of the domestic courts, which found that all the applicants
enjoyed a right of use of accommodation and decided to terminate that
right through payment of compensation.
- The
Court concludes that all the applicants in the present case enjoyed a
right of use of accommodation in respect of the house in question and
the termination of that right for the purpose of implementing
construction projects in the centre of Yerevan amounted to an
interference with the applicants' peaceful enjoyment of their
possessions in the form of deprivation of property (ibid., §§
59 and 61). The Government's objection regarding the incompatibility
of the applicants' complaint with the provisions of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 must therefore be dismissed.
(b) Whether the interference with the
applicants' possessions was justified
- The
Court reiterates that the first and most important requirement of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is that any interference by a public
authority with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions should be
lawful: the second sentence of the first paragraph authorises
deprivation of possessions only “subject to the conditions
provided for by law” and the second paragraph recognises that
the States have the right to control the use of property by enforcing
“laws”. Moreover, the rule of law, one of the fundamental
principles of a democratic society, is inherent in all the Articles
of the Convention (see Former King of Greece and Others v. Greece
[GC], no. 25701/94, § 79, ECHR 2000-XII).
- The
Court further reiterates that the phrase “subject to the
conditions provided for by law” requires in the first place the
existence of and compliance with adequately accessible and
sufficiently precise and foreseeable domestic legal provisions (see
Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 8 July 1986,
§ 110, Series A no. 102; Hentrich v. France,
22 September 1994, § 42, Series A no. 296-A; and
Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96, § 109, ECHR
2000-I).
- The
Court notes that it has previously examined a complaint concerning
the termination of the right of use by the courts with reliance on
Article 225 of the Civil Code for the purpose of the implementation
of construction projects in the centre of Yerevan and found that such
interference with the applicants' possessions was arbitrary and
unlawful (see Minasyan and Semerjyan, cited above, §
75-76).
- The
Court observes that in the present case the applicants' right of use
in respect of the house in question was terminated by the courts for
the same purpose, albeit with reference to Article 218 § 1 of
the Civil Code. The Court notes, however, that this Article spoke
solely of the possibility of terminating the right of ownership in
respect of land and contained no mention whatsoever of terminating
the right of use of accommodation (see paragraph 18 above). Thus, it
appears that the applicants' right of use was terminated with
reliance on legal rules which were not applicable to their case. The
Court considers that such termination of their right of use was bound
to result in an unforeseeable or arbitrary outcome and must have
deprived the applicants of effective protection of their rights. It
therefore cannot but describe the interference with the applicants'
possessions on such a legal basis as arbitrary and unlawful (see,
mutatis mutandis, Minasyan and Semerjyan, cited above,
§ 75-76).
- This
conclusion makes it unnecessary to ascertain whether a fair balance
has been struck between the demands of the general interest of the
community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's
fundamental rights (see Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden,
23 September 1982, § 69, Series A no. 52, and Iatridis
v. Greece [GC], no. 31107/96, § 62, ECHR 1999-II).
- There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicants further complained that the deprivation of their
possessions amounted also to a violation of Article 8 of the
Convention and that the court proceedings were conducted in violation
of the fair trial guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention.
- Having
regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these
complaints fall within its competence, the Court finds that they do
not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms
set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part
of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded,
pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
- The
applicants submitted a claim for just satisfaction outside the
time-limit prescribed by the Court. Accordingly, the Court considers
that there is no call to award them any sum on that account (see, for
example, TV Vest AS and Rogaland
Pensjonistparti v. Norway, no.
21132/05, § 80, 11 December 2008, and Maruszak
v. Poland, no. 11253/07, §
62, 7 July 2009).
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Decides to join to the merits the Government's
objection concerning the incompatibility of the applicants' complaint
under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 with the provisions of that Article
and to dismiss it;
- Declares the complaint concerning the
deprivation of the applicants' possessions admissible under Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
1 of the Protocol No. 1;
- Holds that there is no call to award the
applicants any sum for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 July 2010, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Santiago Quesada Josep Casadevall
Registrar President
