BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] | ||
European Court of Human Rights |
||
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> TAYANKO v. RUSSIA - 4596/02 [2010] ECHR 1267 (2 September 2010) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2010/1267.html Cite as: [2010] ECHR 1267 |
[New search] [Contents list] [Printable RTF version] [Help]
FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF TAYANKO v. RUSSIA
(Application no. 4596/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
2 September 2010
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Tayanko v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Peer Lorenzen, President,
Karel Jungwiert,
Anatoly Kovler,
Rait Maruste,
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Ganna Yudkivska, judges,
and Stephen Phillips, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 6 July 2010,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Ryazan.
5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
A. Proceedings for allocation of a flat
10. On appeal, the Ryazan Regional Court upheld the judgment on 13 September 2000.
B. First round of the supervisory review proceedings
17. On 10 August 2001 the Supreme Court of Russia held a supervisory review hearing in the presence of a representative of the defendant, the Ryazan Town Administration, and a prosecutor of the Prosecutor General’s Office, who argued that the applicant should be provided with a flat in accordance with the order of precedence on the waiting list for improvement of housing conditions. Having heard the defendant’s representative and the prosecutor and having examined the facts of the case, the Supreme Court modified the judgment of the Sovetskiy District Court of Ryazan of 5 July 2000 and held that the applicant was to be provided with a flat in accordance with the order of precedence on the waiting list.
C. Second round of the supervisory review proceedings
28. On 16 February 2005 the applicant moved in that flat with his family.
D. Proceedings for damages
31. It appears that the applicant did not comply with the court’s order.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION AND OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 ON ACCOUNT OF SUPERVISORY REVIEW
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. [...]”
A. Admissibility
34. The Government asserted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim as the Presidium decision of 10 August 2001, which had allegedly been taken in violation of the principle of legal certainty, was quashed on 12 November 2003, and that a court judgment in civil proceedings, acknowledging an alleged breach of the Convention rights, may constitute in itself sufficient redress (Enders v. Germany, no. 25040/94, Commission decision of 12 April 1996; Katayeva and Katayev v. Russia (dec.), no. 45550/99, 6 July 2004).
B. Merits
1. Article 6 of the Convention
(a) Supervisory review: legal certainty
39. The Government argued that the first set of re-trial proceedings had been compatible with the Convention since the Presidium had only changed the way of enforcement, but not the judgment of 5 July 2000 in substance. The applicant maintained his complaint.
40. The Court reiterates that for the sake of legal certainty implicitly required by Article 6, final judgments should generally be left intact. They may be disturbed only to correct fundamental errors. The mere possibility of there being two views on the subject is not a ground for re‑examination (see Ryabykh, cited above, §§ 51-52).
41. The Court reiterates that it has frequently found violations of the principle of legal certainty and of the right to a court in the supervisory‑review proceedings governed by the Code of Civil Procedure in force before 2003 (see, among other authorities, Ryabykh, cited above, §§ 51-56; Volkova v. Russia, no. 48758/99, §§ 34-36, 5 April 2005; Roseltrans v. Russia, no. 60974/00, §§ 27-28, 21 July 2005).
42. In the present case the final and binding judgment was amended to the applicant’s detriment on 10 August 2001 upon an application by a State official, who was not a party to the case. Furthermore, no fundamental error has been demonstrated by the Government to justify the modification of this final and binding judgment. The Presidium’s disagreement with the assessment made by the inferior court is not in itself an exceptional circumstance warranting the modification of the judgment to the applicant’s detriment (see Kot v. Russia, no. 20887/03, § 29, 18 January 2007).
43. The Government’s assertion that on 10 August 2001 the Presidium had not changed the substance of the judgment of 5 July 2000, is not persuasive. The Court observes that the judgment of 5 July 2000 presupposed that the applicant should have been provided with housing immediately (as later reaffirmed by the Presidium on 12 November 2003, see paragraph 24 above). The amendment made on 10 August 2001 entailed necessity to comply with the order of precedence. Apparently there is a difference between an immediate and a conditioned order to provide housing (see Zheleznyakovy v. Russia (dec.), no. 3180/03, ECHR 15 March 2007). Hence that amendment frustrated the applicant’s reliance on this final and binding judgment and his legitimate expectation to receive housing without delay.
44. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
(b) Supervisory review: procedural issues
45. As to the alleged violation of the applicant’s procedural rights in the supervisory review proceedings, the Court considers that given the finding of a violation by the very use of supervisory review, it is unnecessary to examine this complaint (see Ryabykh, cited above, § 59).
2. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
46. The Court considers that the applicant’s claim to a “social tenancy agreement” was sufficiently established in the judgment of 5 July 2000 to constitute a “possession” falling within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Malinovskiy v. Russia, no. 41302/02, § 46, ECHR 2005‑VII (extracts)). The judgment thus created an asset within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Vasilopoulou v. Greece, no. 47541/99, § 22, 21 March 2002, and Malinovskiy, cited above, § 43). As a result of the first set of re-trial proceedings the applicant, a disabled person residing with his wife and two daughters in a 11 square metres’ hostel room (see paragraphs 7 and 24 above), could not, for a significant period of time, rely on and benefit from the final judgment of 5 July 2000 as to his immediate provision of housing (see, mitatis mutandis, Dovguchits v. Russia, no. 2999/03, § 35, 7 June 2007).
47. Accordingly, there has also been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION AND OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 ON ACCOUNT OF NON-ENFORCEMENT
49. The Government argued that the period of non-enforcement was short and there were no periods of the authorities’ inactivity.
51. The Court observes that the judgment of 5 July 2000 remained unenforced for more than four years and that the major part of this delay was due to the modification of this judgment via the first round of supervisory review. Given its finding of violation of the right to court on account of supervisory review (see paragraphs 40-44 above) the Court does not consider it necessary to examine separately the issue of non‑enforcement of the same judgment.
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
54. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
56. He also claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
57. The Government contested the claims.
1. Pecuniary damage
2. Non-pecuniary damage
B. Costs and expenses
63. The applicant also claimed RUB 175,000 for the costs and expenses.
64. The Government contested the claim as unsubstantiated.
C. Default interest
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaints concerning modification, to the applicant’s detriment, of the final judgment of 5 July 2000 via supervisory review and its non-enforcement admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of modification, to the applicant’s detriment, of the final judgment of 5 July 2000 via supervisory review;
3. Holds that there is no need to examine the complaints under Article 6 of the Convention concerning non-enforcement of that judgment and the alleged violation of the applicant’s procedural rights in the supervisory review proceedings;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 2,328 (two thousand three hundred twenty eight euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(iii) EUR 300 (three hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 September 2010, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stephen Phillips Peer Lorenzen Deputy Registrar President