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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF STAMATIS v. GREECE
(Application
no. 41582/08)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
13 January
2011
This
judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision
In the case of Stamatis v. Greece,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a
Committee composed of:
Anatoly
Kovler,
President,
Elisabeth
Steiner,
Sverre
Erik Jebens, judges,
and André Wampach, Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 9 December 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 41582/08) against the Hellenic
Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Greek national, Mr Panagiotis Stamatis (“the
applicant”), on 1st August 2008.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr Ch. Chrysanthakis, a lawyer
practising in Athens. The Greek Government (“the Government”)
were represented by their Agent's delegate, Mr
K. Georghiadis, Senior Adviser at the State Legal Council.
- On
1st September 2009 the President of the First Section
decided to communicate the complaint concerning the length of the
proceedings to the Government and, in due
course, the admissibility and merits of the case to be considered
together according to Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, as it
was in force at the time. In accordance with Protocol no. 14,
the application was allocated to a Committee of three Judges.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant is a retired military officer and
lives in Athens.
- On 31 January 2003 he lodged a recourse with the Athens
Administrative Court of Appeal seeking the annulment of a
presidential decree dated 26 November 2002, according to which
compulsory retirement was ordered, because he had been found to be
incapable of working, due to health problems. The
applicant also challenged the legality of the medical opinion given
by the members of the military committee who had evaluated his
physical abilities.
- On 10 February 2006 the
Administrative Court of Appeal dismissed his recourse. First,
the court held that the applicant's allegations regarding the
legality of the medical opinion given by
the members of the military committee had to be rejected as
inadmissible because, under the national
legislation, the applicant had to exhaust a preliminary
administrative procedure before having recourse to a court. Moreover,
the court found that the decree in question was well reasoned
(judgment no. 214/2006).
- On 14 July 2006 the applicant
lodged an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court.
- On 3 April 2008 the Supreme
Administrative Court upheld the findings of the Administrative
Court of Appeal. In particular it found that the appellate court had
rightly declared inadmissible a part of the applicant's allegations
on the ground that he had not used the preliminary
administrative remedy. Further, it was
pointed out that the medical opinions in question had been brought to
the applicant's notice in good time so that he could lodge
an application with the responsible administrative authority.
Finally, the court ruled that the Court of Appeal had adequately
reasoned its findings concerning the legality of the abovementioned
presidential decree (judgment no.
1148/2008).
The judgment was finalised on 12 June 2008.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF PROCEEDINGS
- The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
- The
Government contested that argument.
- The
period to be taken into consideration began on 31 January 2003 when
the applicant lodged a recourse with the Administrative Court of
Appeal and ended on 12 June 2008, when judgment no. 1148/2008 of the
Supreme Administrative Court became final. It
thus lasted more than five years and four months for two levels of
jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above).
- Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1 in this regard.
II. OTHER
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
- Firstly,
the applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the
rejection of one of his allegations as inadmissible infringed his
right of access to court. Moreover,
he argued that in general the domestic courts' judgments were not
well reasoned. Finally, he complained that, because of the alleged
shortcomings in the procedure, his allegations were not effectively
addressed by the courts.
- The
Court recalls that, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the
right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the
admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are
therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the
national courts. In particular, it is not the Court's function
to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national
court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and
freedoms protected by the Convention (see, among many others,
García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28 29,
ECHR 1999 I).
18. In
this case, the complaints
raised by the applicant
regarding procedural unfairness are of a fourth instance nature. In
particular, throughout the proceedings, the applicant was
fully able to state his case and there is nothing in the case-file to
indicate that the taking and the assessment of the evidence was
arbitrary or the proceedings were otherwise unfair to raise an issue
under Article 6. Moreover, the judgments of the Administrative Court
of Appeal and the Supreme Administrative Court
were sufficiently reasoned. Finally,
the Court finds
no appearance of a violation of Article 6 § 1 as regards the
right of access to court. Indeed, through this complaint, the
applicant appears to be reiterating his claim regarding the reasoning
of the judicial decisions in question.
- In
view of the abovementioned, the applicant's complaints are therefore
manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected under Article 35 §§
3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
- The
applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly,
the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on
that account.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds that there is no call to award the
applicant just satisfaction.
Done
in English, and notified in writing on 13 January 2011, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
André Wampach Anatoly Kovler
Deputy Registrar President
