THIRD SECTION
CASE OF BEDNÁR
v. SLOVAKIA
(Application no.
64023/09)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
8 October 2013
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Bednár v. Slovakia,
The European Court of Human
Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Luis
López Guerra, President,
Ján Šikuta,
Nona Tsotsoria, judges,
and Marialena Tsirli, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 17 September 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an
application (no. 64023/09) against the Slovak
Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovak national, Mr Viktor Bednár (“the applicant”), on 26
November 2009.
The applicant was
represented by Mr A. Slamka, a lawyer practising in Dolný Kubín.
The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Ms M. Pirošíková.
On 15 February 2011 the application was
communicated to the Government.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Trstená.
A. Action and counter-claim
On 7 January 2005 the applicant lodged an action against
two individuals with the Dolný Kubín District Court seeking an order for
payment of an amount of money by way of compensation in respect of what he
considered to have been unjustified use of his real property.
On 1 October 2007 the District Court heard the
case for the first time, but the hearing was adjourned and, on 1 January 2008,
the case was transferred to the Námestovo District Court in the context of
reorganisation of the judiciary.
On 13 May 2009 the case was heard for the second
time and the defendant lodged a counter-claim seeking a ruling declaring him to
be the owner of the property in question.
Subsequently, the applicant’s action was stayed
pending the outcome of the proceedings on the counter-claim, which was
eventually dismissed with final and binding effect as of 12 December 2011.
Between 12 December 2011 and 16 May 2012 the
District Court held four hearings, the applicant provided further and better
particulars of his claim, and submitted new evidence.
On 30 January 2013 the District Court appointed
an expert to draw up a report on the market value of the compensation to
be paid for the use of the property in question. On 12 April 2013 a new expert
was appointed because it had turned out that the previous expert was related to
the lawyer of the defendants.
The proceedings are still pending.
B. Complaint to the President of the District Court
On 25 May 2009 the applicant lodged a complaint
with the President of the Námestovo District Court about the length of the proceedings.
In a letter of reply dated 26 June 2009 the
President of the District Court observed that no procedural steps had been
taken in the action in 2008 and acknowledged that this amounted to unjustified
delay. However, as at that time the proceedings were lawfully stayed, ensuring
their acceleration was not practicable.
C. Constitutional complaint
On 13 July 2009 the applicant lodged a complaint
under Article 127 of the Constitution with the Constitutional Court
contesting the length of the proceedings in his action both before the Dolný
Kubín District Court and the Námestovo District Court.
On 29 September 2009 the Constitutional Court declared
the complaint inadmissible on a number of grounds. It noted first that the
action had been dealt with at first instance by two different District Courts.
While the applicant had not raised a complaint about any possible delays before
the Dolný Kubín District Court with the President of that court at all, he had
lodged his constitutional complaint too early after the response of the
President of the Námestovo District Court. By doing so, the applicant had failed
to allow the President of the Námestovo District Court sufficient time to
ensure acceleration of the proceedings. Moreover, as the proceeding before the
Dolný Kubín District Court had ended prior to the introduction of the applicant’s
constitutional complaint, its part concerning the Dolný Kubín District Court
was belated. Lastly, as the case had been pending before the Námestovo District
Court only since 1 January 2008, the length of the proceedings before that
court was not sufficient to pose any issues under the “reasonable time”
requirement.
In closing, the Constitutional Court observed that nothing
precluded the applicant from raising a fresh constitutional complaint later.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 6 § 1 AND 13 OF
THE CONVENTION
The applicant complained that the length of the
proceedings in his action had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement
and that it had been impossible for him to obtain redress at the national level
in that respect, in violation of Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention, which
read as follows:
Article 6 § 1:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,
everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ...
tribunal...”
Article 13:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the]
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national
authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity.”
A. Admissibility
The Government argued that the applicant had had
at his disposal effective remedies, which he had failed to exhaust. In that
respect, they advanced two separate lines of argument.
First, the Government contended that, before introducing his
constitutional complaint, the applicant had failed to raise the issue of the
length of the proceedings before the Dolný Kubín District Court with the
President of that court and to allow the President of the Námestovo District
Court sufficient time to remedy the situation.
Second, the Government argued that the applicant had failed to
seek redress in respect of the alleged violation of his Article 6 rights by way
of an action for damages under the State Liability Act.
Apart from that the Government accepted that the
length-of-proceedings complaint was not manifestly ill-founded.
The applicant disagreed and reiterated his
complaint.
The Court observes that in its judgments in the
cases of Ištván and Ištvánová v. Slovakia (no. 30189/07, §§ 52 - 55, 63
- 99 and 106, 12 June 2012) and Komanický v. Slovakia (no. 6) (no.
40437/07, §§ 51 - 54, 60 - 96 and 102, 12 June 2012) it
examined at length and ultimately dismissed substantially the same objections
as the Government raises in the present case. As a matter of principle, it
finds no reasons for reaching a different conclusion now.
Moreover, the Court considers that the
problematic nature of the complaint to the president of the given court, as an
intended requirement for the admissibility of the constitutional complaint, is
highlighted in cases such as the present one where the proceedings have taken
place before several different courts. In particular, this requirement in such
cases implies a separation of the proceedings into segments taking place
before the courts involved, which is not conducive to the covering of the
overall length of such proceedings in accordance with the Court’s case-law
(see Sika v. Slovakia (No. 7) [Committee], no. 1640/07,
§§ 32-34, 25 June 2013).
In addition, the Court observes that there has been
a certain incongruity between the position taken by the President of the
Námestovo District Court (see paragraph 13 above) and the conclusions of the
Constitutional Court (see paragraph 15 above). In particular, while the former
appears to have concluded that no acceleration of the proceedings could be
ensured because at that time they were stayed, the latter concluded that the
applicant had failed to allow the President of the District Court sufficient
time to ensure their acceleration.
Lastly, the Court observes that the
Constitutional Court also relied on further reasons for rejecting the applicant’s
complaint. In particular, it divided the proceedings into two segments
according to the courts involved and concluded that, as the proceedings before
the Dolný Kubín had ended prior to the introduction of the constitutional
complaint, the relevant part of the applicant’s constitutional complaint was
belated. At the same time, it concluded that the length of the proceedings
before the Námestovo District Court was not sufficient to raise any issue under
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In doing so, the Constitutional
Court did not seem to have examined the overall length of the proceedings (see,
a contrario, Bako v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 60227/00, 15
March 2005).
For reasons the Government’s objections must be dismissed.
The period to be taken into consideration began
on 7 January 2005 and has not yet ended It has thus lasted more than eight and
a half years for a single level of jurisdiction involving two different
District Courts, with the proceedings having been stayed for more than two and
a half years pending the outcome of the defendants’ counter-claim.
The Court notes that the application is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of
the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of
the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the
case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at
stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender
v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The Court has frequently found violations of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in
the present case (see Frydlender, cited above).
Having examined all the material submitted to
it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or
argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the
present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed
to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
Furthermore, in view of the conclusions reached
above as regards exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of the complaint
under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the Court finds that
there has likewise been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there
has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The applicant claimed 30,000 euros (EUR) in
respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The Government contested the claim as
overstated.
The Court considers that the applicant must have
sustained non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards
award him EUR 5,500 under that head.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant also claimed EUR 707.41 for legal
fees and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and before the Court.
The Government referred to the Court’s case-law
on the subject, in particular to its judgment in the case of Young, James
and Webster v. the United Kingdom ((Article 50), 18 October 1982, § 15,
Series A no. 55) and requested that the matter be considered accordingly.
Under the Court’s case-law, an applicant is
entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has
been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are
reasonable as to quantum (see, for example, Iatridis v. Greece (just
satisfaction) [GC], no. 31107/96, § 54, ECHR 2000-XI). Furthermore, Rule
60 § 2 of the Rules of Court provides that itemised particulars of any claim
made under Article 41 of the Convention must be submitted, together
with the relevant supporting documents or vouchers, failing which the Court may
reject the claim in whole or in part.
In the instant case, the Court observes that the
applicant has not substantiated his claim with any relevant supporting
documents establishing that he was under an obligation to pay the costs of
legal services and administrative expenses or that he has actually paid them.
Accordingly, the Court does not award any sum under this head
(see Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v. Romania [GC], no. 33348/96, §§
133-134, ECHR 2004-XI).
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the
application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 13 of the Convention;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months, EUR 5,500 (five thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax
that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the
remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 8 October 2013,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Marialena Tsirli Luis
López Guerra
Deputy Registrar President
