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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> P (A Child), Re [2001] EWCA Civ 297 (12 February 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/297.html Cite as: [2001] EWCA Civ 297

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE STOKE ON TRENT COUNTY COURT
(His Honour Judge Mitchell)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Monday, 12th February 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE THORPE: This is a very sad case which was initiated by the local authority because of concerns for the future of a little baby, F, who is still really only a baby, but the concerns led to the initiation by the Cheshire County Council of proceedings in relation to F which culminated in an order of 18th August 2000 freeing F for adoption. Both her parents have fragile health. Each of them has a psychiatric history, and the view of the court was that neither of them was able to offer F any sort of sufficiently secure future.
2. One of the issues considered by the judge in his judgment of 18th August was the relationship between F's mother, A, and her own mother, Mrs R. The judge had a lot of evidence to suggest that the relationship between mother and daughter was in part causative of A's frailty. But Mrs R does not accept that and has never accepted that. So it is perhaps not surprising that she sought to intervene in the proceedings. She made an application to the court for party status with a view to putting herself forward as a carer for F and, if that application did not succeed, for having direct and continuing contact. That application was refused by the judge, although seemingly no order was drawn in the county court to give effect to his judgment. However, there is a clear record of the judgment which he gave in the Stoke on Trent County Court on 23rd May, and that shows that he gave unusual time and care to the determination of the application.
3. The application was opposed by the local authority and by the guardian ad litem, and the judge took the relatively unusual course of hearing or accepting oral evidence from Mrs R in furtherance of her application. She was at that hearing represented by counsel. The judge considered the application for party status with care, and he reasoned that, as a consequence of Mrs R's extremely inconsistent reaction, there would be real dangers in giving her access to all the case papers. Her application was equally opposed by A and her husband who did not wish Mrs R to have access to their personal records. Although Mrs R challenged everything that the guardian asserted, the judge could not accept that it was all without foundation. He accordingly concluded that there was no need for her to be brought into the proceedings. It would be of no benefit to the court and, more importantly, of no benefit to F.
4. In relation to her application for a residence order, the judge noted that even her own counsel conceded that that application was unrealistic. In relation to the application for contact, he remarked on the very poor relationship between Mrs R and her son-in-law, as well as the professional concern as to the relationship between Mrs R and her daughter. He concluded that contact would be unworkable if F were placed with either of her parents and equally unworkable were she placed for adoption, since Mrs R would never support an adopted placement. For all those reasons the applications were refused.
5. Any independent observer would say that the order of 18th August was likely to be the last order in the case. It was really a final order insofar as orders ever are final in relation to children, but an application for permission was lodged by A and that came on for hearing on 7th November. A did not appear to pursue the application and I refused to hear Mrs R pursue the application in her stead, so the application for permission was refused, and that obviously confirmed and buttressed the order of 18th August.
6. However, on 15th December this court received an application from Mrs R for permission to appeal the order of 23rd May. Whilst I can fully understand the strength of her feelings and her sense of desperation, the fact is that by the date that application was received F had been placed in her new family, and any further attempt to re-open the litigation was manifestly doomed to failure. The application was put before me on paper and, in an endeavour to save Mrs R the expense and the effort of attending an oral hearing, I simply explained that the application for permission was hopeless. It was incurably out of time and, in any event, the decision of the judge on 23rd May was manifestly within his discretionary field. Mrs R has not felt able to accept that conclusion and she has asked for an oral hearing. She has come to London this afternoon and she has explained her feelings. I can understand that from her perspective this is an absolutely tragic development in a family which prides itself on its longevity and on its capacity to cope. But the function of this court is a limited function. We have to operate in accordance with the rules. We have to operate consistently in giving equal treatment to all. It is impossible for Mrs R to expect that the sort of heartfelt plea that she makes to me will overcome the reality of the chronology which I have unfolded. If permission were granted to Mrs R simply because she feels herself the victim of injustice, no application for permission would ever fail. This court would be completely weighed down to breaking point by the need to hear appeals which have absolutely no realistic prospect of success. I have no alternative but to dismiss the application. I do so without the smallest hesitation, although I recognize that from Mrs R's perspective it will be just another incomprehensible outcome.
Order: Application refused.