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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Deansgate Insurance Services v Khan [2001] EWCA Civ 85 (25 January 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/85.html Cite as: [2001] EWCA Civ 85

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM MANCHESTER COUNTY COURT
(His Honour Judge Tetlow)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		Thursday, 25th January 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE MAY: This is an application by the defendant, Mr Khan, for permission to appeal against an order of His Honour Judge Tetlow in the Manchester County Court on 17th January 2000. The judge dismissed Mr Khan's appeal against an order of Deputy District Judge Coffey on 13th November 1998, under which the deputy district judge dismissed both the claim and counterclaim in these proceedings.
2. Earlier this week Mr Khan wrote to the court, having been told that today was fixed for the hearing of his application, to request that it should be listed in the afternoon. I acceded to that request, bearing in mind that he would have to come from Manchester, and accordingly the matter was listed at two o'clock today. Mr Khan has not appeared, but I have just this minute been handed a letter in which he acknowledges the letter of 22nd January from the court informing him of today's appointment and says that this is a clash with an appointment in the local court. There is no detail about that at all. It seems to me that in the circumstances, when only earlier this week Mr Khan was asking for the hearing to be fixed in the afternoon and we have done exactly what he asked, that letter, bare as it is, provides no proper basis for not proceeding to deal with the matter. Accordingly, I shall do so.
3. If permission were to be granted, this would be a second appeal, to which section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 applies. Section 55 provides:

"(1)Where an appeal is made to a county court or the High Court in relation to any matter, and on hearing the appeal the court makes a decision in relation to that matter, no appeal may be made to the Court of Appeal from that decision unless the Court of Appeal considers that -

(a)the appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice, or

(b)there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it."

4. Equivalent provisions are to be found in rule 52.13 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
5. The papers which the court has do not make every detailed fact entirely clear. But that does not, in my view, disable me from reaching a clear conclusion that this application should be refused.
6. The claimant is an insurance broker. In 1990 the defendant, Mr Khan, took out motor insurance through the claimant, which was renewable on 8th March each year. The defendant over the years made two claims under the policy. One concerned an accident on 2nd November 1993, which is not central to the case. The second involved an accident on 12th December 1995. There appears to have been initially a dispute as to liability for this accident. The defendant paid a renewal premium for the year beginning March 1996 of £120.95. However, on 30th October 1996 the claimant wrote to say that, because of a pending claim (no doubt that referable to the accident on 12th December 1995), the insurance company had applied a 50% premium loading "in view of there being more than one fault claim within the last 3 years". The claimant asked for a further premium payment of £60.48. The defendant wrote on 1st November 1996 disputing the additional premium and saying that there was no fault claim so far. He said that the latest case was in the court, subject to the court's decision. He did not pay the additional premium.
7. Time came round in 1997 for the renewal of the policy. On 27th February 1997 the claimant sent the defendant a renewal notice asking for a premium for the year from 8th March 1997 of £236.78. A handwritten note also asked for payment of the outstanding £60 and said that the no claims bonus proof would be withheld until that payment was paid. The defendant in these circumstances decided to obtain his insurance elsewhere, but was obliged to pay the £60 before the claimant would provide proof of his no claims bonus to his new insurers. He made a cheque out for £60, dated 18th March 1997, and handed it over upon an undertaking by the claimant to pay the £60 back if the decision concerning the 1995 accident was in his favour. The defendant then obtained insurance from other insurers starting on 22nd March 1997. He had therefore had no motor-car insurance for the period between 8th March and 22nd March 1997. On 24th March 1997 the defendant countermanded his cheque, which was not honoured.
8. The claimant therefore started these proceedings claiming the £60.48. The defendant filed a defence and counterclaim, essentially claiming damages for loss of the use of his car between 8th March and 22nd March 1997 and for the increase in his premiums when he changed insurers. At some stage it emerged from the court proceedings that the defendant was not held responsible for the 1995 accident, and at some point in time (which is not entirely clear) this fact became known to the claimant in the context of the present proceedings.
9. There were various interlocutory proceedings, the details of which do not matter. On 13th November 1998 Deputy District Judge Coffey dismissed the claimant's claim and dismissed the defendant's counterclaim. It appears that the essential basis on which he dismissed the claim was that by then it had been established that the defendant was not at fault for the 1995 accident and that accordingly the additional premium for 1996 of £60.48 was not payable or, alternatively, that sum was repayable upon the claimant's undertaking. It appears that the essential basis on which the deputy district judge dismissed the counterclaim was that, at the time when the claimants were demanding the £60 and withholding information about the defendant's no claims bonus, it had not been established (or, alternatively, they did not know) that the defendant was not at fault for the 1995 accident. It appears that the deputy district judge held, therefore, that there was no proper basis for the counterclaim.
10. On 17th January 2000 His Honour Judge Tetlow heard the defendant's appeal and dismissed it. He held that the deputy district judge did not misconduct himself or the proceedings and that he made no error of law. The judge held, in substance, that the basis for dismissing the counterclaim, which I have described, was a proper one.
11. The proposed grounds of appeal are in these terms:

"1.The District Judge Mr Coffey was wrong to treat the claimant only as a broker and not insurer who was supposed to take action against the defendant. Thus the claimant's action is scandalous.

2.Insurance did not run from 8.3.96 as mentioned by Mr Coffey.

3.Cheque was not paid on 8.3.97 but on 18.3.97.

4.Cheque is treated as cash provided its demand is not illegal.

5.Half of the file was missing at the time of the hearing on 17.1.00.

6.The defendant's comments dated 18.2.99 regarding Mr Coffey's misconduct was missing from the court's file and its copy was taken from the defendant's file after the hearing.

7.The points of law were not recognised by the lower court.

8.The defendant repeats its reasons and written pleadings.

The defendant was supplied by the court with the district judge's notes very late."

12. In my judgment, Mr Khan has entirely failed to show that his proposed appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice or that there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. On the contrary, it seems to me that the decisions below were entirely reasonable and sustainable in law and that the proposed grounds of appeal do not raise any proper basis for giving permission to appeal. One only needs to read them to see that, in substance, they do not contain any proper reason why the deputy district judge's decision was wrong or why the judge's decision in upholding that decision was wrong.
13. Accordingly, in my judgment, this application for permission should be dismissed.
Order: application dismissed.