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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> The Brain Disorders Research Ltd Partnership v Revenue And Customs [2018] EWCA Civ 2348 (31 October 2018) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2018/2348.html Cite as: [2018] EWCA Civ 2348, [2018] STC 2382, [2018] BTC 44 |
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UPPER TRIBUNAL (TAX AND CHANCERY CHAMBER)
MR JUSTICE BIRSS AND JUDGE COLIN BISHOPP
[2017] UKUT 176 (TCC)
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
LORD KITCHIN
and
LORD JUSTICE FLOYD
____________________
THE BRAIN DISORDERS RESEARCH LIMITED PARTNERSHIP |
Appellant |
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- and - |
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THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY'S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS |
Respondent |
____________________
Kevin Prosser QC and David Yates (instructed by the General Counsel and Solicitor to HM Revenue and Customs) for the Respondents
Hearing date : 26 July 2018
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Crown Copyright ©
See ORDER at bottom of this judgment.
Lord Justice Patten :
Introduction
"6. The original objective of the tax planning was to identify an area of scientific research where the cost of a conventional research programme would be approximately 100, but where the technology, expertise, systems and data bank held by one particular company, would enable the relevant research to be undertaken and accomplished by that unique company for a vastly lesser sum, albeit that the company in question would retain 90% of any net royalties derived from the work programme to reflect the value of its special expertise, data bank etc held prior to the commencement of the research.
7. Without referring to the full detail of how the scheme might have proceeded, the original scheme envisaged that the partnership would pay 100 to a special purpose vehicle or SPV (in fact the Jersey company owned by a charitable trust, Numology Limited ("Numology"), that performed roughly this role in the Vaccine Research scheme). The 100 was said to be the reasonably verified amount that various third-party providers would have charged for undertaking the research work in the then conventional manner. Under the contract under which the Partnership paid the 100 to Numology, Numology contracted to undertake the work itself or through the identified sub-contractor, namely the company with the special expertise, systems and data bank referred to in the previous paragraph. That company was the Australian company, BRC Operations Pty Limited ("BRC"). In a research sub-contract, Numology then paid 6 to BRC to undertake the work programme that Numology had undertaken to perform or procure for the Partnership. The further terms of this arrangement were that BRC had licenced its existing intellectual property, its patents and knowhow, in relation to the relevant area of scientific research, namely treatments for certain brain disorders, to Numology, and indirectly to the partnership for £1, and that had then been licensed back by the Partnership, first to Numology in return for a combination of fixed royalties and fluctuating royalties, and then sub-licensed by Numology to BRC in return simply for fluctuating royalties equal to 10% of the net royalties eventually derived from the improved and enhanced intellectual property following the work programme undertaken by BRC. Under this sub-contract arrangement, the deal with BRC was simply that if the completed work programme delivered royalties or any other reward, BRC would retain 90% of the net revenues, whilst 10% would flow to Numology and on to the Partnership
8. Since Numology had received 100 from the Partnership and applied only 6 in procuring that the scientific research would be undertaken by BRC, the basic plan (ignoring now irrelevant detail) was to be that Numology would acquire various deposits or other financial instruments with its retained 94, less whatever amount had to be paid in fees, to secure its obligation to pay the fixed royalties for which it alone was liable, as mentioned in the previous paragraph.
9. The tax hope and expectation on the part of the Partnership was that, since the partnership had paid 100 to Numology for the scientific research, (that amount being claimed to be what it would ordinarily have cost to undertake the research, and implicitly therefore fair payment), the partnership would be able to claim capital allowances for 100 and the partners would be able to set their respective shares of the allowances against other income. The tax benefit of that early tax relief, coupled then with the secured receipt of the fixed royalties meant that the transaction was appealing to the partners even if the research was unsuccessful, and no 10% royalties were ever received. Hopefully such royalties would be received. The expectation, however, that capital allowances would be available for the full 100, coupled with the secured receipts of fixed royalties that eliminated the more risky expedient of simply investing the entire partnership capital directly in scientific research was the objective of the planning.
The law change in March 2007 and the revisions leading to the scheme as implemented
10. On 2 March 2007, it was announced that partners would only be able to offset £25,000 of losses or allowances in this situation against other income and accordingly the planning had to be very materially altered.
11. Turning now to the revised scheme, and a simplified version of the actual transactions, the following steps were undertaken.
12. In order to contribute 100 (the eventual actual figure being £122,147,617) to the partnership, the partners borrowed 43 (£53,359,488) from each of two banks, Schroders and Bank of Scotland ("BoS"), these borrowings being arranged by Matrix and integral to the planning. The two borrowings thus provided 86, leaving each of the partners to contribute their share of the remaining required 14. Some of the partners funded their share of the 14 simply from available cash, whilst others borrowed from BoS. These borrowings, usually referred to as "top-up" borrowings, were not an integral part of the planning, and were simply ordinary bank borrowings, just as some of those partners contributing cash might in fact have borrowed from other banks.
13. There was some fairly irrelevant confusion, principally on the part of the Appellants, as to quite how fees and expenses had been incurred and satisfied. What we were initially told was that when the 100 had been contributed into the Partnership, 4 had been applied by the Partnership in meeting various expenses. Of the remaining 96, all of this was paid to Numology under the research agreement, under which Numology contracted to undertake or procure the completion of a designated work programme (various elements of the work being given assumed costings, with those costings aggregating to 96).
14. Having received the 96, Numology applied it as follows. While the initial envisaged profile of the fixed royalties payable to the partnership had been spread over the 15-year term which BRC had in which to complete the work programme, following the March 2007 law change it was decided that Numology should pay the partnership 57 immediately after the receipt of the 96 by Numology under the research agreement, as an advance payment of Numology's obligation to pay the fixed royalties mentioned above.
15. We will deal with the onward application of the 57 by the Partnership prior to describing how Numology disbursed its remaining 39 (i.e. 96 minus 57).
16. The terms of the Schroders loan of 43 were that the liability for the interest was a full recourse liability of the individual partners, whilst the liability to repay the principal was limited recourse, only to be discharged out of post-tax receipts of the 10% floating royalties or alternatively the sale proceeds to the Partnership of the licence and the right to the 10% royalties. No such sale was particularly envisaged, and while we will refer below to an option, this was not an integral part of the tax planning.
17. Immediately the partnership received the 57, by way of early receipt of the fixed rentals, the 57 was distributed to the partners, though in fact held at all times in an account in one or other bank. 40 was then immediately paid to Schroders, fully discharging the full recourse liability to pay the entirety of the interest on the Schroders loan. The interest rate was of course considerably higher than that under the BoS borrowing because of the non- recourse terms as regards the principal under the Schroders loan, the BoS loan having no such term.
18. The remainder of the Partnership's, and the partners' early receipt of fixed royalty, namely 17 (i.e. 57 minus 40) was applied in pre-paying the entirety of the interest on the BoS loan, i.e. the loan of 43, and not the interest on any of the top-up loans.
19. Returning to the residue of the 96 held by Numology, namely 39, 29 was contributed to some form of deposit in another BoS Treasury company to secure (i.e. fully secure) Numology's remaining liability to pay the remainder of the fixed royalties to the Partnership over the 15-year term of the transaction, the pre-tax amount of those royalties on receipt by the partnership being sufficient to repay, and specifically designed and charged to repay, the outstanding principal of the BoS loan of 43. In contrast to the position in relation to the 10% royalties to be applied in repaying the principal of the Schroders loan, there was no provision for only the post-tax receipt of fixed royalties to be applied in repaying the BoS loan. The assumption had been that, because full capital allowances would have been received, either those allowances were later being reversed by the receipt of the fixed rentals, or indeed if the losses derived from the capital allowances were being carried forward they would simply be netted off against the receipt of the fixed royalties. In the event that no capital allowances had been secured and that the fixed royalty receipts received by the Partnership and distributed to the partners remained taxable, the entire receipts were to flow automatically in discharge of the BoS loan, and the partners would have to pay the tax on the royalties out of other funds.
20. Of Numology's remaining 10, 6 (the actual figure being £7,760,427) was paid to BRC under the research sub-contract; 3 was paid by Numology to Schroders for an assignment to Numology of Schroders' remaining rights under its loan (i.e. the limited recourse right to receive a repayment of the principal essentially from and only from the post-tax receipt by the partners of distributions to them of the fluctuating 10% royalties), and the remaining 1 was applied in meeting expenses.
21. The essence of the revised tax planning was of course that if there was a limit on the amount of losses derived from capital allowances that could be set by the partners against other income, it was preferable to diminish the net claim for such losses by arranging for the partnership to have a receipt of income of 57, such that the claim for the net loss was reduced (ignoring the claim for fees and expenses) to 39 (96 minus 57), with the claim for tax relief then hopefully being augmented by relief for 57, the entire receipt of 57 being applied in pre- paying interest on the Schroders and BoS loans."
"all the circulating payments that we have just dealt with (including of course the 29 and the 3 paid for the assignment of the Schroders loan) had no remote relationship to scientific research or indeed to "guaranteed fixed royalties" derived from scientific research."
"87. We accept that had BRC sought to buy out the Partnership's and Numology's 10% interest at a more sensible price, the Partnership and Numology might have been amenable to that. Nevertheless the reason why the floor price of the option had been [pitched] at the high level, when the aim was to return to the partners the realistic cost of the project, must have been that any other chosen floor price (geared for instance to the realistic cost of the scientific research) would have been inconsistent with the fictitious claim that the Partnership's relevant cost had been the high figure."
"Equally everything in relation to the refund of the capital expenditure should the research project be abandoned was non-commercial. The term, and the requirement to repay some balance of the 6 at the BRC level was perfectly commercial, but the term of the top level research contract that provided that none of the 100, 99 or 96 should be refundable in any circumstances was uncommercial. It is obvious that when the 57 had been paid out immediately following the Day 1 payment to Numology, and the 29 and the 3 were irrevocably dedicated to their two objectives, none of those payments could possibly be refunded (on a failure by BRC to complete the work programme). The terms of the documentation providing, however, for a total non-refund in this situation (even of any realistic residue of the 6), was obviously explained by the fact that any partial refund of 6 would again have undermined the fictitious claim that the much higher amount had been paid by the Partnership to Numology for the scientific research."
CAA 2001
"Allowances are available under this Part if a person incurs qualifying expenditure on research and development."
"(1) In this Part "qualifying expenditure" means capital expenditure incurred by a person on research and development directly undertaken by him or on his behalf if—
(a) he is carrying on a trade when the expenditure is incurred and the research and development relates to that trade, …"
The Decision of the FtT
Trading
"112. We conclude that the Partnership's total activity is not a trading activity. Everything in relation to the payment of the 99 or 96 that is destined to pay the 57, the 29 and the 3, and the payment away by Numology of those three items, has nothing whatever to do with any trade. In reality there are major non-trading transactions undertaken in efforts to increase the allowances (by matching additional expenditure with so-called fixed royalties), and with a view to claiming relief for massive pre-payments of interest, and none of those transactions has anything to do with any trade.
113. It is actually difficult to say that any of the transactions just identified has very much to do with investment either, because there is absolutely no way in which any can generate any net investment return. It might be said that the 57 and all the later payments of the balance of the fixed royalties are an investment return. None of them produce an investment profit however. The 57 goes into the partnership and back to the partners, with no increment, and beyond being a step in a scheme to generate up-front tax savings from pre-payments of interest, the only implication of the movement of the 57 into and back from the Partnership is that if no capital allowances are available, and the 57 receipt remains taxable income (issue 10 in paragraph 32 above), the partners are landed with a tax liability, without funds to pay it, because the 57 was automatically and immediately applied in payments to Schroders and BoS. The same applies to any royalties paid out of the deposits funded with the 29. Those deposits are fixed rate deposits, and our understanding of the figures is that in due course the fixed royalties funded out of the deposits will be exactly sufficient to repay the 43 of the BoS bank debt, but without any provision for any tax chargeable in respect of the receipt of the fixed royalties. The disbursement of the 3 by Numology, applied by Numology in purchasing the limited recourse right to the repayment of the Schroders debt, generates no conceivable return to the Partnership. All that it may do, assuming receipts of fluctuating royalties, is pass to Numology up to £53.4 million in debt repayment, at a loss to the partners, in terms of pre-tax flow of fluctuating royalties, of potentially about £97 million.
114. Whilst thus we fail to discern any possible investment profit that the Partnership or the partners might derive, our decision is nevertheless that all these money movements are nothing whatever to do with trading, but steps in a scheme designed to generate up-front tax savings. The fact that on the basis of our various decisions they will fail to do that, and at worst for the partners they might generate excess tax liabilities, has no bearing on this conclusion."
"117. We are influenced by the marketing and the reality of this scheme which was that it was first and foremost a tax deferral scheme, coupled with secured receipts effectively just to pay off borrowings, and those two features were treated as the basis on which intending partners could sensibly join the Partnership, with the possible receipt of fluctuating rentals being a possible "add-on". Without them, however, the scheme was marketed on the basis that it was thought that everything made sense even if there were no receipts of fluctuating royalties.
118. The next point is that, although the intellectual property is technically licensed to Numology and then the Partnership and then immediately licensed back to Numology and then to BRC, the substance is that an up-front payment is made for possible receipts of net royalties. The Partnership will in no way incur further costs in any trading venture. Many of the fees charged appear to be structuring fees, and certainly not fees that represent on- going expenses of a trade. Furthermore there is no active involvement that might occasion trading losses. There has simply been an up-front payment for a possible revenue stream and that does not appear to us to be a trading activity.
119. We largely accept the Respondents' claim that at the outset the prospects of there being fluctuating royalties was highly speculative, and akin to a bet. This was not only the view of BRC in November 2007 when the document from which we quoted in paragraph 58 was issued, but this view tallies with the point made above in paragraph 117. This militates against the activity being a trading activity.
120. Neither the Partnership nor Numology had any right of control over how BRC undertook its research project. The absence of any right of control is again a pointer against the trading analysis.
121. The fact that a scheme may be a tax scheme may of itself have nothing to do with whether a participant in the scheme is trading, but when the efficacy of the tax scheme has resulted in the insertion of wholly non-commercial arrangements into the steps that might be trading transactions, this also militates against the trading analysis. We have already explained why we consider that the floor price in relation to the option, the feature that all the payments made by the Partnership to Numology are "non-refundable in all situations", and the way in which the payment of the 3 by Numology to Schroders appears potentially to deprive the Partnership of about £97 million of pre-tax royalties are all inexplicable on trading grounds. This is significant. It does not matter that the floor price in relation to the option, if exercised prior to completion of the project, is in favour of the partnership. The point is that the floor price is pitched at a ridiculous level for some ground that has certainly nothing to do with any serious trading considerations.
122. Our conclusion is that the Partnership is not trading at all."
"When all the documents had been entered into, Victory Partnership was subject to an obligation to pay $3,250,000 to LPI and subject to an obligation whereby any money paid by LPI into the scheme current account was immediately transferred back to LPI. The financial consequence to Victory Partnership of its obligations under the scheme was the expenditure by Victory Partnership of $3,250,000. When all the documents had been entered into, Victory Partnership had a right to 25% of the net receipts from the exploitation of the film. The financial consequence to Victory Partnership of its rights under the scheme was the receipt by Victory Partnership of $3,000,000, being 25% of the net receipts from the film. The taxation consequences were that Victory Partnership, provided it were trading, generated a first-year allowance of $3,250,000 and Victory Partnership became in due course liable to corporation tax on the profits of $3,000,000 which it received."
"... if the commissioners find as a fact that the sole object of the transaction was fiscal advantage, that finding can in law only lead to one conclusion, viz. that it was not a trading transaction ... if the commissioners find as a fact only that the paramount intention was fiscal advantage ... the commissioners have to weigh the paramount fiscal intention against the non-fiscal elements and decide as a question of fact whether in essence the transaction constitutes trading for commercial purposes."
"My Lords, I do not consider that the commissioners or the courts are competent or obliged to decide whether there was a sole object or paramount intention nor to weigh fiscal intentions against non-fiscal elements. The task of the commissioners is to find the facts and to apply the law, subject to correction by the courts if they misapply the law. The facts are undisputed and the law is clear. Victory Partnership expended capital of $3¼m. for the purpose of producing and exploiting a commercial film. The production and exploitation of a film is a trading activity. The expenditure of capital for the purpose of producing and exploiting a commercial film is a trading purpose. By section 41 of the Act of 1971 capital expenditure for a trading purpose generates a first-year allowance. The section is not concerned with the purpose of the transaction but with the purpose of the expenditure. It is true that Victory Partnership only engaged in the film trade for the fiscal purpose of obtaining a first-year allowance but that does not alter the purpose of the expenditure. The principles of Ramsay and subsequent authorities do not apply to the expenditure of $3¼m. because that was real and not magical expenditure by Victory Partnership.
The Vice-Chancellor referred to authorities in which intentions sometimes illuminated and sometimes obscured the identification of a trading purpose. But in every case actions speak louder than words and the law must be applied to the facts."
"If, in order to get what he wants, the taxpayer has to embark on an adventure which has all the characteristics of trading, his purpose or object alone cannot prevail over what he in fact does. But if his acts are equivocal his purpose or object may be a very material factor when weighing the total effect of all the circumstances."
"All these authorities were dealing with the identification of a trading transaction. In the present case a trading transaction can plainly be identified. Victory Partnership expended capital in the making and exploitation of a film. That was a trading transaction which was not a sham and could have resulted in either a profit or a loss. The expenditure of $3¼m. was a real expenditure. The receipts of $3m. were real receipts. The expenditure was for the purpose of making and exploiting a film and entitled Victory Partnership to a first-year allowance equal to the expenditure. The receipts imposed on Victory Partnership a corporation tax liability."
"[56] …. Although we have found the FTT's reasoning a little difficult to follow in parts, we are satisfied that it took the right approach to answering the question whether the Partnership was trading, and reached a conclusion which was supported by the evidence. Had there been a straightforward contract between the Partnership and BRC for the undertaking of research in return for 6, with a sharing of any resulting royalties but without the involvement of Numology and the overlay of guaranteed payments, it might well be possible to reach the conclusion that the Partnership was trading despite the highly speculative nature of the transaction. But the proposition that the vast sum supposedly spent on research, whether that is taken to be 100, 99 or 96, was in reality incurred on trading activity is absurd.
[57] … In our judgment the FTT's decision contains no error of approach and reaches a finding which was open to the tribunal on the evidence."
Lord Kitchin :
Lord Justice Floyd :
UPON THE APPEAL against the decision of the Upper Tribunal of 8 May 2017
UPON HEARING Counsel for the Appellant and for the Respondents
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
Dated 31 October 2018
David Southern QC David Yates
Counsel for the Appellant Junior counsel for the Respondents