England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions

"The circumstances of the manner in which the victim met his death were most unusual. We have some concern as to whether there might have been a break in the chain of causation and whether in the summing up this issue was adequately dealt with. In those circumstances we grant the application for leave to appeal against conviction. We consider that this issue was worthy of review by the full court."

"Manslaughter    unlawful killing of another person or unlawfully causing the death of another person, directly or indirectly...

...

What is alleged here is, of course, indirect. It is not suggested that the killing was perpetrated as such by the defendant. What is suggested is that the violence of the defendant, coupled with the real fear of further violence from him, led the victim to do something which resulted in his death. What it was it led him to do was to attempt to escape. You have got to assess from the evidence whether or not the defendant is in law proved to be the cause of that death, albeit indirectly."

"These are the questions. Has the evidence proved first and foremost:

'That the victim, Mr Bishop, immediately before he sustained the injuries was in fear of being hurt physically?

'That this fear was such that it caused him to try to escape?

'That while he was trying to escape, and because he was trying to escape, he met his death?

'That his fear of being hurt there and then was reasonable and was caused by the conduct of the accused?

'That the accused's conduct which caused the fear was unlawful,' and

'... such that any sober and reasonable person would recognise it as likely to subject the victim to at least the risk of some harm resulting from it, though that need not be serious harm?'"

"Was it in fact the fear of being hurt physically that was causing him, in the brief interlude, if you think it was, to try to escape? What you know is that the third man pulled off the defendant, who was, as the evidence shows, apparently assaulting the deceased. It is for you to say whether that is what was happening or not."

"Whether that fear was caused by the conduct of the defendant, the way the defendant was behaving? Whether what the defendant was doing was unlawful?"

"You will, of course, look to see what was the state of the person, the victim, who died at the time. Was what he did within what one might call the foreseeable range? A person in his condition, at that time, trying to escape. You will, of course, look at what had been happening already. Running up the road amongst the cars, trying to stop one to get away. Look at his known condition, because we do know that he was immensely full of drink. Was in fact what he did something that might be expected as a reaction of somebody in that state?

Those are factors that you have to bear in mind. Members of the jury, the important thing is, first of all, for the Crown to establish an affirmative answer, the answer 'yes' to each of those questions on that bit of paper."

"Then it is said that the judge gave a wrong direction as to the law on the subject. He put to the jury, 'Will you say whether the conduct of the prisoner amounted to a threat of causing injury to this young woman, was the act of jumping the natural consequence of the conduct of the prisoner, and was the grievous bodily harm the result of the conduct of the prisoner?' We think that that was a proper direction as far as the law went; we are satisfied that there was evidence before the jury of the prisoner causing grievous bodily harm to the woman. No one can say that if she jumped through the window it was not the natural consequence of the prisoner's conduct. It was a very likely thing for a woman to do as the result of the threats of a man who was conducting himself as this man indisputably was."

"The test is: Was it the natural result of what the alleged assailant said and did, in the sense that it was something that could reasonably have been foreseen as the consequence of what he was saying or doing? As it was put in one of the old cases, it had got to be shown to be his act, and if of course the victim does something so 'daft', in the words of the appellant in this case, or so unexpected, not that this particular assailant did not actually foresee it but that no reasonable man could be expected to foresee it, then it is only in a very remote and unreal sense a consequence of his assault, it is really occasioned by a voluntary act on the part of the victim which could not reasonably be foreseen and which breaks the chain of causation between the assault and the harm or injury."

"The harm must be physical harm. Where the unlawful act is a battery, there is no difficulty with the second ingredient. Where, however, the unlawful act is merely a threat unaccompanied and not proceeded by any actual violence, the position may be more difficult. In the case of a life threatening assault, such as pointing a gun or knife at the victim, all sober and reasonable people may well anticipate some physical injury through shock to the victim, as for example in Dawson where the victim died of a heart attack following a robbery in which two of the appellants had been masked, armed with a replica gun and pickaxe handles. But the nature of the threat is of importance in considering both the forseeability of harm to the victim from the threat and the question whether the deceased's conduct was proportionate to the threat: that is to say that it was within the ambit of reasonableness and not so daft as to make it his own voluntary act which amounted to a novus actus interveniens and consequently broke the chain of causation. It should of course be borne in mind that a victim may in the agony of the moment do the wrong thing."

"In our judgment the direction in Daley is not sufficient where there is a real issue as to causation. In that case it could hardly be disputed that a reasonable man should foresee that the victim would flee if he was being stoned and that while fleeing he might slip and fall. In the present case the judge did not include this direction as being part of the necessary ingredients of the offence, relying no doubt on Daley. He referred to the victim's need for a well founded and not a fanciful fear that was out of all proportion to the threat. But that does not relate to his reaction in jumping out of the car. In the last sentence of the passage quoted he refers to the attempt to get out of the car being out of all proportion to the force used. But even here it is put as an alternative and not as an additional requirement and begs the question of what, if any, force was used.

In our judgment the failure of the judge to give any direction on causation was a misdirection and the conviction on this count must be quashed."

1. The deceased's irrational disposition to expose himself to danger, coupled with his distress as a consequence of the fight.

2. Possible fear that the occupants of the Salvage's car were going to attack him.

3. Possibly stumbling into the path of the car.

4. Random, drunken wandering.

"In this case, there is the additional complication that the decision not to give evidence has been underlined by a decision not to favour us with his presence for the last part of the trial. Again, and I have to underline this because it is immensely important, do not draw any inference adverse to the defendant from the fact."

1. The immediate remorse demonstrated by the appellant at the scene, of which an instance has already been cited, and his practical assistance there, notwithstanding he was distraught and upset.

2. The absence of any previous convictions for violence in his record.

3. The efforts he made to curb his drinking in the 16 months he was on bail, and the testimonial from his employers.

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