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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Chapman,R. v [2002] EWCA Crim 2346 (16 October 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2002/2346.html Cite as: [2002] EWCA Crim 2346

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2
		16 October 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE JUDGE: Andrew Chapman is now aged 20. He is a young man without previous convictions who, on 2nd October 2001 at the Bradford Magistrates Court, pleaded guilty to an offence of violent disorder. The Justices committed him to the Crown Court for sentence. On 5th November in the Crown Court at Bradford the appellant was sentenced to three years' detention in a young offender institution by His Honour Judge Scott.
2. To understand the sentence imposed in this case we must put the offence into context. On 7th and 8th July 2001 massive violence erupted in Bradford City Centre. A full-scale riot lasted something like 12 hours. Two days later more violence, generated at least in part by the earlier violence, broke out in the Ravenscliffe Estate, some two miles or so from the City Centre. This outbreak was less intense in its violent manifestations and less sustained than the first riot and lasted about four hours.
3. The television screens were filled with alarming images of the first riot but most of us were distant observers. For those innocently present at either scene going about their lawful business, for those who became accidentally involved in the incident, for those targeted directly or indirectly by the violence, or whose homes were in its vicinity, and for the police performing their duty to maintain public order, these were horrifying incidents.
4. Under the leadership of the resident judge at Bradford, His Honour Judge Gullick, the judiciary in the Crown Court resolved that so far as it lay within their powers and subject always to individual and specific mitigation available to any defendant, the sentences arising from or connected with this violence should send out a clear and unambiguous message, the object of which was to discourage and prevent any repetition of those violent scenes: the consequences of involvement in this kind of criminal behaviour would be severe.
5. In the first case arriving in the Crown Court arising from the first disturbance, on 23rd November 2001, Judge Gullick made the following observations in public on behalf of himself and his judicial colleagues:

"Any participation whatsoever of whatever duration in an unlawful and riotous assembly of that type, irrespective of its precise form, derives its gravity from becoming one of those who by sheer weight of numbers pursued a common and unlawful purpose.

On the one hand, I must have regard to the total picture as it has been presented to me and on the other I must pay heed, as I have done, to the specific acts of an individual such as yourself. However, it must be made crystal clear to everyone that...each individual who takes an active part by deed or by encouragement is guilty of an extremely grave offence simply by being in a public place and being engaged in a crime against the peace. While it is plain that there were many, many people on the street, a goodly number of whom for a whole variety of reasons may never be prosecuted, may never be called answer for the acts which they perpetrated and thus would escape punishment, nevertheless in my judgment it is neither wrong in principle nor a matter which should affect sentence of those who have been prosecuted that the appropriate sentence should be given to those that are before the court. Those who choose to take part in activities of this type must understand that they do so at their peril. It must be made equally clear, both to those who are apprehended and to those who might be tempted to behave in this way in the future, that the court will have no hesitation in marking the seriousness of what has occurred and it will act in such a way in the present case as will, I hope, send out a clear and unambiguous message as to the consequences to the individual. It is a message which I trust will deter others from engaging in this type of behaviour in the future."

He went on:

"The people of this city are all entitled to look to the law for protection and to the courts to punish those who behaved so violently and viciously. It would be wholly unreal therefore for me to have regard to the specific acts which you committed as if they had been committed in isolation. In my judgment it would be a wholly wrong approach to take the acts of any individual participant in isolation. Those acts were not committed in isolation and, as I have already indicated, it is that very fact which constitutes the gravity of this offence. What the court has to pay regard to is the level and nature of the violence used, the scale of the riot, the extent to which it is premeditated, the number of persons engaged in its execution and finally, in the context of the overall picture, the specific acts of the individual defendant."

In that case the judge was dealing with a defendant who had been involved in the first and most serious offence of riot. Nevertheless, the observations made by the judge apply equally to the second offence. We wholeheartedly and unhesitatingly endorse them, and adopt them as our own. They reflect the appropriate judicial response to sustained and violent public disturbances. In truth they reflect the fact that the maintenance of the peace of the community, and the protection of the public and the police doing their duty, is an imperative.

6. The sentence now under consideration must be seen in this context. This is not the case of a young man who participated in the first and worst outbreak of public disorder, but one who took part in the second copycat outbreak which in the end had less broad impact than the first. That distinction has been reflected in the charges which the Crown Prosecution Service has brought. In relation to the first incidents there have been many charges of riot for which the maximum sentence is 10 years' imprisonment. For the second incident the charges have largely, if not wholly, been limited to violent disorder for which the maximum sentence is five years' imprisonment. Nevertheless, however it is put, although the second incident was less serious than the first riot, it was never less than serious. The police had to attend in numbers, wearing full riot gear to contain and control the situation. Quite how long they might have been at risk was not known to them when they started carrying out their duties. A very large number of youths estimated variously at between 75 and 100, many wearing masks or hats to hide their faces, armed with bats and staves and stones, attacked the police by throwing stones at them. Property was damaged, although much less than in the first riot. A car was set on fire: again, an incident which on its own was much less significant than the incidents of damage on the first occasion. Additionally, at one stage a resident of the area of Asian origin was targeted just because of his racial origin.
7. The appellant pleaded guilty and the judge's attention was drawn to a sentencing decision in another case passed by His Honour Judge Gullick (R v Jones). The basis of the plea was that the appellant had been involved for about 15 minutes. His case was that he had spent much of the evening with friends and had not been present at the outset. His account was that he had been walking home when he passed the disturbance and recognised some people that he knew who were participating in it, and so he became actively involved. Video footage taken by the police showed the appellant throwing stones. He did not however just pick up a stone which happened to be in front of him and hurl it at the police. A few minutes later he was seen to go to a wheelie bin in which stones had already been collected by other youths, and he re-armed himself in order to get more stones to throw in the direction of the police.
8. When the judge's attention was drawn to Judge Gullick's decision in Jones, he indicated to counsel that he would pass sentence on the defendant as he thought appropriate, but he would discuss the case with Judge Gullick, and having discussed it, if he felt that the sentence imposed on this defendant was inappropriate then he would bring the case back to court and reduce the sentence. He promised that he would not increase it.
9. He heard the mitigation. The mitigation has been repeated before us in a careful argument by Mr Hendron on the appellant's behalf. What it comes to is that this is a young man of good character, who has pleaded guilty and whose involvement, according to the mitigation, was not prolonged. The argument on appeal then proceeds to ask us to consider Judge Gullick' decision in Jones, just as Judge Scott was asked to consider it. What seems clear that the judge would undoubtedly have done what he promised to do, which was to discuss the sentencing decision in Jones with Judge Gullick, and from that it seems to us that the fact that he chose not to ask this appellant to return to court for re-sentencing purposes means that Jones must have had some significant personal mitigation which is not available to the appellant.
10. In the end, however, the question is whether the sentence for this young man's participation in this scene of violent disorder was manifestly excessive, having regard to the general judicial response that deterrent sentences should be passed to make it absolutely clear that behaviour of this kind and involvement in it was intolerable. The judge said to the appellant:

"You take responsibility for your own actions but you must understand that by doing that you encourage others either to join in or to carry on doing what you are doing and that is why violent disorder is a serious offence."

He reflected on the maximum sentence in the case; he took account of the credit due to the appellant for his plea and for the fact that he had no previous convictions, and made allowance for the further fact that in relation to his own personal participation he was not identified as a ringleader.

11. In our judgment the sentencing decision in this case fell within the appropriate range of judicial sentencing decisions. Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed.