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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> L, R (disrupting services at an aerodrome) [2003] EWCA Crim 243 (04 January 2003) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2003/243.html Cite as: [2003] EWCA Crim 243

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2 Tuesday, 4th January 2003

1. MR JUSTICE GRAY: On 12th April 2002 the appellant was sentenced by His Honour Judge Coates in the Warwick Crown Court to a term of three years' imprisonment for the offence of disrupting services at an aerodrome with intent contrary to sections 1(2)(b) and (5) of the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990. He pleaded guilty to that offence. He had also pleaded guilty to an offence of damaging property at the aerodrome. No separate penalty was imposed for that offence. He did face a further count of endangering the safety of a person or property on an aircraft. To that offence he had pleaded not guilty and it was ordered to remain on the file. The total sentence, therefore, was one of three years' imprisonment.
2. The appellant appeals against that sentence with the leave of the single judge.
3. The offences took place on 12th October 2001. Before coming to the offences themselves we should record the background to the events of that evening. The appellant is a helicopter pilot who uses Coventry Airport for leisure purposes. It appears that a dispute had arisen between the appellant and the airport director. The origin of this dispute was that the director had mistaken the appellant for someone with a criminal record wanted by the police. The director appreciated that he had made that mistake, but he then found that the appellant's medical certificate required for his pilot's licence had expired. The appellant explained that this was an oversight on his part and that he had taken steps to get a new one. The director then advised the appellant that as his pilot's licence was not valid he needed a pass to access the airport's premises. When the appellant went to see the director to discuss the matter, he felt that the director was unreasonable towards him. The director circulated all users of and staff at the airport with a notice to the effect that the appellant was excluded from using the airport. The consequence was that for some five weeks before 12th October 2001 the appellant had been prevented from using Coventry Airport.
4. Pausing there, we are told that there were before the court below several letters from others who had experienced similar encounters with the director of this aerodrome. We think it right to proceed on the basis that the background was broadly as we have described it.
5. Coming to the events of 12th October 2001, at 5.10 p.m. on that day the appellant landed at the Coventry Airport in a helicopter for what he had hoped would be a quick refuel. He was told there would a delay due to the departure of two private passenger jets. At this point the director of the airport walked over to the appellant who was sitting in the pilot's seat of his helicopter and asked him to leave the airport forthwith or be escorted off because he had no landing pass.
6. The appellant then took off in the helicopter, but instead of leaving the airport he went and hovered at the intersection of the only two operational runways. He radioed the control tower that he had a problem with the airport director and that the airport was closed. Indeed, by hovering at the intersection of the runways he had effectively closed the airport.
7. Two jets waiting to take off had to taxi to a position just off the runway. The appellant then positioned his helicopter so that he was facing the first of those two jets. He did so in an intimidating fashion. The pilot of the other jet returned to the apron and disembarked his passengers as he was concerned by the threat posed by the helicopter. In addition, by positioning his helicopter as he did, the appellant caused another helicopter which was coming into land to pull up short so as to avoid a collision.
8. The appellant was becoming increasingly irate. Advised that the director was in the control tower, the appellant said, "I am coming to talk to him". He then flew the helicopter at speed towards the control tower only pulling into a hover directly outside the fourth floor window. He then flew in a loop around the control tower, over-flew the fire station and then circled the control tower again before coming back to hover by the fourth floor window.
9. These actions by the appellant meant that the two inbound aircraft, one of which was low on fuel, had to be put into a holding pattern for some ten to 15 minutes. A pilot at the airport who knew the appellant tried to calm him down, but he continued to rant on the radio, saying "I've had enough". The helicopter's nose then dipped and the engine note changed as it powered up. The helicopter came straight for the control tower, only pulling away at last minute. An immediate evacuation of the control tower was ordered in fear that the appellant was going to ram the control tower. It has to be borne in mind that this was only a month after the events in New York of September 11th. Some in the control tower thought that they were going to die and one of them was off work after this incident for a month. The appellant then flew off towards the aeroplane club on the far side of the perimeter of the airport. As he did so he clipped a glide path monitor which had to be recalibrated at a substantial cost.
10. The appellant, having landed the helicopter, was arrested by officers on the premises.
11. On any view the conduct of the appellant on that day was, as several of the references which are before this Court say, wholly out of character. It can be said on behalf of the appellant, and has been said, that he is a man of exemplary character. He is now aged 42. He has been self-employed as a helicopter pilot since 1984. He lives for flying. It is his hobby as well as his job. Not only has the appellant never been in trouble, there is material in the form of the references to which we have referred that he has a positive good character. The referees speak, as it were, with one voice of his trust worthiness and the careful and professional approach he takes towards flying.
12. His disabled mother writes of the efforts he makes to assist her and her severely disabled son and daughter who are respectively the brother and sister of the appellant.
13. There is a pre-sentence report which says, among other things, that the appellant is currently struggling to come to terms with the loss of his good character, his self-esteem appears low and he is having difficulty accepting he now has a criminal record and, stating that he did not know if he could live with this negative image of himself. The likelihood of any reoffending is considered to be low.
14. There was also before the sentencing court a psychiatric report from Dr Whitehouse from which it appears that the events of 12th October, which we have described, have had a severe effect on the appellant. He has since had difficulties sleeping, cannot concentrate, is depressed and is diagnosed as having a moderate to severe post traumatic stress disorder. He is also described as being extremely remorseful.
15. The learned judge acknowledged that the appellant's conduct was wholly out of character. He recognised that the devastating effect which a custodial sentence would inevitably have on the appellant and on his family. Moreover, he accepted that the appellant would be unlikely to reoffend. Nonetheless, he felt that it was his public duty to pass a custodial sentence. He said:

"I have to pass a custodial sentence upon you. I have a public duty and anybody reading the events that have been related to me will expect me to pass a custodial sentence upon you, but, let me say, nevertheless sentencing principles do apply."

16. He went on to say that he took account of the appellant's positive good character, early plea of guilty and the effect of custody. But he imposed the sentence of three years as we have described.
17. We say straightaway that we consider that the judge was entirely justified in imposing a custodial sentence. Using an air craft in the way that this appellant did that evening was, as he now appreciates, foolhardy and dangerous in the extreme. The seriousness with which any such conduct must be regarded is reflected in the fact that the maximum sentence for the offence is life imprisonment.
18. The question which we have to decide is whether three years was manifestly excessive, as Mr Cliff in his succinct and helpful submissions has urged upon us. In this respect we consider that the sentencing judge had a difficult task. This was a man of unblemished character who, as Mr Cliff puts it, "snapped" as a result of what he perceived to be the unreasonable behaviour on the part of those responsible for running the airport. Of course, that does not excuse what the appellant did, but it does go some way to explain it. Moreover, as the judge accepted, there is no question of this appellant reoffending. He does not represent a future risk to the public. There is no need for the sentence to include any element to deter him. As to punishment, we think it right to take into account that for this individual a custodial sentence of whatever length is likely to carry with it the loss of his livelihood, not just for the term of his sentence but very likely for a period thereafter as well. In addition, there is the mitigation of remorse, pleas of guilty, and positive good character.
19. We have no doubt from the sentencing remarks that the learned judge had all these considerations in mind. But we are persuaded, with respect to him, that the judge made insufficient allowance for them in imposing a sentence of three years. It does appear to us that neither public perception, or any other consideration, requires the imposition of a sentence of as long as three years upon this appellant. In the circumstances we conclude that the sentence should be reduced to one of two years. We find ourselves unable to accede to the suggestion that the expedient should be adopted of imposing a sentence tailored to enable the immediate release of the appellant. As we say, therefore, we quash the sentence of three years and substitute one of two years. To that extent the appeal is allowed.