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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Bantick, R. v [2007] EWCA Crim 1404 (18 May 2007) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2007/1404.html Cite as: [2007] EWCA Crim 1404

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2
		18th May 2007

1. Dame Heather Steel: On 9th March 2007, in the Crown Court at Ipswich, the appellant, Suzanne Louise Bantick, who is 27 years of age, pleaded guilty to five offences of theft. On 19th April 2007 she was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment in respect of counts 3, 5 and 6 of the indictment. In respect of counts 1 and 2 no separate penalty was imposed. At the time she was sentenced she asked for eight other offences to be taken into consideration which represented a total loss to her employers of just over £45,000 as a result of offences committed over a period of about two years.
2. Her application for leave to appeal her sentence has been referred to the Full Court by the single judge, who refused an application for bail. Accordingly we grant leave so that we may consider this matter this morning.
3. Briefly the facts of the offences are these. A Mrs Diana Bryce, together with her husband Richard, ran two businesses in Hintlesham. "Birch Farm" started in September 2002. It was a nursery which started with about 30 children a day but which grew to about 84 children a day. "The Barn" was independent from the nursery. It contained a large sports bar, cafe, changing rooms and provided swimming pool sessions and things of that kind.
4. In 1999 the appellant's mother was employed on a part-time basis to assist at reception and to assist with the accounts. That year the appellant taught the Bryces' children horse riding.
5. When the appellant was taken on as an employee in 2003 the Byrces felt no need to obtain references. She was employed for two days each week to look after the day to day accounts of both businesses. She was responsible for writing all of the cheques and she would then get signatures. On some occasions she took work home to complete, including completing the wording on the cheques. Such was the trust reposed in her by her employees that they were comfortable with handing her blank cheques. When they went on holiday she would be given a small number of blanks cheques to cover expenses whilst they were away. She also had access to their bank accounts. The Bryces never at any time had cause to doubt her honesty. She was paid a wage of £8.00 an hour.
6. Between 2004 and 2006 the business began to suffer financially. As a result the appellant's mother was made redundant in January 2006 because they could no longer afford to keep her on. That led to the appellant being in sole charge of the accounts.
7. When the appellant left on maternity leave Mrs Bryce then looked at the borrowing on an Egg account. She noticed that £13,000 had gone on or about the date of 20th July 2005. She contacted Egg and discovered that the money had gone to an account that the appellant held jointly with her husband. A full scale examination of the accounts took place to see whether any other unauthorised transfers had taken place in the appellant's favour. It was discovered that she had used three different methods to steal money from the business accounts.
8. Count 1 relates to a cheque for £3,735.71 drawn on the Farm business. The appellant made this payable to herself and she paid it into the account she held jointly with her husband. It was credited to her account on 20th April 2004.
9. Count 2 related to a cheque from the Bryces' business account in the sum of £7,292.18, again credited to the appellant's joint account with her husband on 1st June 2004. The same day the appellant was credited with her legitimate wages of £521. That cheque took her joint account with her husband to just below £6,000 in credit.
10. Count 3 relates to a cheque made payable to the appellant from a business account which was originally made out for £150. The appellant altered the figures and the words on the cheque to £2,150.
11. Count 5 relates to the balance transfer of £13,000 from Egg on 20th July 2005, which was the transaction that brought the matter to the notice of the Bryce. This credit took the joint account from a £1,500 overdraft to £11,000 in credit. The appellant admitted in interview that she had performed that transaction by online transfer and that she knew it was wrong.
12. In relation to count 6, the appellant overpaid herself £1,000 in wages by direct transfer. There is a similarity between the offence represented by count 6 and one of other offences taken into consideration which employed the same system of automatic credit. She was paid £502 on 30th May 2006. She then received her legitimate wages on 1st June.
13. The remainder of the other offences were a combination of cheques payable to herself, a transfer from Egg to pay her MBMA credit card, a cheque into her Tesco account and cheques into the joint account. The majority of the cheques went into her joint account.
14. The offences on the indictment took place between 20th April 2004 and 1st March 2006. The amount of money concerned in the five accounts is £27,177.35 and the eight offences taken into consideration relate to a total sum of £17,853.62.
15. Mrs Bryce said that the appellant knew the firm was struggling financially at the time she admitted the offences. The bank had stopped some payments which is why they had to take out credit card finance. During 2004 and 2005 Mrs and Mr Bryce had been seeking to sell their business, but the accounts showed a downward trend and put prospective buyers off. Offers that were made were below the asking price that the Bryces thought the business was good for. As a result of that, and because things were not on a strong financial footing, they had to make the appellant's mother redundant and it appears they had to pay her some money in the form of redundancy payment.
16. When interviewed, the appellant said that she took the money from her employer for her own purposes because they were living beyond their means.
17. Before she was sentenced the judge had the benefit of a pre-sentence report, dated 4th April 2007, prepared by Alison Dance. He also considered two letters which had been produced by the appellant: one from her mother, Mrs Caley, and one from her husband. Those letters, which we have read this morning, very fairly set out the family situation and the domestic background and all the relevant and necessary information about the two children of the marriage and indeed the way in which the appellant looked after those children.
18. In sentencing the judge gave very careful consideration to the sentence that he passed. He took into consideration the case of R v Mills [2002] 2 Cr App R(S) 52, but inevitably concluded that this was a very serious breach of trust. He referred also to these two letters to which we have this morning been referred.
19. He referred to the total sum of money dishonestly acquired, being in the region of £45,000. This woman, together with her mother, had been taken on by a family. The victims were a small family concern and this was a large part of the money passing through the business. It was not a small and insignificant sum. The judge then expressed the view that a prison sentence was inevitable and the court was unable to suspend it.
20. The ground which is urged upon this court this morning is that the sentence was wrong in principle for this appellant. For a mother with two young children the sentence should and could have been suspended. Further, an application has been made to receive fresh evidence under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, that we should receive and consider statements from the appellant's husband, Darren Bantick, her mother, Brenda Caley, and the headteacher of the primary school which is attended by her four year old child, that being Alison Herbert.
21. This court has received written statements from those three witnesses. This is not a case where the court needs to consider whether fresh evidence needs to be called. We have read those statements with care. We are fully aware of the distress which has been caused to the family of the appellant by her imprisonment, and the effect on the two children, we are satisfied, has not been understated in those three documents. There is no question that the inevitable deterrent and punishment element of any sentence in a case such this will impact very severely on a defendant's family, particularly where, as here, the children are very young. In many such cases, of course, an offender may be a sole carer. That is, mercifully, not the case here. What can be said in this case is that the children are in the most secure and loving environment where they were being given every care and kindness from a loving grandmother and father. The school, also, it is clear is keeping a very sensitive and careful eye on the little boy aged four.
22. It is submitted that insufficient weight was given by the sentencing judge to the impact on the children that a sentence of immediate custody would have. This court, it is submitted, should have regard to the balance between the public interest and the welfare of very young children such as these. Mr Gritt urges us to consider that a sentence of immediate imprisonment was wrong in principle.
23. We have to consider, is that right? Was this sentence, or may it have been, wrong in principle or manifestly excessive? Whatever sympathy we may have with this appellant it is impossible for us to say that the sentence was either wrong in principle or manifestly excessive. The offence committed here represented a very serious breach of trust and was committed over a period of time towards a small company who trusted this lady totally. The consequences to the firm and indeed to her mother cannot be disregarded. The offences were committed deliberately and committed for gain rather than for need.
24. £45,000 is a large sum. The judge correctly gave the appellant credit for her pleas, took all the circumstances into account and the sentence that he passed was entirely appropriate in our view for all those circumstances. The appeal accordingly is dismissed.