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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Vasili, R. v [2011] EWCA Crim 615 (23 February 2011) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2011/615.html Cite as: [2011] 2 Cr App R 5, [2011] 2 Cr App Rep 5, [2011] EWCA Crim 615

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2A 2LL
		23rd February 2011

1. SIR ANTHONY MAY: The single short question in this appeal against conviction by Temis Vasili, now aged about 19, is whether an object which may briefly be described as both a flick-knife and a lighter was an offensive weapon per se, whose possession contrary to section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, with other things being equal, be an offence.
2. Mr Recorder Bourne at the Harrow Crown Court on 24th June 2010 so ruled, thereby withdrawing that question from the jury and the appellant was subsequently convicted and sentenced to a community order of 12 months with unpaid work requirement of 80 hours.
3. She has leave to appeal against her conviction on the single basis that the object was not an offensive weapon per se, and Mr Vullo submits that in that event the question whether it was should not have been decided by the judge and withdrawn from the jury but should have been left to the jury.
4. We do not have the physical object in question. We do have a photograph of it, which is pretty poor but nevertheless sufficient for our purposes. It is an object which has a flick-knife mechanism and a flick-knife's blade and when the blade is flicked and is extended, the object is about 5 inches in length, with a short stubby handle and a short stubby blade. The blade's length is almost but not quite half the length of the total object. It has on one side a serrated edge and on the other side a sharp edge. The sharp edge curves round to the more or less straight serrated edge to form a point. The object is also a lighter which can be used when the blade is not flicked out. It can also be used when the blade is flicked out and the suggestion is that one possible use of this might be to warm the blade so as to cut cannabis or similar.
5. The submission to the Recorder, which he rejected, was that this was not an offensive weapon per se and that the judge should not so rule. The ruling contained the following passages, the Recorder said:

"It is, as I understand it, common ground that at the relevant time she had an item which combines the functions of a knife and a lighter. The knife is a flick-knife, that is to say the blade opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a button in the handle of the knife. It is within the definition of such a weapon, whose manufacture or sale is made illegal by the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959, although possession of such a weapon, by itself, is not illegal. When the blade is out, it is locked in position. It is necessary to press the button in the handle before the blade can be returned to the closed position. The lighter mechanism is positioned so that flame can play on the blade if the blade is out. If the blade is not out, the lighter remains a lighter."

6. The Recorder referred to the Court of Appeal decision of R v Simpson [1983] 3 All ER 789, to which we will refer in a moment and he quoted from that case. He recorded that the defendant submitted that this was not an offensive weapon per se and that the question whether it was should be left to the jury and the basis of the submission was that it was not so because the object was made for a dual purpose. Had only the purpose been that of a flick-knife, the defendant agrees that it would be an offensive weapon, however because there is a secondary purpose, whereby the lighter flame is or can be switched on or played on a knife blade it cannot be said this item is made for use to cause personal injury.
7. Reference is made to other cases to which it is not necessary to refer. The Recorder then said:

"The case of Simpson is binding authority on the subject of flick-knifes. Therefore, the only question is whether our exhibit 1 is the type of knife to which Simpson applies or whether it is something different. Our exhibit 1 has the distinctive flicking and locking mechanism which makes it potentially, particularly dangerous."

The Recorder then went on to say:

"... there is no reasonable alternative to the view that a flick-knife is a dangerous weapon per se."

He concluded this ruling by saying:

"Meanwhile, the fact of our exhibit 1 having a secondary function, that is indicated by the lighter does not in any way explain or excuse the fact that it also has those flicking and locking mechanisms for its blade. Those are what make such an item dangerous, and those are the reasons, in my judgment, for the law taking the approach that was taken in Simpson. In my judgment, it is those functions and features that betray the purpose for which item was made, and it was made to cause injuries to the person. I therefore conclude that our exhibit 1 is no exemption from the rule in Simpson, and, the jury will have to be directed that the item is an offensive weapon per se."

8. Reference to Simpson reveals the following passages in the judgment of Lord Lane CJ. He set out the definition of offensive weapon in section 1(4) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 as being:

"'offensive weapon' means any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him."

Of that Lord Lane said:

"If one analyses the words of the definition, there are three possible categories of offensive weapon. First of all the weapon made for use for

causing injury to the person, that is, a weapon offensive per se as it is called; for instance, a bayonet, a stiletto or a handgun. The second category is the weapon which is adapted for such a purpose; the example usually given is the bottle deliberately broken in order that the jagged end may be inserted into the victim's face. And the third category is an object not so made or adapted, but one which the person carrying intends to use for the purpose of causing injury to the person."

Lord Lane then referred to judgment of Griffiths J (as he then was) in Gibson and Wales [1983] 1 All ER page 869 at page 872, where Griffiths LJ had said:

"There is no reasonable alternative to the view that a flick knife is an offensive weapon per se. It is made for the purpose of causing injury to the person. It may sometimes be used for wholly innocent purposes, even possessed for innocent purposes, but there will be a very heavy burden on any person in possession of a flick knife to satisfy any court that he had it for such an innocent purpose, I would say that the justices here on the facts of this case fell into error and that a flick knife is now to be regarded as an offensive weapon per se for the purposes of section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953."

Lord Lane then referred to various other authorities and on page 794, said this:

"It is never easy to say where the line should be drawn in this type of situation. This court has held that the category into which a sheath knife falls is a matter for the jury - Reg. v. Williamson, 67 Cr.App.R. 35 - because in effect it depends on the sort of knife which was in the sheath.

We think that the flick knife falls on the other side of the line and that these knives do come into the category of weapons which are offensive per se, namely, the first category which is raised by the definition in section 1(4) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. These weapons are plainly designed by the manufacturers to be carried conveniently in the hand or in the pocket and there concealed, to be brought into use with the minimum of delay to the assailant and the minimum of warning to the victim. There is no pause while the blade is pulled out from the handle against the spring or is removed from its sheath by hand. By their very design in this way they betray the purpose for which they were made."

He concluded the judgment by saying:

"Once one reaches the conclusion, as we have done, that a knife proved to be a flick knife necessarily is one made for use for causing injury to the person, we take the view that that is a matter of which judicial notice can be taken and the jury can be directed accordingly. That is what we believe Griffiths L.J. intended and we respectfully agree with his conclusion in all aspects of his judgment."

9. Mr Vullo submits that the critical question for the court is whether the item was made for the sole purpose of causing injury to the person and it appears to be the logic of posing that question that the submission is that any object which is made for more than one person cannot be an offensive weapon per se. He points out that with this object, the blade closed it is not concealed in the handle; the serrated edge is visible when the blade is closed. It is not, he suggests, a secret weapon disguised as a lighter. He says in terms that where an item is made for two purposes, it cannot be an offensive weapon per se. The court should not have taken judicial notice that in this instance this flick-knife was an offensive weapon and that it is going too far away from the jury question, whether this object may not have been made for a non offensive purpose. It is, as we said at the outset, a short point.
10. In our judgment this was an object which was both a flick-knife and a lighter. An object which has all the characteristics of a flick-knife does not cease to be a flick-knife because it also has the secondary characteristic of being a lighter. The same no doubt would also apply to a handgun which was also a lighter although possession of a handgun might be dealt with under a different statute. James Bond might no doubt carry an object of this kind for a dual purpose but a flick-knife does not, in our judgment, lose its character as a flick-knife because it is also a lighter. It is just as much an offensive weapon and potentially dangerous as if the lighter function were not there. In our judgment the Recorder's ruling was correct for the correct reasons and the appeal is dismissed.