BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] | ||
England and Wales Care Standards Tribunal |
||
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Care Standards Tribunal >> JF v Secretary of State [2005] EWCST 591(PVA) (01 November 2006) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCST/2006/591(PVA).html Cite as: [2005] EWCST 591(PVA) |
[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]
JF v Secretary of State [2005] EWCST 591(PVA) (01 November 2006)
(a) Failure to take reasonable steps to prevent residents from sustaining wounds or pressure sores or to ensure that such steps were taken;
The Appellant admits that she failed to provide additional training for qualified staff but claims she had tried to source training with the Tissue Viability Nurse. She also states that the home provided equipment to manage pressure sores but is now aware that the equipment was not always functioning properly. Also, there was a procedure for reporting maintenance issues which she was not aware was not being followed at the time.
(b) Failure to ensure that staff were properly trained in wound care and that wound care was provided;
The Appellant's response is that she accepts responsibility but says that each nurse would have received wound care training as part of their professional training.
(c)Failure to have residents' wounds or pressure sores checked by the Tissue Viability Nurse (TVN) when appropriate;
The Appellant claims that she tried to involve the TVN in training and she was not aware that "my staff were not calling her in for assistance". If she had been aware of the extent of pressure sores, she would have called the TVN.
(d)Failure to properly monitor document and audit residents' wounds or pressure sores or to ensure that they were so monitored, documented and audited.
The Appellant accepts that she "failed to monitor staff after I found out there was a problem with pressure sore care at AH". She states that she was given oral assurances by staff members as to the care being provided and believed that "staff members were documenting properly".
(a) failing to provide adequate care for residents of the Home or to ensure that adequate care was provided for them to meet their health, personal and social needs; and/or
(b) neglecting residents.
The Appellant's response is only in respect of the matters for which she has accepted responsibility and is that she "failed to ensure that adequate care was provided for residents of the Home to meet their health, personal and social care need needs" but does not accept that she neglected the residents.
The standard of proof required, in order to be satisfied as to the matters set out in section 4(3) of the 1999 Act, is that described in the decisions of the House of Lords in Re H and others (minors) (sexual abuse: standard of proof) [1996] AC 563; [1996] 1 All ER 1 [1996] 1 FLR 80 and Secretary of State v. Rehman [2002] 1 All ER In the former case, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead said:"[T]he standard of proof required in non-criminal proceedings is the preponderance of probability, usually referred to as the balance of probability. The balance of probability standard means that a court is satisfied an event occurred if the court considers that, on the evidence, the occurrence of the event was more likely than not. When assessing the probabilities the court will have in mind as a factor, to whatever extent is appropriate in the particular case, that the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred and, hence, the stronger should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation is established on the balance of probability….Built into the preponderance of probability standard is a generous degree of flexibility in respect of the seriousness of the allegation." In the latter case Lord Hoffman said: "It would need more cogent evidence to satisfy one that the creature seen walking in Regent's Park was more likely than not to have been a lioness than to be satisfied to the same standard of probability that he was an Alsatian. On this basis, cogent evidence is generally required to satisfy a civil tribunal that a person has behaved in some reprehensible manner. But the question is always whether the tribunal thinks it more probable than not Misconduct.
Misconduct is not defined in the 1999 Act nor is the term qualified by any adjective such as "serious" or "gross". In Mairs v. The Secretary of State [2004] 269 PC, the Tribunal held that, in principle, a single act of negligence could constitute misconduct but in most cases the misconduct will be an incident forming part of a course of erroneous or incorrect behaviour undertaken by a person who knew or ought to have known that what he or she was doing was contrary either to the general law or to a written or unwritten code having particular application to his or her profession, trade or calling.
It is sufficient to satisfy the test ….that she is unsuitable to work with children by virtue of the misconduct which placed at risk of harm a vulnerable adult.
Accordingly, it is our unanimous decision that both appeals be dismissed.
APPEALS DISMISSED
Anthony Wadling
(Chairman)
Jenny Cross
Denise Rabbetts