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England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges)


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges) >> A (A Child : Adoption) (Rev 1) [2017] EWFC B46 (9 May 2017)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2017/B46.html
Cite as: [2017] EWFC B46

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IMPORTANT NOTICE

This judgment was delivered in private.  The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the child and members of his family must be strictly preserved.  All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with.  Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.

 

Case No: NE16C00715

IN THE FAMILY COURT

SITTING AT NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE

The Law Courts

The Quayside

Newcastle-upon-Tyne

NE1 3LA


IN THE MATTER OFTHE CHILDREN ACT 1989

AND THE ADOPTION AND CHILDREN ACT 2002

AND IN THE MATTER OF: A (A CHILD)


Tuesday, 9th May 2017

 

Before:


HIS HONOUR JUDGE SIMON WOOD

 

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Re: A (A Child)

 

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Counsel for the Local Authority: Miss Smith

Counsel for the Mother: Miss Sweeting

Counsel for the Child: Mr Kinkaid

 

Hearing date: 9th May 2017

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APPROVED JUDGMENT

 

 

 

Transcribed from the Official Tape Recording by

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JUDGMENT

HIS HONOUR JUDGE SIMON WOOD:

1.                  The court is concerned with the welfare of A, a boy born on 4th September 2016 and so now aged 8 months. 

2.                  The local authority issued an application on 14th September seeking a care order in respect of A and it now seeks a care order together with a placement order in order to achieve permanence for A outside his birth family, orders which are supported by A’s children’s guardian, Mrs McGuaghey  and opposed by A’s mother, M.  She seeks an order, I think any order, that would enable A to come and live with her. 

3.                  A’s father has never been identified.  Three potential fathers named by mother have not been confirmed on DNA testing.  A fourth proved to be impossible to contact so the local authority has drawn a blank in identifying him.

4.                  Why does the local authority say that A was likely to suffer significant harm and that it is likely that it was attributable to the care provided to him not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give a child?  Sadly, the answer to this question is to be found in the mother’s diagnosis of bipolar affective disorder, which, says the local authority, prevents her from being able to provide safe and secure parenting to her son.  That has featured episodic psychotic symptoms, violence and aggression when unwell, as well as making threats including to A, all of which are pleaded and accepted, with the important qualification that these symptoms manifest themselves at a time when the mother is unwell and not at a time when she is not and she is not unwell for all of the time.  Also pleaded are the facts that the mother was detained initially under section 2 of the Mental Health Act from August to September 2016 and then under section 3 from mid-September to mid-January 2017 and assessed as lacking litigation capacity beyond that date until relatively recently.  This is not therefore a case which is about threshold, which is accepted.  It is a case about outcome.

5.                  I need to set some of the scene before coming to background.  The mother was born in 1992.  Her mental health problems aside, the local authority evidence points to her being a vulnerable young woman, who has been exploited, particularly sexually.  She did not enjoy consistent or stable care herself as a child.  She was not cared for by her mother from the age of 3 due to her mother’s own mental health illness.  She is said to have a similar diagnosis to the mother.  Instead, she lived with her father and stepmother until she was 18.  An intelligent girl, she did well at school and at college, as her public examination results would indicate, and she had perfectly reasonable employment ambitions, sadly, none of which were achieved.  A same sex relationship seems to have estranged her from her disapproving father.  For a while, she worked in the sex industry.  Her lifestyle has been a transient one. 

6.                  Whilst the local authority assessment of her family support structure is that it is limited and it describes the family dynamics as both strained and confusing, depriving the mother of consistent, positive and stable support, the mother in effect seeks to challenge that assessment and before me advances a network of potential support available from her mother and siblings.  Having identified two separate alternative family carers at an early stage, a great uncle, MGU1, and his wife and another great uncle, MGU2, the former could offer no more than assistance as opposed to alternative care.  Whilst the latter, MGU2, did at one point indicate a willingness to care and was positively assessed at the viability stage, he withdrew his offer on the basis of his own health issues.  That is something which appears to have resulted in a degree of estrangement between the mother and him, which was particularly unfortunate as he was a family member who had been noted to show commitment to the mother during her long recent illness. 

7.                  The social worker, SW, carried out a very detailed parenting assessment, which was completed in December.  It noted many positives and I want to emphasise them.  The mother was well able to meet A’s basic physical needs, as well as offer appropriate emotional warmth.  She was described as “a caring, proactive and confident mother” who was “aware of A’s needs,” was well able to manage distress “with ease and confidence.”  She was able to offer appropriate stimulation in contact for which she was always well prepared, she had a good understanding of the needs for and implementation of appropriate boundaries, as well as the imperative of protecting A and keeping him safe.  She also had a very good appreciation of the need for, and importance of, stability.  The mother had other qualities that are very attractive and would also contribute to her ability to meet A’s needs.  Her own self-description is of a person who, when well, is bubbly, confident, loving and caring.  She has a strong creative streak: baking, music, arts and crafts.  Her caring side was very much noted by the ward staff and social worker, where she was able on the ward to demonstrate a good level of empathy and understanding of the emotions and sensitivities of others. 

8.                  Set against that, however, the local authority also identified concerning negatives.  Since they flow in significant measure from her mental illness, it is convenient at this stage to consider the expert evidence and the context in which they fall to be considered. 

9.                  An initial report from the mother’s treating psychiatrist, Dr P, presented to the child protection review conference on 6th September, notes the trigger of this long episode, which followed the discontinuance of her medication as far back as November 2015, which after a period of elevated mood turned into a period of depression and an overdose.  In fact, her pregnancy was identified as she was being treated for that.  There were concerns of episodic dips in mood in March and then in May 2016 where her mixed presentation was felt to be a response to the stressful situation in which she found herself, being pregnant with the local authority plainly very much in the foreground. 

10.              However, then in August, she presented with manic psychosis, manifesting itself with marked lability of mood, the complete refusal of medication, the posing of a direct risk of physical harm to others and the posing of an indirect risk of harm to herself and her unborn baby.  She was not manageable on the mother and baby unit.  She was found to lack capacity to make decisions in respect of her own and her unborn baby’s health and she was admitted under section 2 of the Mental Health Act.  That, it should be noted, was against a background of significant admissions in 2011-12, 2012-13 and 2014, the second two of those being for periods of six months or more where she was variously detained under section 2 and then section 3 of the Mental Health Act.

11.              The diagnosis of bipolar affective disorder was made.  She was found to have demonstrated a poor response to antipsychotic mood stabilisers, albeit responded well to lithium and it was felt that she was likely to make a recovery with time.  Dr P, however, highlighted several concerns.  He noted that she had never seemingly lived independently, when unwell had made serious attempts to harm herself, including tying a ligature around her neck, attempting to set fire to a house, threatening to harm another patient’s baby, as well as overdoses.  He suggested that there was a high risk of impulsive risky behaviour when unwell.  He noted the vulnerability that I have already mentioned and concluded that she had to be considered to pose a risk to others when manic.  Whilst there was evidence that she had tried to protect her baby at various stages, that had to be balanced against the overdose in January, the use of cocaine in the third trimester of her pregnancy and he also noted a further risk factor from the lack of a current reliable partner.

12.              Professor Turkington reported on 12th December at the request of the court and he confirmed the diagnosis and noted that she then remained in a state of hypomania.  Whilst she was improving, he highlighted the fact that this was her fourth admission since 2011, a strong genetic vulnerability arising from her mother’s diagnosis and the fact that her condition had not proved to be easily controllable.  He said it was then resistant to treatment, she was prone to relapse and these factors meant that she posed a risk to others and her child and could not care for a child.  He said that her condition may come under better control, but the relatively poor response to treatment, the genetic predisposition, as well as some episodic substance abuse, placed her at high risk of further episodes.  He then estimated that a recovery would take six to twelve months, treatment would be lifelong and he predicted further episodes of hospitalisation under the Mental Health Act

13.              By early March, her hypomania had settled, but she was suffering from depression, what he called a “full house of biological symptoms.”  He assessed its severity as moderate to severe and noted that it necessitated on-going treatment in hospital, albeit not on a compulsory basis.  The antidepressant medication was itself liable to trigger a further manic episode and so could not be used.  He noted that she had not then regained capacity and she remained at high risk of relapse, with the accompanying risks already identified.  In fact, the mother rapidly regained capacity after that assessment and her mood recovered, as Dr Q found about three weeks later and Professor Turkington confirmed in his further evaluation on 13th April, albeit in confirming that he repeated his warning as to the prognosis. 

14.              This is, in the court’s judgment, the context for the negatives that the local authority identified in the parenting assessment: the transient lifestyle, the unsatisfactory partners, the variable financial mismanagement that at times left her severely compromised and vulnerable and the episodic use of elicit substances.  It also directly feeds into the risk that significant mental ill health of this type would create: the inability to maintain the positives that I have set out here, the risk of harm that she poses to herself and others, including, of course, A, the emotional non-availability that occurs when she is unwell and the risk of harm from a lifestyle that has variously included abusive men, sexual exploitation and drug use. 

15.              Accordingly, the local authority concluded that her vulnerability and significant history of mental ill health and the lack of a history of sustained stability in all aspects of her life really from her own home through to everything else pointed to an inability safely to meet A’s needs now or in the foreseeable future, despite the obvious good qualities and her absolutely unquestioned love for her son. 

16.              The mother filed a statement.  It was her first.  That is not a criticism.  She was only first able to attend a hearing in these proceedings in the middle of February.  In it she explains her inability to respond to many of the more concerning behaviours identified, some of which I have mentioned, because of the simple fact that she has no recall of them.  She says that her more concerning threats would never have been carried out, but should be seen as an expression of emotion.  She admits that there has been drug use, involvement in prostitution when she was 20 and she points to the fact that she was raped.  However, she also draws attention to the improvement that she has been able to demonstrate in her health, her recognition of the importance of working with mental health professionals, as well as taking her medication, which is now the mood stabiliser, lamotrigine, because she recognises its importance in enabling her to function as a mother caring for a young child.  Accordingly, she argues that, although the threshold is crossed, her past issues can now be managed from a welfare point of view. 

17.              Of course, care proceedings involve two questions.  The first is are the threshold criteria for making a care order under section 31 of the Children Act satisfied?  Secondly, if so, what order should the court make?  The court has, in asking the question that it posed at the beginning of this judgment, already set out the relevant part of section 31 of the Act and indicated that it is not disputed that the threshold criteria are satisfied.  The findings that the mother accepts the court must make lead inexorably to the conclusion that at the relevant date when proceedings started shortly after A was born there was a likelihood that A would have suffered significant harm were he to have been placed in his mother’s care.  Accordingly, this judgment needs to focus closely on the question of welfare, the second question that arises.

18.              The risk identified by the local authority is heightened by its assessment of the lack of support that this mother has.  The mother’s own account to the social worker was of her mother, brother and sister being her main sources of support, yet it was the local authority assessment that the mother herself was deeply upset by the chaotic support that had in fact been offered.  None of these three were regular, reliable, dependent supports for the mother herself when she was ill and in hospital for so long. 

19.              As I have mentioned, both her mother and brother each have a similar diagnosis.  Their care is overseen by the community mental health teams.  Whether that explains the inability of the social worker to identify a consistent individual who has supported her rather than those who, as she put it, leave her life as suddenly as they re-enter it, it is not possible to say.  However, it is the fact that none of those individuals have come forward during these long months, despite the dire situation in which the mother has been and every opportunity being afforded to do so.

20.              The mother points to the fact that her own mother has been stable in her own health for a year or more.  Despite not visiting her whilst on the ward, explained by her own unhappy memories of it, the mother is confident that her own mother would offer emotional and practical support.  She says that her brother has been stable now for ten years and has always been there and visited her and her older sister has recently had a baby and would also be able to help.  She also suggests that after the distancing which arose when MGU2 withdrew as a potential carer, that distancing has now narrowed and he would be able to help, certainly during a period of transition from hospital, as would MGU 1 and his wife as and when required.

21.              The issues that the court has to consider of course fall to be determined on well-established legal principles, none of which are in dispute.  It is of course for the local authority to prove on the balance of probabilities the facts upon which they seek to rely.  It is also for the local authority, since it seeks to have A adopted, to establish that nothing else will do, having regard to the seminal causes of Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33 in the Supreme Court and Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146 in the Court of Appeal.  I remind myself that Baroness Hale in Re B said:

“The test for severing the relationship between parent and child is very strict: only in exceptional circumstances and where motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to the child’s welfare, in short, where nothing will do.”

That of course echoes what was said in the Strasbourg court in YC v The United Kingdom in 2012, where the court added that:

“Where the maintenance of family ties would harm the child’s health and development, a parent is not entitled under Article 8 to insist that such ties be maintained.”

22.              In considering the local authority’s application for a care order, I must have regard to the welfare checklist in section 1 of the Children Act 1989 and, since the plan is for adoption, also the welfare checklist in section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002.  I must treat as my paramount consideration A’s welfare throughout his life in accordance with section 1(2) of the 2002 Act and, in deciding whether or not to dispense with A’s mother’s consent, I must apply section 52 of the 2002 Act, as was explained in Re P (Adoption: Leave Provisions) [2007] EWCA Civ 616

23.              By agreement and at the suggestion of counsel on behalf of the mother, this case has proceeded on the basis of hearing no oral evidence, but the court has been addressed by oral submissions drawing the court’s attention to specific aspects of the evidence.  Miss Sweeting very succinctly set out very clearly the issues for the court to consider.  She pointed out that the more worrying behaviour of the mother in terms of violence and threats of violence are restricted to periods when she is unwell.  She identified many positive signs as at today in terms of clinical engagement, re-engaging with her family, compliance with medication and those seeking her attendance.  She remains in hospital as a voluntary attender and is well on the way to stable management and, consistent with that progress, her engagement with the court process has been entirely appropriate. 

24.              There are encouraging signs from contact, which is positive and has been able to progress to the community.  However, grasping the nettle of health, she acknowledges that there is concern as to whether medication within the community would be complied with, acknowledging that this is a lifelong condition and therefore a requirement.  She invites me to the view that there is before the court sufficient material to reach the conclusion that enough support could be placed around her for this to be manageable. 

25.              The suggestion is made that in the first instance it would be necessary for the mother to move to some form of supported accommodation.  She is not yet ready for discharge and, as matters stand, that has not been identified, but I think the implication was it can be with appropriate support from the local authority.  Then there can be placed around her family support, who will offer emotional and practical support.  She has mentioned the three family members I have already referred to, her mother, brother and sister.  She acknowledges that her uncle cannot offer 24 hour care or offer to care for A if unwell, but nevertheless submits that these family members, who are all sufficiently proximate, living in various suburbs of [town A] with the exception of the uncle who lives in [town B], will be available.  She acknowledges that the mother did not put them forwards at an earlier stage, but prays in aid her then state of mind in her illness.  She also was obliged to concede that, so far as the court process is concerned, they have not been visible supporters.  She therefore invites me to the view that it is here possible to put together a package which can ensure that A can live with his mother and be kept safe with all family members having their part to play and being able to step in and assist as and when that is required. 

26.              Miss Smith on behalf of the local authority, who addressed me with very great sensitivity, acknowledged the mother’s undoubted and unquestioned love for her son.  However, she reminded me that the law is concerned with neither blame nor fault, but what is best for A in terms of his welfare and submits quite simply that the seriousness and intractable nature of the mother’s illness is such that she simply cannot realistically meet A’s needs.  She cannot do so within timescales.  He is a child who, as I say, is now 8 months old.  He needs decisions making for him.  She points to the risk that would be posed by the florid nature of her very worrying presentation when she is unwell and the fact that the medical evidence points to the near inevitability of further relapses.  She reminds me that the mother was self-harming as recently as February and, although wishing her well and not in any sense seeking a finding of fault on her part, notes that she is currently well cared for with an uncertain prognosis as to when she will leave hospital, there being no discharge plan.  Further, as yet, living in the community, which will be a major challenge after so long, quite apart from the background, is all yet to be faced.

27.              Mr Kinkaid on behalf of A associated himself with the local authority’s remarks, but reminded me of some of the particular features of Professor Turkington’s evidence to which I will have to come in a moment.  Really, the guardian found herself in exactly the same position as having to highlight the severity and chronicity of the mother’s illness and noting that the optimism for continued improvement nevertheless is qualified and cautious. 

28.              This is a desperately sad case.  It is, of course, always sad when the court is asked to make orders of the nature that are today sought.  That is particularly so in a case where so many positives can and have been identified and I do emphasise, as did Miss Smith quite appropriately, that the court is not in any sense concerned with blame, but is considering the question of welfare.  It is the awful truth that this mother is suffering from a very serious, enduring condition that has resulted in four very significant hospitalisations in a relatively short period of time.  Her most recent hospitalisation continues today and has now endured for nine months, albeit latterly on a voluntary basis, with no discharge date in sight. 

29.              The prognosis, I am afraid, on the evidence is not a good one, albeit there are early signs of optimism from the current response to her treatment with lamotrigine, but Professor Turkington is extremely cautious in projecting that forwards.  In his letter as recently as 6th May, he noted that, although her mood is currently normal, in bipolar disorder resistant to treatment he said there would also be expected to be periods of time which can last a number of months during which the mood is entirely normal and that is the natural course of the disorder.  Of course, I have already emphasised this is the fourth period in her short adult life where it has endured for a number of months.  He also identifies a number of negative prognostic indicators for stability: the genetic predisposition, the severity of the manic episodes which have been particularly difficult to treat, the long periods of hospitalisation and the use of the Act in order to enforce treatment.  Thus, it is against that background that his assessment of the chance of a degree of stability that would allow safe and consistent parenting over the medium term he would put in the order of 10 to 20 percent if there is continued evidence of positive response to lamotrigine. 

30.              I am reminded by Mr Kinkaid that, although the manic episode is over, she presents, as I have mentioned, with the full house of biological symptoms of depression, which themselves would pose a very considerable problem in terms of caring for a child over its minority.  Thus, the court is driven to the conclusion that, as matters stand, this is a mental illness of an enduring nature and of a severe kind. 

31.              The ups and downs that have undoubtedly occurred therefore raise the question of whether it is a manageable condition in terms of A and his being in the mother’s care.  The mother submits that there is a basis for finding that there would be support from both family, those I have identified, and the professionals, including her community psychiatric nurse, who unfortunately is about to change, as well as the community mental health team.  The court has of course experience of this in other contexts.  With a manageable condition where they may be episodic periods of ill health, it is sometimes possible to put in place a network of support that can variously monitor on a regular basis the wellbeing of the person with the condition, identify at an early stage signs of deterioration, make appropriate reports to the authorities when those signs are identified and ultimately step in and take over the care of any child in that person’s care.  With an appropriate team in place, it is sometimes possible to manage a placement in that way.  For it to work, it requires a very tight, close network of committed individuals because it is not small task.  It is a very considerable commitment from which there may be no respite at all.  It requires firm action to be taken in difficult circumstances.  It needs someone who can say to a mother, “You are not well.  Your child will have to come with me and stay with me until you are better.”  It needs a mother who can and will respond appropriately to such a direction.

32.              I have considered very carefully all that I have read and what has been submitted to the court today, but there really is in the court’s judgment no basis for considering that such a network can be created in the mother’s case, certainly not from those who have been identified. 

33.              In saying that, I point to the severity of this treatment resistant illness, which in the court’s judgment is self-evident.  A, if he had been an older child, would have had to have had an alternative carer for the last eight months with no timescales as at today as to when he might be able to go home.  Secondly, the mother’s response to challenge when she is unwell is itself problematic as the history shows.  Thirdly, I am afraid that her family members have been near invisible.  The local authority evidence points very clearly to that and even now I have short letters from three of them, not the individuals who wrote them, individuals who I have absolutely no doubt the local authority would have loved to have seen during these long months whilst the mother has been so unwell.  Indeed, the social worker commented in the parenting assessment of the lack of any regular reliable presence from any family member who could be identified as a potential source of support in due course. 

34.              Fourthly, each of the family members has problems of their own.  The maternal grandmother has had an enduring mental illness and has felt unable to visit her daughter in hospital, despite having apparently been well for the last twelve months, because of her concerns about revisiting an environment that has unhappy memories for her.  Those unhappy memories are of course understood, but in terms of prioritising her daughter and grandson, it is hardly a promising start. 

35.              So far as PU is concerned, he has a similar diagnosis, albeit is said to have been well for ten years and been in regular touch.  However, the question has to be posed as to where he has been, why has he not made contact with the local authority, why has he not put himself forwards having a unique understanding of what his sister has been experiencing. 

36.              So far as PA is concerned, it is thought that she has no similar diagnosis.  However, it is possible that she has been understandably preoccupied with prioritising her own baby at this time and it is really very unclear how she could give the commitment or be available for the type of role that would be necessary in the short, medium and long-term. 

37.              MGU2 withdrew from the process.  I note that he lives in [town B].  It is very difficult to see how he could fulfil the role of monitoring and stepping in without being in close proximity to mother, who it is assumed will be looking for accommodation close to where the immediate family are in [town A]. 

38.              As matters stand, there is no indication  from any of these carers that they would be in a position to care for A in any event for what might be long periods of time should there be a repetition of the type of illness that the mother has experienced over the last few months. 

39.              At the end of the day and stripped down to the basic essentials, the question has to be ‘can A be safe in his mother’s care?’.  When she is well, I could have a reasonable degree of confidence that he will be, based on the positives to which I have drawn attention.  The real difficulty is what happens when she becomes unwell.  Plainly, the manic episodes would be very dangerous, but the depressed mood that is described would also carry with it very considerable risk and, since the high level of risk associated with further episodes is such that I have already mentioned, it is clear that A would end up being significantly co-parented by others and certainly, on the material before the court, they would not be family members.  In the court’s judgment, the risk is one that is simply unmanageable, there are not practical mechanisms available that can in fact be put in place, whether family or professional or a combination of the two, that would safeguard A. 

40.              Adoption is, as has been said, a drastic remedy.  It is to be contemplated only where nothing else will do.  The court must reach the conclusion that nothing else will do only once it has evaluated all the other realistically available options and considered whether its concerns can adequately be met by the provision of appropriate support services, whether from the local authority or family and friends.  I have taken into account what is said by way of support that may be offered.  However, I am afraid I am not persuaded that they can provide the necessary monitoring, support and safety mechanisms which A would need for him to be safe in his mother’s care and nor can the local authority, however substantial the support may be in principle, step in, in such circumstances.

41.              In that position, despite everything that has been said by the mother and urged on me by Miss Sweeting, I am afraid I am driven unhesitatingly to the conclusion that A’s welfare now and into the future and indeed throughout his life demands that I grant the local authority the orders that it seeks.  I am satisfied that this is one of those sad and exceptional cases where nothing else will do.  There is in the court’s judgment no other outcome capable of affording A the protection, security and stability that he must have from the risk that has been identified.  For the same reason, I am satisfied that his welfare does require me to dispense with the mother’s consent to his adoption. 

42.              This is not, I want to emphasise, a case where my decision is driven by any sense of blame directed at the mother, still less by a belief that A will simply have a better life if he is adopted.  It is more fundamental than that.  It goes to the question of whether A can be kept safe and have his needs met and the fact is that, in the court’s judgment, he will not be. 

[Judgment ends]


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