England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges)

IN THE FAMILY COURT AT NEWCASTLE

Case No:  NE17C00006

 

The Law Courts

The Quayside

Newcastle-upon-Tyne

Tyne & Wear

NE1 3LA

 

 

Tuesday, 4^th May 2017

 

 

Before:

HIS HONOUR JUDGE SIMON WOOD

 

 

B E T W E E N:

 

 

A Local Authority

 

and

 

 

1) M

2) F

3) C (A Child)

 

 

MS M KING solicitor, appeared on behalf of the Applicant

MS D DIXON solicitor, appeared on behalf of the First Respondent

MR N ELLIOTT solicitor, appeared on behalf of the Second Respondent

MR D BRADLEY solicitor, appeared on behalf of the Third Respondent

 

 

JUDGMENT (Approved)

 

If this Transcript is to be reported or published, there is a requirement to ensure that no reporting restriction will be breached.  This is particularly important in relation to any case involving a sexual offence, where the victim is guaranteed lifetime anonymity (Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992), or where an order has been made in relation to a young person.

 

 

HHJ WOOD: 

 

1.                  The court is concerned with the welfare of C, a boy born on 7 July 2016, and so now 10 months old.  He is the second child of M, his mother, and F, his father, an unmarried couple who are certainly physically separated by virtue of the fact that the father is currently serving a prison sentence, but the state of their emotional relationship is, to put it neutrally, ambiguous.  They deny that it is an ongoing relationship.  The Local Authority believe the contrary to be the case, a belief which is reinforced by information that they have received from both sets of grandparents who suggest that it is nevertheless an ongoing relationship.

2.                  Belatedly, C having been in the care of the Local Authority since his birth, the Local Authority, on 6 January 2017, issued this application seeking a care order in respect of him.  It now presents a plan of permanence by way of the making of a care order and a placement order, a plan that is supported by C’s Children’s Guardian, and not opposed actively by either parent.

3.                  Why does the Local Authority say that C would be likely to suffer significant harm, and the likelihood of that harm is because the child would not receive the care that would be reasonably expected from a parent?

4.                  These parents, who were born the father in 1990 and the mother in 1992, are also the parents of B, a boy born in 2012.  When B was 11 weeks old he was found to be suffering from a subdural haematoma as well as facial bruising.  That became the subject of litigation and a fact-finding hearing within care proceedings, where the court found that B’s mother had caused his injuries and B’s father had failed to protect B from that harm.  There was no acceptance of those findings then – indeed, as I will come to, there is very limited acceptance of them now – and B was placed in the care of his paternal grandparents under a special guardianship order, where he remains to date.

5.                  When it became known that the mother was pregnant again, the Local Authority embarked on a pre-birth assessment of both parents, who indicated their intention to be considered as sole carers for the unborn baby.  It was a negative assessment.  The post-birth assessment that followed C’s birth was also negative and, in short, it is concluded that neither parent accepted any responsibility for the injury to B in 2012.  It also found that there was ongoing evidence of domestic abuse between the parents, the last reported incident, before C’s birth, being as recently as 22 June, when the mother alleged that the father had thrown a petrol bomb at her home, amongst other things.

6.                  Subsequent to C’s birth it was felt that neither parent had committed wholeheartedly to contact.  Mother’s contact reduced from three times a week to once a week at her own request.  Father stopped attending contact in September altogether and has not seen C since.

7.                  Another concern, which is perhaps apparent from where the father currently resides, is that his criminal behaviour has persisted, with a variety of offences of dishonesty and drug use, amongst other things.

8.                  No alternative carers were advanced who were able to care for him and were suitable to care for C.  However, at the case management hearing, the mother indicated to the court her intention, or wish at any rate, to instruct an independent social worker.  She was critical of the assessment of her and therefore asked for this to be revisited.

9.                  A Part 25 application followed.  It was approved, in my absence, by Her Honour Judge Hudson, and the timetable was modified accordingly.  However, unexpectedly, and very shortly after that permission was granted, the mother indicated through her solicitor that she did not wish any longer to seek to oppose the making of the order sought by the Local Authority.

10.              At an urgent directions hearing held on 9 March, the court again revised the timetable to an issues resolution hearing today, which is how the matter comes before the court.  The position, therefore, is that the findings from 2012 in large measure stand.  The mother continues to deny responsibility for the serious injuries found on B.  The father is more accepting to this extent: he denies any responsibility of causing the injuries but acknowledges that he ought to have sought treatment earlier.  There is an acceptance by both parents of the history of domestic abuse. 

11.              In those circumstances the Local Authority submits that the threshold is made out, is crossed, that assessment rules out a safe placement with either parent, whether separately or together.  The mother does not seek to oppose the making of an order, albeit cannot agree to it, and likewise, whilst the father does not agree to the making of order, he accepts that he is no position to care for C now or in the foreseeable future, and he too does not seek actively to oppose.

12.              The Children’s Guardian has filed her report.  I have considered it.  It supports the Local Authority plan on the basis that this is, sadly, one of those exceptional cases where there is simply no realistic alternative plan that will meet C’s needs going forwards.  In addition, she pays tribute, as do I, to the very difficult decision that these parents, who have not attended this hearing, have made.  The parents are not here, but lest that be held against them, I should explain briefly why.  The mother is presently in hospital and I am grateful to her for giving her solicitor instructions to enable this hearing to proceed.  As far as the father is concerned, an arrangement was made for him to attend by video link this morning from prison, where he is held.  He was able to have a consultation with his solicitor before this hearing was called on this morning.  He confirmed his instructions to her but also indicated that he did not wish to attend the hearing itself.

13.              There is no issue as to the legal principles that the court must apply.  It is for the Local Authority to prove on the balance of probabilities the facts upon which it seeks to rely.  It is for the Local Authority, since it seeks to have C adopted, to establish that, in the circumstances, ‘nothing else will do’.  Those words, of course, come from the leading Supreme Court case of Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33, as well as the cases that followed in the Court of Appeal, in particular Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146. 

14.              I remind myself that in Re B, Baroness Hale said: ‘The test for severing the relationship between parents and child is very strict – only in exceptional circumstances and where motivated by the overriding requirements pertaining to the child’s welfare, in short where nothing else will do’.  

15.              That was no more than an echo of the European jurisprudence, as set out in YC v The United Kingdom [2012] ECHR 433:

‘Family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and that everything must be done to preserve personal relations, and where appropriate to rebuild the family.  It is not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his upbringing, however where the maintenance of family ties would harm the child’s health and development the parent is not entitled under Article 8 to insist that such ties be maintained’.

16.              In considering the Local Authority’s application for a care order, I must of course have regard to the welfare checklist in Section 1 of the Children Act 1989, and since the plan is for adoption, to the welfare checklist in Section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002.  I must treat as my paramount consideration, in accordance with Section 1(2) of the 2002 Act, C’s welfare throughout his life, and in deciding whether or not to dispense with the parents’ consent, I must apply Section 52(1)(b) of the 2002 Act, as explained in Re P in 2008.

17.              I have summarised the evidence to the extent that is necessary for the purpose of dealing with this application.  Sadly, the threshold is plainly crossed by virtue of the concessions which have been made, arising most particularly from the events of 2012.  It is not sought to be challenged further.  In addition, as has been acknowledged by all, there is a stark lack of alternatives available to the court in determining what plan best meets C’s welfare going forwards. 

18.              Adoption is, of course, a drastic remedy.  It will only be contemplated where nothing else will do.  However, the court must not come to the conclusion that nothing else will do until it has evaluated all the other realistically available options and considered whether its concerns can adequately be met by the provision of appropriate support and services, whether from the Local Authority or from family and friends.  In addition, this is a case where there are no family and friends who can provide that support and service.  Nor can the Local Authority, however substantial the support it might, in principle, be able to offer. 

19.              In those circumstances, I am driven, sadly but unhesitatingly, to the conclusion that C’s welfare now and into the future, throughout his life, demands that I grant the Local Authority the care and placement orders it seeks.  I am satisfied that nothing else will do and, for the same reasons, I am satisfied that C’s welfare requires me to dispense with his parents’ consent to adoption.  This is not, I stress, a case where the decision is driven by nothing more than the belief that C will have a better life if he is adopted.  It is far more fundamental than that, because it goes to the essence of the question of whether C will be safe and his welfare needs met if rehabilitated to the care of either or both of his parents, and in the court’s judgement, sadly he will not be.

20.              This is, of course, I accept, a matter that is deeply distressing to the parents.  There is very little by way of consolation that can be offered to parents in such circumstances, but I hope that, in the long term, the opportunity that C is afforded by this order of being kept safe, and being able to fulfil whatever potential he may have, will be some consolation.

 

End of Judgment

Transcript from a recording by Ubiqus

61 Southwark Street, London SE1 0HL

Tel: 020 7269 0370

[email protected]