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	England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges)
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges) >> A Local Authority v M & Ors [2017] EWFC B66 (10 August 2017) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2017/B66.html Cite as: [2017] EWFC B66

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IN THE FAMILY COURT AT NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE

		The Law Courts The Quayside Newcastle-upon-Tyne Tyne & Wear NE1 3LA 10.30am – 12pm
		10th August 2017

This Transcript is Crown Copyright. It may not be reproduced in whole or in part, other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority. All rights are reserved.

If this Transcript is to be reported or published, there is a requirement to ensure that no reporting restriction will be breached. This is particularly important in relation to any case involving a sexual offence, where the victim is guaranteed lifetime anonymity (Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992), or where an order has been made in relation to a young person.
 


HH Judge Simon WOOD:

Introduction

1. The court is concerned with the welfare of G, a girl born on 8 June 2016, and, therefore, now 14 months old. She is the only child of M, a 20-year-old woman, and F, a 25-year-old man.
2. The local authority issued proceedings on 20 June 2016 and now seeks a care order and placement order in respect of G. The application is supported by G's Children's Guardian, Laurie Forsey, but opposed by the parents. Presenting to the court as separated, they each seek to care for G. In M's case, if she cannot, she supports the local authority's case as the alternative to F. Insofar as F is concerned, he is opposed to M caring for G. No other family carers have been identified who have either been positively assessed or sought to challenge the assessment of them and so the options facing G, the parents and indeed the court are stark.
3. At the outset, I should point out that this is a much delayed final hearing. Proceedings were issued on 20 June when G was just 12 days old. They were timetabled to an Issues Resolution Hearing on 18 October but the case not ready so it was re-timetabled to ensure that it was ready for a final hearing listed on 25 January 2017.
4. When the Guardian filed, she identified gaps in the evidence with particular reference to M, which feature in the judgment that follows. Therefore, she recommended further assessment which, ultimately, the local authority agreed to on a community, as opposed to a residential basis. But at the listed final hearing in January, the case was re-timetabled for a second time to a further Issues Resolution Hearing on 15 March. At that hearing it was listed for trial for the second time on 14 June, but that hearing had to be vacated because of F's presentation, which was thought to be psychotic and raised a question in the mind of his, by then former, legal team and indeed the judge, that he may lack the capacity to litigate.
5. The case was therefore adjourned. He was examined by Dr Ince for the specific purpose of considering the question of capacity and found to have it, and so, on 21 June, the case was listed for a third time for a final hearing before me to start on 8 August. That date was only achieved by cancelling a pre-arranged period when I was not sitting in order to avoid it going off to the earliest date that listing could then offer, which was 17 October.
6. Therefore, although two months were shaved off that rather pessimistic timetable, the fact is that this final hearing has taken place when G is 14 months old, having spent all but the first 13 days of her life in foster care. In the context of the Children Act 1989, Section 1, Subsection 3, as well as the requirement to complete cases within 26 weeks, and I note that this is now week 59, decision making for G has been seriously delayed and, thus, the local authority and the Guardian urge resolution for G now.

The nature of the case

7. Why does the local authority say that G was suffering, or likely to suffer significant harm, and that such harm, or its likelihood, was because she was not receiving the care that would be reasonably expected from the parent? There was, in relation to M, agreement in relation to the question of threshold in that it is her case, which coincides with the local authority case, that the relationship that she had with F was characterised by significant domestic abuse including violence and that, notwithstanding the nature of that relationship, it continued for a significant period thereafter despite the abuse to which she was being exposed.
8. She also accepts that the precipitating event, which occurred on 18 June 2016, in which she permitted F to come into contact with G, was in breach of a written agreement that she had with the local authority. She also accepts that she, herself, has had a long history of local authority involvement due to a difficult childhood, on which I will touch a little more shortly.
9. Insofar as F is concerned, he denies that he has been guilty of any behaviour that would have exposed G to significant harm, or the risk of it, and, thus, the local authority case is not agreed. By way of a mirror image of the case against M, it is said by the local authority that F was domestically abusive towards M, including the use of actual violence and thus was a perpetrator, resulting in many police callouts to support M, and it is the risk that flows from that as well the general volatility of the relationship, that the local authority seeks to demonstrate amount to threshold in his case.
10. It seems to the court beyond argument that the essence of the local authority case is to be found in the volatile relationship that has existed between these parents for the whole of G's life together with their inability, or unwillingness, to cooperate with professionals, and their openness and honesty in dealing with those professionals. Indeed, in M's case, the latter is the only outstanding issue, albeit she accepts that the following protective measures being taken that she was, indeed, responsible for not being open and honest with the local authority, whereas, as I said, F denies he is responsible for any such behaviour and lays the blame entirely upon M.

Background

11. There is, however, a very significant background of concern. As I have mentioned, M had a difficult childhood and was known to the local authority from at least July 2011 and, without reciting the history in great detail, she became known to the local authority on a Child In Need basis. This was, initially, because of her troubling behaviour which, over the time that followed that initial involvement, escalated to include substance misuse, physical aggression, controlling behaviour by her of key adults in her life, absconding, misuse of drink, the entering into inappropriate relationships, being herself subject to harbouring notices in respect of people found in her care, and, ultimately, ending up being the subject of a secure accommodation order.
12. She plainly had the most difficult childhood, with a confrontational and a violent relationship with her own mother that escalated in the way that I have described. It was a feature of her behaviour that she was manipulative with adults, was reluctant and, at times, refused to let professionals intervene or help her, engaging with professionals in a superficial way at best. Although subject to the leaving care provisions with an allocated worker, she has not meaningfully availed herself of the help on offer.
13. The background would suggest that she had not had the structures or role models that any young mother would need if they are successfully and safely to parent a young and vulnerable child. Amongst the worrying relationships that she has had is that with F which began when she was 16. Issues between them were known to the police from at least April 2015, and on 6 May of that year, following a second police callout, the police informed the local authority that M was by then pregnant.
14. There was then an escalation of incidents with the case being considered by a MARAC on 4 June 2015. However, complaints continued through the rest of the year, including a child concern notification in October of that year following a complaint by her of domestic violence in which F was alleged to have punched her in the face and spat on her as she tried to get back up from the ground where she had been knocked. Their neighbours at that time reported many arguments between the parents. It was said that she was then 11 weeks' pregnant. The case was referred to a MARAC. M had not been booked in for antenatal care and, in the weeks following, there were further callouts to police following more arguments between the parents in the course of which she reported again that she had been assaulted.
15. A pre-birth assessment was completed by the local authority on 26 January and it concluded that the case needed to proceed into child protection measures, with an initial child protection conference arranged. The assessment raised a large number of concerns, which I can summarise as follows. In addition to the long history of Children's Services involvement and the lack of engagement with services or professionals, the local authority was concerned as to her lack of insight as to why the local authority might be worried about her pregnancy. There was also her reconciliation with the father of the unborn baby despite the complaints of violence she had made, her lack of honesty about her relationship, as well as practical matters such as not maintaining her tenancy and not accepting support from relevant services.
16. Looking at the longer term background concerns were: the collusion of her family historically, despite her controlling and manipulating manner; her history of damaged attachments and the lack of evidence of a stable lifestyle for any length of time. Her inexperience was self-evident. There were concerns about her substance misuse. There was a risk, if not worse, of sexual exploitation, that was reflected by the harbouring notices that had been served on the premises to which she had absconded, as well as she having harboured girls from another local authority. Finally, she was not engaging with the 16 plus team in anticipation of leaving care.
17. At the conference on 17 March, the unborn baby was made the subject of a child protection plan under the category of neglect and the plan, at that stage, was for the baby to be received into foster care at birth. However, a dramatic improvement in M's behaviour and engagement after the conference resulted in the local authority revising its plan. It was keen to offer M, as a young mother, a foster placement with a mother and baby placement. She declined that and so, with some hesitation, a community assessment, anticipated to last eight weeks, was agreed upon.
18. When G was born a written agreement was signed in which she agreed to prioritise G over F and ensure that he had no contact with the child. Within 10 days that had broken down with incidents occurring on 17 and 18 June, where, on the latter occasion, after she had gone on a night out with F, with G in her great-grandmother's care, the parents returned to their home and F is said to have demanded that G be handed over to him. The great-grandmother refused and it is alleged that he then made threats of trouble to her.
19. It is a fact that, within hours, the grandmother's car was set on fire, completely burnt out and there was much damage caused to neighbouring structures in the process. F denies, absolutely, any responsibility for that. He has certainly never been charged with any offence and he suggests that it was simply an unfortunate coincidence.
20. However M's behaviours, in bringing F to the house where G was, in having met up with him despite her agreement to prioritise G over her relationship with him, against the background of her reports of his violence and the risk that he posed to her, let alone a child, caused the local authority to act which it did, by issuing proceedings and seeking an interim care order with a plan of removal, which was granted.
21. Following issue, the local authority agreed to carry out a parenting assessment of both parents, and M engaged. The local authority says F did not.
22. The outcome was negative for each. It is a comprehensive document but its conclusion can be summarised, thus: that M would be unable to offer stable, secure and long term care to G due to her lifestyle choices, her perpetuating her relationship with F despite it being an abusive one and which, despite completing the Freedom Project, caused her to continue to blame herself as the instigator of abuse as well as minimising the role of F. Her inability to recognise the impact of that posed, in the local authority's opinion, an unmanageable risk that exposed G to harm.
23. In F's case, he simply had not engaged. He failed to attend any contact during this period with his daughter, despite arrangements facilitated pursuant to a risk assessment. Nor did he attend any sessions to contribute to the parenting assessment.
24. The delay in timing for the issues resolution hearing scheduled in October meant that the Guardian did not file until 18 January in accordance with the then revised timetable. The Guardian noted significant positives in M:

(i) a cessation in the use of alcohol, drugs and cigarettes from the moment she had become pregnant;

(ii) no reports of risk-taking behaviour;

(iii) a clear ability to meet G's needs in contact;

(iv) continued evidence of her ability to care for G, which was the assessment made when G was still in hospital.

25. Set against that, however, was the significant risk of domestic abuse, which M continued to minimise, from a man that the Guardian describes as volatile, not engaging with services and having difficulty with emotional regulation.

25. M insisted that the relationship had ended but it was described by the Guardian as the central issue and one of great uncertainty. Nevertheless the Guardian felt that, given a chance, M may yet be able to demonstrate sufficient change. In that event, the capacity to care had not been fully tested and so, given, by then, the clear local authority plan, she recommended a further period of assessment. The outcome therefore was the community-based assessment that ended on 9 March. That too has many positives.

(i) M's ability to provide day-to-day care was proven and, in her evidence, the Guardian said that it was plainly better than good enough.

(ii) M showed great emotional warmth towards G and, again, the Guardian said, in evidence, that seeing M and daughter together was a lovely experience.

(iii) she had an entirely suitable and well-presented home.

27. However, the local authority continued to express concern that M was still minimising the risk posed by F. They had been dishonest about the relationship in the past and, against the background of her own upbringing, her limited engagement with the local authority, including the leaving care services and her vulnerability born of her past experiences, the assessment risk, the local authority felt, was entirely justified.

26. Having told M of the outcome, within hours, F was back at her home, resulting in, what M alleges, was a serious assault on her.
27. Accordingly, the plan went into reverse and there were further worrying incidents.

(i) on 9 April 2017, M reported that F had thrown a glass at her, had been verbally abusive and intimidating.

(ii) on 24 April, the police were called on M's complaint that F had been harassing her with vile threats made by texts and phone calls.

(iii) on the same day, later that night, M was found in a written-off car, at which F had been involved in off-roading at [a village] on the other side of [the county], and he was arrested in respect of other matters.

(iv) on 7 June, an incomplete 999 call resulted in the police attending M's property, F was found to be there. No complaint was made by either but there had obviously been an incident of some kind between them.

(v) on 9 June, and this was not an incident involving M, there was a verbal altercation between F and his father, resulting in F breaking his own father's van window. F attended the police station to hand himself in and, whilst he was there in respect of the damage to the van, he volunteered that he had sexually touched a child six years before, as well as downloaded child pornography.

30. There are certain common threads in the first four of those five events:

(i) having called the police on several occasions, M declined to make a complaint.

(ii) she refused to provide a witness statement.

(iii) expressly, on 24 April, she said she was not complaining because to do so may jeopardise her chances at getting G back.

(iv) she reported that she was seeking a non-molestation order, via her solicitor, to protect her from F.

(v) on 7 June, M denied that there had been ever been a relationship with F to the police. It took F to tell the police that they, in fact, had not only had a relationship but had a child together, that they were not meant to be together, hence they had not wanted the local authority to know about the events of that day.

31. In respect of F, no one knows whether there was any truth in what he said on 9 June. No evidence of it, certainly, was found. The police and the local authority recognised it could be pure fantasy. F attributes it to psychosis caused by non-prescription painkilling medication that was provided following a head injury in a road traffic accident.

28. It is the fact that he was detained under the Mental Health Act, section 2, hence the failure of the final hearing on 14 June when he did, indeed, appear psychotic. Unfortunately, although he submitted to a capacity assessment, as I have mentioned, he has declined to provide his medical records and has not sought to put before the court any other evidence to explain his then mental state, still less whether his explanation for his psychotic behaviour is or may be the correct one, a considerable concern, given the thread running through the papers of illicit drug use, which is something else he denies.
29. There was another incident, on 15 June, when the police attended his home after he had made threats to kill G following the row with his father who had reportedly removed his cannabis. Steroids were removed from F's bedroom. F denied that he had any intent to harm G but, nevertheless, the police expressed concern as to his increasingly aggressive behaviour.
30. There the history of incidents end. The local authority suggest that there have been no more since that date, albeit the last police disclosure is dated 12 June. Certainly, no concerning information regarding M has been noted, since the last one that I have mentioned.
31. F, meanwhile, sought to engage himself in the litigation, having dismissed his lawyers. He requested contact which the local authority offered on the basis of once a week until sufficient commitment was shown to progress it. That commitment was demonstrated and it is unfortunate that the plan to increase it regularly to twice a week has, largely, been frustrated by events beyond anyone's control, such as G developing chickenpox. G's contact with F has been largely positive. There is evidence of inexperience, which is understandable, but no worrying behaviour as such.

The parties' positions

32. That, therefore, brings the matter to the present day. The local authority case, very simply, is that, notwithstanding M's very considerable qualities, the risk that the on-off nature of what is a violent and volatile relationship poses, whether with F or anybody else of a similar character, is such that it would expose G to an unacceptable risk of serious harm that cannot be mitigated by any measures that could be put in place. The underlying problem is M's lack of acceptance of this risk, and her inability or unwillingness to address it, coupled with her inability or unwillingness to be honest with those seeking to help her. Likewise, says the local authority, F remains a wholly unassessed risk of a significant order, who has not engaged in this litigation in a meaningful way, until the last couple of months, such that it could not begin to support placement of G with him.
33. M, on her part, accepts the criticisms of her, almost without reservation, but says that she now realises that F poses a risk to G, as well as to her, and so will now do anything to keep herself and G safe and separate from F. Recognising it is late in the day, it is argued that there are so many positives for such a young mother that it would be wrong to shut the door on her now. G is young enough for M to given a further chance in the knowledge that, if she does not take it, it is not too late for the local authority plan to be approved. Through Counsel, she invites me to make a care order today enabling the local authority to share parental responsibility, but place G with her: thereby the local authority would be able to step in should there be any recurrence of worrying behaviour. In those circumstances, I am asked to finalise the proceedings and leave the question of rehabilitation to be managed under the care order.
34. F strongly opposes both the local authority's case and M's proposal. He seeks a plan to rehabilitate G to his care. He suggests that would be achieved over six weeks. He maintains that he has been wrongly accused of many things which are all fabrications, mainly by M. He says that he will bring G up, describing it as 'a big sacrifice for me', and he said that he would protect her from M, whom he characterises as the violent party here, and he would deny her, as a result, any contact with her daughter.
35. The Guardian remains supportive of the local authority case despite the considerable praise that she expressed in respect of M, describing the efforts that she has made to lead a normal, decent life, including holding down a job, as unique in her experience of young parents who have suffered the type of upbringing that she has had. Despite the 'exceptional care' that M has been seen to offer G, the Guardian maintains that the moment for demonstrating that she can be open and honest, can separate from F and not enter into a similar relationship and show sustained stability has passed so far as G is concerned. At 14 months, with all but a few days of which spent in foster care, G's primary attachment is now to her foster carer. She needs to transfer that to a reliable permanent carer sooner rather than later, a carer who can offer the sustained, stable and safe care that G inevitably needs.

The law

36. There has been no dispute as to the legal principles that the court has to apply. It is for the local authority to prove, on the balance of probabilities, the facts upon which it seeks to rely. It is for the local authority, since it is seeking to have G adopted, to establish that nothing else will do. Those principles are derived from the leading Supreme Court case Re B [2013] UKSC 33 followed by Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146. I remind myself that Baroness Hale in Re B emphasised that: 'the test for severing of the relationship between parent and child is very strict, only in exceptional circumstances and when motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to the child's welfare, in short, where nothing else will do'. That was no more than an echo of what was said by the European Court in YC v United Kingdom [2012] ECHR.
37. In considering the local authority's application for a care order, I must, of course, have regard to the welfare checklist in the Children's Act 1989, Section 1 and, since the plan is one for adoption, also the welfare checklist in the Adoption and Children Act 2002, section 1. In that context I must regard, as my paramount consideration, G's welfare throughout her life. In deciding whether or not to dispense with her parents' consent, I must apply the Adoption and Children Act 2002, Section 52, as explained in Re B.

The evidence received

38. This has been a short case in which I heard only from the key social worker since January, SW, M, F and the Guardian. F, as I have said, represented himself having filed a lengthy and undated statement in which he refutes every allegation made against him. However, the opportunity afforded the local authority to call primary evidence to answer each of F's points, was, by virtue of the manner in which this case has developed procedurally, significantly reduced, but the court is satisfied, within the parameters of the factual issues, that there is, in fact, sufficient evidence to make the findings that most influenced the issues that now need determining.

The social worker

39. SW filed no fewer than six statements, as well as her own parenting assessment of M, to which I refer. She conceded that determining what was best for G had not been easy and that reaching the conclusion that G needs to be adopted was a difficult one. However, despite the positives, she said it came down to basic issues of safety and M's ability to protect G.
40. Stressing that it was not all about M's relationship with F, SW said it was about all relationships because there was a lack of insight on M's part, in her denial over a long period of time, that there were in fact issues along with M's own determination to cope alone without help.
41. Acknowledging that her start in life would have made it very hard for M to accept help, she pointed to the length of time this case has taken and despite, in her view, having built a successful relationship with M, offering support and advice, as she put it, above and beyond, she said that it had largely fallen on deaf ears despite the knowledge of the worst case outcome if it came to that. This worried her and, in short, SW said she is a mother who does not follow through where following through is required.
42. SW was not persuaded that M's acceptance of risk can now readily be accepted. She said the intense community assessment ended with a serious domestically abusive incident. Within weeks she was willingly getting into F's car and setting off across [the county].
43. Even if the penny has now dropped, M has done nothing to protect herself via any legal framework, for example the obtaining of a non-molestation order, something that had been discussed several times, and her reluctant conclusion is that she simply has not demonstrated her capacity to protect her daughter. Not only has she not followed up matters such as police advice, making a statement, prosecuting, changing locks, addressing housing, she had failed to access her leading care worker who she described as having much to offer.
44. SW rejected Mr Cahill's suggestion of a yet further plan of support as being too late. Pointing to the intensity of the assessment between January and March which, despite the positives noted, was characterised by continued denial in the face of absolute clarity as to the risk and reluctance to accept support. She suggested that, despite the good things, it was ultimately a superficial engagement in terms of the central issue of failure or the inability to protect.
45. She could not accept that it would be appropriate for G simply to be placed under a care order because she believed that F would disregard any legal order and, whether his attention was focused on M or G, he would likely disrupt and cause harm. Also, there was no evidence from which she could conclude that M would appropriately follow through as required because, quite simply, she never has done in the past.
46. Stressing that it was not just F's behaviour that worried her, she said that the Freedom Project completed, seemingly successfully by M, was followed by the continued demonstration of lack of insight and persistence with that abusive relationship. Accordingly, more work was needed and M was also likely to need some therapeutic work, when she is in a position to accept it, to address her own past difficult experiences. In short, SW could not conceive of a plan that ensured G's safety in M's care. She argued it was too late to embark on a new plan and, however good things were at the present time, history showed that matters can deteriorate very quickly. Hence it is not safe to return G to M's care. She also pointed to the adverse consequences of yet more delay, in respect of G in terms of attachment.
47. SW acknowledged F had attended contact regularly since it was reinstated, at his request, in June and there had been no issues worthy of the name. I only mention the one that she did raise, namely the attempt by F to give G a Haribo sweet, to emphasise to F that neither she, nor the court, considered it was a serious issue. I emphasise it will play no part in the decision making process in respect of G at all.
48. SW shared F's frustration that contact had not progressed as much as had been hoped but she rejected outright the proposal for a rehabilitation plan, such as M had had in January, saying:

'I would not see it as feasible in terms of G's safety. It has taken two staff to supervise contact, there had been a recent reported threat via police to G's life, there had been a recent drug induced psychosis and hospital admission, there is a history of concerns over substance misuse in the context of a significant police incident on 9 June over cannabis when steroids were also found in his room'.

Nor was she convinced by F's protestations that the allegations made against him were false nor the fact that there were no convictions. She said there was no arguing with the finding of steroids and the hospital admission for the psychosis. That was the local authority evidence, as it was explored in court.

The mother's evidence

49. M gave evidence. She had made a statement on 8 August, her only substantive statement, handed in as the hearing began, in which she acknowledged, without qualification, the criticisms of her pertaining to F, suggesting that following the last incident on 7 June: 'I think I have finally learnt my lesson', and she asked the court to give her a chance. Acknowledging that she had made 'a number of mistakes', the explanation of what those were amounted to a failure to appreciate the need to cut all ties with F, saying that, having tried to remain in touch with him as friends to speak about G, she realised it was not possible. In fact, it was F's hospitalisation in June that made her think 'I should not put this on myself'.
50. She explained her denial, or minimisation, of domestic abuse as fear that it would reflect badly on her to admit it in full. She insisted that calling the police had been an appropriate action to safeguard herself and she said that she had learnt from the Freedom Project, such that she would be able to walk away from any similar situations in the future.
51. Having not heard from him 'for some time', M said that this has been the longest period without F, and the happiest. He is, for reasons that were lost on her, focused now on G, but she said that were he to contact her she would know what to do, namely, call the police.
52. Cross examined, she said that she had always known there was something not quite right about F but all had been fine until she became pregnant. Identifying the risk as being to herself all along, she said it was a text to her that made her realise that the risk extended to G as well. Reluctant to say what it was that he had texted, she wrote down what she indicated was a sanitised version of the text message, which amounted to a suggestion that he was going to perpetrate a form of sexual abuse on G.
53. That suggestion, made in cross examination for the first time in the case to the obvious surprise of all when it was pointed out, as was the case, that it was at the very time when contact was being promoted for F, she said that she did not think to tell SW about it because she knew the contact was being supervised and so, inferentially, was not a real risk. However she insisted that the further parenting assessment had been positive and that the assault on her only happened after it had ended.
54. She said she had not obtained a non-molestation order as she felt that it would make F want to come round more, rather than the reverse. The incident on 24 April had not been intended to happen as it did: she simply got in the car to chat to him. The abandoned 999 call had indeed been made by her when she had been threatened, but she said that he had, nevertheless, not committed any offence. She insisted she would keep G safe by ensuring no communication with F, keeping her house secure and locked, as well as obtaining a non-molestation order and an exclusion order: 'I will do anything I could to protect her'.

The father's evidence

55. F gave evidence by way of a 15-page statement, filed shortly before the hearing. In essence, it is his case that M has lied and fabricated, both before and after G was born. The violent partner in the relationship was M. Despite all this, he had been prepared to stand back to give her a chance with the local authority. When she finally failed the assessment in 2017, he stepped back in to prove that he could be the carer for G and that he was not the person the local authority believed him to be.
56. His illness, in June, was a psychosis induced by the painkilling medication, from which he has fully recovered. He has cut all ties with M and he will engage in full with professionals to offer G a stable, safe and loving environment. He was insistent that he posed no risk at all to G. Each incident relied on by the local authority had been instigated by M. He had never assaulted her or been abusive. It was, in fact, the other way round with M using the police as a means of getting back at him. He suggested that it was M's inability to meet G's needs that had ruled her out: it was not a question of her inability to protect, the implication being there was nothing that she needed to protect herself from. He said the relationship was now 100% finished.
57. His early non-engagement was explicable by:

(i) giving M a chance to prove that she could care.

(ii) his heavy work commitments. He is employed as a contract grounds worker and, at times, he has put in additional hours as a pizza delivery driver.

(iii) It was natural that he should come forward after M failed that assessment as there was now no role for M in G's life because of the risk that she poses.

The children's guardian's evidence

62. The Children's Guardian, who is, it has to be said, enormously experienced, gave evidence. As already mentioned, she came out fighting for M in January, but in her final report in June, she identified the risk in respect of M, thus:

'M does not regard herself as a victim of domestic abuse and since she has acknowledged that she is able to fight back during physical altercations with F, she has stated that, if he is a risk, then so is she. Sadly I agree with her. I do not believe that M would physically harm G, and I know that she is aware of the emotional damage to children growing up within an abusive environment. However, if she does not consider herself to be a victim of domestic abuse when she is at the point of losing her child as a result of it, then in my view her own coping mechanisms do not support the reality of the situation. In these circumstances, I have no confidence that she fully understands the importance of health positive attachments for herself and, by extension, for G. M has not been honest with the local authority and in doing so, she has put her own need to continue as G's carer before her daughter's need for safe, emotionally nurturing, predictable care'.

63. In respect of F, Ms Forsey said this:

'F has not been a stable figure in his daughter's life, has not established a reciprocal attachment with her or demonstrated that he is able to meet her needs. He has also not been able to demonstrate ability in his own life, particularly recently, and does not acknowledge much of the police information about his actions. In my view, G would not be safe in his care'.

58. The oral evidence that she heard did not change her view. Whilst F was good with G in contact, his inexperience as a parent was apparent. She was troubled by his increasing rigidity in thinking 'that doesn't allow the possibility that he needs help or may be wrong', something she described as being very dangerous for a child. However, the emotional harm, to which G would be exposed from the chaotic lifestyle that she characterised as 'volatile, explosive at times', would be significant but, raised the prospect of G being unable to go on to form secure, predictable attachments necessary for her emotional wellbeing as she grows up.
59. Of M, she said this: 'She has so much potential, she has come so far in so many ways, and she is unique in organising her life to become employed'. However, she went on to say:

'Some of her testimony made me aware that she has a long way to go. She has survived on her wits. She asks what she needs to do to overcome hurdles in a strategic way and to do so has not been entirely honest. There are huge issues with trust, which is what makes me hesitate. I am not sure she would have the confidence to work with the local authority'.

Stressing that she had potential, she said this: 'Without the confidence that she would work collaboratively with authorities, that orders put in place would not work'.

60. The additional concerns she raised was the impact of F's now expressed views about M were G to be placed in her care. She said: 'I think he is likely to be round more, and G will grow up without being able to rely on a secure, stable home with people whose focus can be on her emotional wellbeing'.
61. Ms Forsey agreed with the local authority that M's instinct is to protect herself, and then address the problem. She acknowledged, repeatedly, that there are 'many things that she has done for herself to her advantage, for which she is to be commended, but there are many things she cannot do and that is where the risk of harm lies'.
62. To Mr Cahill, she acknowledged that M was now making the right noises, but: 'It is late in the day. I have no doubt about her potential but it is a year on and she has not been able to demonstrate that she can do it'.
63. Emphasising that M had been told repeatedly of the need to be open and honest for over a year, she said: 'I wish I could be persuaded by her. I'm not sure if I believe it or whether the circumstances here, at the final moment, have made her think she has to do something now'. Asked if more delay would not harm G, she said that she proposed more time be taken in January because she felt it could then be taken without harming G. She said: 'I was very keen. She is now 14 months old and is likely to regard the foster care as her home'.

Discussion

64. It is not in dispute that the threshold is crossed on M's evidence and the court has no difficulty in making the conceded findings, and that includes the concession that she has not been, at all times, open and honest, if I accept her evidence.
65. The position regarding F is more difficult. He has denied any action on his part that would amount to exposing G to the risk of harm, or likelihood of harm of a significant nature. It follows that both of these parents cannot be correct.
66. I remind myself of the warning of Macur LJ in Re M (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1147, not to judge the parents solely on their performance in the witness box in the course of highly charged family proceedings. That said, the contrast between the two of them could not have been greater. M is as unlike other mothers the court has seen over the years who have suffered as she suffered in her own bringing up. She was very impressive, immaculately and smartly groomed. She was self-possessed, she spoke up, she answered questions directly in the main, and she did not flinch from answering questions that were, on the whole, difficult things to accept. She presented as determined, purposeful and anxious to convey the message that she has finally 'got it' and will do anything. There was, however, as I detected, no display of emotion.
67. F, making all due allowance for his representing himself, which he did with admirable clarity and courtesy, is very loud, very direct and very focused on conveying his message. In his case he was equally determined that there was a simple minded focus on his goal and that made it very difficult to obtain direct answers to, apparently, straightforward questions.
68. He had no concept of considering hypothetical situations. So, for example, he could not contemplate G living with M because she had been negatively assessed. Likewise, the issue of contact with him were G to be living with M, simply would not arise because G would not live there. There was a stone cold certainty that a denial of any wrongdoing on his part would be accepted without argument.
69. In contrast to M's willingness to admit almost anything, there was a determination, on his part, to deny everything, however obvious it might seem. Thus he accepted no responsibility for having virtually no contact for G from birth until June 2017, a whole year, for not engaging with the parenting assessments, or even with the litigation in a meaningful way until June 2017.
70. In another context, as I have mentioned, the Guardian referred to his rigid thinking. In the context here of the discussion, it was very much on display. Discursive discussion was not possible. It is all very black and white with no shades of grey.
71. At a superficial level, it would be very easy to find that M was the more impressive witness and that, therefore, her evidence should be preferred in all respects where it differed from F, but I am not convinced that that would be fair.
72. In M's case, impressive though she was, the ready willingness to accept she was to blame for her own defaults has to be put in the context of the history, and the court found it very difficult to accept that, whatever difficulties she has had, this intelligent and significantly achieving young woman, did not appreciate the extent and scale of the warnings she had been given. Therefore:

(i) her claim that she did not appreciate F might pose a risk to G until he made a direct text threat about her was incredible and she was too quick, in the court's judgment, to justify that by saying that when F assaulted her in March, that G was not there, so there was no risk. After all the social work involvement, the Freedom Project and the intense assessment in January to March, she demonstrated either a lack of frankness or a lack of insight. Either of which is worrying.

(ii) there had also been so much police involvement that there had been a MARAC in 2015, a MATAC in 2017 and, together with all the local authority involvement, the clear message, which was delivered in January, was that this was, very much, the last opportunity to demonstrate that she really had 'got it' and could work with the local authority. It makes it, therefore, more difficult to explain her behaviour between March and June and to dismiss it, as she now seeks to do in reliance on the text message that she told the court about for the first time from the witness box.

(iii) Whilst M's repeated past remarks that she was to blame, or at least equally to blame could be, themselves, a product of an abusive relationship, that she could, as late as November after the Freedom Project, be making remarks about how lovely F is with G in contact, commenting on how Freedom has made her realise how nice F in fact is, remarks that are echoed in the January parenting assessment, all go to explain, in a way that she did not why she was prepared to spend time with F despite the parenting assessment coming to the abrupt end that it did, by his behaviour. It seems to the court, therefore, that her evidence needs to be treated with a good deal of caution.

79. Much the same has to be said for F. His explanations for what the court finds to be his non-cooperation in respect of contact, parenting assessment and domestic abuse perpetrated program in the early stages, his failure to cooperate with reasonable enquiries as to the true cause of his psychosis in June, really carry no weight at all, in the court's judgment. He has conducted this litigation to suit himself, not G.

73. It is not credible, if M has lied as wickedly as he says she has, that he would have stood back to let her be assessed as the primary carer. He knows nothing now, on his account, about her character and honesty that he did not know in June 2016 when G was born. He was subject to numerous police callouts, MARAC and other humiliations, yet he formed the view that M ought to be able to care for his daughter.
74. His complete about-turn, in that regard, is in character with the rigidity of thinking I have mentioned. His refusal to engage until it suited him was not, in any sense, a child-focused approach. I take nothing from his contact with G, but his engagement since June has been entirely on his terms.
75. His dogged contention that non-prescription painkillers induced psychosis could so easily have been clarified by his cooperation with medical records being produced, but the privacy that he claimed for them trumped that. This refusal, thereby, to enable that to be checked, along with his failure to submit to assessment, make his late claims very difficult to accept as having any realistic substance to them.
76. Any evidence with which he disagrees is a fabrication but that extends, as we learnt, to his own father, with whom he claims to have a great relationship and who, seemingly, lied about the argument that they had that resulted in the police callout, during which the grandfather told the police that he had removed F's cannabis.
77. The court is, therefore, faced with two fundamentally unreliable parents, whatever good qualities they have, so their evidence has to be treated with the utmost caution. Indeed, the court would go so far as to say it ought not to be accepted unless it is supported elsewhere.
78. With appropriate warnings to the court about the effects that domestic abuse can have, SW was almost certainly correct when she said that each of these parents is as culpable as the other. This was, the court finds, a volatile and, at times, explosive relationship, adopting the Guardian's words, that caused a chronically unstable and chaotic lifestyle that was very much in evidence until just two months ago, each playing their part.
79. F denies any part but M, accepting her part, nevertheless, attributed it substantially to him. Neither, in truth, recognises the harm it caused or had potential to cause.
80. The disclosure by M of the very unpleasant text, the threatening of sexual harm to G, emerged only in cross-examination. The original text was never produced and she, seemingly, told no one about it. Indeed, we only have her word for it that it was ever sent. If she received it, her inability to see its significance in terms of contact, is striking: as the Guardian called it, the 'jump-out part of her evidence'. If she did not receive it and F never sent it, it is a very worrying apportionment of blame. As the Guardian said: 'It goes to the heart of how she works'. So, whilst M makes the concessions she does, in F's case, the court finds that he was an integral part of a domestically abusive relationship, in which he has not just denied his part, but wrongly and unfairly sought to shift the entire blame onto M.
81. The court is satisfied that his behaviour was sufficiently abusive towards M for the authorities to consider a MARAC necessary in 2015, and a MATAC in 2017. Whilst he may never have been prosecuted in December 2015, when M was 15 weeks pregnant she reported that she had been assaulted. She was taken to hospital by the police who found the home had suffered physical damage and M objectively was found to have multiple cuts and bruises to her legs and hand.
82. F's aggression has manifested itself in other ways. The serious threat to the maternal great-grandmother on 18 June, the physical damage to M's home in May 2015, on two occasions, and physical damage to the paternal grandfather's vehicle in June 2016. Secondly, F represents an unassessed risk by reference to his mental health:

(i) there is no evidence to support his claim that his psychosis was secondary to non-prescription painkilling medication post a head injury.

(ii) there is no proper explanation for the exceedingly worrying things that he said to the police when in custody in June, whether it was the product of fantasy or fact.

(iii) there is independent evidence of the finding of steroids in his bedroom and the fact that his fight with his father, in June 2016, was due to cannabis, a drug that features elsewhere in the history.

90. As I said, that F has never permitted proper investigation of this, his late claim that he will submit to drug testing is just that. It is a fact that he was detained under the Mental Health Act. The court adjourned the final hearing on the basis of his presentation. Without an understanding of why he should have thus presented, the risk he would pose to any child would be self-evident. It is all, I am afraid, part of his non-cooperation with this litigation.

83. Accordingly, the court is satisfied that the threshold is made out in respect of F on these bases and therefore, regardless of concerns flowing from M, separate findings against F are directly relevant to the welfare analysis.

Welfare analysis

84. The court was presented with three options:

(i) a return of G to M,

(ii) placement of G with F; and

(iii) permanence, by way of adoption.

93. Ignoring, for the present, the mechanism of the return to either parent, that these, it seems to the court, are the arguments.

Rehabilitation to the mother

85. In respect of a return to M, given the positives that she can offer G, which are accepted and not in dispute, the focus is acutely on her capacity to protect G from a lifestyle and partner such as have been described. The latter has been directed particularly at F in this case, albeit SW was very clear that it could be any partner in the future.
86. M's case is very clear: the scales have fallen from her eyes. She recognises that she has failed, until recently, to appreciate the risk and, so, she seeks a chance to demonstrate it, two months, she would say, already being behind her. I have re-read her statement, and her evidence, and have these factors firmly in mind. Mr Cahill's central submission is that, given the alternative, it is not too late to give G a chance to be brought up by M, a mother with such good qualities.
87. Whilst F opposes that on the basis that M is not a fit mother, the local authority and Guardian point to the issue I have identified, the capacity to protect. This has been tested out, not once, but twice, and the circumstances were that she could not have been under any illusions as to the height of the stakes. Despite that, say the local authority and the Guardian:

(i) she has actively deceived professionals.

(ii) she has persisted in the contact with F, seeing him in dangerous and inappropriate situations. Not just a night out when G was days old, but taking herself off in a car with him in April this year.

(iii) if correct, she has not only not disclosed a direct threat to G, but has failed to do so at the very time F was engaging in contact.

(iv) at no stage has she followed through as expected, in terms of action with the police, seeking orders and so on.

(v) this is against the background of intensive involvement, Freedom Project and repeated statements by her that the relationship is over and that she knows what to do to keep herself safe.

97. The history shows, says the local authority, that they can keep apart for periods, quite significant ones, as in January to March this year and, therefore, the last two months, in reality, tell us very little. It is, therefore, hard to say how long would be required to test this out further. Time is not on her side but to take time would be to expose G to unwarranted experiments.

88. Therefore, on analysis of the various pros and cons, the positives would be:

(i) the chance of G being cared for by M.

(ii) retention of the direct link to her birth family.

(iii) the promotion of the positive sense of identity.

(iv) confidence that love, affection and basic care will all be provided to a good standard.

(v) a history, in her case, of demonstrating her commitment to providing that type of care via contact.

99. Set against that:

(i) there are historic and current significant concerns regarding her ability to keep G safe throughout the rest of her minority.

(ii) the harm to which G would, thereby, be exposed would pose a significant risk to her emotional and physical wellbeing, as there would be significant concerns regarding her safety. This has been demonstrated from the earliest dates of her life through to the very recent times, despite M's protestation that, for example, in March, G was not there.

(iii) there is no confidence that M has, in fact, acquired, let alone demonstrated, insight into those concerns.

(iv) there is no confidence that history will not repeat itself either with F, or some other partner.

(v) the risks posed by contact between F and G, were G to be in M's care, are significant and it is far from clear how, in the long run, they could be managed.

100. The local authority denies that measures can be put in place to mitigate this harm because of M's failure to take basic measures to protect herself and G, to seek help or be open and honest. The most recent example, the 'jump-out' example, shows that she does not yet have an appropriate strategy to deal with such issues. Thus, the Guardian and the local authority speak very much from the same page.

Placement with the father

89. Turning to F. This is an option that has come about very late in the day, but it is presented by G's birth father and, so, of course, it is worthy of proper consideration. His argument is very simple. M cannot safely meet G's needs, there is no reason why he cannot, he is prepared to proceed at G's pace but is clear that there is no legitimate reason why this cannot be achieved in a matter of weeks.
90. The positives of such a placement would be very similar to those identified in respect of M.

(i) she would have the chance to be cared for by her birth father.

(ii) she would retain her links with her birth family.

(iii) her sense of identity as a member of her family would be promoted.

(iv) love and affection is not in doubt, basic care can be learnt, albeit it remains wholly unassessed at present.

(v) having engaged more recently, he has demonstrated his commitment by contact and, indeed, sought more.

103. Set against that, there are, however, these negatives.

(i) the historic and current significant concerns as to whether G could be safe in his care, whether through mental health issues or abusive, volatile behaviour.

(ii) the harm to which G would be exposed would pose significant risk to her emotional and physical wellbeing and there would be significant concerns regarding her safety.

(iii) F remains an unassessed risk because of his non-engagement until recently.

(iv) his very late engagement raises serious questions as to his long-term commitment.

(v) there is no evidence that F has any insight into these issues.

(vi) there is every reason to suppose that history will repeat itself.

(vii) F is wholly unaccepting of the possibility of contact between G and M, which is likely to be a constant source of tension, or worse.

104. The local authority, therefore, argues strongly that F's proposal is much too little, much too late and lacks any evidential basis to warrant its support, given the circumstances in which it is belatedly risen.

Permanence by placement for adoption

91. A third option is adoption. It is, of course, the most final of outcomes but it offers advantages and disadvantages as well. In favour of it:

(i) in all probability, G's emotional health and physical needs will be fully met.

(ii) she would be placed with a carer, or carers, who will be comprehensively assessed as having the capacity to meet the needs of a child of G's age and, specifically, matched to meet G's needs.

(iii) there is no likelihood of ever being exposed to significant harm in what would be a safe and secure environment where she would not be exposed to the risk of volatile adult relationships.

(iv) as a result of that she would have an opportunity to live a normal life, free from interference by others with a good chance of developing into a well-balanced and emotionally stable person.

(v) at 14 months old, she is still young enough to manage the transition from foster care to an adoptive placement without suffering undue emotional harm.

106. There are, of course, obviously profound, disadvantages:

(i) there would be the loss of the relationship with both parents, who plainly love her and, in their own ways, are desperate to look after her.

(ii) there is the loss of potential relationships with the other parent and the extended family and, of course, extended families are very valuable to children's sense of worth and identity as they grow up.

(iii) that she would lose that identity as a member of her birth family and become an adopted person, identity being an important aspect of any child's development.

(iv) although most adoptions succeed, a not-insignificant number break down, exposing a child to the risk of permanent emotional harm.

Welfare decision

107. In the court's judgment the case complies with the requirements identified by the Court of Appeal in Re B-S, the realistic options of each being analysed comprehensively, or at least as comprehensively as they can be in F's case, and carefully considered by both SW and the Children's Guardian and I accept their analyses.

92. The court does not doubt F's love for his daughter and is pleased that, belatedly, he has sought to play a part in her life. It is entirely understandable that he would wish to care for her and I commend him for taking this step, albeit late, but the findings it has made are serious and, in truth, point to the extent to which he poses a risk. He is unassessed and not understood. His involvement has, I am afraid, been far too late. It has been at a time of his own choosing and not at a time of G's need, and the court is satisfied that his rigidity in thinking, which lacks any real insight, is such that these factors together would combine to expose G to a serious risk of harm in his care.
93. Insofar as M is concerned, Mr Cahill's central point is that the penny has finally dropped and M ought to be given that further chance. It is difficult to see what more can be done than to give more time. There is no further parenting, as such, to be assessed, there have been periods of calm before and the recent one has lasted two months. There were six weeks in January.
94. A review of the chronology in the police disclosure that shows other significant gaps where no concerns came to the attention of the authorities, so, for example, from May to October 2015, from December 2015 to May 2016, some of which occurred at times characterised by claims that the relationship was over. The reality is, therefore, that there will need to be a significant number of months to demonstrate that the corner really has been turned.
95. Indeed, implicit in his recognition of this, is Mr Cahill's submission that the court should simply make a care order and place G with M now as there is no timescale, let alone a realistic one, that could otherwise be suggested for the testing. Mr Cahill is driven to fall back on the suggestion that, if it is going to fail, it is likely to fail sooner rather than later so, either way, there should be no great delay for G. Looking at the gaps where no concerns have been raised in the past, that is a submission that is difficult to accept.
96. The court has had to consider this very carefully and anxiously, and it has not been an easy judgment call to make, but the court was impressed by the social work evidence it has heard: SW has invested a great deal, and rightly so, in this case. As she said, she has gone above and beyond. Unusually, I have set out most of her oral evidence in the course of giving this judgment because it was so direct in relevance, it was so focused and it was very thoughtful and reflective, all borne of significant experience, particularly of M.
97. That she was open to the Guardian's suggestion of further assessment in January is to her credit. That she tackled it with an open-minded rigor is greatly to be commended. She was, the court found, both even-handed and fair. She readily made concessions and there was nothing defensive in her approach.
98. Likewise, as I have said, this Children's Guardian is enormously experienced, calm, measured, and deeply thoughtful, in the court's judgment. She, too, has developed a very good understanding of M and how she functions. It is, in her case, born of difficult life experiences, a form of survival technique in which she has developed her own strategies for managing difficulties that have been thrown in her way. Whilst that is impressive to a point, it is a strategy that does not contemplate the involvement of professionals, who may just happen to know better than her. She does not trust the authorities: that is clear from most of the police dealings. There is no evidence, beyond assertion, that this has changed, the threatening text being a very good and seemingly recent example. Her response to it was the exact opposite of that which was required and, even when challenged, she justified not telling the local authority about it by saying they were supervising the contact anyway so there was no risk to G, without seemingly any appreciation that this was a risk of which the local authority was wholly unaware and, so, did not feature in its risk assessment or form part of its plan to protect.
99. Therefore whilst M makes the assertion, there is no evidence that she really has learnt of the need to be open and honest and disclose, as well as following through. As the Guardian said, this is likely only to come with more time and work and, indeed, SW suggested possibly work of a therapeutic nature, which, in the court's judgment, M is not yet in a place to contemplate.
100. Therefore the risk that has been identified has not just been correctly identified, it remains very much a live one which would expose any child in her care to the risk of serious harm. It is not clear to the court, I am afraid, that she has yet developed the necessary insight into that risk. It is particularly so when one factors in F. A continuing, unassessed and un-assessable risk. He has shifted his focus from M but, were G to be in her care, inexplicably to him, the court is confident that it will revert to her.
101. Whilst his behaviour could be addressed by extreme measures taken to protect M, that will require a level of involvement and cooperation on M's part that she has simply never before demonstrated. The court therefore struggles to proceed on the basis of assertion, however attractively M puts it. The likelihood is that there will be further onslaught from F and, in the court's judgment, M is nowhere near the place that she needs to be to protect G from it.
102. Therefore the court is driven to the conclusion that, to accede to her understandable request, would be to embark upon an experiment without the confidence that the outcome is more likely than not to be positive. SW and the Guardian were right when they said the time for this was in January when the court sanctioned this case lasting longer than 26 weeks. That failed and, six months on, with two months of recent calm, there is no other basis for conclusion that it would be any more successful if extended for several more months as the court could not contemplate a final order such as Mr Cahill suggests for the reasons that it has given.
103. The Supreme Court reminds us that adoption is a last resort and, wherever possible, children should be brought up by natural parents. Mr Cahill reminded me that adoption is also not a panacea, it has advantages and disadvantages, as have been analysed by the local authority and the Guardian. The court must not come to the conclusion that nothing else will do until it has evaluated all the realistically available options and considered whether the concerns can be addressed by the provision of support and services.
104. However, the truth is that the local authority cannot provide the appropriate safety mechanisms that G would need because M has no trust in it and cannot provide it with the information it would need to provide that protection.
105. The risk of repetition of some of the more serious incidents in the history is real. It is no answer that they have not, in the main, occurred in G's presence, as G has been, frankly, so little in M's care that she has been protected from that.
106. Therefore, despite everything that has been said, and having conducted the balancing exercise, I have unhesitatingly reached the conclusion that G's welfare now and in the future, throughout her life, requires the court to grant the local authority the orders it seeks. The court is satisfied that nothing else will do and, for the same reasons, satisfied that G's welfare requires me to dispense with the parents' consent.
107. This is, I acknowledge, an enormously distressing outcome for both parents and there is really very little that can be said by way of comfort. In M's case however, I echo the Guardian's words of encouragement and praise, and urge her not to let this setback undo the progress that she has made or reduce her resolve to work with professionals that can help her in the future.
End of Judgment