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England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Edward Ware New Homes Ltd v Secretary Of State For Environment, Transport & Regions [2001] EWHC Admin 1131 (19th December, 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2001/1131.html Cite as: [2001] EWHC Admin 1131 |
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL | ||
B e f o r e :
____________________
EDWARD WARE NEW HOMES LIMITED - v - SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, TRANSPORT AND THE REGIONS
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited, 190 Fleet Street
London EC4A 2AG
Tel No: 020 7421 4040, Fax No: 020 7831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
(instructed by TLT) for the Claimant
Mr Paul Brown
(instructed by Treasury Solicitor) for the Defendant
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
INTRODUCTION
THE DECISION LETTER
“18. In the event of the appeal being unsuccessful, in my view the most compelling evidence in relation to the possible future use of the site derives from my visit. Taking no account of the wrecked cars to which I have referred, and notwithstanding the apparently reasonable structural condition of most of the walls of the buildings, I saw on my visit that many of the units or potential units are in a very poor condition. Part of the roof has collapsed on at least one of the buildings, most of the doors and windows are either missing or broken, services to not appear to be readily available, and many of the units appear far from secure or even weather-proof. The buildings on the site have a semi-derelict appearance and character, and I consider their re-use even by the low-order activities referred to by the appellant is an unlikely prospect, even if planning permission for such uses would not be necessary. Evidence submitted on behalf of the appellant suggests that should an application for planning permission prove to be necessary, this would also act as a significant disincentive to the occupation of the space.19. It follows therefore that, notwithstanding the common ground between the principal parties, in my view it is most unlikely that the quantity and quality of traffic generated by the fallback use would be even near that estimated by the appellant’s accessibility technical note. I note in this regard that my predecessor predicted that in the event of the previous appeal being dismissed, he had little doubt that the owners of the site would still wish to achieve the best return possible from their investment. Rather than allowing the site to fall into unprofitable dereliction, he considered the owners would attempt to realise its apparent scope for employment uses.
20. From the evidence I received at the inquiry, and on the basis of my site visit, I believe his prediction has turned out to be incorrect, and that any re-use of the buildings would now require levels of investment of a quantity which would be likely to result in rents which would render the units unattractive to many potential occupiers. Evidence submitted on behalf of the appellant suggests that there would only be a limited demand from companies or others for small, low quality industrial uses, such as car repairs, workshops or storage. In my view however, even this modest prediction is over-optimistic. The buildings and the estate as a whole are not in such a condition that a wholescale refurbishment is difficult to imagine, and I believe a phased or piecemeal approach (which would be more prudent in financial terms) would still be unlikely to attract tenants because of other units which would remain unimproved.
21. Although improvements were carried out to some of the units relatively recently, I saw on my visit that most of these are now empty, open and unused. I acknowledge that in the light of the favourable discussions held with the Council, the probability of planning permission being granted for residential or live/work redevelopment would have reduced the purpose of the active marketing of the space. I am also conscious that reletting the units would have resulted in Local Plan Policy E/2 and JRSP Policy 30 having additional weight. However, on the basis of all I have both heard and seen, I consider the prospect of significant reoccupation of the buildings to be distinctly unlikely. Furthermore, in the event of planning permission being required for such a reoccupation, and notwithstanding the observations of my predecessor, I consider the contents of paragraph 3.8(d) of PPG2; Green Belts (on the re-use of existing buildings) would represent a considerable hurdle. Even if planning permission was to be granted in such circumstances, on the basis of the evidence I heard, any conditions as referred to in the footnote to paragraph 3.8(d) would be expensive to implement and so render the scheme even more potentially unrealistic.”
“The appellant’s view that the proposed scheme would be the least sustainable of the possible alternatives is entirely contingent upon the fallback use of the buildings constituting a realistic possibility. Whatever the lawful planning status of the land may be, I have already expressed serious doubts about the possibility of such a re-use, and therefore conclude in respect of this main issue that the appeal proposal would conflict with the locational principles of sustainable development. ...”
“I conclude that the proposal would result in significant benefits as far as its impact on the amenity of neighbours is concerned. However, in relation to the enhancement of the landscape and its impact on openness, I believe the scheme would bring both benefits and harm. Nor in my view would I be justified in concluding that the development would result in a reduction in the quantity of traffic which may otherwise occur, and there would therefore be no landscape or openness benefit from this source. I consider these conclusions fall well short of the clear advantage required by paragraph 3.2 of PPG 2 in order to outweigh the harm resulting from the inappropriateness of the scheme. I further conclude they do not constitute the very special circumstances necessary to overcome the presumption against inappropriate development in the Green Belt, and I consider the proposal would therefore be in conflict with Structure Plan Policy GB.6 and Local Plan Policy GRB/3.”
“39. In his decision letter I acknowledge my predecessor raised the possibility of another scheme. He recognised that he was considering a proposal which was in outline form and which covered the whole site. However, he also recorded that he did not know whether or on what basis, an acceptable scheme could be devised on the lower part of the site. The current appeal proposal is a detailed scheme which is restricted to the land below the 55m contour and which in the first instance was recommended for approval by the Planning Officer. Much of the appellant’s argument in this case is based on a theoretical reduction in the volume of traffic in comparison with a fallback position which I am unable to adopt for the reasons I have given.40. In relation to the 3 main issues I have identified, although I have concluded the scheme would bring some benefit in terms of employment opportunities to the area, I also conclude the proposal would be incompatible with the locational principles of sustainable development. In respect of the third main issue, I believe the benefits of the scheme would be insufficient to constitute the very special circumstances necessary to overcome the presumption against inappropriate development in the Green Belt. I conclude that, on balance, the harm resulting from the proposal would significantly outweigh the benefit.
41. For the reasons given above and having regard to all other matters raised, I conclude the appeal should be dismissed.”
THE CHALLENGES
CONCLUSION