[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> C, R (on the application of) v Grimsby & Cleethorpes Magistrates Court [2004] EWHC 2240 (Admin) (28 July 2004) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2004/2240.html Cite as: [2004] EWHC 2240 (Admin)

[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		28 July 2004

1. LORD JUSTICE DYSON: This is an application for judicial review to challenge the decision of 22nd March 2004 of the Grimsby & Cleethorpes Youth Court to commit for trial to the Crown Court C, the claimant, on a charge of inflicting grievous bodily harm on another person contrary to section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
2. The claimant was born on 12th April 1987. He asserts that the decision was unlawful because the Youth Court had previously made a decision in the same matter to retain jurisdiction at a hearing on 26th November 2003. What is said on his behalf is that the Youth Court did not have the legal authority either at common law or by statute to set aside the decision taken on 26th November.
3. The facts can be briefly stated. On 1st November 2003 the claimant was arrested in connection with an incident which had occurred on 31st October. He was subsequently charged, together with MC, the co-defendant, with an offence under section 18 of the 1861 Act. On 9th November he was questioned about a separate incident which had also allegedly occurred on 31st October. He was subsequently charged, again together with the co-defendant, with an offence under section 20 as regards this other alleged offence.
4. The claimant and the co-defendant appeared before the Youth Court on 26th November. The Youth Court directed that the section 18 offences for both defendants should be committed to the Crown Court and the matter was adjourned for committal papers to be served. The court then went on to deal with the section 20 offences. After discussion, the charge under section 20 was put to both defendants and they were invited to enter their pleas. They both entered not guilty pleas. The section 20 case was then adjourned to 12th January 2004 for a pre-trial review before the Youth Court with a view to the section 20 charge being tried in that court.
5. The hearing listed for 12th January was adjourned until 26th January. When the claimant's solicitor received the committal papers from the Crown Prosecution Service he noticed that the prosecution had included both the section 18 and section 20 charges in the committal papers. The claimant's solicitor objected to this at the hearing on 26th January and that hearing was adjourned. Thus it was that the matter came before the Youth Court for determination on 22nd March.
6. At the hearing on that occasion the prosecutor asserted that it would be appropriate for the section 20 charge to be tried together with the section 18 charge in the Crown Court. What happened is described in some detail in the affidavit of Mr Ives, the solicitor acting on behalf of the claimant in the proceedings. He states at paragraph 12 that the court clerk initially addressed the court and set out the history of the case. She said that there had been "an error" on her part because she had taken a plea with regard to the section 20 charge. The solicitor's recollection is that she stated that the court had not heard any information at the hearing on 26th November with regard to this charge. The prosecutor addressed the court and said that it "didn't cross his mind" that the section 20 charge should be dealt with in the Crown Court. He submitted to the justices that the section 20 offence had been allegedly committed approximately 1¼ to 1½ hours before the section 18 offence. He said that there was a causal link between the two offences and that the two defendants had been pursuing a course of conduct on the night in question. He said that they were "on a violent crime spree against others".
7. He said that a witness to the section 20 charge was also a witness to the section 18 charge and that it was not appropriate to put the defendant through two separate trials. He said that at the hearing on 26th November there had been no determination and therefore the defendants did not have a "reasonable expectation" that the section 20 charge should be heard in the Youth Court.
8. Following those submissions and submissions made on behalf of the claimant, the justices decided as follows:

"On what we have heard today we believe that no determination was made on the issue of venue for the Section 20 charge on the 26th November and therefore the Section 20 charge should be sent to the Crown Court for determination with the Section 18."

9. The relevant statutory provisions are to be found first in the Magistrates' Court Act 1980, section 24 of which provides:

"(1) Where a person under the age of 18 appears or is brought before a magistrates' court on an information charging him with an indictable offence other than homicide, he shall be tried summarily unless-

(a) the offence is such as is mentioned in subsection (1) or (2) of section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (under which young persons convicted on indictment of certain grave crimes may be sentenced to be detained for long periods) and the court considers that if he is found guilty of the offence it ought to be possible to sentence him in pursuance of subsection (3) of that section...

"(1A) Where a magistrates' court -

(a) commits a person under the age of 18 for trial for an offence of homicide; or

(b) in a case falling within subsection (1)(a) above, commits such a person for trial for an offence, the court may also commit him for trial for any other indictable offence with which he is charged at the same time if the charges for both offences could be joined in the same indictment."

10. Section 25, so far as material, provides:

"(5) Where a person under the age of 18 appears or is brought before a magistrates' court on an information charging him with an indictable offence other than homicide, and the court -

(a) has begun to try the information summarily on the footing that the case does not fall within paragraph (a) or (b) of section 24(1) above and must therefore be tried summarily, as required by the said section 24(1); or

(b) has begun to inquire into the case as examining justices on the footing that the case does so fall,

subsection (6) or (7) below, as the case may be, shall have effect.

(6) If, in a case falling within subsection (5)(a) above, it appears to the court at any time before the conclusion of the evidence for the prosecution that the case is after all one which under the said section 24(1) ought not to be tried summarily, the court may discontinue the summary trial and proceed to inquire into the information as examining justices and, on doing so, shall adjourn the hearing.

(7) If, in a case falling within subsection (5)(b) above, it appears to the court at any time during the inquiry that the case is after all one which under the said section 24(1) ought to be tried summarily, the court may proceed to try the information summarily."

11. Section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 so far as material provides:

"(1) Subsection (3) below applies where a person aged under 18 is convicted on indictment of -

(a) an offence punishable in the case of a person aged 21 or over with imprisonment for 14 years or more, not being an offence the sentence for which is fixed by law; or

(b) an offence under section 14 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (indecent assault on a woman); or

(c) an offence under section 15 of that Act (indecent assault on a man)...

(3) If the court is of the opinion that none of the other methods in which the case may legally be dealt with is suitable, the court may sentence the offender to be detained for such period, not exceeding the maximum term of imprisonment with which the offence is punishable in the case of a person aged 21 or over, as may be specified in the sentence."

12. This court has had to consider a problem similar to that which has arisen in this case on previous occasions. The authority which to my mind is the most directly in point and the most helpful is that of R on application of the Director of Public Prosecutions and Camberwell Green Youth Court, a decision of the Divisional Court comprising Rose LJ and Jackson J, judgment being given on 5th December 2003.
13. In short what was held by the court was that the magistrates only have power to reopen a previous decision as to mode of trial in circumstances where section 25 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980 applies. It is sufficient to read paragraphs 80-83 of the judgment given by Jackson J, with which Rose LJ agreed:

"80. In my view, the statutory scheme is clear. The provisions of the 1980 Act concerning adults and juveniles run in parallel. In each case there is a procedure whereby the Magistrates' Court determines whether or not to accept summary jurisdiction. Section 20 sets out the procedure in respect of adults, section 24 sets out the procedure in respect of persons under the age of 18. In each case, the statute provides for a single decision on the mode of trial. It does not permit serial reconsideration of the same question, whether or not new material emerges.

81. One then moves on to section 25. Subsections (1) to (4) deal with adults, and subsections (5) to (7) deal with persons under 18. Subsections (2) and (3) permit the Magistrates' Court to change its mind as to mode of trial for adults during the course of the summary trial or committal proceedings. Subsections (5) to (7) permit the Magistrates' Court to change its mind as to mode of trial for persons under the age of 18 during the course of the summary trial or committal proceedings.

82. The statute is quite explicit as to the circumstances in which justices can change a decision as to mode of trial. It is not permissible to read into the Act some vague power to change the mode of trial in other circumstances.

83. This conclusion, which I reach as a matter of statutory construction, is supported by the line of authority referred to in part 4 of this judgment. Only ex parte F contains dicta which tend in the other direction. Those dicta have been disapproved on a number of subsequent occasions."

14. In my judgment it is clear that a decision was made by the Youth Court on 26th November 2003 to retain jurisdiction in relation to the section 20 charge. That is made abundantly clear in the witness statement of Miss Anne Lockwood, Clerk to the Court, paragraph 5 of which reads:

"On the 22 March 2004 I advised the Magistrates that they were empowered to consider the position afresh in relation to the section 20 charge as the original decision made in November had been taken without a relevant statutory provision which had a bearing on the situation being taken into account, ie section 24(1A) of the 1980 Act."

15. There is also a letter from Philip Houlden, Clerk to the Justices at the Grimsby & Scunthorpe Magistrates Court dated 4th May 2004 which states:

"In essence the defendant will be saying that at the hearing held on 26 November 2003 a relevant statutory provision, ie Section 24(1A) Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 was not drawn to the Court's attention. The decision on that day was, therefore, reached in error and subsequently a full hearing was held on the 22 March 2004 when all of the statutory provisions were fully and lawfully considered."

16. It is quite clear from both the witness statement and the letter that it is acknowledged on behalf of the magistrates that a decision was indeed made on 26th November to retain jurisdiction to deal with the section 20 charge. The fact that that decision might have been erroneous does not take away from its quality as a decision.
17. The authority in the Camberwell Green case demonstrates that outside the circumstances referred to in section 25 of the 1980 Act a magistrates' court has no power to reopen a decision already made as to mode of trial. It is submitted on behalf of the claimant that none of the provisions of section 20 of the 1980 Act applies to the claimant in the present case. A section 20 offence is not a "grave" offence within the meaning of section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Court (Sentencing) Act 2000 since the maximum sentence for such an offence is five years' imprisonment. It is a curiosity of the legislation that section 25 of the 1980 Act does not make any reference to section 24(1)(a) of the Act. The submission made by Mr McGuire in his very helpful skeleton argument is that in these circumstances section 25 of the 1980 Act cannot be relied on in the present case. In my judgment there is no answer to that submission. It follows that the decision which is challenged by these proceedings was one which was erroneous in law and must be quashed.
18. MR JUSTICE HENRIQUES: I agree.
19. LORD JUSTICE DYSON: Now we come on to the serious business of funding.
20. MR MCGUIRE: Yes, I am grateful. As I indicated earlier there is a legal aid certificate which has been submitted and I would ask for the usual order for legal aid assessment.
21. LORD JUSTICE DYSON: That has been lodged with the court, has it?
22. MR MCGUIRE: Yes, I understand it has been.
23. LORD JUSTICE DYSON: Yes, you may have it.
24. MR MCGUIRE: I am grateful, my Lord.
25. LORD JUSTICE DYSON: Thank you again very much.
26. MR MCGUIRE: There is just one point, in the absence of someone for the defendant--
27. LORD JUSTICE DYSON: Yes.
28. MR MCGUIRE: --the order which I asked for on page 14 of my skeleton was an order quashing the decision to commit the claimant for trial. Now, of course, there was also a co-defendant who has been made fully aware of these proceedings but has decided to take no action. Now the order sought here would only apply to the claimant.
29. LORD JUSTICE DYSON: Yes. That is all that is before us.
30. MR MCGUIRE: Yes. Yes, my Lord. Thank you.