[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Raschid v General Medical Council [2006] EWHC 886 (Admin) (30 March 2006) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2006/886.html Cite as: [2006] EWHC 886 (Admin)

[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		30th March 2006

1. MR JUSTICE COLLINS: This is an appeal by Dr Raschid against a finding of serious professional misconduct by the Fitness to Practise Panel of the General Medical Council ("the GMC") on 27 July 2005 following a three-day hearing. The appellant also appeals against the sanction which was imposed, namely, a suspension for a period of twelve months and a requirement that there be a review hearing towards the end of that period of twelve months before he would be able to practise again.
2. Dr Raschid is a psychiatrist. His origins are that he was born in Burma and he is now almost 69 years old. He has a largely academic background and most of his working life has been involved in organising and in attending conferences of one sort or another. He has also worked in academic circles, if I may put it that way but that, of course, has not been particularly lucrative and has not enabled him always to earn his living properly. Therefore he has at quite regular intervals engaged in practice, usually more recently as a locum consultant. It was when he was practising as such that the incident arose which led to his appearance before the General Medical Council.
3. The circumstances very briefly were these. The patient in question was a young 23-year-old at the time. She had come from a broken home. There had been, it would seem, a particularly messy divorce, and she had suffered some sort of abuse at the hands of her father. All this had had a profoundly damaging effect upon her. What led her firstly to come across Dr Raschid was her admission to hospital following an episode where she had either jumped or fallen out of a first-floor window, fortunately not causing herself any serious physical injuries.
4. Obviously her mother and her grandmother, with whom she was living, were very concerned at what had happened. Initially somewhat against her will, she was admitted to hospital. She was treated by Dr Raschid and the treatment was very successful. Indeed, by the time she was released from hospital at the beginning of February of 2004 a letter was written to Dr Raschid by her mother praising him for what he had done for her daughter. It is indeed sad that what happened thereafter should have soured the situation. The letter in question, which is dated 9 February 2004, stated in part as follows:

"I would also like to take this opportunity to thank you for all your care and support in helping [R] move forward and live a full and happy life. I am finding it hard to find suitable enough words to express my appreciation and gratitude for all that you are doing. I am very, very thankful to [whatever] forces have led us to meet you, and I am very comforted that [R] now has the guidance of you and your knowledge and expertise."

5. It was that very day, 9 February, that the problem which led to the appellant's appearance before the GMC occurred. It is, I think, convenient in the circumstances to refer to the charge which he faced. As is known, the charge is set out in the form of a series of numbered allegations of fact and some allegations of conclusions to be drawn from those facts. The allegations set out were as follows:

1. At all material times you were a Registered Medical Practitioner."

That was admitted.

2. During the period of 28 July 2003 to 18 February 2004 you were employed as a Locum Consultant Psychiatrist."

The employer and place is then stated. That was admitted.

3. During your employment with the Trust, Miss R was your patient."

That was admitted.

4. On 9 February 2004 you undertook a patient consultation with Miss R."

That was admitted.

6. I should add that she had been discharged from hospital shortly before but she was not, in the view of Dr Raschid cured. The question arose as to what should be the best form of further treatment. What he had in mind, as he told the Panel, and as he has told me, was that she might benefit in due course from the assistance of an organisation called the Philadelphia Trust, which ran a number of homes, one in particular in London. He had the idea that she might well benefit from a sojourn at one of those homes. It was too soon and she was too fragile at that time for that to be recommended as an immediate course but he wanted to discuss with her precisely the sensible way ahead. It was for that reason that there was a consultation arranged for and held on 9 February 2004.
7. He tells me that he now regrets that he did not request her mother to attend at that consultation with the daughter because, obviously, the mother would be interested in the plans for her daughter's future and whatever treatment was considered appropriate. However, the consultation took place, and that led to allegation number five on the charge sheet, which was as follows.

"5. That during your consultation with Miss R on 9 February 2004

a. You told Miss R that,

(i) she was attractive,

(ii) she would make a good companion,

(iii) 'you could live with me',

(iv) she should not repeat your comments in (i), (ii) and (iii) above to her mother,

b. You touched Miss R down the right side of her head with one hand,

c. You kissed Miss R on the head."

All those allegations were admitted. Then in charge 6 it was asserted:

"Your actions as set out in 5a. to c. above were,

a. Inappropriate,

b. Unprofessional,

c. Not in the best interests of your patient, Miss R."

8. That, too, was admitted by the appellant. Indeed, in the light of his admissions as to what he had done at that consultation, it is difficult to see how he could not admit what were there set out as the conclusions to be drawn from what he had done.
9. Obviously, from the date, Valentine's Day was close. Unfortunately, the appellant contacted Miss R on her mobile telephone. That he should have done that was, of course, not in itself either surprising or improper because again he was still considering and intending to discuss with her what future treatment should be carried out. But what he did and said in the course of those calls was, to say the least, unfortunate. I go back now to read out what was alleged in charge seven, which is as follows:

"Between the dates 11 February 2004 and 14 February 2004 you called Miss R's mobile telephone on several occasions. During these calls you,

a. Suggested that you meet Miss R outside of the hospital environment for her next consultation,

b. Suggested meeting her at a hotel for her next consultation,

c. Asked her to be your Valentine,

d. Said that if the telephone lines to the florists had not been busy, you would have sent flowers for Valentine's Day, but as an afterthought you added it was just as well because it would not have been appropriate and would have alarmed the family if flowers had arrived from you."

10. All those allegations of fact were admitted. Dr Raschid recognises now, and indeed when the complaint was drawn to his attention he recognised that what he had done was inappropriate and unprofessional, and he admitted that before the Panel. But he denied that it was not in the best interests of his patient.
11. That was not quite the end of the matter because there had been as a result of the initial actions and observations on 9 February a complaint made by the family about his conduct, and that had been brought to the attention, as one would expect, of the Medical Director of the Trust, his employers. She had given instructions that he was not to have any further contact with Miss R or with her family.
12. Despite that instruction having been given to him, on 17 February he did have further contact. What he did, as he admitted and as is set out in charge nine, was as follows; and I should read that out.

"Contrary to advice and instruction given to you by [the Medical Director] on 17 February not to have further contact with Miss R or her family you,

a. On the 2 March 2004 rang Miss R's family home and spoke to her grandmother,

b. On the 29 March 2004 sent a card to Miss R's grandmother,

c. In the card written to Miss R's grandmother...you wrote 'I am sending [Miss R's] art book',

d. Under separate cover you sent an art book to Miss R's grandmother."

13. What that was all about was that in the course of discussions with her, when treating her, he had ascertained that she had a considerable interest in art and was an artistic person, and he offered to send her a copy of a classic book on art. She expressed an interest in seeing that, and it was to honour that promise that he contacted her grandmother and sent the book. It did not occur to him that that would or could in any way be detrimental to her. As I say, he was merely, he said, fulfilling the promise that he had made to her. Accordingly he denied that his actions in that regard were inappropriate, unprofessional or not in the best interests of his patient.
14. Following the hearing, all the allegations were found to be proved by the Panel. The important aspect of the conduct is and must be regarded as the effect that it was going to have upon the patient, Miss R, and that it did have a damaging effect there can be no doubt. Evidence in relation to that was before the Panel and was given by Dr Baruch, who was the doctor who took over from the appellant when he was taken off the case.
15. It is, I think, convenient to refer to the statement made by Dr Baruch because it was confirmed in the evidence that he gave to the Panel. What he said was this:

"On 16 May 2005 during a consultation with me, Miss R described the impact that Dr Raschid's behaviour had had on her. She described feeling very distressed and disturbed for many weeks following Dr Raschids's inappropriate approaches towards her. By her description she was initially incredulous, then guilty and angry. It is clear to me from discussing matters with Miss R that Dr Raschid's behaviour resonated with her guilt and poor self esteem, for example, causing her to feel that she must have invited his advances, although she could not see how she might have done this. She told me...that she has put this incident behind her but still feels sick when she thinks about it. She would find giving evidence in the GMC proceedings in person very distressing and would prefer to avoid this if possible."

16. In fact, she did not give evidence because the appellant very properly and very sensibly in the circumstances indicated that he did not require her to be present or to give evidence.
17. What Dr Raschid failed properly to appreciate was that his inappropriate behaviour was likely to damage the patient, partly because of her background and the sexual approaches that had concerned her from her father in the past. I should make it clear that it was not alleged and indeed there was no finding that there was any sexual motivation behind what Dr Raschid did. That may have been the background to some extent, but, at the conclusion of the hearing, it was plain that there was no evidence which would justify a finding that Dr Raschid was motivated in any way by any desire to form a sexual relationship with or had any sexual concerns with Miss R.
18. However, as I say, he should have appreciated, had he thought about it, that she might believe that that was what he was about, and thus the effect upon her of what he had done could be serious indeed. Why he did it is far from clear. He explains it as effectively a momentary aberration or lapse and something which he really finds it difficult to explain. He tells me that he has something of a reputation for making inappropriate remarks, usually in the form of inappropriate jokes, and those who know him well effectively ignore that. That may be, but, if that is a shortcoming, he must be very careful not to let it spoil or damage any relationship with his patient. Having indicated that there was no sexual motivation, the effect upon the patient does make the inappropriate behaviour the more serious.
19. In the end, as I say, the Panel decided that he had been guilty of serious professional misconduct. I have no doubt that that finding is one which was a wholly proper finding. It is certainly not a finding which I can conceivably say was wrong, or was wrong to such an extent as would justify my interference on appeal. Indeed, quite the contrary, in my view it was a correct finding on the material before the Panel albeit, as the Panel said, they accepted that this was an isolated case that took place over a relatively short period of time; the appellant had made full and frank admissions when originally notified of the complaint by the GMC and during the course of the hearing; and he had not previously been subject to any proceedings before the GMC.
20. None the less, despite the fact that this was an isolated incident and no suggestion had ever been made that he had fallen below the proper standards in the way in which he had treated patients in the past, and there was no evidence to justify a concern that he was likely to do anything like this in the future, the incident in itself was sufficient, in my view, to justify a finding of serious professional misconduct. Accordingly, the appeal against the finding will not be upheld.
21. I turn then to consider the sanction that was imposed. In considering the appropriate sanction, the Panel properly had regard to the relevant Indicative Sanctions Guidance, which was issued in April 2005. It is necessary for a Panel, when considering the appropriate sanction, to work from the bottom up, if I may put it that way, that is to say to consider the least penalty and to ask itself whether that is sufficient, and, if not, then to go to the next one, and so on. Thus they go from taking no action and merely recording a serious professional misconduct finding through a reprimand, the imposition of conditions, suspension, and the final sanction of erasure. In the Panel's view, suspension was appropriate here having regard to their view of the seriousness of the misconduct in question.
22. Paragraph 12 of the Indicative Sanctions Guidance refers to the public interest. What is said is that the GMC should be able to take action in relation to the registration of a doctor in the interests of the public. The public interest has two closely woven strands, namely, the particular need to protect the individual patient and the collective need to maintain the confidence of the public in their doctors. The correct message must be sent to the public when a doctor guilty of serious professional misconduct is being dealt with so that it is known and recognised not only by the public but also by the profession that misconduct will attract the appropriate sanction, and that will be a serious sanction if the misconduct itself is serious enough to warrant it.
23. At paragraph 27 of the Guidance there is a reference to suspension, and this is said:

"Suspension can be used to send out a signal to the doctor, the profession and public about what is regarded as unacceptable behaviour. Suspension from the register also has a punitive effect, in that it prevents the doctor from practising (and therefore from earning a living as a doctor) during the period of suspension. It is likely to be appropriate for misconduct that is serious, but not so serious as to justify erasure (for example where there may have been acknowledgement of fault and where the panel is satisfied that the behaviour or incident is unlikely to be repeated)."

24. The GMC publishes a booklet which concerns fitness to practise, Professional Conduct and Discipline, and which sets out advice on standards of professional conduct and medical ethics. The advice is there for practitioners to study and to consider in recognising what is and what is not regarded as appropriate conduct. Personal relationships between doctors and patients are covered within that guidance in paragraphs 68 to 75. In paragraph 69, this is said:

"The Council has always taken a serious view of the abuse of a doctor's professional position in order to pursue a personal relationship of an emotional or sexual nature with a patient or the close relative of a patient. Such abase may be aggravated in a number of ways. For example, a doctor may use the pretext of a professional visit to a patient's home to disguise the pursuit of the personal relationship with the patient (or where the patient is a child, with the patient's parent). Or a doctor may use knowledge, obtained in professional confidence, of the patient's marital difficulties to take advantage of that situation. Both these are merely examples of particular abuses."

In paragraph 71, this is said:

"The trust with should exist between doctors and patients can be severely damaged when, as a result of an emotional relationship between a doctor and a patient, the family life of that patient is disrupted. This may occur without sexual misconduct between the doctor and the patient."

It is unnecessary to read more.

25. This case, as it seems to me, is slightly out of the ordinary in as much as Dr Raschid was not seeking to establish or to pursue an emotional relationship in order to provide for himself some sort of gratification. What he was doing, and doing in a thoroughly inappropriate fashion, was trying to maintain a proper doctor-patient relationship with Miss R. The observations he made were really inappropriate for pursuing what he hoped to pursue, namely, as I say, the proper doctor-patient relationship. They were liable to, and did, strike the patient as an attempt to establish an improper relationship. Whether it was going to develop into a full sexual relationship being perhaps beside the point, it was improper so far as she was concerned, and as to its effect upon her there can be no doubt.
26. As I say, this was not perhaps the more usual case, which is referred to in the passages in the advice to which I have referred, of a doctor trying to build up a personal relationship outside the doctor-patient relationship. If he had bothered to think about it properly, one hopes that Dr Raschid would have appreciated that he was doing something which was not likely to further the proper doctor-patient relationship but was actually bound to damage it, and indeed, as we know, it did just that. The distinction that I have referred to, albeit perhaps somewhat subtle, is I think of some potential importance in the context of this case because it puts in perspective the nature of his wrongdoing.
27. What the Panel said when considering the appropriate sanction was this at page 13 of the transcript of the third day of the hearing:

"The Panel first considered whether to conclude this case by taking no action or by issuing a reprimand. The Panel has decided, in view of the serious nature of its findings, that it is necessary to take action against your registration. The findings against you represent a serious breach of the principles of Good Medical Practice...which states (paragraph 20) that, 'you must not allow your personal relationships to undermine the trust which patients place in you. In particular, you must not use your professional position to establish or pursue...[an] improper emotional relationship with a patient or someone close to them.' For these reasons, the Panel have concluded that a reprimand would be wholly insufficient."

28. Pausing there, the reference to paragraph 20 of Good Medical Practice is obviously in very similar terms to what was set out in the advice to which I have already referred, but it is open to question whether it was in this case appropriate to describe what Dr Raschid did as using his professional position to establish or pursue an improper emotional relationship with a patient. What he did had that apparent effect; but that was not the purpose for which he did it. I come back, as I have said, to recognise, though, the damaging effect that this had upon her. Going back to the Panel's reasoning, they said this:

"The Panel then went on to consider whether to impose conditions on your registration. You proposed a condition that you would work solely in old age psychiatry, and therefore not come into contact with young female patients. However, the Panel considers that the imposition of conditions would not be sufficient to protect patients and the public interest.

The Panel then went on to consider whether it would be sufficient to direct that your registration be suspended, or whether it is necessary to direct the erasure of your name from the Register. The Panel considered that this was a serious instance of misconduct for which a lesser sanction was not appropriate but that in the circumstances of this case, it was not incompatible with your remaining a registered medical practitioner. It has considered that in order to protect patients, maintain public confidence in the profession, and uphold proper standards of conduct, it is necessary and proportionate to suspend your registration.

The Panel has decided that the appropriate period of suspension should be twelve months to allow you to address the deficiencies in your conduct that have been identified.

The Panel then went on to consider whether to review your case at a meeting to be held before the end of the period of suspension. Taking into account the circumstances of your case, the Panel considers it is necessary to do so. You will be informed of the date of that meeting which you will be expected to attend. Shortly before the review hearing you will be asked to furnish the General Medical Council with the names and addresses of professional colleagues and persons of standing to whom the Council may apply for information as to your conduct since this hearing. The Panel recommends that at that hearing you are able to demonstrate that you have acquired an acceptable understanding of the principles of 'Good Medical Practice', particularly in relation to maintaining trust and the appropriate boundaries between doctors and patients. It will also expect to see that you have kept your clinical knowledge and skills up to date."

29. I should add that the GMC in May 2004 had requested reports from psychiatrists on the appellant in order to ascertain whether there was any possible medical condition which should concern the GMC and which might explain the conduct which was in issue. Both psychiatrists who reported, who were very distinguished consultants, agreed that there was no formal diagnosis of any psychiatric disorder to be made and that Dr Rashid was fit to practise, There were no indications of future medical management and there should be no limits upon his prescribing.
30. One of them, Dr Bird, gave the clear opinion that she did not consider it necessary for Dr Raschid to be supervised under the Health procedures. That of course does not directly affect the matters which the Panel were to deal with, but it does indicate that there were no concerns about the future or that Dr Raschid would be likely to behave in an inappropriate fashion again.
31. True, he had not appreciated, it would appear, the seriousness of what he had done. Indeed, the fact that he has appealed against the finding of serious professional misconduct indicates that that may still be so. However, I would be surprised to say the least if he did not now appreciate that it was indeed serious, it having been so decided by the Panel and that finding having been upheld by me.
32. It is pertinent to ask oneself what was the thinking behind the requirement to indicate that conduct since the hearing had been good and that he had acquired an acceptable understanding of the principles of Good Medical Practice.
33. A period of twelve months had been imposed on the basis that it allowed him to address the deficiencies that had been identified in his conduct. The deficiency in relation to this patient had been an apparent inability to appreciate that his conduct was inappropriate at the time, and, more importantly, the effect of that conduct. Quite why it should take him twelve months to address those deficiencies is a little difficult to follow.
34. However, it is perhaps to be noted, and it is important that one should, that in so far as the need for some sort of reconsideration and keeping up to date is concerned, this matter was touched on in questions from the Panel to Dr Raschid. At page 53 of the transcript of the second day, this question was asked:

"My last question is about continuous professional development and I wonder if you could just tell us what continuous professional development you were undertaking."

He started to answer that. Over the page, he said that he recognised that it was important to keep up to date. He indicated that he had never, because of the nature of his practice, been subject to appraisal procedures. He kept up to date by concerning himself with the literature and by discussing matters with professional colleagues, but he had not done any kind of structured appraisal, or anything like that.

35. On the other hand, it is plain from the documents I have seen that there has never been any suggestion that Dr Raschid has not shown the necessary ability and knowledge in the manner in which he has carried out his practice. There have been, so far as I am aware, no complaints on that score at all. Indeed, his academic past and his academic interests ensure that he keeps himself well up to date by informing himself of relevant matters in order to deal properly with his patients. He has been approved under section 12 of the Mental Health Act 1983 since 1984. That approval comes up for reconsideration at intervals of five years, and the next one is due in June of this year.
36. Before I consider finally whether I am persuaded that the sanction imposed was excessive, I should refer to another matter. Once this complaint was made, Dr Raschid was dismissed from his post by the Trust and an alert letter was sent out to other Trusts. The result of that was that he has found it impossible, to obtain employment elsewhere within the National Health Service. The result of that is that he has in fact since March of 2004 been unable to obtain gainful employment as a practitioner, and, although he has not been formally suspended, he has in effect not been able to practise. That has had a profoundly damaging effect upon him, as one might expect. I have to consider whether it is appropriate to take that into account.
37. It was a matter that was before the Panel, of course, in July of last year, but it is not a matter which they have referred to in the reasons which they gave for imposing the sanction. Miss Lee has submitted that it is generally a matter that is not material when considering the appropriate sanction. I disagree. It seems to me that it is as material as any other form of mitigation, and it may well be, in the circumstances, that the fact that there has been considerable damage to the doctor is something which can be taken into account. In my view, it ought to be taken into account in the circumstances of a case such as this where erasure is not considered to be a necessary sanction and therefore the Panel is considering the appropriate length of any suspension or indeed even a need for any suspension. Much turns upon the view that is taken of the seriousness of the misconduct in question.
38. That it amounted to serious professional misconduct and resulted in a finding to that effect is in itself of course an important consideration because that sends out a message to the public that a doctor will be adjudged to be guilty of serious professional misconduct. That will be a matter on his record, and for him that is an important matter.
39. The fact that it is recognised that a finding of serious professional misconduct may justify no more than suspension or a reprimand is itself an indication that it does not necessarily need to result in a serious penalty. However, I recognise that this sort of conduct, particularly by a psychiatrist, who is inevitably dealing with a vulnerable patient, is conduct which can properly be considered as serious indeed. Patients of psychiatrists must know that they can have complete faith in their doctors and that they will not be treated in a manner which is inappropriate and liable to be damaging to them, and that there will be no attempt to engage in a relationship which goes beyond the proper doctor-patient relationship.
40. Having said that, it is sometimes not easy to draw the line between what is appropriate and what is not appropriate. There are a number of different views, as I am well aware, amongst psychiatrists as to what is indeed appropriate treatment in given circumstances and whether it is appropriate to treat, for example, at home or in the environment of a formal medical institution. There are different views about that sort of thing.
41. Further, there are different views about the extent to which it is appropriate to build up a rapport with the patient and what should be done in that regard. In this case, the line was obviously crossed, but there are circumstances in which it can be difficult to know where the line should be drawn. Accordingly, one has to be careful not to think in terms of absolutes.
42. What I have to consider is whether I can be persuaded, as I say, that the view taken by the Panel was one which in the circumstances was clearly wrong in as much as they were not reasonably entitled to take the view that they did. I observe that if it were left to me I would have no doubt that the sanction was unnecessarily severe. But that is not the test which is the right one for me to apply because it is not for me to override the view of the Panel, who have the expertise and who draw the lines and make the decisions as to what is or is not to be regarded as serious and justifying a particular penalty.
43. On the other hand, this is an appeal, with no limitations beyond those which the Privy Council and this court have indicated are appropriate. I have to consider the matter on the basis of all the material that is before me. I also have to have a particular regard in this context, as it seems to me, for the reasons given by the Panel for proceeding as they did.
44. It is, in my view, difficult to follow why they took the view that this case merited the most serious form of suspension, namely, one of twelve months. It would have been open to them to impose, if they felt a suspension was essential, a lesser period of suspension.
45. Furthermore, it is, in my judgement, difficult to understand why they felt it necessary to decide that there should be a review hearing. I can understand their concern about keeping clinical knowledge and skills up to date, but that could only be done by a suspended doctor by keeping himself up to date through reading and discussion. Indeed there is no reason to believe that Dr Raschid would not do that because he would still maintain and has still maintained his academic interests. Accordingly, that seems to me in the circumstances to be unnecessary so far as the ability to demonstrate the requirement of an acceptable understanding of the principles of Good Medical Practice. Indeed, it is difficult to see what he could do other than read them and appreciate what they said, and that would not take twelve months for him to do.
46. The assertion that an appropriate period of twelve months would allow him to address the deficiency in his conduct really is doing no more than asserting the opinion that the misconduct was serious and that nothing short of the sanction of a period of suspension would suffice. But I have no doubt whatever that to impose that maximum period of suspension was wrong and excessive in all the circumstances of the findings made in this case, having regard to the nature of the misconduct which I have identified.
47. I have to consider further whether suspension at all is necessary. In that regard, I do consider the effect that all this has had on Dr Raschid's ability to practise. The fact is that he has not practised for a substantial period of time. Whether that in itself should justify a lesser penalty than suspension seems to me to be less obvious. Although I would not have regarded this, had it been left to me, as a case that required suspension, I am not prepared to say that the view that it did require suspension was a view which was unreasonable. Accordingly, I propose to uphold the suspension, but, in my judgement, it should be reduced drastically in the circumstances. Indeed, having regard to the situation it seems to me that the message that a suspension was appropriate should go out, but the suspension should be for the minimum period that is in the circumstances sensible.
48. What I would propose to do in those circumstances is to substitute for the suspension that was imposed a suspension for a period of one month. That of course will run from today. To that extent, this appeal is allowed.
49. MISS LEE: Can I ask about the review? Is your Lordship proposing a review after one month, or not?
50. MR JUSTICE COLLINS: No review. Dr Raschid, you have had a partial success although not a complete success.
51. THE APPELLANT: Yes, my Lord. Thank you very much.
52. MR JUSTICE COLLINS: I think probably in the circumstances I would be reluctant to award you any costs, even if you apply for them, but you are entitled to make an application, if you wish to do so.
53. THE APPELLANT: Does that mean that I have to pay the costs?
54. MR JUSTICE COLLINS: No, you do not have to pay anything.
55. THE APPELLANT: I am very grateful to you, my Lord. I think you have been extremely fair, and thank you very much indeed.
56. MR JUSTICE COLLINS: All right. In that case, no order for costs.
57. THE APPELLANT: No order for costs?
58. MR JUSTICE COLLINS: Yes. You will get in due course, if you want it, a transcript of this judgment.
59. THE APPELLANT: Yes, my Lord.
60. MR JUSTICE COLLINS: When I have had the opportunity to correct the grammar.