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England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Kabashi v London Borough of Redbridge [2009] EWHC 2984 (Admin) (20 November 2009) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2009/2984.html Cite as: [2009] EWHC 2984 (Admin) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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Zoja Kabashi |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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London Borough of Redbridge |
Defendant |
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Stephen Evans (instructed by the Legal Services, London Borough of Redbridge) for the Defendant
Judgment
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Crown Copyright ©
Judge Anthony Thornton QC:
Introduction
Redbridge's Housing Allocation Scheme
(1) Redbridge allocates accommodation using a 'choice based' lettings system. Properties are advertised on a fortnightly basis. As a registered applicant, Ms Kabashi may bid for up to two two-bedroom properties (prior to 1 August 2007, three-bedroom properties) in each fortnightly list. When the bidding closes, Redbridge sorts the bids for each property by the applicants' effective dates.
(2) Additional preference applicants are ranked in effective date order and have first priority. If there are no additional preference applicants, the reasonable preference applicants are ranked in effective date order with the applicant having the greatest number of reasonable preferences at the top of the list and those with one reasonable preference ranked in effective date order behind those with more than one reasonable preference.
(3) Redbridge therefore gives effect to the obligation to make provision for determining allocation priorities between households with similar levels of need by using the effective date system whereby such households, in Ms Kabashi's case being the large number of households having one reasonable preference, are ranked in effective date order.
(4) This Scheme is operated separately for each property type and an applicant on the list may only bid for properties of the type for which they have been assessed. When an assessed housing need changes, the Scheme provides:
"For new applicants [such as Ms Kabashi] their registration date is when we receive their application. However, should an applicant's assessed housing need change necessitating the provision of a particular type of accommodation or property with more or less bedrooms than originally needed, the effective date will be when the new need arose."
It is only this particular, but critical aspect of the Scheme that is challenged by Ms Kabashi.
Relevant law
(1) A housing applicant has no right to a house but a local housing authority has a duty to promulgate and give effect to a lawful allocation policy which applies to the selection of tenants for their own housing. That policy must comply with the statutory requirement "to secure that reasonable preference is given to" the statutorily defined groups in section 167(2) of the Housing Act 1996 and with the general public law requirement of rationality. Local housing authorities may give additional preference to some narrowly defined households who are in the greatest need.
(2) Subject to rationality and compliance with any relevant statutory provision, the terms of any allocation scheme are a matter for local housing authorities. In particular, there is no need, and their statutory duty does not require them, to determine priorities as between the people within section 167(2) by reference to the gravity of their needs and they need not identify the extent to which such according of priority is required. Such schemes must give reasonable preference to particular groups of people and not to individual households within them which are in greatest need.
(3) Points-based assessment schemes are not an ideal way of ensuring that housing lettings meet need in a sustainable way. It is preferable for a housing allocation scheme to move to more broad-brush banding systems which may be as simple as "people with an urgent need for social housing; those in non-urgent need of social housing; and those with no particular need for it"[4]. Experience has shown that a points-based scheme on the grounds that they are too rigid or because the particular distribution of points is for some reason irrational.
(4) There is nothing inherently absurd or arbitrary about prioritising those who satisfy section 167(2) by reference to how long they have been waiting on the waiting list, subject to having a very small preference group. Such a policy that is given effect to be a scheme is not irrational. A scheme may be framed so as to give additional preference to particular descriptions of people within section 167(2). This is permitted, but not mandated, by the closing sentence of section 167(2).
(5) A scheme that distinguishes between applicants in the same band by reference solely to how long they have satisfied that criterion is undoubtedly a rough and ready system but it has many advantages over a more sophisticated system. It is clear, relatively simple to administer and highly transparent. Once an authority has a number of different bands based on degree of need, or the degree to which the section 167(2) factors are satisfied, the scheme is much more based on value judgment, much more open to argument, much more opaque and would be one requiring much more monitoring as applicants' circumstances will inevitably change over time.
(6) It is unrealistic and undesirable for a judge to become involved in the details of housing allocation schemes. If it were otherwise and because of the multifarious factors involved, the large number of applicants and the relatively small number of available properties at any one time, any scheme would be open to attack and it would be a very difficult and time-consuming exercise for a judge to decide whether the scheme before him was acceptable.
(7) It cannot be said that there could never be circumstances in which a scheme, which complies with the statutory requirements, could be susceptible to judicial review on the grounds of irrationality. However, once a scheme complies with the statutory requirements of section 167 and any other statutory requirements, the courts should be very slow to interfere on the ground of alleged irrationality.
"The mere fact that a different scheme could be adopted, or that an aspect of the allocation scheme might be improved or done differently does not mean that that particular aspect of the scheme is unlawful. It is for the Council to devise the structure of the scheme. A scheme which, inter alia, seeks to prevent leap-frogging is not in principle unreasonable. In my judgment, the Council's approach to this particular aspect of its scheme is within the ambit of discretion conferred by section 167, and by reference to the two examples that I have set out above, it cannot be said that the Council's approach is unreasonable."
It was contended on behalf of Ms Kabashi that this case is distinguishable from hers because the applicant's needs were for accommodation of increased size rather than hers which were for accommodation of reduced size. On behalf of the defendant it was contended that both cases were in principle similar and that the reasoning of Sullivan J applied equally to Ms Kabashi's case. In the light of the Ahmed decision, I do not see how it is any longer possible to contend that the upwards movement in the Yemlahis' requirements were such that their case was to be treated differently from Ms Kabashi's case with the downwards movement in her requirements. The arguments based on irrationality are similar in both cases. Thus, Yemlahi is of considerable relevance notwithstanding the subsequent Ahmed decision.
Parties' Contentions
Discussion
Conclusion
Note 1 Code of Guidance for Local Housing Authorities on the Allocation of Accommodation (2002). [Back] Note 2 “Quality and Choice: A Decent Home for All” (April 2000). [Back] Note 4 As suggested in paragraph 91.8 of the Green Paper (see footnote 2 above). [Back]