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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> HM Attorney General v Edwards [2010] EWHC 1267 (Admin) (30 April 2010) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2010/1267.html Cite as: [2010] EWHC 1267 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		30 April 2010

1. LORD JUSTICE PILL: This is an application by the Attorney General for an order under Section 42 of the 1981 Act (as amended) restricting Mr Simon Edwards from litigating whether in his own name or any other person's name, including that of his wife. Notice of today's hearing has been given to Mr Edwards and voluminous documents served upon him along with a statement from Mr David Edmonds, on behalf of the Attorney General, to which a schedule of the litigation in which Mr Edwards has engaged since March 2001 has been attached. The case has been listed for hearing today. Mr Edwards has appeared in person. Mr Blundell appears for the Attorney General.
2. Mr Edwards had two applications to make. The first was that the application should not proceed further without an order excluding from court Mr Paradise-Hirst who has been the defendant in cases brought by Mr Edwards. We are quite unable to accede to that application. It is suggested that because there is a pending action between Mr Edwards and Mr Paradise-Hirst, there is privileged material which ought not to be mentioned in these proceedings. We reject that application.
3. The second application was that the case should be adjourned. That is sought on two grounds: first, that Mr Edwards should be supplied with transcripts of some of the hearings at which he has appeared in person before the courts, and, second, that he should have an opportunity to obtain legal representation. He has had that opportunity but he says that recent correspondence had led him to believe that there would be an adjournment and that is one reason why he has not obtained it. He has told the court that he is in employment, working a 50-hour week, and that if he is granted the adjournment he intends to be legally represented on the Attorney General's application under Section 42.
4. For present purposes I need refer to the background only briefly. The schedule is most helpful in setting out the proceedings involved. Most parts of it, to which reference has been made, Mr Edwards has not sought to challenge as inaccurate. There was a series of claims by Mr Edwards against Marconi, his former employers. Those claims were the subject of distinctly adverse comment on him in the employment jurisdiction. However that appears to be over. Its potential relevance is as background to the more recent conduct of Mr Edwards. That recent conduct has mainly been in relation to Mr Paradise-Hirst, already mentioned.
5. There have been a number of actions which are summarised in the schedule. The dispute appears to have originated over a small area of land and claim to title by adverse possession. That has led to other proceedings. In the written submissions on behalf of the Attorney General the appropriate test is set out, in particular by reference to the judgment of the then Lord Chief Justice in Attorney General v Barker [2000] 1 FLR. Those are the principles which the court would apply.
6. The conduct concerned is certainly capable of coming within the test for the making of a Section 42 order. Emphasis has been placed in the rulings upon the failure of Mr Edwards to pay a substantial sum of costs which he has been ordered to pay to Mr Paradise-Hirst. As of January 2010 the sum of about £13,000 remains outstanding. There now are libel proceedings by Mr Edwards against Mr Paradise-Hirst.
7. There are two actions which have been consolidated. Master Leslie has been involved. He has, it appears, put a stay upon those actions pending certain action by Mr Edwards. On 5 November 2009 Master Leslie made a limited civil restraint order of the court's own motion in the two consolidated libel claims.
8. The four transcripts which Mr Edwards seeks have now been identified. He made an application on 11 March 2010 that did refer to a hearing before Mr Justice Eady in the libel proceedings on 22 January 2010. It did not sufficiently identify the other transcripts sought; Mr Edwards has done that this morning: On 17 November 2008 a hearing before District Judge Taylor at the Central London County Court; a hearing on 5 November 2009 before Master Leslie; a hearing on 18 January 2010 before His Honour Judge Mitchell; and a hearing on 22 January 2010 before Mr Justice Eady.
9. The 18 January order had not been identified in the information placed before the court on behalf of the Attorney General. It is a strong order against Mr Edwards. It finds that an oral application for permission to appeal in action 246, out of which the costs order arises, is "totally without merit". The order added:

"Further upon Mr Edwards indicating that he will not issue any further proceedings against the defendant and the County Court, nor any further applications in this court, the court declines to make either a limited civil restraint order or an extended civil restraint order but reserves the right to consider that course of action in the event that further proceedings are begun by the claimant against the defendant or further applications are made in this case. In that event, the defendant and Mr Paradise-Hirst has the right to make an application in writing to His Honour Judge Mitchell that some form of civil restraint order be imposed upon the claimant."

10. Mr Edwards has endeavoured to persuade the court that - both in relation to the hearing at which that order was made and in relation to the two earlier hearings referred to - it would assist the case and assist the administration of justice if the transcripts were to be obtained. We see no merit in that application. The Attorney General has provided a full bundle which appears to us to contain in relation to those proceedings sufficient information. In other cases more detail is given but we see no merit in an application that transcripts for those three hearings should be obtained. They are most unlikely to assist Mr Edwards. It is not in the interests of the administration of justice that those orders be made.
11. Mr Justice Eady's order was made on 22 January 2010. The court stamp bearing the date is not entirely clear but I believe it is 28 January: 331 is the heading, that is one of the libel actions to which I have referred:

"Upon hearing on a pre-trial review the claimant and defendant, both being in person, [the defendant being Mr Paradise-Hirst]

It is ordered that;

(1) The trial set down for 1 March 2010 be vacated.

(2) The pre-trial review be adjourned to a date to be fixed.

(3) There be no order as to costs."

That order makes no reference to the restraint orders to which I have referred. On the face of it, it is a routine order simply granting an adjournment and contemplating a pre-trial review on a date to be fixed. On the face of it, there is difficulty in reconciling that order with the earlier orders which have been brought to the attention of the court.

12. In those circumstances we consider it appropriate that the transcript of that hearing be obtained. Whether it will assist is questionable and by no means would it resolve the whole matter one way or the other. The court hearing the case will no doubt consider all the material before it, of which that will be but one part. Nevertheless we consider that the applicant Mr Edwards should have the opportunity to obtain that transcript and base any submissions on it. Accordingly, we direct that it be obtained.
13. That being so, and the relationship between that order and earlier orders being at present in doubt, we consider it appropriate to grant the adjournment. We would not have granted it on the basis of the request that opportunity be given for legal representation required an adjournment. The case was listed for hearing today and Mr Edwards should have come to court prepared for that. If he is going to obtain legal assistance I find it extremely difficult to understand why he has not done so hitherto, having had very long notice of today's hearing. His belief that it may be adjourned is no good reason.
14. We make the order for an adjournment, believing, as we do, although it will be a matter for the court considering the merits of the case to form a judgment, that the libel actions are an important part of the Attorney General's application.
15. We referred to the Marconi proceedings which concluded some years ago. I accept that proceedings in relation to Mr Paradise-Hirst are certainly capable of leading to a conclusion against Mr Edwards on Section 42. But the high point is in relation to libel proceedings which appear to come within the mischief against which the authorities wish to safeguard defendants, and the question mark on the approach of Mr Justice Eady and why he made the order he did is worthy of consideration.
16. We hope and expect that the adjournment will be for a comparatively short time though I have in mind weeks rather than days. Mr Edwards should be mindful - I put it no higher than this - of the indications which have been given by judges other than Mr Justice Eady. I say that not to express any view on the merits of the present application but clearly his position would not be improved if further proceedings capable of coming within the Section 42 mischief were to be commenced or pursued in the meantime.
17. We should like to reserve the case to ourselves having done a considerable amount of reading, but the way in which constitutions are organised and work loads are distributed does not make make that possible. We do not exclude the possibility that we would hear it, but from what we know of our commitments for the next few weeks that would appear to be extremely unlikely. We allocate one day for the case as has been allocated for today's hearing.
18. We make only one further reference hoping it will help those considering the case. At page 25 there is a reference to a case - 658; that is the case which appears at tab 16. On page 20 it appears as 369 but it has been re-numbered to 658.
19. For those reasons and on that basis the application for an adjournment is granted.
20. Are there any other applications?
21. MR BLUNDELL: There are no other applications.
22. THE APPLICANT: I am not sure if it is appropriate but I have often seen it in the Administrative Court, I was due to be working today and what I am really talking about is the cost of my attendance here, not least underground tube fares for example. It may be totally the wrong thing to do because I have not been advised on this at all but if this transcript had been given to me around thereabouts 10 February, it may well have been - it certainly would have been, I would say - certainly would have had my representation here and we would have dealt with this case today, saved time and saved Treasury Solicitor's time. And just for a transcript not being here we have not been able to go ahead of my understanding of the judgment. I have lost income today and I have lost travel costs coming here. You may say that is an entirely inappropriate matter. I am not sure how these things are ever dealt with. I thought I should mention that.
23. LORD JUSTICE PILL: Unless you have any contrary submissions, we propose to reserve the question of costs. You may want to put a marker down.
24. MR BLUNDELL: Yes. If your Lordship is minded to reserve costs so be it. But my submission would be that there should be no order for costs against the Attorney General. The extent of the transcript which Mr Edwards received only very recently made clear if - - and the Attorney General should certainly not be expected (?) to pay costs today if your Lordship were minded to make an order for costs in these circumstances. I simply lay down that marker that it will be resisted very strongly.
25. THE APPLICANT: If it assists, perhaps if we could have most of - - I have lost half a day's pay. But literally if I could just recover my underground costs of being here. I am newly self-employed and now every pound counts literally to me. My underground comes to about £6 or £7 or so. I am literally out of pocket by being here for this reason. There you go.
26. LORD JUSTICE PILL: We reserve the question of the costs of today's hearing. I should say for the record that documents have been put in today which were not in the bundles and they should be in any future bundles, the first being the order of Mr Justice Eady to which I referred; the second is the order of His Honour Judge Mitchell, to which I have also referred; the third is a document which had reached me and has now been disclosed to Mr Edwards, an e.mail, my copy is undated - Miss Catherine Edwards of the Treasury Solicitor - beginning: "I am sorry I was not in the office yesterday." I say that to identify it. Those are the documents, all of which Mr Edwards has - indeed it was he who produced the Mitchell document about which the court would not otherwise have known - to form part of the documentation.
27. MR BLUNDELL: Can I take that opportunity to raise a matter about documentation? It came to my attention last night that the

document in tab 2 of the authorities bundle may be the wrong document. It was intended to be Section 42 of the 1981 Act as it now stands. The document which I was given seemed to be a print-out from Wikepedia.

28. LORD JUSTICE PILL: My tab 2 is the Supreme Court Act 1981.
29. MR BLUNDELL: Is it Section 41?
30. LORD JUSTICE PILL: It is Section 75 referred to. You will see that is put right in our bundles.
31. MR BLUNDELL: That will be done.
32. THE APPLICANT: You mentioned costs in relation to my claim costs. There was £1,200. That was paid some time ago. I don't have the precise date here. In relation to the other costs, £10,000, advice to me is that should not be paid pending - - - - -
33. LORD JUSTICE PILL: We have given our ruling.
34. THE APPLICANT: I just mention it. It just should be stated next time.
35. LORD JUSTICE PILL: I do not propose to make any - - - - -
36. THE APPLICANT: I am just for the record stating that for next time, the costs have been paid.
37. MR BLUNDELL: Do your Lordships want to direct a date after which the case should be heard, after 21 days or 28 days, something of that nature?
38. LORD JUSTICE PILL: I have not been at all precise about that. I do not think we would be able to get a date today. The reason I have not been precise is that I do not know how long it will take you to get a transcript. What is your prediction on that?
39. MR BLUNDELL: We had hoped to have it today. We did indicate to the transcript providers that the hearing was taking place and if possible could we have one.
40. LORD JUSTICE PILL: Do you have any representations on that, Mr Edwards - a date before which the case should not be heard?
41. THE APPLICANT: I am in your hands.
42. LORD JUSTICE PILL: One of the reasons you applied is that you want legal representation.
43. THE APPLICANT: I am bound to say the longer the better because of my workload, my current surveying workload as arbitrator in relation to the normal thing I am supposed to do and obviously in relation to this. Literally the longer the better. I am conscious that justice delayed is justice denied. I would not like to think it was a week or two.
44. LORD JUSTICE PILL: That is a fair comment that justice delayed is justice denied. (Bench confer) Can you help with the vacation date? When is the Spring vacation?
45. MR BLUNDELL: I think it might be 28 May.
46. THE APPLICANT: Are we permitted to discuss later an appropriate date - or are we not allowed - between ourselves?
47. LORD JUSTICE PILL: We will indicate the case not to be listed before 23 May. That gives you over three weeks, Mr Edwards.
48. MR BLUNDELL: I am grateful.
49. LORD JUSTICE PILL: Does anything else arise?
50. THE APPLICANT: No.