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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2012] EWHC 1239 (Admin) (23 April 2012) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2012/1239.html Cite as: [2012] EWHC 1239 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		23 April 2012

1. MR JUSTICE OUSELEY: This is an application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, whereby the local authority, the Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead, challenge a decision of the first defendant's inspector in a letter dated 7 April 2011. By that letter he allowed an appeal by the second defendant who does not appear and is not represented. The second defendant appealed successfully against the decision of the local authority to refuse planning permission for the change of use from retail to residential of the old post office in Cookham Dean near Maidenhead.
2. The local authority challenged the decision of the Inspector to grant permission. This was on a variety of grounds. Except for a procedural issue concerning the way in which written representations were dealt with, the grounds took issue with the conclusion of the Inspector that the local planning authority was a Community Infrastructure Levy charging authority under the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations. Accordingly, he did not require the second defendant to make any form of contributions of the sort which the local authority was seeking to cope with the costs of the change of use.
3. It however appears, and is accepted by the Secretary of State to be the case, that the relevant statutory regime contain provisions which meant that the Community Infrastructure Levy regime was not applicable. There was no liability under this regime to make the payments. The transitional provisions had disapplied that liability.
4. Accordingly, the question of infrastructure costs fell to be determined in a different manner, and this was by reference to the local plan and supplementary planning documents. The Inspector, having misinterpreted the statutory provisions, ignored the relevant provisions and failed to require or to consider requiring the contribution which those planning documents required.
5. The Secretary of State has accepted that that error was made and has agreed that the decision should be quashed.
6. The second defendant lives in Australia. Permission was granted by this court for the papers to be served out of time on her in Australia. There is no doubt but that she has received those documents. It appears that she had intended to appear through someone described as a next friend, whoever that might be, but at all events she knows of the proceedings and their timing today. She has not consented to the consent order. The solicitors who were acting on her behalf and have a very limited remit now have sent an email to the court explaining the position. The crucial parts are that the second defendant is not continuing with her defence of the proceedings and will not be represented in court, she had only sought an adjournment by agreement and that was refused.
7. The second defendant, whilst complaining that the first defendant has not told her until lately that it was not going to defend the action, appears to have been assuming that there was some common interest between them which required them to keep her alert as to what it was doing.
8. The Secretary of State, having taken the view he has and in consenting to a consent order, is fully entitled no longer to contest the proceedings; he is not obliged to reach decisions at a time convenient to other litigants.
9. The fact that the second defendant feels that the rug has rather been pulled from under her feet because her champion, as she might have seen him, has decided not to enter the list is neither here nor there.
10. The second defendant does not contest the proceedings. It is perfectly clear from the claim and concession that the claimant is right in its contentions and accordingly I quash the decision of the Secretary of State.
11. The consent order provides for costs to be paid by him to the claimant in the agreed sum of £4,125. The order also contains the basis upon which the decision is quashed and which relates to the impact of the CIL regulations.