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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Chiltern District Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] EWHC 1020 (Admin) (10 March 2015) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2015/1020.html Cite as: [2015] EWHC 1020 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		10 March 2015

1. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: This is an application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended to quash a decision of an inspector allowing an appeal by Mr Lord against a decision by the local planning authority, Chiltern District Council, in relation to a mobile home for agricultural use and, in particular, the provision of toilet facilities at Penn Meadow Farm, Forty Green, Buckinghamshire. The local planning authority as the claimants, the applicants in this case, submitted grounds of challenge which assert that the inspector erred in law in that he failed to give primacy to the local development plan as he was required to by law and instead found a contradiction between that plan and the National Planning Policy Framework's provisions in relation to the Green Belt within which the development is sited.
2. Those grounds were regarded by the Secretary of State as having such merit that the Secretary of State has indicated that he concedes that the application should be granted. That puts Mr Lord in a somewhat awkward position because he seeks to continue to rely on the benefit of a decision which even its maker, or those responsible for its maker's acts, accept is one which was unlawful.
3. I have considered the grounds of challenge in the light of the Secretary of State's position and also in the light of what Mr Lord, who has appeared in person, has told me this morning. I am satisfied that the concession made by the Secretary of State is an entirely proper one and reflects what would have inevitably been the outcome of a full hearing of the matter in dispute by reason of this challenge.
4. Mr Lord asks me to say that nevertheless the decision of the inspector was the right one in the circumstances. What he has said to me briefly this morning has made it perfectly clear his deep interest in the farm which he farms, and his responsibility for his employees, in particular in the provision of toilet facilities. He has also told me that he has had increasing difficulties in dealing with the local planning authority, but in saying that I should not be understood to accept some of the matters that he has felt it necessary to refer to in detail as to his dealings with them.
5. The position, as I see it, is as follows. The grounds of challenge in a case like this are restrained. The challenge cannot lie on the basis that a different inspector might have made a different decision, nor on the basis of any challenge to the inspector's planning judgment. The decision nevertheless has to be properly reasoned and has to comply with the legal requirements of a decision of this sort.
6. The grounds of challenge made by the local planning authority, as I have indicated, are grounds which, in my judgment, would inevitably succeed. In those circumstances, there is no good basis for allowing Mr Lord, the second defendant, to rely on the decision as it stands. If Mr Lord is right that the decision in the result is the correct one, then the position will be that as a result of a new decision by a new inspector he will succeed again, but will succeed by virtue of a decision which complies properly with the requirements imposed on inspectors by the law.
7. I will therefore allow this challenge. I will quash the decision of the inspector. That means that the position returns to what it was before the inspector made his decision, that is to say an outstanding appeal to an inspector which requires a decision by an inspector in accordance with the law.
8. So far as costs are concerned, the position, as I understand it, is as follows. The Secretary of State accepts responsibility for the costs up to the forwarding of the consent order, the terms of which broadly speaking I have endorsed. However, I have heard today that the Secretary of State's position was communicated very late to Mr Lord. In the circumstances, I would regard it as inevitable that Mr Lord and somebody on behalf of the Council attended today. It might well be said that the Council did not need to be here, but realistically they were bound to be. I therefore propose to order that the Secretary of State pays the costs of the proceedings up to and including today.
9. I hope there are sufficient reasons there, Mr Lintott, for you to be able to communicate them to the Treasury Solicitor and achieve an agreed order in due course.
10. Mr Lord, the position is that Mr Lintott, or those instructing him, will send you a document looking rather like the consent order you have already seen, which they will invite your agreement to. But that is simply a matter of its terms. It is not you saying "I agree that the judge was right," you do not have to do that; you merely have to agree that what I have just said is incorporated in the document that Mr Lintott draws up.
11. There will in due course be another hearing and all I can say is that I wish you well of it. Thank you for taking the trouble to come today.