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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Sarao v United States of America [2015] EWHC 1570 (Admin) (20 May 2015) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2015/1570.html Cite as: [2015] EWHC 1570 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice The Strand London WC2A 2LL
		20th May 2015

Wednesday 20^th May 2015

MR JUSTICE CRANSTON:

1. This is an application to vary bail conditions pursuant to section 1A of the Criminal Justice Act 1967. The background to the case is well known. The applicant is 36 years of age and a man of good character. He studied at Brunel University. He resided with his parents. He is not married and has no children.
2. The applicant registered as a self-employed trader. He has a credit of approximately £5 million in a trading account with a broker, RJ O'Brien, in the United States of America.
3. On 11^th February 2015 a warrant of arrest was issued by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. That was followed at the end of March by an extradition request by the Embassy of the United States of America. On 1st April 2015 the Secretary of State for the Home Department issued a certificate under section 70 of the Extradition Act 2003.
4. The applicant was arrested on 21^st April 2015. He appeared before the Westminster Magistrates' Court the following day. Subsequently, at an adjourned hearing on 26^th May, District Judge Purdy granted bail subject to a number of pre-release conditions. One of those was that security was to come from the applicant of £5 million, and £50,000 from others. Moreover, the applicant's parents were voluntarily to surrender their United Kingdom passports and to undertake not to apply for any other passports. There was also to be an electronically tagged curfew on the applicant from 11pm to 4am daily with a doorstop condition. The applicant was not to access the internet for any purpose. There were additional conditions in relation to his own passport and any applications he might make to obtain international travel documents. He was also ordered to report three times a week to the Hounslow Police Station.
5. On 23^rd April 2015 the applicant's solicitor contacted Mr O'Brien in the United States of America. The solicitor was informed that it was not possible to release funds because there was a freezing order over the account. On 12^th April 2015 the Commodities and Futures Trading Commissioners in the United States had filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. A Statutory Restraining Order was issued which froze all of the applicant's assets wherever they are located. Papers relating to that order were delivered to the applicant on 29^th April. Its existence had not been known to the applicant or his solicitors at the hearing before the district judge on 22^nd April.
6. On 6^th May 2015 there was an application at the Westminster Magistrates' Court to vary the bail conditions. District Judge Roscoe refused the application to vary bail. The matter consequently comes before me.
7. On the applicant's behalf Mr Lewis QC has advanced four arguments. First, it is said that it is impossible and unlawful for the applicant to comply with the condition as to the £5 million, and it cannot be right in principle that such a condition should operate to deny the applicant the right to bail. These will be lengthy proceedings, possibly extending into the New Year, and it would be manifestly unjust that bail should not operate to the applicant's advantage because of such a condition.
8. Secondly, Mr Lewis submitted that the £50,000 surety would operate to mitigate flight risk. The applicant comes from a tight-knit family. He still lives with his parents. He does not own a car. His personal circumstances and his family life are such that it would be inconceivable that he would act in a way which would deprive his family of their "life-long savings". Further, Mr Lewis indicated that it may be that the applicant's family could provide an additional surety through raising money on their property, which is presently unencumbered. His main point, however, was that the applicant would not deprive his family of their hard-earned savings by breaching bail.
9. Thirdly, Mr Lewis submitted that this £5 million condition was "unheard of". He informed the court that in other situations (such as those involving Russian oligarchs) no comparable condition had been imposed. Despite extradition requests, they had been released on relatively little or no security.
10. Fourthly, Mr Lewis submitted that there should be modification to some of the conditions in relation to access to a computer and to reporting conditions.
11. The overall thrust of Mr Lewis's submission was that the £5 million condition was unnecessary, but that in any event it was impossible and unlawful for the applicant to comply under the freezing order.
12. In my judgment this application must be refused. There is a clear flight risk. Undoubtedly that is why the experienced district judge imposed the condition for security of £5 million. I accept the submissions of Mr Summers QC, who appears on behalf of the Government of the United States of America. He took me to passages in the extradition documents which demonstrate that (to put it no higher) the applicant has not been especially forthcoming about his behaviour in terms of market manipulation. Mr Summers also underlined the fact that, despite the close family from which he came, the applicant had a lack of ties being without a partner and/or children. Moreover, there is, in my judgment, no reassurance that the applicant is not a flight risk. The £50,000 surety already available, compared with what is alleged to be the $14 million profits he has made, is no assurance at all.
13. I also accept Mr Summers' submission that until the applicant demonstrates that he has no access to any funds anywhere, so as to provide the reassurance in relation to flight risk that any court would want, the application is premature. Accordingly, it is refused.