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England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Yilmaz & Anor v Government of Turkey [2019] EWHC 272 (Admin) (14 February 2019) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2019/272.html Cite as: [2019] EWHC 272 (Admin) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
And
MR JUSTICE OUSELEY
____________________
VELI YILMAZ and ERKAN YILMAZ |
Appellants |
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- and - |
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GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY |
Respondent |
____________________
David Josse QC and Joel Smith (instructed by Criminal Defence Solicitors) for the Appellant Erkan Yilmaz
Richard Evans (instructed by CPS Extradition Unit) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 30 January 2019
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Bean:
The hearing and decision in the Magistrates' Court
"5.3 Bursa is Turkey's fourth largest city (population 2.35 million) in NE Anatolia on the sea of Marmara and lies approximately 100 miles south of Istanbul by road. Bursa has a large E-Type prison with a stated capacity for 1000 prisoners. It is reasonable to assume that Veli Yilmaz will be held on remand at Bursa prison.
5.4 I have never been to Bursa prison and neither has the CPT. I know of no reliable information regarding the current occupancy of Bursa prison or of conditions there. Further, as indicated above, we have no very up to date [reports] from the CPT regarding prisons in general and E-Type prisons in particular due to the failure of the Turkish authorities to authorise publication of recent CPT reports. It follows that I have no alternative but to fall back on rather old CPT data regarding E-Type prisons other than that at Bursa and draw some conclusions from my visits to Maltepe Prisons 2 and 3 [L-Type prisons] in 2015 and 2017.
"4.5 We appear now to have entered a new dark phase. The last CPT report to be published was in January 2015 for a visit undertaking by the CPT in June 2013. Since then, there have been four CPT visits (in June 2015, April 2016, August 2016 and May 2017). None of which reports to date have been published. It is not unreasonable to speculate why that should be the case. The August 2016 CPT visit, for example, was specifically to monitor what the Turkish authorities were doing with the thousands of persons (estimates vary between 35,000 and 70,000 arrested following the failed coup on 15 July 2016). The CPT press release for the August 2016 visit included the information that the Committee had, inter alia, been to a "basketball court" which was being used to detain arrestees.
4.6 The new coyness on the part of the Turkish authorities to reveal what is happening in custodial sites includes their refusal to grant me access in the present case, in marked contrast to the permission granted in March 2015 in the case of Ross Charles v Turkey and coincides with what I learned about NGOs' access to prisons when I was in Turkey in early 2017."
"A major concern is that all visited facilities (except closed prison no.9 of the Silivria Penitentiaries Campus) were significantly overcrowded with occupancy ranging from 125% to more than 200% of the actual capacity. In some institutions the overcrowding appeared to result from the recent influx of inmates following the massive arrests after the failed coup. However, in other locations, the overcrowding as alleged to have been persistent for several years. This overcrowding has had a significant negative impact on prompt access to medical care as well as on recreational activities, working opportunities, training activities and the frequency of family visits."
"I conclude that there is a substantial risk that if Veli Yilmaz is extradited to Turkey he will be held in conditions breaching Article 3. I also conclude that the Turkish authorities have provided no information and have refused inspection access, such that the known existence of this substantial risk might be dispelled."
"52. It is for the Requested Persons to establish that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited, each will face a real risk of being treated in a manner which breathed his Article 3 right. The Requested Persons submit that the test set out above is met. I reject this submission for the following reasons:
53. First, Turkey is a member of the Council of Europe and has the benefit of a presumption that the Turkish authorities will protect prisoners from breaches of Article 3.
54. Second, taking into account Professor Morgan's evidence it is reasonable to assume the Requested Persons will be held on remand at Bursa prison. This court has no reliable information regarding conditions or current occupancy in Bursa prison. Professor Morgan has never been to Bursa prison and neither has the CPT (see paragraph 5.4 of his report).
55. Third, the published evidence from the CPT regarding conditions within a Turkish prison estate is now likely to be out of date. The most recent available CPT report relates to a visit in 2013. There have been no published CPT reports since this visit.
56. Fourth, whilst I accept Bursa prison is an E-Type prison, old CPT data regarding E-type prisons in my view does not assist this court in understanding the current conditions at Bursa prison. Equally, evidence regarding Maltepe Prisons 2 and 3 (L-Type prisons) does not assist.
57. Fifth, it is not currently known where the Requested Persons will be held if detained following conviction, as Professor Morgan deals only with their remand awaiting trial. This court is therefore being asked to determine this issue on the basis of findings about the Turkish prison system as a whole rather than in relation to identified prison establishments. There is very limited up-to-date information before this court on conditions across the whole estate.
58. Sixth, references to "overcrowding" do not specify the personal space available to a detainee. Professor Morgan, on the basis of May 2017 data suggests the prison estate is now at least 9.2% overcrowded (see paragraph 7.2 of his report). These statistics do not by themselves indicate that the personal space available to a detainee falls below 3 sq. m in multi-occupancy accommodation. In addition according to Professor Morgan there is a maldistribution of prisoners between institutions, depending on where people have been arrested and held, and where they wish to be held. Overcrowding will therefore vary from prison to prison.
59. Seventh, I note Professor Morgan's view that the Requested Persons' ethnicity is "potentially" highly significant. However, Professor Morgan links this issue with their "known" political engagement with the Kurdish independence movement. I have set out above the limited evidence regarding the Requested Persons' political activity. There is no evidence that either Requested Persons support armed struggle, the PKK or any other proscribed organisation.
60. Eighth, the most recent reliable, objective information regarding the conditions within the Turkish prison estate therefore comes from Mr. Melzer, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture following his visit in November/December 2016. Mr. Melzer did not visit Bursa prison.
61. Mr. Melzer did visit prisons in Ankara, Diyarbakir, Sanlurfa, Istanbul and two police stations in Esenler. During this visit he and his team enjoyed "unrestricted access to all places where people are deprived of their liberty", he was able to interview inmates in private. He found the overall conditions of detention in the places visited to be "satisfactory or at least acceptable" (paragraph 5 of his report). Regarding the sanitary conditions he observed, "sanitary and hygienic conditions observed and facilities are generally satisfying, but also affected by the overcrowding" (paragraph 5 of his report).
62. Regarding post-coup arrests, after an initial phase marked by arbitrariness, ill-treatment appears to have ceased. Apart from occasional verbal threats, the team received no allegations and collected no evidence of currently ongoing torture or ill-treatment with respect to those inmates, male or female, who were arrested for reasons related to the attempted coup.
63. Regarding "the situation in the South-East", Mr. Melzer noted a resurgence in violent clashes between the Turkish army and the PKK since July 2015. He noted troubling testimonies of torture and other forms of ill-treatment from both male and female inmates suspected to be members or sympathisers of the PKK during arrest and interrogation. However, his team generally received no allegations and collected no evidence with regards to currently ongoing torture or ill-treatment (paragraph 4 of his report). More importantly, there is no suggestion the Requested Persons are either members of the PKK or sympathise with this organisation.
64. I accept that Mr. Melzer reports that all visited facilities except for one were significantly overcrowded with occupancy ranging from 125% more than 200% of the actual capacity. I note his visit took place within four months following the failed coup of July 2016 and he attributes the overcrowding in some institutions to the result of recent influx of inmates following the mass arrests after the failed coup. In relation to other locations the report makes a general comment that overcrowding was alleged to have been persistent for several years but provides no details regarding the degree of overcrowding, including cell space allocated to detainees, within these prisons.
65. Ninth, regarding the "openness" or otherwise of the Turkish authorities in relation to allowing inspections of their prisons, in my view the picture is a mixed one. I accept Professor Morgan's evidence that the Turkish government has not published reports from four recent CPT visits (June 2015, April 2016, August 2016 and May 2017). It is concerning that Professor Morgan was told, in early 2017, by a prison monitoring human rights group (the Turkish Centre for Prison Studies) that access to visit prisons to monitor aspects of the regime has been denied since 2015. However, the Turkish government did publish the CPT report dated January 2015 for a visit undertaken in June 2013. In addition, the Turkish authorities allowed Mr. Melzer, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture to visit the prison estate, over the period of a week between 27 November and 2 December 2016. As noted above, Mr. Melzer was granted unrestricted access to all places where people are deprived of their liberty. This recent and unrestricted access by the Special Rapporteur is not indicative of a regime refusing to grant access to the international committee to their prison estate.
66. For these reasons I am satisfied that there is insufficient evidence to find that the Requested Persons' extradition is incompatible with Article 3 of the ECHR."
The presumption of compliance and the evidence required to rebut it
1. These six extradition appeals have been listed together as in each case the sole issue is the same, namely whether to extradite the Appellants under either accusation or conviction European Arrest Warrants would be a breach of Article 3 of the Convention by reason of prison conditions in Poland. In four of the appeals this issue was raised before the District Judge; in two of them it was not. It is not necessary to set out the facts relating to each Appellant.
2. The purpose of hearing the six appeals together was to enable the court (1) to consider whether, in the light of the very large number of cases [of Polish extradition appeals] to which we refer at paragraph 8 below, the evidence adduced before this court raises any issue which has not already been considered; (2) to consider whether it is the type of evidence that is anywhere near sufficient to establish a case under Article 3; and (3) to set out the way in which this court will deal with any further appeals raising the issue relating to Polish prison conditions in the future.
The legal principles
3. The law is clear. First, the circumstances in which this court as appellate court can be provided under s.29(4) of the Extradition Act 2003 with evidence which was not adduced before the District Judge is set out in the judgment of this court in Szombathely City Court v Fenyvesi [2009] EWHC 231. If there is an intention to rely before this court, which is an appellate court, on evidence that was not adduced before the District Judge, then a statement must be served explaining the circumstances.
4. Second, it is very clear from a long line of authority in this court that Poland, as a Member State of the Council of Europe, is presumed to be able and willing to fulfil its obligations under the Convention, in the absence of clear, cogent and compelling evidence to the contrary. It is not necessary for this court to restate the position. It is well summarised in Targonsinski v Judicial Authority for Poland [2011] EWHC 312 (Admin) and Agius v Court of Magistrates Malta [2011] EWHC 759 (Admin) at paragraphs 12 to 20. In such a case it would have to be shown that there is a real risk of the requested person being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment: see R(Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] 2 AC 323 at paragraph 24.
5. Third, the presumption is of greater importance in the case of Member States of the European Union in relation to a European Union Instrument. In N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department (C-411/10 and 493/10, 21 December 2011), the Luxembourg Court in a decision in relation to the removal of an asylum seeker to Greece, held there was a strong but rebuttable presumption that a Member State would abide by the Convention, as the common European asylum system was based on the assumption that states would abide by the Convention and that other states could have confidence in that regard. The court said at paragraph 83:
"At issue here is the raison d'être of the European Union and the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice and, in particular, the Common European Asylum System, based on mutual confidence and a presumption of compliance, by other Member States, with European Union law and, in particular, fundamental rights."
The court drew a distinction between minor infringements and systemic flaws which might result in inhuman or degrading treatment.
6. Fourth, the type of evidence necessary to rebut the presumption and establish a breach was made clear by the Luxembourg court – a significant volume of reports from the Council of Europe, the UNHCR and NGOs about the conditions for asylum seekers (see paragraph 91 of the decision in N.S.). The Luxembourg court also had the decision of the Strasbourg Court in M.S.S v Belgium and Greece (21 January 2011) as evidence before it.
7. The reasoning of the decision in N.S. is plainly applicable to the Framework Decision which forms the basis of Part I of the Extradition Act 2003. It reinforces the decisions of this court in Targonsinski and Agius. It also confirms the observations of Mitting J in Tworskowski v Judicial Authority of Poland [2011] EWHC 1502 at paragraph 15 as to the type of evidence required, namely that something approaching an international consensus is required, if the presumption is to be rebutted.
Mr Evans emphasised in particular the phrases "clear, cogent and compelling evidence" in paragraph 4 and "something approaching an international consensus" in paragraph 7.
"88 …[W]here the judicial authority of the executing Member State is in possession of evidence of a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment of individuals detained in the issuing Member State, having regard to the standard of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law and, in particular, by Article 4 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment in Melloni, C-399/11, EU:C:2013:107, paragraphs 59 and 63, and Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 192), that judicial authority is bound to assess the existence of that risk when it is called upon to decide on the surrender to the authorities of the issuing Member State of the individual sought by a European arrest warrant. The consequence of the execution of such a warrant must not be that that individual suffers inhuman or degrading treatment.
89 To that end, the executing judicial authority must, initially, rely on information that is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated on the detention conditions prevailing in the issuing Member State and that demonstrates that there are deficiencies, which may be systemic or generalised, or which may affect certain groups of people, or which may affect certain places of detention. That information may be obtained from, inter alia, judgments of international courts, such as judgments of the ECtHR, judgments of courts of the issuing Member State, and also decisions, reports and other documents produced by bodies of the Council of Europe or under the aegis of the UN."
"Mr Fitzgerald QC submitted that the process of obtaining further information which is here described involves an evidential threshold which must be satisfied before such a request is made, namely, as referred to in [94], that there is "objective, reliable, specific and properly updated evidence" of a real risk of a breach of Article 3.
In my judgment, this is an incorrect interpretation of the Aranyosi decision. The case emphasises the importance of the court having "objective, reliable, specific and properly updated evidence" before any determination of a breach of Article 3 is made, and in particular information relating to the conditions in which the individual in question will be detained. It is "to that end" that further information is to be sought. The court must obviously be satisfied that there is a need to seek further information but there is no evidential threshold to be crossed before it can do so. There is therefore no implication from the making of the request for further information that the court has found that Article 3 would be breached on the information currently before it, or that a prima facie case to that effect has been made out.
This is supported by Criminal Practice Direction 50A.1, upon which the Appellants relied, which refers to requests being made "where the issues are such that further information from the requesting authority or state is needed…."
Fresh evidence
"It is now clear that there are two prisons at Bursa at one of which (Bursa E-Type) custodial conditions are reportedly not overcrowded (though this description is no guide as to whether there is acceptable resort to isolation and other abuses) and at the other (Bursa H-Type) conditions are reportedly grossly overcrowded – possibly over 100% - and very bad.
5.2. I concluded, therefore, that there is a substantial risk that if Veli Yilmaz is extradited to Turkey that he will be held in conditions breaching Article 3. I also conclude that the Turkish authorities have provided no information, and have refused inspection access, such that the known existence of this substantial risk might be dispelled. I should emphasise that this lack of information could be easily rectified: the Turkish authorities could publish the most recent CPT reports, they could identify the particular prison in which Veli Yilmaz will, if extradited, be held, and they could allow an independent inspection of the prison they intend employing. The fact that they have done [none] of these things suggests that they have things to hide.
7.4 Finally Veli Yilmaz is of Kurdish ethnicity. If his personal history involves political engagement with the Kurdish independence movement, or if his alleged offence is said to have a political dimension, then in the current political climate in Turkey his vulnerability to maltreatment possibly breaching Article 3 must be judged significant. Veli Yilmaz says that members of his family have been politically involved in the Kurdish independence."
The parties' submissions in this court
i. There is no international consensus that prison conditions in Turkey violate Article 3. There is no real risk that the Appellants would be at risk of ill treatment;
ii. There is no pilot judgment of the ECHR or any report of the CPT demonstrating a real risk of violation of Article 3.
iii. The evidence of Professor Morgan is based primarily on open source material. Although he asserts that prisons are overcrowded, he does not provide any evidence to demonstrate that each of the Appellants would not receive 3 sq.m of person space as prescribed by Mursic v Croatia (2016_ App 7334/13;
iv. Any assertions that the Appellants may be subject to torture are misconceived. Any allegations relating to the use of torture relates to those alleged to have been involved in the attempted coup d'etat in Turkey in July 2016;
v. The case of Charles v. Turkey [2017] EWHC 952 (Admin) and LMN v. Turkey [2018] EWHC 210 (Admin) are confined to their own facts and relate to the specific circumstances of the Appellants in those cases (namely treatment of LGBT prisoner and those with specific healthcare needs);
vi. The fresh evidence should not be admitted as it is not determinative (although it is appreciated that the Court will need to consider it;
vii. Should the Court find there to be a real risk of violation of Article 3 they are respectfully invited to ask for further information and/or assurances."
Conclusion
(1) In which institutions will the Appellant be detained if he is returned to Turkey, both before trial and, if convicted, after conviction?
(2) Will the Appellant always be accommodated in a cell which provides him with at least 3 square metres of personal space (excluding any in-cell sanitary facilities)?
(3) What will the other detention conditions and detention regime be for the Appellant throughout his detention, including sanitary facilities, air, light and time out of his cell?
(4) Is the Requesting Judicial Authority prepared to give assurances in relation to any of the above?