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England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> HM Senior Coroner for Sefton Knowsley and St Helens v Kay & Ors [2024] EWHC 1366 (Admin) (15 May 2024) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2024/1366.html Cite as: [2024] EWHC 1366 (Admin) |
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KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
B e f o r e :
MRS JUSTICE FARBEY
____________________
HM SENIOR CORONER FOR SEFTON | ||
KNOWSLEY AND ST HELENS | Applicant | |
(1) MICHAEL KAY | ||
(2) STEPHEN FRIAR | ||
(3) ST HELENS & KNOWSLEY TEACHING HOSPITALS NHS TRUST |
____________________
the Applicant.
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
LORD JUSTICE LEWIS:
INTRODUCTION
THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
"Michelle Kay was sadly found deceased on 2 October 2010 (sic) when she was found unresponsive on her bed by her husband at 119 Exeter Street, St Helens, W10 4HP. Several packets of medication were found at the address, notably dihydrocodeine and mirtazapine. There was no indication of suicide. The post-mortem findings showed a cocktail of drugs had been taken. Both the bronchopneumonia and the mixed-drug toxicity led to the death of Michelle Kay."
In section 4, headed "Conclusion of the Coroner as to the death", the same words are repeated.
"1. For context, Michelle's life was very complicated. She always suffered from mental health issues and was diagnosed with bipolar years before her death.
2. Michelle also took additional prescription medication to which she was addicted to and, despite attempts to intervene and help, our attempts were not successful. We would like to ask the court to not reopen the inquest into Michelle's death, as we believe the initial inquest to be more than sufficient. Losing Michelle has already been very painful and traumatic on the family, and we feel this process is adding to that. Furthermore, a new decision of a suicide verdict is not one that we would relish.
3. It is important that the court understands the decision to quash the initial coroner's reports revolves around letters that the hospital have submitted to the coroner after the hearing. These letters were dated some two months prior to her death. They had been written around 8 August as she was taken into hospital as a suspected overdose. These are noted in the hospital records dated at the same time (August).
4. On that particular visit to hospital, again in August, she was seen by the mental health team who note in the hospital records that she was no longer feeling suicidal and was now looking forward to life. There was also the signing of the release at the end of the hospital notes.
5. Michelle was then taken into hospital on 26 September after collapsing in Asda. She was unconscious when the mental health team went to visit her, and yet they returned some six hours later and, at that time, she had, sadly-- had already been released, which we believe to have been detrimental.
6. After the post-mortem, it was noted on the report that she did not have enough additional medication in her system to end her life but she did have a chest infection, therefore it was recorded that bronchopneumonia and mixed-drug toxicity was the probable cause. Referring to point 5, we believe Michelle was severely poorly and it was not a suicide attempt. We also know that the letters were dated prior to her last hospital visit and believe these should be excluded in this new matter.
7. For your reference, the hospital record regarding intake of the letters is also dated in August."
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
"(1) . This section applies where, on an application by or under the authority of the Attorney-General, the High Court is satisfied as respects a coroner ('the coroner concerned') either—
...
(b) where an inquest or an investigation has been held by him, that (whether by reason of fraud, rejection of evidence, irregularity of proceedings, insufficiency of inquiry, the discovery of new facts or evidence or otherwise) it is necessary or desirable in the interest of justice, that an investigation (or as the case may be, another investigation) should be held.
(2). The High Court may—
(a) order an investigation under Part 1 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 to be held into the death either—
(i) by the coroner concerned; or
(ii) by a senior coroner, area coroner, or assistant coroner in the same coroner area;
(b) order the coroner concerned to pay such costs of and incidental to the application as to the court may appear just; and
(c) where an inquest has been held, quash any inquisition on, or determination or finding made, at that inquest."
"The power contained in s.13(1)(b) stated in very broad terms. The necessity or desirability of another inquest may arise by reason of one of the listed matters 'or otherwise'. Notwithstanding the width of the statutory words, its exercise by courts shows that the factors of central importance are an assessment of the possibility (as opposed to the probability) of a different verdict, the number of shortcomings in the original inquest, and the need to investigate matters raised by new evidence which has not been investigated at the inquest…"
"We shall focus on the statutory language, as interpreted in the authorities, to identify the principle appropriate to this application. The single question is whether the interests of justice make a further inquest either necessary or desirable. The interests of justice, as they arise in the coronial process, are undefined, but, dealing with it broadly, it seems to us elementary that the emergence of fresh evidence which may reasonably lead to the conclusion that the substantial truth about how an individual met his death was not revealed at the first inquest, will normally make it both desirable and necessary in the interest of justice for a fresh inquest to be ordered. The decision is not based on problems with process, unless the process adopted at the original inquest has caused justice to be diverted or for the inquiry to be insufficient. What is more, it is not a pre-condition to an order for a further inquest that this court should anticipate that a different verdict to the one already reached will be returned. If a different verdict is likely, then the interests of justice will make it necessary for a fresh inquest to be ordered, but even when significant fresh evidence may serve to confirm the correctness of the earlier a verdict, it may sometimes nevertheless be desirable for the full extent of the evidence which tends to confirm the correctness of the verdict to be publicly revealed."
THE PRESENT CASE
MRS JUSTICE FARBEY: