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	England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Smith & Nephew Pharmaceuticals Ltd., R (on the application of) v Medicines Control Agency [1999] EWHC 260 (Ch) (25 March 1999) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/1999/260.html Cite as: [1999] EWHC 260 (Ch)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CHANCERY DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		25 March 1999

Jacob J:

"My Lords, my clients have no merits, but they are right". Mr Kenneth Diplock KC once so opened an appeal. And so submits Mr Michael Brindle QC, who appears for Smith & Nephew Pharmaceuticals Ltd. ("S&N"). They are in dispute with Primecrown Ltd. ("Primecrown"), for whom Mr Martin Howe QC appears. What I have to decide is a preliminary point as to the basis of assessment of damages payable by S&N to Primecrown under a cross-undertaking in damages given by S&N in judicial review proceedings.

The events giving rise to the preliminary point

S&N used to make and sell in the UK a pharmaceutical drug under the trade mark "Ditropan". The sale of pharmaceuticals in the UK requires a licence from the Medicines Control Agency ("MCA") established under the Medicines Act 1968. S&N (or another member of the group of which S&N forms part) held such a licence for Ditropan. Although such licences are no more than permissions to do what would otherwise be unlawful they can be immensely valuable. For if a company is the only company to have such permission, in practice it will have a monopoly in the drug concerned. And when a second company gets a licence, that too is valuable. It will enable the second company to undercut the first, but only by a relatively small amount, thus giving it a large margin. As more and more companies get licences, so their value decreases. The

competition reduces prices and hence the possibility of specially lucrative margins.

Licences can be of different sorts. The original introducer and manufacturer of the product requires a full licence of the sort held by S&N. Another sort of licence is required by a trader who wishes to act as a middleman by importation of the drug from a manufacturer abroad. Traders often wish to do this because they can exploit price differences between countries. Of course those able to sell in high price countries wish to stop, if they can, imports from low price countries. This is so even where they themselves (or their associated companies or licensors) sold the product in the low price country. "Parallel importation" (as it is called) of such low priced drugs from within the Common Market cannot be prevented by the exercise of intellectual property rights by virtue of the well-known "exhaustion of rights" principle. Thus, within the Common Market, all that stands between a parallel importer and a lucrative trade is his need for a licence.

Within the Common Market there are Community law rules about such licensing. The importer can obtain from the MCA a product licence for parallel importation (UPL(PI)") of a drug from another Common Market country where the seller himself has an appropriate licence from the local agency corresponding to the MCA. That is what happened here. On 24^th August 1993 Primecrown was granted a PL(PI) to import Ditropan from Belgium. The product was made by Marion Merrell Dow who were S&N's licensors. S&N, foreseeing competition from cheaper Ditropan, discovered that the grant of Primecrown's PL(PI) fell outside the MCA's published guidelines. (The guidelines did not cover the case where the UK PL holder was a licensee as opposed to being a member of the same group of companies as the vendor in the other EU country). S&N complained to the MCA which responded by asserting to Primecrown that the PL(PI) was invalid. Primecrown lodged a statutory appeal. MacPherson J on 26^th November 1993 suspended the MCA's purported invalidation of the licence. Somewhat oddly to my mind, (though I do not know the details), S&N were not allowed to intervene in this dispute even though they tried. So they set about challenging Primecrown's licence by their own judicial review proceedings.

On 26 January 1994 those proceedings began when Dyson J gave leave to apply for judicial review. He also granted an interim order (save in respect of some existing commitments) suspending Primecrown's licence and restraining Primecrown from importing or dealing in Ditropan. At that time it was thought that it would not take long before the matter could be resolved. But, as a cynic might well have expected, things were not that simple. It became apparent that a reference to the European Court of Justice was necessary. The dispute came before Latham J on 29^th March 1994. He reconsidered the question of the interim injunction anew and decided it should remain in place. A reference was duly made. It was determined in Primecrown's favour on 12^th November 1996. The interim injunction was lifted and the licence was restored on 12^th December 1996 by order of Tucker J.

The result of all this was that Primecrown was deprived of the benefit of its licence for nearly 3 years. The benefit to S&N was colossal. It kept its monopoly in Ditropan for all this period. So not only did S&N make more sales than would have been the case with competition, but also S&N were able to keep their high margins. This is of course also typically the case when an interim injunction is granted against a competitor in respect of a product covered by a patent. The value of the injunction to the patentee is much greater than anything he might have to pay to the competitor under the cross-undertaking if it turns out that there should not have been any injunction - a "wrong injunction" generally pays. The biggest loser is normally the public. In the instant case that would be the NHS. The extra the public have had to pay on this case by reason of the "wrong" injunction must run into millions of pounds. Even in the short period of trade until the injunction was granted, S&N calculated that it had "lost" over £300,000 the bulk of which (£250,000) was due to S&N's own enforced price cutting. Whether those who negotiate on behalf of the NHS can, in future negotiations with S&N, "recover" the extra that had to be paid is not a matter for me to say. I would add this, that in future applications of this sort it may be possible for significant third party customers to protect themselves against the effects of a "wrong" injunction by themselves applying to the court for a cross-undertaking to be given in respect of their losses arising from having to pay more than they would have to pay if competition had been permitted - see Allied Irish Bank v Ashford Hotels^[1]

As a condition for the grant of the injunction a cross-undertaking in damages was required of S&N. In its original form the order was sloppily drafted, saying no more than:

"AND UPON Smith & Nephew giving a cross-undertaking in damages to Primecrown and the MCA in respect of any interim relief ordered by this Court"

Fortunately there has been no dispute between the parties that this order meant that S&N undertook:

"To abide by any order which this court may make as to damages in case the court may hereafter be of the opinion that the defendants, or any of the, have suffered by reason of this order which the plaintiff ought to pay."

(This adapts the terminology of a civil claim, though of course S&N were applicants for judicial review, the MCA were respondents and Primecrown were interveners. "The defendants" means the MCA or Primecrown.) What was agreed is, of course, the normal form of a cross-undertaking and it would be better practice for the normal form to be used in judicial review cases too.

Following discharge of the injunction, the cross-undertaking was activated by an order of Carnwath J on 21^s1 January 1997. He also rejected a further claim for judicial review by S&N. The inquiry under the cross-undertaking has been transferred to this Division. Following pleadings S&N successfully applied for trial of a preliminary issue, and it is that issue which falls to me to decide.

The issue arises because of a complication not foreseen at the time when the interim injunction was granted by Dyson J or continued by Latham J. On both of these applications Primecrown was treated as the legal entity which was going to import and deal in Ditropan. But that was not so. The trade was actually going to be conducted by a company called Necessity Supplies Ltd. ("Necessity"). I must explain this in more detail.

The managing director of both Primecrown and Necessity is Mr Ketan Mehta. I found him an honest, precise, and indeed courteous witness. A clear indication of his business skills is found in Necessity's turnover by ] 997, namely nearly £50m. I reject entirely and completely the suggestion made on behalf of S&N that his evidence in the judicial review proceedings was deliberately less than candid about Primecrown and Necessity. It is a suggestion which should not have been made. Mr Mehta qualified as a pharmacist in 1981 and started trading in wholesale pharmaceuticals in 1984 under the name Necessity Supplies. The business was transferred to the company in 1986. In 1988 Mr Mehta and a friend who had specialised knowledge of the pharmaceutical trade set up Primecrown. This company was to specialise in acquiring PL(PI) licences. And that is what happened. Identifying sources of supply and obtaining such licences requires both business acumen and an extensive knowledge of the practice and procedures of the MCA, all of which must, understandably, be strictly complied with. Skill in these matters can result (as it did here) in being the first to obtain a PL(PI) with the lucrative results I have described above. Primecrown became so skilled. But when it acquired licences it exploited them by permitting Necessity (and sometimes others) to do the actual trading in the drug. Section 7 of the Medicines Act 1968 in effect allows a licence holder to "procure" sale or assembly by others and that is what in substance happened between Primecrown and Necessity. (Incidentally there was a parallel situation within the S&N group, where one company was the PL holder and other the trader) The arrangements between Primecrown and Necessity have not changed. Mr Mehta's friend was bought out early on, and the two companies are owned by Mr Mehta, his brother Bharat, and, in the case of Necessity, members of their respective families. The companies have different employees, different businesses and different accounts. The commercial substance of the position is that Primecrown owns assets in the form of PL(PI)' s which it licences to others, particularly Necessity. When those assets are licensed to arms length third parties, what is negotiated is in substance a royalty (whether it is called a labelling fee or whatever). The amount depends on the worth of the licence - if there are plenty of others holding licences the rate is low, if not, it is high. As between Primecrown and Necessity the position is in substance the same. Necessity must pay Primecrown for the "use" of the licence and must do so at a commercial rate. That is what would have happened but for the injunction as Mr Karavadra, the financial controller of the two companies, made clear in his witness statement. What the commercial rate would have been was never actually settled, but it is difficult to see how it could have been different from that which would have been negotiated at arm's length.

So (apart from some labelling activities by Primecrown) the real intended trader in Ditropan was Necessity and not Primecrown. S&N did not know that when they applied for an interlocutory injunction. They assumed the trader would be Primecrown. So their evidence was directed at future importation and trade by Primecrown. When they gave the cross-undertaking they expected, if it was ever called upon, to have to compensate Primecrown for a lost trade in Ditropan. Primecrown did not defend the proceedings well. They permitted them to proceed on the basis that the trade would indeed be conducted by Primecrown. The reason for that was that Mr Mehta regarded the existence of the two companies as no more than a historical artefact and in practice treated the businesses of the two companies as one. Even the name of Necessity hardly emerged at all, though an invoice for purchase was exhibited. On the basis of that, Mr Dick, S&N's witness, assumed (wrongly but understandably) that there was some form of inter- company trade in Ditropan. Clearly what should have been done was for the true picture to have been given, and a cross-undertaking imposed in favour of both companies. That indeed did happen in a similar case a few years later. Mr Mehta was wiser by then.

So in the result the trading loss incurred by reason of the injunction was incurred by Necessity, but only Primecrown had the benefit of the cross-undertaking. The heart of the preliminary question before me is whether somehow Primecrown can claim the full trading loss. Or is it the case that S&N get yet a further windfall in that although they expected to have to pay for a full trading loss, they will not have to pay as much as that?

As finally formulated the preliminary question reads:

"Whether in point of law or fact Primecrown Limited ('Primecrown') may seek to recover from Smith & Nephew Pharmaceuticals Limited ('Smith & Nephew') under Smith & Nephew's cross-undertaking in damages their alleged losses in so far as those losses were (or would have been) suffered as a consequence of sales which would have been made by Necessity Supplies Limited ("Necessity") whether

(i) by virtue of

(a) its alleged 'usual' practice of allowing profits to be generated in Necessity (as pleaded in paragraph 21 of its Statement of Contentions) or

(b) its alleged agreement with Necessity that Necessity would trade in Belgian Ditropan for Primecrown's benefit (as pleaded at paragraph 24 of Primecrown's Statement of Contentions)

(ii) or otherwise"

Mr Howe produced a number of arguments by which he suggested the full trading loss of Necessity/Primecrown was recoverable. Before I deal with them I should mention two he did not raise, rightly in my view. He did not suggest that the reference in the undertaking to "Primecrown" should be construed as a reference to whoever would in fact have been conducting the trade but for the injunction, i.e. both companies collectively. That would involve the sort of "never mind what was actually said, it is what was actually meant and understood" point considered in Mannai Investment v Eagle Star^[2]. It is not possible to apply that argument to the order. The most that can be said is that S&N expected to pay for lost trade, but the court which made the order had no idea that any other legal entity might be involved. Nor did Mr Howe suggest that there should be a straightforward stripping of the corporate veil, as has been held legitimate in some "alter ego ,. - type cases.

Mr Howe did suggest, however, that the two companies could and should be regarded as one because the whole context in which the injunction was granted was that of Community Law. Frequently Community Law regards a number of legally distinct entities as one "undertaking" or economic unit. That of course makes sense in particular contexts, for instance competition law. But I see no room for that concept here, where one is concerned with what the order actually meant. It would mean the same whether the background was Community law or not.

Next Mr Howe sought to rely upon a point of fact. The suggestion was that although normally Primecrown did not trade and Necessity did not trade for it as an agent, things might have been different in the case of Ditropan. Arrangements might have been put in place for the trading profits to be Primecrown' s. The reason that this might have happened was said to be as a result of an arrangement involving Primecrown and other members of the Association of Pharmaceutical Importers. Following the initial assertion of the MCA that Primecrown's PL(PI) was invalid, it was realised that substantial legal costs were likely to be incurred. The idea was for a number of companies to fund the litigation jointly. For the other companies to do this, they would have to have an incentive and what was discussed with Mr Barker, Chairman of the Association, was the idea of a "pot" of profits from Ditropan in which other members would share in return for their financial assistance. The idea was discussed, but never came to anything. It finally died when there were no profits to be shared (though of course there could have been an agreement about sharing damages paid under the cross-undertaking) But even if the injunction had not been granted I remain unconvinced that any agreement would have been reached. Mr Barker goes no further than to say that if there had been no injunction "the task of persuading API members would have been easier." That really disposes of the point, so whether the "pot" would have been held by Primecrown or Necessity is immaterial. From the point of view of the proposal it did not matter in which company's name the "pot" was put. Mr Mehta thinks it probably would have been put in Primecrown's name but this is too speculative to be a firm basis for decision.

Of course what is clear from this evidence, and was in any event readily conceded by Mr Brindle, is that it lay within Mr Mehta's power to arrange that all profits from the sale of Ditropan would be made by Primecrown. This would have been achievable simply by appropriate documentation making Necessity Primecrown's agent in respect of the trade concerned. If all the profits were in Primecrown, there still would have been incentive for Necessity (treating it as an arm's length third party) to provide the services for Primecrown as Mr Mehta's unchallenged evidence demonstrated. The point is that it would be commercially advantageous to deal in Ditropan because of the goods which could be conveyed with it.

Mr Howe's next point was rather less well defined. It runs in steps something like this:

(1) The jurisdiction is equitable and discretionary in its nature;

(2) The discretion extends not only to the threshold decision of whether or not damages should be awarded but also to quantification. Dicta to the contrary are wrong;

(3) Quantification is therefore flexible and should extend to doing justice between the parties

( 4) In so doing the court should have regard to analogous principles of which contract is but one. In particular the court should have regard to the circumstances in which the undertaking was given and what it was designed to cover

(5) In the present case it was designed to cover lost trading profits and that in particular is what S&N expected to pay. It is just and equitable that they should pay that;

(6) In any event the court should, by analogy, have regard to the sort of contract case where one of the parties has to pay the other for damage really suffered by some third party - cases of the kind examined and found in Linden Gardens v Lenesta Sludge.^[3]

Mr Brindle does not challenge the first proposition, namely that the jurisdiction is equitable. There is no contract and no tort. The right to damages, if any, stems only from the cross-undertaking. The party giving the cross-undertaking is not normally regarded as a tortfeasor or in a like position to that of a tortfeasor, (though I suppose things may be different in a case where the party is guilty of deliberately misleading the court or, in the case of an ex parte injunction, failing to disclose highly material matters).

Moving on from the equitable nature of the jurisdiction, Mr Howe attacks the view, expressed obiter by Lord Diplock in Hoffmann-La Roche v Trade Secretary^[4] that quantification is non-discretionary and should be on the basis of a notional contract between the parties to the effect that the injunctor would not prevent the injunctee from doing the injuncted acts. If one adopts that basis then the paying party will pay only for such damage as he could reasonably foresee the injunction might cause, either from his general knowledge or from his knowledge of the particular circumstances of the injunctee. This follows from the contractual principle of Hadley v Baxendale^[5] If right, then an injunctee cannot recover for any damage directly caused to him by the wrongful injunction if that damage could not be foreseen by the injunctor because he did not have enough knowledge of the injunctee's circumstances.

I certainly agree with Mr Howe that the precedential basis for a rule that the damages can be assessed only on a notional contract damages is slender. As I have said, Lord Diplock mentioned it in Hoffmann-La Roche. Lord Diplock relied solely on a rather unsatisfactory case of Smith v Day.^[6] In that case the three members of the Court of Appeal gave different reasons

for their decision to refuse an inquiry as to damages. The defendant said that the injunction had prevented him from letting some premises on advantageous terms. Sir George Jessel MR was of the opinion that there should never be enforcement of the undertaking if the injunction had been granted owing to the mistake of the court, a view finally killed off in Griffith v Blake.^[7] Oddly to modern eyes he was also of the opinion that even if a particularly advantageous lease had been lost damages could not be recovered. Brett LJ held that the application for an inquiry was made too late after the dissolution of the injunction but went on to discuss, obiter, the basis of compensation. He said that the Court "should act as nearly as may be on fixed rules or by analogy with fixed rules." But he did not exactly tie the damages to notional contract damages.

He nearly did so. What he said was:

"If damages are to be granted at all, I think the Court would never go beyond what would be given if there were an analogous contract or duty to the opposite party. The rules as to damages are shown in Hadley v Baxendale. If the injunction had been obtained fraudulently or maliciously, the Court, I think, would act by analogy to the rule in the case of fraudulent or malicious breach of contract, and not confine itself to proximate damages, but give exemplary damages."

Cotton LJ disagreed with Sir George Jessell. He said, (having rejected the suggestion that there actually was a beneficial lease):

"I think that the damages must be confined to loss which is the natural consequence of the injunction under the circumstances of which the party obtaining the injunction has notice, as for instance a claim by the builder in consequence of the injunction compelling the defendant to break his contract with him."

It will be seen that both observations were obiter. Similar obiter observations have been made in a few cases down the years (for instance Cheltenham and Gloucester BS v Ricketts^[8] and Financiera Avenida v Shiblaq^[9]) although a more liberal approach had been indicated by James LJ in Graham v Campbell^[10]

"If any damage has been occasioned by an interlocutory injunction, which, on the hearing, is found to have been wrongly asked for, justice requires that such damage should fall on the voluntary litigant who fails, not on the litigant who without just cause has been made so."

A more liberal approach was also indicated in the Australian case of Victorian Onion and Potato Growers v Finnigan^[11] where Cussen J said:

"I think the word 'damages' in that undertaking is to be given a very general meaning, and is not necessarily to be given the same meaning as the word 'damages' when used in connection with breaches of contracts. 'Damages' in this case seems to me to mean real harm, rather than to have any strictly defined meaning."

The leading modern case is in the High Court of Australia, Ansett Transport v Air Express^[12] On the facts the ultimate holding was that the damage had been caused by the litigation itself and not by the interim injunction. There was considerable discussion of the principles of assessment. Aickin J was not prepared to say that the contract measure was immutable. He said:

"In a proceeding of an equitable nature it is generally proper to adopt a view which is just and equitable, or fair and reasonable, in all the circumstances, rather than to apply a rigid rule. However, the view that the damages should be those which flow directly from the injunction and which could have been foreseen when the injunction was granted, is one which will be just and equitable in the circumstances of most cases and certainly in the present case. No doubt the view as expressed in the two decisions of the Court of Appeal does not constitute a rigid rule and circumstances may sometimes require a different approach. However, it will in my opinion be seldom that it will be just or equitable that the unsuccessful plaintiff should bear the burden of damages which were not foreseeable from circumstances known to him at the time."

On appeal Berwick CJ and Stephen J agreed with Aickin 1's opinion, Gibbs J found it unnecessary to consider the principles of assessment, contenting himself with the causation point Mason J appeared to favour the straightforward measure of "the loss which is the natural consequence of the injunction." But all of this was subordinate to the real point - that one must look for the loss caused by the injunction, distinguishing, if necessary, the loss caused by the litigation itself.

I have much sympathy with the view that the contract basis for assessment is or may be too narrow in some cases. After all, even if the injunctor is no wrongdoer, as compared with the wholly wrongly assailed injunctee, he stands a notch down. It was he who (as it turned out) wrongly assailed the injunctee. He was the "voluntary litigant" as James LJ put it. There is a lot to be said for the view that the paying party should pay for all the damage directly caused to the injunctee by the wrongful injunction - that he must take his victim as he finds him. Of course if, once he knows of the injunction, the injunctee does not spell out to the injunctor any special circumstances causing direct but, to the injunctor, unforseeable damage, he may not be allowed to recover for that damage. Equity would be apt to blame an injunctee who stood by, letting the injunctor build up a liability on the cross-undertaking of which he had no knowledge.

I think that in an appropriate case the courts will have to examine the principles more closely. I do not think it is necessary for me to do so here. Whether the recoverable damage is that which is foreseeable by the plaintiff or that which is directly caused by the injunction is not in point None of the differing views expressed in the cases go so far as to say that the injunctee can claim for damage not suffered by him. Nor do the very words of the undertaking (which is the foundation of the jurisdiction) suggest that he can recover more than that which he has suffered, whether that damage is foreseeable by the injunctor or not. Thus while I have sympathy with Mr Howe's "flexible approach" I do not think it can go so far as to require the "wrongful injunctor" to pay for damage not suffered by the injunctee at all

I think this consideration also disposes of Mr Howe's Linden Gardens point. In that case the House of Lords held that damages for breach of a contract between a developer and a builder should include the damage suffered by the purchaser from the developer. The parties could be treated as having entered into the contract on the basis that the developer would be entitled to enforce its contractual rights on behalf of purchaser who suffered the actual damage. The case depended on the parties having full knowledge that the developer was going to pass the property on to the purchaser, so the builder knew exactly who would be suffered if his work was inadequate. Mr Howe suggested that in this case there is a parallel in that S&N expected to have to pay for trading losses. So they did, but they did not undertake to pay for trading losses, they only undertook to pay for Primecrown's losses. The analogy with Linden Gardens breaks down.

I turn finally to Mr Howe's last shot. This was an argument suggesting that Necessity's lost trading profits were actually to be regarded as lost profits of Primecrown. He founded his argument on Ward v Newalls Insulation^[13] The plaintiff contracted asbestosis as a result of the negligence of the defendants. By the time he contracted the disease (and thus suffered damage) he was in partnership with another. On accountancy advice each partner had brought his wife into the business as a sleeping partner. With agreement with the Revenue the income and profits from the business were divided into four equal amounts, each husband and wife getting a quarter each. The defendants argued that the plaintiff's lost earnings was thus one quarter of the income and profits of the business. The Court of Appeal rejected this. They held that the arrangement between the working partners and their wives was merely an informal arrangement, terminable at will. So the earning partner] s real loss of earnings was half What he had been deprived of was his earning capacity which was really the half and not a quarter share.

Mr Howe said the position was the same here. What Primecrown had been deprived of was its earning capacity from the PL(PI) The arrangement between it and Necessity was informal and determinable at will. At any time matters could have been so arranged that all the trading profits would be in Primecrown. So the real loss was Primecrown's. Attractive though I think the argument is, I think it breaks down. The Court of Appeal's reasoning depends upon the fact that the wife partners were mere nominees.^[14] If they had been working partners then the division would have been according to the plaintiff's actual contribution - as occurred in Kent v British Railways Board.^[15] The better analogy in this case is that Primecrown and Necessity were not partners at all but independent companies under common control.

So [ think what has to be asked is what would have happened but for the injunction? The answer is Primecrown would have earned royalties from the trade of Necessity and from those third party companies with whom it had established arrangements. A better analogy than a partnership is that of patentee and licensee. It is well established that a non-trading patentee can only recover a reasonable royalty for infringements. What Primecrown can recover is a reasonable royalty on the lost sales, as Mr Brindle accepted was the position. Formally I answer the preliminary point in the negative.

Looking to the future of this inquiry, what really matters is the rate (or rates) of such a royalty and the lost sales over which they are to be paid. Mr Howe says the rate should be high (and points to the comparables in the actual agreements with third parties). Mr Howe further says that the high rate should stay constant for the whole period of the injunction because during that period it is unlikely that the MCA would have granted any other PL(PI). Thus he seeks to invoke a windfall of litigation going the other way. The current pleadings on the inquiry seem to me to involve a host of further points, most or all of which are irrelevant. I rather think it would be sensible for those pleadings to be simplified. To that end I think the parties' representatives should meet with a view to ensuring that only points of weight are taken. The existing pleadings could usefully start as a basis for discussion - each side indicating which points it really intends to take. [say this because, at least on S&N's side, points were taken in the pleadings upon which Mr Brindle indicated he did not intend to rely.

I will hear counsel as to the form of order, including directions as to the further conduct of the inquiry.

Note 1    [1997] 3 All ER 309    [Back]

Note 2   [1997] AC 749     [Back]

Note 3   [1994] AC 85    [Back]

Note 4   [1975] AC 295 at 361    [Back]

Note 5   (1854) 9 Exch 341    [Back]

Note 6   (1882) 21 Ch.D 421    [Back]

Note 7   (1884) 27 ChD 474    [Back]

Note 8   [1993] 1 WLR 1545 at 1552     [Back]

Note 9   Unrep 7th November 1990, CA    [Back]

Note 10   (1878) 7 ChD 490     [Back]

Note 11   [1922] VLR 819    [Back]

Note 12   [1979] 25 ALR 639 (Aickin J); [1981] 33 ALR 578 (Full Court).     [Back]

Note 13   [1998] 1 WLR 1722    [Back]

Note 14   see p.1725C    [Back]

Note 15   (1995) PIQR Q42    [Back]