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England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Marini Ltd, (The Liquidator of) v Dickenson & Ors [2003] EWHC 334 (Ch) (03 March 2003) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2003/334.html Cite as: [2003] EWHC 334 (Ch) |
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CHANCERY DIVISION
COMPANIES COURT
133-137, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1HD |
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B e f o r e :
IN THE MATTER OF MARINI LIMITED
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE INSOLVENCY ACT 1986
____________________
THE LIQUIDATOR OF MARINI LIMITED |
Applicant |
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- and – |
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(1) GARY ELLIOTT DICKENSON (2) GERALD DICKENSON (3)PAULINE DICKENSON |
Respondents |
____________________
Andreas Gledhill (instructed by Mishcon de Reya for the Respondents)
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
H.H. Judge Richard Seymour Q. C.:
Introduction
"Provided that he shall declare his interest in any contract or transaction a Director may vote as a Director in regard to any such contract or transaction in which he is interested or in respect of his appointment to any office or place of profit or upon any matter arising thereout and if he shall so vote his vote shall be counted.""
"114. The company in general meeting may declare dividends, but no dividend shall exceed the amount recommended by the directors.115. The directors may from time to time pay to the members such interim dividends as appear to the directors to be justifIed by the profits of the company.".
"On our return to England, Pauline and I decided that we had had enough of retail management. The hours are long, and even in good times, it is a stressful way of life. We wanted instead to set up a consultancy, effectively capitalising on our substantial experience to act as troubleshooters for stores in difficulties. We discussed our plans with Norman Hanison [their accountant, a partner in a firm called Cavendish & Co ( Cavendish ) and shortly after our return through him set up Earlstar Management Limited ( "Earlstar" ) to act as the vehicle for the consultancy. As far as I can recall, I was never a director of, or shareholder in Earlstar. I think that when he first set up the company, Mr. Hanison may have advised me that it would be simpler for tax reasons if I had no direct interest in it, but I do not now remember the details…"
"17. For the reasons I have explained in paragraph 7 above, originally, Pauline and I were employed and remunerated by Earlstar, Earlstar being paid consultancy fees in turn by the Company. I am asked about the contractual arrangements between Earlstar and the Company and between the Company and its directors. There were no written consultancy or service agreements, Pauline, Gary and I would decide what we should be paid in the light of what the Company could afford and advice from Norman Hanison. Earlstar would invoice the Company ... . and the Company would make payments to it and the directors by cheque. These cheques were written-out by Pauline as part of her weekly cheque- run (comprising also payments to staff, utilities, suppliers and so forth). Although I am advised that the absence of formal agreements was far from ideal from a legal standpoint, I would respectfully ask the court to remember that both the Company and Earlstar were small family concerns. It never occurred to me that the relationships needed to be formalised. I would have looked to Norman Hanison to advise us if the contrary were the case, and in all the many years in which he advised us, he never did. Mr. Davis [the solicitor representing Mr. Dickenson in these proceedings] has pointed out to me that from the bundle of copy minutes [of meetings of the Company or of its board of directors], it appears that in each of the years down to 1990, directors remuneration was expressly approved at the Company's annual general meeting or an adjournment thereof Mr. Davis further points out to me that at an extraordinary general meeting on 7 March 1991, a resolution was passed dispensing with future annual general meetings, and that thereafter, the only meetings were meetings of the board to approve the audited financial statements, a change in the Company's registered office, and my appointment as a director. I do not recall (if I ever knew,) why this change came about in 1991, although it has been suggested to me, and I agree, that it reflects the fact that the Company was a small family concern. I stress that we relied entirely and at all times on Norman Hanison to ensure that proper principles of corporate governance were adhered to. All the minutes [mentioned above] were drafted by him, and after presenting them to us for signature, he would invariably take them away and retain them for safe keeping.
18. As time went on, the relationship between the Company on the one hand, and Pauline and me on the other, became in practice more that of employer and employee than client and consultants.... It was for this reason that I eventually became a director and shareholder in the Company on 1 December 1997. I seem to recall having a conversation with Norman Hanison (presumably at about this time) in which we agreed that the original structuring of the relationship as one of consultancy had been superseded by the way things had developed in practice, and he advised that my role might as well now be put on a more formal footing. I see from my April 1998 and April 1999 tax returns ... that in 1998, I derived employment income from both Earlstar and the Company. The allocation of my income as between the companies would have been made by Norman Hanison (who also dealt with my family's personal tax affairs), and I do not now recall (if I ever knew) why in 1999 it was split in this way. In preparing this statement, I have considered copies of Pauline's tax returns to April 1998 and April 1999 ... from which I see that she was paid solely by the Company in both of those years... This accords with my impression that (at least by the date of the events to which these proceedings relate), she was paid by the Company, not Earlstar. As far as I am aware, Gary was only ever paid by the Company."
I accept that evidence. It was not the subject of any real challenge.
"At some point in the autumn of 1997, we were approached by the landlord of "Zanelli" in Burlington Gardens (Scottish Widows). Rents in the Bond Street area rose steeply in the mid/late 1990s, and the terms of the lease we had originally agreed had turned out to be highly advantageous for us. Scottish Widows wanted to know if the Company would be prepared to surrender the lease in return for a reverse premium. Since, as I have explained, "Zanelli" was by far the least successful of the Company's outlets, we had no hesitation whatever in agreeing to this suggestion in principle. The offer represented an opportunity to streamline the Company's business, while realising a substantial capital gain. After an extended period of negotiation, we agreed a figure of £150, 000 for surrender of the lease. Looking at the schedule of administrative expenses at the last page of the audited financial statements to 31 March 1998, I confirm that the £135,470 recorded there in respect of profit on disposal of a tangible asset represents the reverse premium received from Scottish Widows, less estate agents' and solicitors' fees. "Zanelli" shut at about the end of February 1998."
"At the date on which the net funds from Burlington Gardens were received, there was no question of the Company needing to retain any part of those monies for working capital purposes. Both previous financial years had been highly successful, and there was every reason to expect the Company's profitability, if anything, to improve with "Zanelli" disposed of. I consequently asked Norman Hanison whether we could pay out the net proceeds of surrender of the lease to the family. I recall that I was anxious, if possible, for payment to be made before the Company's year-end to avoid having to show a high profit figure (with attendant tax implications) in the accounts to 31 March 1998. Mr. Hanison told me that there was no difficulty in paying the money out in the form of a dividend. He never advised me that a dividend in the full net amount of the reverse premium might be improper (if that was indeed the case), and never mentioned any need for accounts to be drawn-up in advance. Mr. Davis again points out to me the apparent absence of any formal resolutions reflecting this dividend, and again I can only say that we left the relevant paperwork to Mr. Hanison. From note 7 to the accounts to 31 March 1998, I see that the dividend appears to have been paid on 26 February 1998, though I have no specific recollection of the date. I do, however, recall ... that it was divided up among the shareholders according to their holdings in amounts advised by Mr. Hanison — I believe I received £12,000, Pauline £61,200 and Gary £46,800."
"Performance continued to be satisfactory during the period from February 1998 until September of that year.There had been an amount of unfavourable publicity both in our own and the foreign press, highlighting the enormous price differentials between London and other comparable European Cities/Capitals. As the core business was targeted at overseas visitors this had a marked, indeed, disastrous effect on sales. Turnover plummeted from September of 1998 and the Company experienced extremely difficult trading conditions.
Cash flow became stretched and it was necessary to fully utilise the available overdraft facility. Arrangements were made with the Inland Revenue and H M. Customs and Excise for payment to be made by installments and extended credit terms agreed with the Landlord and suppliers.....
It was anticipated that there would be a recovery in the medium term, and in order to generate cash the Company's motor vehicle was sold to Mr. Gerald Dickenson for the sum of £15, 000 following a professional valuation.
With a view to stabilising the position, overheads were cut to the minimum, staffing levels were reduced, and both shops opened 7 days per week staffed only by the Directors to economise on running costs.
During this period, the Directors further supported the Company by declining to draw a salary from the business.
Despite the strenuous efforts made, the remedial action was not successful and the health of Mr Gerald Dickenson the principal Director deteriorated rapidly and the whole family experienced severe stress.
In June of 1999, the Company suffered two disastrous trading weeks and was unable to honour its commitments to both suppliers and Landlord.
The Directors seriously reviewed the Company's circumstances and reluctantly reached the conclusion that there was no alternative but for trade to cease and Marini to be placed in Liquidation….
The shops in Duke Street and Curzon Street were closed with effect from the 21st June 1999 and all staff were dismissed.".
"26.... I did not conclude in September 1998 that decreased turnover in that month signalled an irreversible decline in the Company's fortunes, and I emphatically deny any suggestion that anyone with significant experience in the retail sector would have reached that conclusion either. An experienced retailer knows that a bad week or month (at least for an established outlet) can just as easily be followed by a successful period as by further poor performance. Although, going into October, we were certainly worried about turnover I do not believe at that point that it had even crossed our minds to liquidate the Company — and nor do I accept it should have. To have done so would simply have made no sense commercially, for at least four reasons:27. First, we had no reason to suppose the poor performance in September to be attributable to some fundamental problem with the business or an adverse long- or medium-term trend in the market within which it was operating. Quite the reverse. We thought the business was sound, and the downturn in sales was short- term.
28. Second, I was confident in my ability to claw back turnover. The difference between retailing success and failure often comes down to delicate (and almost imperceptible) factors such as window dressing, layout and stock placement. With the benefit of my many years' experience, I had every reason to believe that I could reverse the Company's decline, if it indeed proved due to anything more than short-lived bad luck.
29. Third, the Company was, in any event, well able to cope with a few months of lacklustre trading. As events were subsequently to prove, there was ample scope for cost reductions by cutting-back on shop staff and reducing the family's drawings.
30. Fourth, in common with virtually all other retailers, the Company's stronges period for sales was the run-up to Christmas and the subsequent January/February sales. It would have been a commercial nonsense to cease trading immediately prior to the most cashflow-positive period of the year. This point has particular force since the stock for the autumn/winter season had, by September, been ordered and already mostly delivered. This is standard practice in the clothing retail trade. Stock for autumn/winter collections is generally ordered the preceding February/March for delivery in late summer and early autumn. Stock for spring/summer collections is generally ordered the preceding July for delivery in February/March. Most of the Company's Italian suppliers effectively closed for business each August, and generally, I would try to ensure that as much autumn/winter stock as possible was delivered in July. Most of the balance would arrive in September, with the remainder in October. By the time the extent of the decline in turnover in September 1998 became apparent, the Company had already taken delivery of the bulk of its merchandise for the next four and a half months."
"As things turned out, a poor September was followed by a poor autumn generally. Turnover did not recover to the previous year's levels in the run-up to Christmas, and the New Year sales were disappointing too. Again, without reference to the Company's books, it is impossible for me to be more specific about figures or percentages. It would have been in about March, however, that we came to the view that we were experiencing a medium or long term trend and that the Company's future was seriously under threat, and, consequently implemented measures to try to save it. We started by putting a number of the sales staff on 2-3 day weeks. Soon we had to make redundancies — Pauline and I helping Gary to fill the staffing gaps by spending more and more time in the shops ourselves. We introduced Sunday opening. We reduced our drawings. Eventually, we were working full-time, seven days a week, for weeks on end without any payment at all. I cannot adequately describe to the court the stress and anxiety all of this caused the three of us. Pauline and I were both within months of our sixties by the date of all of this, and I have high blood-pressure for which I am on medication.32. By about mid-April, we decided to go to Norman Hanison for advice about what we should do. He recommended us to the Liquidator (who, as I think he said, was the only insolvency practitioner he knew), and we made arrangements to meet him. I have been asked whether I can remember any specific event that prompted our decision to seek advice in April: I cannot. It may be that payment of rent on the quarter day at the end of March helped crystallise our thinking, but I am not sure about this. I can, however, say for certain that no proceedings of any kind had been threatened against the Company at that point. As far as I recall .... we were not even experiencing creditor pressure in the form of threatening letters or complaints about late payment. It is worth noting at this point that Abital was probably our principal supplier by value, and that its credit terms were generous. I do not now recall what the contractual payment terms may have been, but whatever they were, in practice, we were allowed up to six months' credit."
"The key to that strategy was the one remaining valuable asset owned by the Company at that date which could be readily converted into cash — a Rolls- Royce Silver Sprit [sic — in fact Spirit] II (registered in 1991) purchased second- hand some years previously (I do not remember precisely when) for my use. I decided to buy it from the Company, and use the proceeds to meet essential outgoings for the further short period of trading I envisaged. Appreciating the importance of having it independently valued before I bought it (a point which I think was impressed on me by the Liquidator at our meeting), initially I contacted the well-known luxury car specialist, H. R.. Owen. They told me that to value it properly, they would have to keep it overnight for a thorough workshop inspection (to include an examination of the underside of the chassis), but that they were fully booked at that time, They recommended me instead to another specialist, DK Engineering Limited. I got in touch with them, and they collected the car. A day or so later (I do not remember when precisely), I received their valuation dated 25 April 1999 in the amount of £14,500 (page 68). Being anxious to ensure that the Company got proper value, the next day I bought the car by cheque for £15,000, and duly prepared a receipt to document the transaction (page 69). In procuring the Company to sell the car to me rather than an independent third party, it is right that I should accept that I was to some extent motivated by sentimental attachment to a vehicle of which I am very fond. I should also stress, however, that the only realistic alternative at this stage was to sell to a garage — inevitably, at a low trade price. The Company needed cash by then too urgently to risk waiting until an advertisement produced results, and the car needed work doing to it which I believed would probably have deterred a non-trade purchaser in any event."
The present proceedings
"1. That, pursuant to section 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986, the First Respondent [Mr. Gary Dickenson] do pay back to the Company the sum of £88,228 with interest.2. That alternatively, pursuant to section 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986, the Respondents and each of them do account to the Company for the sum of £88,228 with interest.
3.That, pursuant to section 238 of the Insolvency Act 1986, the Second Respondent [Mr. Gerald Dickenson] do pay the Company the sum of £1,500 or such other sum as the Court may determine with interest.
4.That, pursuant to section 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986, the Second Respondent do repay to the Company the sum of £122,898 with interest.
5. That [sic] a declaration pursuant to section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, that the Respondents and each of them are liable to make a contribution to the Company in the sum of £119,599.47 with interest.
6.That [sic] alternatively, a declaration pursuant to section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, that the Respondents and each of them are liable to make a contribution to the Company in the sum of £85, 275.22 with interest.
7. That, the Respondents do pay the costs of and incidental to this application."
"1. That, pursuant to section 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986, the First Respondent do pay back to the Company the sum of £120,000 with interest; alternatively that, pursuant to section 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986, the Respondents do pay back to the Company the following sums with interest:
a. (the First Respondent) the sum of £46,800 or such other sum as represents his portion of the dividend wrongly paid out on 26 February 1998;
b. (the Second Respondent) the sum of £12, 000 or such other sum as represents his portion of the dividend wrongly paid out on 26 February 1998;
c. (the Third Respondent) the sum of £61,200 or such other sum as represents her portion of the dividend wrongly paid out on 26 February 1998.
....
4. That, pursuant to section 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986, the Second Respondent do repay to the Company the sum of £122,898 with interest; alternatively that pursuant to section 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986, the Second Respondent do account to the Company for such portion of the consultancy fees paid by the Company to Earlstar Management Limited after 1 December 1997 as were paid by Earlstar Management Limited to the Second Respondent and repay such sums with interest."
The Dividend
"The respondents do not dispute that the Dividend was, to the extent of £68,228 a distribution in contravention of part VIII of the Companies Act 1985."
As matters turned out there were two principal issues which I had to decide in relation to the Dividend claim. The first was whether the whole of the Dividend was unlawful, with the potential consequence that the whole sum of £120,000 was repayable, or whether the Dividend was only unlawful to the extent that the amount of it exceeded the available distributable reserves of the Company at the date of distribution, with the consequence that only the amount of the excess of the total of the Dividend over available distributable reserves was potentially repayable. The second main issue, which arose whatever was the result of my determination on the first, was whether relief should be afforded to any of the Respondents under s.727 of the 1985 Act, and, if so, on what terms. Subsidiary issues, relevant in the event I think only to the question of relief under s.727 of the 1985 Act, were whether the Dividend had in fact been declared and whether, as Mr. Miller put it in his written skeleton argument at paragraph 5f, "the relevant accounts recommended no dividend".
"A company shall not make a distribution except out of profits available for the purpose."
the effect is that the whole of the dividend is unlawful, or only that part which exceeds the available profits, does not seem to have been the subject of clear, binding decision. I was referred to four decisions which were said to indicate what the answer to the question was. Two were rounds, respectively at first instance and in the Court of Appeal, in Bairstow v. Queens Moat Houses Plc. The first instance decision of Nelson J. is reported at [2000] 1 BCLC 549, while the decision in the Court of Appeal is reported at [2001] 2 BCLC 531. The only other decision of the Court of Appeal to which I was referred in the context of the argument in relation to this question was Precision Dippings Ltd. v. Precision Dippings Marketing Ltd. [1985] 1 Ch. 447. The other case to which I was referred was Inn Spirit Ltd. v. Burns [2002] 2 BCLC 780, a decision of Rimer J. Before turning to consider the authorities to which my attention was directed it is convenient to set out the relevant provisions of the 1985 Act.
"For purposes of this Part, a company's profits available for distribution are its accumulated, realised profits, so far as not previously utilised by distribution or capitalisation, less its accumulated, realised losses, so far as not previously written off in a reduction or reorganisation of capital duly made."
"(1) This section and sections 271 to 276 below are for determining the question whether a distribution may be made by a company without contravening sections 263, 264 or 265.(2)The amount of a distribution which may be made is determined by reference to the following items as stated in the company's accounts-
(a) profits, losses, assets and liabilities,(b) provisions of any of the kinds mentioned in paragraphs 88 and 89 of Schedule 4 (depreciation, diminution in value of assets, retentions to meet liabilities, etc), and(c) share capital and reserves (including undistributable reserves).(3)Except in a case falling within the next subsection, the company' s accounts which are relevant for this purpose are its last annual accounts, that is to say those prepared under Part VII which were laid in respect of the last preceding accounting reference period in respect of which accounts so prepared were laid; and for this purpose accounts are laid if section 241(1) has been complied with in relation to them.
(4) In the following two cases —
(a) where the distribution would be found to contravene the relevant section if reference were made only to the company's last annual accounts, or(b) where the distribution is proposed to be declared during the company' s first accounting reference period or before any accounts are laid in respect of that period,the accounts relevant under this section (called" interim" accounts" in the first case, and "initial accounts" in the second) are those necessary to enable a reasonable judgment to be made as to the amounts of the items mentioned in subsection (2) above.(5) The relevant section is treated as contravened in the case of a distribution unless the statutory requirements about the relevant accounts (that is, the requirements of this and the following three sections, as and where applicable) are complied with in relation to that distribution. "
"The accounts must have been properly prepared in accordance with this Act, or have been so prepared subject only to matters which are not material for determining, by reference to items mentioned in section 270(2), whether the distribution would contravene the relevant section; and, without prejudice to the foregoing-
(a) so much of the accounts as consists of a balance sheet must give a true and fair view of the state of the company's affairs as at the balance sheet date, and
(b) so much of the accounts as consists of a profit and loss account must give a true and fair view of the company's profit or loss for the period in respect of which the accounts were prepared."
"(1) Where a distribution, or part of one made by a company to one of its members is made in contravention of this Part and, at the time of the distribution, he knows or has reasonable grounds for believing that it is so made, he is liable to repay it (or that part of it, as the case may be) to the company or (in the case of a distribution made otherwise than in cash) to pay the company a sum equal to the value of the distribution (or part) at that time.(2)The above is without prejudice to any obligation imposed apart from thi section on a member of a company to repay a distribution unlawfully made to him; but this section does not apply in relation to —
(a) financial assistance given by a company in contravention of section 151, or(b) any payment made by a company in respect of the redemption or purchase by the company of shares in itself."
"if in any proceedings for negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust against an officer of a company or a person employed by a company as auditor (whether he is or is not an officer of the company) it appears to the court hearing the case that that officer or person is or may be liable in respect of the negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust, but that he has acted honestly and reasonably, and that having regard to all the circumstances of the case (including those connected with his appointment) he ought fairly to be excused for the negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust, that court may relieve him, either wholly or partly, from his liability on such terms as it thinks fit."
"I do not find it necessary to examine the wording of section 44(1) since by subsection (2) the provisions of section 44 are declared to be without prejudice to any other obligation imposed on a member to repay a distribution unlawfully made to him. I would put the position quite shortly. The payment of the £60,000 dividend to Marketing was an ultra vires act on the part of the company. Marketing when it received the money had notice of the facts and was a volunteer in the sense that it did not give valuable consideration for the money. Marketing accordingly held the £60,000 as a constructive trustee for the company…"
Although Mr. Miller relied quite heavily on the decision in Precision Dippings Ltd. v. Precision Dippings Marketing Ltd.., that case did not raise the question which I am now considering and in my view no observations helpful to that consideration were made in the judgments in it Dillon LJ did not find it necessary to address the wording of Companies Act 1980 s. 44(1), and it appears that the question now before me did not arise on the facts in that case.
"The second challenge to the amount of the first defendants' claim in relation to unlawful dividends is that they claim £47m in one part of their claim and £58m in another, and hence are inconsistent. The submission however is a misunderstanding of the basis upon which the first defendants make their claim. The allegation of insufficient reserves relates to all dividends paid both under the 1990 final accounts and under the 1991 final accounts. Thus, to the extent to which there were proper reserves they fall to be deducted, in the sum of £11.9m in 1990 and £11.5m in 1991 (£ 70.3m -£11.9m -£11.5m = £46.9m). The allegation that the dividends were unlawful because the 1991 accounts did not give a true and fair view however, relates only to those dividends paid under the 1991 final accounts and as it is contended that all the dividends paid under the 1991 final accounts are unlawful the company's reserves of £11.5m do not fall to be deducted. The claim on the basis of insufficient reserves is therefore £46.9m whereas the claim on the basis of insufficient reserves for the 1990 accounts but the failure to give a true and fair view in relation to the 1991 accounts is £58.4m."
Mr. Gledhill relied upon the apparent approval, or at any rate lack of any criticism, on the part of Nelson J. of the analysis which he explained in the passage from his judgment which I have set out as providing support for his submission. Robert Walker LJ considered at paragraphs 23 to 25 inclusive on pages 541 and 542 of his judgment the analysis of Nelson J. which I have just set out. He criticised the analysis on the figures, as Nelson J. had apparently overlooked some relevant entries in the accounts, but expressed no criticism of the explanation in principle as to why the sums claimed on the different bases differed.
"The strict and mandatory character of s.270 must be fatal to Mr. Purle's argument based on Duomatic, not only in relation to the dividends based on the 1991 accounts but also in relation to those based on the 1990 accounts. The former directors could not go behind the figures for Queens Moat's distributable profits disclosed by the accounts which they had prepared (and in the case of Mr. Bairstow and Mr. Marcus, signed) and laid before the company in general meeting. Even if it could be shown that wholly-owned subsidiaries had distributable profits which could lawfully and prudently have been paid up by way of dividend to Queens Moat, that would go to the issue of relief, not to that of liability."
"22. Mr. Collings' point was that the last sentence of that quotation showed that, even though a declaration of a dividend of say, £100,000 might have been unlawful, in consequence of which the director responsible for it was in theory liable to repay the whole £100,000, the court would nevertheless only order him to pay £60,000 if the evidence was such that, had the right hoops been gone through, a dividend of £40,000 could lawfully have been declared and paid. He said that it followed that if the debts of ISL proved at trial to be no more than £586,374, ISL could lawfully have declared a dividend of the difference between that and £1.9m, and Mr. and Mrs. Burns ought only to be ordered to pay at most a sum equal to the proved indebtedness of £586, 374.
23. I respectfully disagree with that submission and I do not accept that it is an accurate representation of what Robert Walker LJ was saying. I do not propose to repeat it in detail, but Mr. Alexander gave me a careful analysis of the structure of Robert Walker LJ's judgment as a whole and submitted to me that Mr. Collings' interpretation of the phrase "issue of relief" in the last sentence of paragraph 36 was incorrect. Mr. Alexander submitted, and I accept, that the "issue" there referred to was simply the question of whether or not, and if so to what extent, the misfeasant director was or ought to be entitled to relief from liability under s. 727 of the Companies Act 1985, which was the fourth main issue in the appeal. Robert Walker LJ was not suggesting that, apart from the possibility of relief under that section, the judgment or order which ought to be made against the director was limited to the excess over the amount at which a lawful dividend might have been declared. I agree with and accept Mr. Alexander 's submission.
24. It follows, therefore, that subject only to s. 727 I can see no defence to ISL's claim to recover compensation from Mr. and Mrs. Burns in the full amount of the loss which their breach of duty has caused to ISL, namely the full £1 9m. That is money which either is or may be needed by ISL to meet its liabilities. To the extent that there is any surplus, it is payable to BLL to meet its liabilities.
"It follows that Mr. D 'Jan is in principle liable to compensate the company for his breach of duty. But s 727 of the Companies Act 1985 gives the court a discretionary power to relieve a director wholly or in part from his liability for breaches of duty, including negligence, if the court considers that he acted honestly and reasonably and ought fairly to be excused. It may seem odd that a person found to have been guilty of negligence, which involves failing to take reasonable care, can ever satisfy a court that he acted reasonably. Nevertheless, the section clearly contemplates that he may do so and it follows that conduct may be reasonable for the purposes of s.727 despite amounting to lack of reasonable care at common law.
In my judgment, although Mr. D 'Jan's 99% holding of shares is not sufficient to sustain a Multinational defence, it is relevant to the exercise of the discretion under s.727. It may be reasonable to take a risk in relation to your own money which would be unreasonable in relation to someone else's. And although for the purposes of the law of negligence the company is a separate entity which Mr. D'Jan owes a duty of care which cannot vary according to the number of shares he owns, I think that the economic realities of the case can be taken into account in exercising the discretion under s.727. His breach of duty in failing to read the form before signing was not gross. It was the kind of thing which could happen to any busy man, although, as I have said, this is not enough to excuse it. But I think it is also relevant that in 1986, with the company solvent and indeed prosperous, the only persons whose interests he was foreseeably putting at risk by not reading the form were himself and his wife. Mr. D 'Jan certainly acted honestly. For the purposes of s.727 I think he acted reasonably and I think he ought fairly to be excused for some, though not all, of the liability which he would otherwise have incurred. Mr. D 'Jan has proved as an unsecured creditor in the sum of £102,913. He has been paid an interim dividend of 40p in the pound and the liquidator has paid a further dividend of 20p but withheld payment to Mr. D 'Jan pending the resolution of these proceedings. In my view, having been responsible for the additional shortfall in respect of unsecured creditors, I do not think that he should be allowed any further participation in competition with ordinary trade creditors. On the other hand, I do not think it would be fair to ask him to return what he has received or make a further contribution out of his own pocket to the company's assets. I therefore declare that Mr. D 'Jan is liable to compensate the company for the loss caused by his breach of duty in an amount not exceeding any unpaid dividends to which he would otherwise be entitled as an unsecured creditor."
"In these circumstances I am prepared to accept that Mr. and Mrs. Burns have at least a real (meaning more than fanciful or imaginary) prospect of persuading a court that they acted "reasonably" for the purposes of s.727. By itself that would not entitle them to relief under s. 727 since they will also have to satisfy the court that they "ought fairly to be excused" for their breach of duty. As to that, I cannot see that the court could or should excuse them from liability at the expense of the creditors of the companies, and in my judgment it follows that it could and should order them to repay every penny of the £1. 9m (and interest) necessary to enable the companies to pay all creditors what would otherwise have been paid to them if the money had not been removed from ISL in the first place. But the other side of this particular coin is that it is at least arguable that they ought to be excused from having to repay to the companies more than is necessary to enable the creditors to be paid in full; and an obligation to do so could produce a real hardship on them, since although ultimately any surplus will be repaid to them, perhaps via Mr. Patel, it may in the meantime have inevitably been reduced by the incurring of the charge on all realisations in compulsory liquidations which are paid into the Insolvency Services Account. The resolution of the extent to which, if at all, they should be excused from having to make full repayment is, however, one which will probably require rather more information as to the claims of the creditors."
Mr. Miller submitted that, in keeping with the sentiments expressed in that passage, I should not grant relief to Mr. Gary Dickenson, Mr. Gerald Dickenson or Mrs. Pauline Dickenson if the effect of so doing was to leave them better off than they would have been had they not received unlawful dividends, whilst creditors were worse off.
The payment of fees to Earlstar
"(1) It is the duty of a director of a company who is in any way, whether directly or indirectly, interested in a contract or proposed contract with the company to declare the nature of his interest at a meeting of the directors of the company.(2)In the case of a proposed contract, the declaration shall be made —
(a) at the meeting of the directors at which the question of entering into the contract is first taken into consideration; or(b) if the director was not at the date of that meeting interested in the proposedcontract, at the next meeting of the directors held after he became so interested;and in a case where the director becomes interested in a contract after it is made, the declaration shall be made at the first meeting of the directors held after he becomes so interested.(3)For purposes of this section, a general notice given to the directors of a
company by a director to the effect that —
(a) he is a member of a specified company or firm and is to be regarded asinterested in any contract which may, after the date of the notice, be made with that company or firm; or(b) he is to be regarded as interested in any contract which may after the date ofthe notice be made with a specified person who is connected with him (within the meaning of section 346 below),is deemed a sufficient declaration in relation to any such contract.(4) However, no such notice is of effect unless either it is given at a meeting of the directors or the director takes reasonable steps to secure that it is brought up and read at the next meeting of the directors after it is given.
(5) A reference in this section to a contract includes any transaction or arrangement (whether or not constituting a contract) made or entered into on or after 22nd December 1980."
"Apart from that, however, if the judge was entitled to make the findings of non- disclosure and non-declaration of interests that he did, the position is that each of the directors has failed to disclose formally at the board meeting an interest common to all the directors and, ex hypothesi, already known to all the directors. I would hesitate to hold that such an apparently technical non-declaration of an interest in breach of s. 317 has the inevitable result, as to which the court has no discretion, that the second management agreement is fundamentally flawed and must be set aside if Lee Lighting chooses to ask sufficiently promptly that it be set aside."
That comment was obiter, but it reflects a concern as to the technicalities of s.317 which is also to be found in other cases to which Mr. Gledhill drew my attention.
"If then one poses the simple question: what does the balance of justice require in the present case, I am left in no doubt whatever as to the proper answer. The plain fact is that this plaintiff continued, from 1987 to 1990, to serve the company as its chairman understanding that his notice term had been increased to five years; that equally was the understanding of all his fellow directors; and Avena too, at the time of their takeover of the company, clearly understood that to be the position an understanding in their case derived from the company's explicit letter published earlier in opposition to the bid. To hold in these circumstances that what was at most a merely technical breach of a statutory duty of disclosure should render that variation unenforceable would to my mind involve the most patent injustice."
"If it was necessary for me to do so in order to decide this case, I would take the same line as that taken by Simon Brown J. in the Runciman case and hold that non-disclosure pursuant to s. 317 and the articles which I have mentioned does not in any way vitiate cl. 8.4 (or any other provision) of the 1991 agreement. I consider, however, that this case should be decided in the same sense on a narrower ground. As I observed earlier on, it was not suggested that the contravention of s.317 and the relevant articles did more than render the 1991 agreement voidable. It was not void from the beginning. Accordingly reliance on this contravention cannot benefit ESB unless it is open to ESB to rescind the agreement and ESB has actually done so. Moreover it would be essential for ESB to plead the fact that it has done so. Not only is there no pleading of this kind but ESB could not informally point to anything which amounted to rescission. On the contrary there are a number of documents, which I have not dealt with specifically, which suggest that over the years since 1991 ESB has, in a variety of contexts, treated itself as bound to pay a share of the GDRU fee to Mr. MacPherson and Miss Torevell. In any event the 1991 agreement has been fully performed in a number of respects. Mr. MacPherson has given up his directorship and both he and Miss Torevell have transferred their shares to Mr. Lyman in order to obtain the benefit of his guarantee, limited as it is. I find that not only has ESB not rescinded the 1991 agreement but it is now impossible to do so."
"It seems to me that when a director fails to disclose his interest, the effect is the same as non-disclosure in contracts uberrimae fidei, or non-disclosure by a promoter who sells to the company property in which he is interested: see Re Cape Breton Co., Burland v. Earle. Non-disclosure does not render the contract void or a nullity. It renders the contract voidable at the instance of the company and makes the director accountable for any secret profit which he has made."
and then by Lord Wilberforce at page 589F-G:-
"If the matter rested there, it would be plain that the civil law relations between a director and his company with regard to a contract or proposed contract would be governed by normal principles of law and equity relating to contracts made by persons in a fiduciary position, such principles as govern the position of such persons as trustees or solicitors or anyone else in a similar position. The normal consequences which follow from a contract made by a person in such a fiduciary position are that the contract may be voidable at the instance of, in this case the company and that in certain cases a director may be called upon to account for profits which he has made out of the transaction."
page 697G—H:-
"… it has long been the law that, as a condition of rescission of a voidable contract the parties must be put in statu quo: for this purpose a court of equity can do what is practically just, even though it cannot restore the parties precisely to the state they were in before the contract."
That being the position, it is well-established that rescission is not possible of a contract which has been wholly performed. In the present case, as it seems to me, each payment made by the Company to Earlstar after Mr. Gerald Dickenson became a director of the Company was in effect a compromise of the obligation to pay a reasonable sum for services rendered at the request of the Company. The compromise agreement in each case was fully performed upon the making of the relevant payment. Consequently rescission is no longer possible. Moreover, as each relevant contract was at best voidable, not void, it remained valid and binding on any view until avoided. There was no evidence in the present case that the Company had ever sought to avoid any relevant contract. Mr. Miller submitted that it was implicit in the commencement of the proceedings which I have tried that the Company was rescinding all relevant contracts. I do not accept that. In my judgment a decision to rescind a contract, to be effective, must be communicated clearly and promptly. The right to rescind is in effect a right of election. Unless it is exercised the relevant contract is valid and binding and continues in existence. The position was explained by Lord Pearson in Hely-Hutchinson v. Brayhead Ltd. at page 594E-F:-
"....the contract is voidable at the option of the company, so that the company has a choice whether to affirm or avoid the contract, but the contract must be either totally affirmed or totally avoided and the right of avoidance will be lost if such time elapses or such events occur as to prevent rescission of the contract..."
The relevant contracts in the present case were all made at the latest some four years ago. It would be far too late now, in my judgment, to rescind them, even if rescission were technically possible.
Wrongful Trading
"(1) Subject to subsection (3) below, if in the course of the winding up of a company it appears that subsection (2) applies in relation to a person who is or has been a director of the company, the court, on the application of the liquidator, may declare that that person is to be liable to make such contribution (if any) to the company's assets as the court thinks proper.
(2) This subsection applies in relation to a person if-
(a) the company has gone into insolvent liquidation,
(b) at some time before the commencement of the winding up of the company, that person knew or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation, and
(c) that person was a director of the company at that time;
but the court shall not make a declaration under this section in any case where the time mentioned in paragraph (b) above was before 28th April 1986
(3) The court shall not make a declaration under this section with respect to any person if it is satisfied that after the condition specified in subsection (2)(b) was first satisfied in relation to him that person took every step with a view to minimizing the potential loss to the company's creditors as (assuming him to have known that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation) he ought to have taken.
(4) For the purposes of subsections (2) and (3), the facts which a director of a company ought to know or ascertain, the conclusions which he ought to reach and the steps which he ought to take are those which would be known or ascertained, or reached or taken, by a reasonably diligent person having both-
(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same functions as are carried out by that director to the company, and
(b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that that director has.
(5) The reference in subsection (4) to the functions carried out in relation to a company by a director of the company includes any functions which he does not carry out but which have beer entrusted to him.(6) For the purposes of this section a company goes into insolvent liquidation if it goes into liquidation at a time when its assets are insufficient for the payment of its debts and other liabilities and the expenses of the winding up."
The Car
Conclusion