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England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Lancore Services Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc [2008] EWHC 1264 (Ch) (25 June 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2008/1264.html Cite as: [2008] 1 CLC 1039, [2008] EWHC 1264 (Ch) |
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CHANCERY DIVISION
MANCHESTER DISTRICT REGISTRY
1 Bridge Street West Manchester M60 9DJ |
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B e f o r e :
Sitting as a Judge of the High Court
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LANCORE SERVICES LIMITED |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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BARCLAYS BANK PLC |
Defendant |
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Mr Andrew Sutcliffe QC and Mr Jonathan Davies-Jones (instructed by DLA Piper UK LLP, Manchester) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 23rd, 24th April 2008
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Crown Copyright ©
His Honour Judge Hodge QC:
The operation of the credit and debit card system
The history of dealings between Lancore and Barclays
The litigation and trial
Assessment of the principal witnesses
Principal findings of fact
Barclaycard Business's Merchant Terms and Conditions
"(a) You must only send us Payment Details for payments by Cardholders to you for goods or services provided by you or the supply of cash by you to Cardholders.
...
(c) If we become aware, or reasonably suspect, that:
(i) the Card Payment was not genuine; or
(ii) the Card Payment was for an illegal transaction; or
(iii) the Card Payment was for a payment by a Cardholder to another person or for cash given to a Cardholder by another person; or
(iv) the payment does not in some other way constitute a Card Payment then we may withhold or debit from your bank account the amount of that Card Payment."
"(i) In some circumstances we will have the right not to pay you for a Card Payment. If we have already paid you for it, you may have to pay that amount back to us. This is called "charging back". (ii) We may charge a Card Payment back to you or refuse to pay it even if it has been authorised. (iii) We may also do this if you send us information about a transaction which is not a Card Payment but which has been processed by us as a Card Payment. (iv) If we have the right to charge a Card Payment back that amount will be a debt from you to us which you will owe immediately. (v) We will have the right not to pay you or to chargeback in the following circumstances:
(a) if the Card Payment or the way in which it was carried out has broken this Agreement or if the Payment Details or the way in which they have been sent to us have broken this Agreement;
...
(g) in any other circumstances where the Operating Instructions and Procedure Guides say we can charge the Card Payment back to you;
..."
For ease of exposition, I have inserted roman numerals (in italics) into the preamble to Condition 4.1. I accept Mr Sutcliffe's submission that the sentence in the preamble which I have identified as (iii) is free-standing; and that it confers upon the merchant acquirer a right, where a merchant has sent information about a transaction which is not a Card Payment but which has been processed as one, to charge the Card Payment back to the merchant, or to refuse to pay it, which is unqualified by the sub-paragraphs (a) to (h) of Condition 4.1 which follow. The Procedure Guide, which expressly forms part of the MSA, explains (at page 7.2 at 4A/64) that one of the most common reasons for chargebacks is that "a transaction was processed on behalf of a third party who could not process the transaction themselves. This is called laundering and is in breach of your Merchant Agreement."
"Normally we will give you at least 30 days' notice in writing if we want to end this Agreement. However, in certain circumstances such as those set out in Condition 4 (1) (h) (i) to (viii), or where we reasonably suspect fraud, or where you are in breach of Conditions 3.12 (a) or 4.2, we may end this Agreement by giving you immediate notice."
Lancore accepts that it was engaged in third party processing, that is to say that it was sending Barclays Payment Details otherwise than for payments by Cardholders for goods or services provided by Lancore itself. Lancore was therefore in breach of Condition 3.12 (a). Having rejected Lancore's case that Condition 3.12 (a) was varied by agreement, or that Barclays is estopped from relying upon that Condition according to its terms, it follows that Barclays was entitled to terminate the MSA by giving Lancore immediate notice (which Barclays did by its letter of 7th March 2006). Lancore's claim for damages for premature termination of the MSA therefore fails.
"If this Agreement ends, you will continue to be liable to us for all obligations which arose before the date the Agreement ends. Conditions 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 24 and 25 will continue after this Agreement ends."
Mr Cogley points out that Condition 3.12 is not one of those that is expressed to survive the termination of the MSA. That is correct; but it does not seem to me to assist Lancore, because Barclays had already exercised its right to withhold payments to Lancore before Barclays exercised its right to terminate the MSA by its letter of 7th March 2006. Condition 3.12 (c) refers to a right to "withhold" (that is to say, to hold back, to keep back, to refuse to give, or to refrain from making) payment, and not to a right merely to "suspend" (in the sense of stopping for a time, or deferring) payment. That meaning of the verb "withhold" is reinforced by the right that is also conferred by Condition 3.12 (c), in the circumstances identified therein, to debit the amount of a Card Payment from the merchant's bank account. Moreover, as Mr Sutcliffe observed in his closing oral submissions, acceptance of Mr Cogley's submission, that the right to withhold payment under Condition 3.12 (c) cannot survive termination of the MSA, would produce the absurd result that, if the right to withhold payment for an illegal transaction were to be exercised prior to termination, Barclays would be obliged to make the payment as soon as it had exercised its right to terminate the MSA. I agree with Mr Sutcliffe that neither party to the MSA could have intended such an absurd result. Having exercised its right to withhold payment during the subsistence of the MSA, in my judgment Barclays is entitled to rely upon Condition 3.12 (c) to continue to withhold payment, notwithstanding the MSA's termination.
A penalty?
"This provision purports to entitle the contractor to "suspend or withhold payment of any moneys due". There is no reference to the amount of the contractor's claim in respect of breaches of contract and no requirement that before withholding payment he need even estimate the amount of his claim. Read literally this provision would entitle the contractor to withhold sums far in excess of any fair estimate of the value of his claims. That would simply be to impose a penalty for refusing to admit his claims. Not only would the withholding of the excess permanently deprive the sub-contractor of the interest on that excess which would accrue while the dispute lasted, but it might have most damaging effects on the sub-contractor's business. So as it stands, this provision is unenforceable."
"It is now evident that the power to strike down a penalty clause is a blatant interference with freedom of contract and is designed for the sole purpose of providing relief against oppression for the party having to pay the stipulated sum. It has no place where there is no oppression."
Lord Woolf pointed out that those views were in accord with those expressed by Diplock LJ in Robophone Facilities Ltd v Blank [1966] 1 WLR 1428 at p 1447 that the "court should not be astute to descry a penalty clause". Those statements were said to "assist by making it clear that the court should not adopt an approach to provisions as to liquidated damages which could, as indicated earlier, defeat their purpose". Lord Woolf continued:
"Except possibly in the case of situations where one of the parties to the contract is able to dominate the other as to the choice of the terms of a contract, it will normally be insufficient to establish that a provision is objectionably penal to identify situations where the application of the provision could result in a larger sum being recovered by the injured party than his actual loss. Even in such situations so long as the sum payable in the event of non-compliance with the contract is not extravagant, having regard to the range of losses that it could reasonably be anticipated it would have to cover at the time the contract was made, it can still be a genuine pre-estimate of the loss that would be suffered and so a perfectly valid liquidated damage provision… A difficulty can arise where the range of possible loss is broad. Where it should be obvious that in relation to part of the range, the liquidated damages are totally out of proportion to certain of the losses which may be incurred, the failure to make special provision for those losses may result in the "liquidated damages" not being recoverable… However, the court has to be careful not to set too stringent a standard and bear in mind that what the parties have agreed should normally be upheld. Any other approach will lead to an undesirable uncertainty especially in commercial contracts."
This passage was cited with approval by Mance LJ in Cine Bes Filmcilik at paragraph 14.
"The speeches in Dunlop… show that whether a provision is to be treated as a penalty is a matter of construction to be resolved by asking whether at the time the contract was entered into the predominant contractual function of the provision was to deter a party from breaking the contract or to compensate the innocent party for breach… The question that has always had to be addressed is therefore whether the alleged penalty clause can pass muster as a genuine pre-estimate of loss… However, the jurisdiction in relation to penalty clauses is concerned not primarily with the enforcement of inoffensive liquidated damages clauses but rather with protection against the effect of penalty clauses. There would therefore seem to be no reason in principle why a contractual provision the effect of which was to increase the consideration payable under an executory contract upon the happening of a default should be struck down as a penalty if the increase could in the circumstances be explained as commercially justifiable, provided always that its dominant purpose was not to deter the other party from breach."
In Lordsvale Finance, Colman J. accepted that a clause which sought to provide that, on the happening of a default, the rate of interest payable on a loan would be increased with retrospective effect would "have all the indicia of a penalty". But he held that the position was different where, on default, the increase in the rate was prospective. That was not because, in the latter case, there was "in any real sense a genuine pre-estimate of loss", but because there was "a good commercial reason for deducing that deterrence of breach is not the dominant contractual purpose of the term". In M & J Polymers, Burton J was satisfied that, as a matter of principle, the rule against penalties might apply to a "take or pay" clause; but on the facts of the case, he was entirely satisfied that the take or pay clause was "commercially justifiable", did not amount to "oppression", was negotiated and freely entered into between "parties of comparable bargaining power", and did not have the "predominant purpose of deterring a breach of contract" nor amount to a provision "in terrorem". It was therefore upheld.
"Undoubtedly the law about penalties does not apply if the obligation is to pay for a service or upon an event other than a breach, even if the service supplied or the event takes place against the background of or accompanied by a contractual breach, and even if the service would not have been provided or the event would not have occurred but for the breach. A customer could not necessarily invoke the law about penalties to challenge charges payable for his bank lending him money simply because his account would not be overdrawn but for his own breach. If an obligation to pay is penal, it must require payment upon the breach itself."
Mr Sutcliffe seeks to test the matter in this way: If Condition 3.12 (c) (iii) and preamble (iii) to Condition 4.1 were to be struck down, that would still not achieve the result that Lancore seeks to achieve, because that can only be secured to Lancore by re-defining Barclays's primary payment obligation under Condition 2.1; and that has nothing to do with the law of penalties.
Relief against forfeiture
Agency and fiduciary duty
Restitutionary claim for unjust enrichment
Illegality and ex turpi causa
The £36,000 deposit
Conclusion