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England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Alfa Laval Tumba AB & Anor v Separator Spares International Ltd & Anor [2010] EWHC 674 (Ch) (30 March 2010) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2010/674.html Cite as: [2010] EWHC 674 (Ch) |
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CHANCERY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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(1) Alfa Laval Tumba AB (2) Wytwornia Separator Krakow SP z.o.o. |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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(1) Separator Spares International Ltd (in administration) (2) Mark Richard Hardwick Pacy |
Defendants |
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Mr Mark Richard Hardwick Pacy The Second Defendant appeared in Person
Hearing date: 12th March 2010
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Crown Copyright ©
Peter Smith J :
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
"… that he will without limit in time provide all necessary co-operation and information, including the provision of evidence:-
(a) identifying all those persons firms or companies in any part of the world who are using, have used or have had drawings or other documents containing technical information belonging to [the Claimants];
(b) as to what has become of and the whereabouts of such drawings and documents; including the backup tapes (for the Separator Spares International Ltd servers) that he claims to have destroyed."
SUBSEQUENT EVENTS
"Schedule
Set out a list of all persons firms or companies who have supplied or offered to supply parts for Alfa Laval separators to Separator Spares International (UK) Limited ("SSI (UK)") or to you, to Julie Shotter, to Brett Nicholls or any person associated with SSI (UK),
setting out in respect of each person supplying or offering parts:
(a) their full names and contact details (and in the case of companies, the names of their senior managers);
(b) the type and numbers of each part supplied or offered by each such person (by reference to the relevant Alfa Laval part number and SSI (UK) part number);
and
(c) the dates of supply or offer to supply.
The list should clearly identify all persons supplying or offering to supply parts for SU machines.
With respect to any persons in this list who did not previously supply or offer to supply parts to Separator Spares International Limited, you must identify when those persons first commenced supply of first offered to supply parts so SSI (UK)."
EVIDENCE
THE RESPONDENTS' EVIDENCE
CONCLUSION
STANDARD OF PROOF
"51 Several points strike us immediately:
i) The perfectly proper desire to trace and preserve the partnership assets has led to a number of different techniques being used at once, in such a way that it is difficult to work out the proper and fair procedures for determining the various issues before the court It is necessary to draw careful distinctions between the four issues raised in the applications before the judge:
a. Is Mr Symes in breach of the undertakings given on 22 May? Initially both parties sought a ruling on this, the claimants with a view to lifting the suspension of the committal and Mr Symes with a view to lifting the committal (but it appears that Mr Symes has withdrawn his application).
b. Is Mr Symes in breach of the order made on 22 May? The claimants have alleged that he is and want a ruling with a view to a further committal on that.
c. Is Mr Symes in breach of other orders, or otherwise guilty of contempt of court, as particularised in the points of claim?
d. Should Mr Symes be cross-examined generally on his evidence by reference to matters raised in the points of claim and skeleton argument of 11 August 2003?
ii. Where someone has purported to comply with either undertakings or orders to make disclosure by affidavit, we doubt whether it is right to place the deponent in the position that, unless he is prepared to be cross examined on his affidavits, they count for nothing at all. On the other hand, without cross examination, the court is entitled to attach little weight to them: see Comet Products UK Ltd v Hawkex Plastics Ltd [1971] 2 QB 67, CA.
iii. Where a party comes to court alleging that those affidavits do not comply with an undertaking or an order, the burden of proving this will obviously lie on that party. The standard of proof will depend upon the purpose for which the allegation is made. If it is for the purpose of supporting a fresh allegation of contempt with a view to obtaining a fresh order for committal, then clearly it will be to the criminal standard. If it is for some other purpose, such as obtaining an order for further affidavits, the civil standard will suffice. We are not aware of any authority dealing with the standard of proof to which non-compliance with the conditions of suspension of a committal order must be proved. Yet this is a question which theoretically arises every time a suspended committal order is used to secure compliance with some procedural requirement, an everyday occurrence in county courts up and down the land. The committal order has already been imposed, following the proof of a contempt to the criminal standard. A breach of condition may or may not involve a further contempt of court, but the application is not to impose a further sentence but to implement the one which has already been imposed. It is not self-evident that proof to the criminal standard is required. In practice, we suspect that the difficulty is more apparent than real: it will usually be obvious whether or not the condition has been complied with.
iv. Whatever the position in relation to the privilege against self incrimination in proceedings alleging further contempts, there can be no such privilege in proceedings concerned with whether or not the conditions of suspension have been complied with. The relevant contempt has already been proved and the only question is implementation of a sentence already imposed. The right time to worry about whether committal is the right order is when the committal order is made. Thereafter, it would not be right to ignore the fact that the committal order has been made and treat any subsequent application in relation to it as a fresh application to commit.
v. The judge was right to refer to the width of the court's discretion when ordering "post judgment" cross examination for the purpose of assisting execution. However, we are troubled about blending cross examination of that more general kind with cross examination aimed either at establishing a breach of the conditions of a suspension or at establishing further contempts of court."