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England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Compton Beauchamp Estates Ltd v Spence [2013] EWHC 1101 (Ch) (01 May 2013) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2013/1101.html Cite as: [2013] EWHC 1101 (Ch) |
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CHANCERY DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION CLAIM CONCERNING A RENT REVIEW OF
KINGSTONE FARM, KINGSTONE WINSLOW, BERKSHIRE
AND IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION UNDER THE ARBITRATION ACT 1996
AND IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION AWARD DATED 18 NOVEMBER 2011
AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION UNDER SECTIONS 68 AND 69 OF THE ARBITRATION ACT 1996
Rolls Building, Fetter Lane London, EC4A 1NL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
COMPTON BEAUCHAMP ESTATES LIMITED |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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JAMES WILLIAM MILLS SPENCE |
Defendant |
____________________
Mr William Batstone (instructed by Thrings LLP) made written submissions for the Defendant
Hearing date: 19 March 2013
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Morgan :
The claim
The background facts
The arbitration
"(9) For the purposes of this section the rent properly payable in respect of the holding shall be the rent at which the holding might reasonably be expected to be let by a prudent and willing landlord to a prudent and willing tenant, taking into account all relevant factors, including (in every case) the terms of the tenancy or prospective tenancy (including those relating to rent) and any such other matters as are specifically mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 1 of Schedule 2 to this Act (read with sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) of that paragraph)."
"1(1) For the purposes of section 12 of this Act, the rent properly payable in respect of a holding shall be the rent at which the holding might reasonably be expected to be let by a prudent and willing landlord to a prudent and willing tenant, taking into account (subject to sub-paragraph (3) and paragraphs 2 and 3 below) all relevant factors, including (in every case) the terms of the tenancy (including those relating to rent), the character and situation of the holding (including the locality in which it is situated), the productive capacity of the holding and its related earning capacity, and the current level of rents for comparable lettings, as determined in accordance with sub-paragraph (3) below.
(2) In sub-paragraph (1) above, in relation to the holding—
(a) "productive capacity" means the productive capacity of the holding (taking into account fixed equipment and any other available facilities on the holding) on the assumption that it is in the occupation of a competent tenant practising a system of farming suitable to the holding, and
(b) "related earning capacity" means the extent to which, in the light of that productive capacity, a competent tenant practising such a system of farming could reasonably be expected to profit from farming the holding.
(3) In determining for the purposes of that sub-paragraph the current level of rents for comparable lettings, the arbitrator shall take into account any available evidence with respect to the rents (whether fixed by agreement between the parties or by arbitration under this Act) which are, or (in view of rents currently being tendered) are likely to become, payable in respect of tenancies of comparable agricultural holdings on terms (other than terms fixing the rent payable) similar to those of the tenancy under consideration, but shall disregard—
(a) any element of the rents in question which is due to an appreciable scarcity of comparable holdings available for letting on such terms compared with the number of persons seeking to become tenants of such holdings on such terms,
(b) any element of those rents which is due to the fact that the tenant of, or a person tendering for, any comparable holding is in occupation of other land in the vicinity of that holding that may conveniently be occupied together with that holding, and
(c) any effect on those rents which is due to any allowances or reductions made in consideration of the charging of premiums."
The award
"6. In my judgment the overall results of my determination in assessing the rent properly payable I assess the rental and budgetary valuation as follows:-
6.1 Farmhouse
Mrs Martin produces a figure of £6,250 per annum on the basis of considering the local figure in Swindon for the Local Housing Allowance. I hold that this is not a figure in accordance with the definition of rent properly payable under the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 and so accept the Tenants figure of £2,475 per annum.
6.2 Land and Buildings Neither party produced any comparables within the strict meaning of the word. Mr Horton was criticized for producing "comparables" which could not be examined and I only take these as backing for his professional opinion. He also produced a letter regarding settlements on Salisbury Plain which I did not find relevant to the rental assessment of this holding.
6.2.1 Mrs Martin bases her assessment on her research into other agreed rents by reference to seven other land agents in Oxfordshire and N. Wiltshire. She also considers the rent and on the basis of a share of the farm surplus provided by Mr Hollis, Mrs Martin produces a figure of £41,600 per annum for the land and buildings and adds a further £1,700 for marriage value on the premis that the tenant could use other land. As there was no evidence that any marriage value had been implemented I do not hold this applicable.
Mrs Martin then makes a discount of 5% "for excess above tone of the list" and arrives at a total rent including the farmhouse of £47,000 per annum.
6.2.2 On the basis of other rents he has agreed Mr Horton produces a figure of £28,600 for the land and buildings before the disregards.
6.2.3 I have difficulty in reconciling the differences between the parties owing to the very different approaches by both valuation experts. I find that by reason of my findings on the Productivity and related earning capacity amendments need to be made to both valuation experts as they relied to an extent on the results of these calculations.
7.1 The Productivity and Related earning capacity:-
7.1.2 I had further difficulty in reconciling the differences between the two parties since the two experts had approached their assessment on a different basis so that extracting and comparing individual figures was not wholly fair to either expert. Both experts were working on the basis of a 50/50 split between landlord and tenant and I accept that method.
7.1.3 I marginally prefer the system adopted by Mr Green but accept that he has been overcautious in some of his figures. The evidence of Mr Hollis on the use of the heavier land to the north of the farm raised some questions as to the achievement of his figures in view of the nature of the soil and its cultivation problems in wet years. The livestock system he adopted I considered was unlikely to be possible in the hands of a competent tenant.
7.1.4 There was an agreement as to the Single Farm Payment and Entry Level Scheme but Mr Hollis had included part being suitable for the Higher Level Scheme and I accept that in the circumstances that is reasonable.
7.1.5 There was cross examination of both farm management expert witnesses concerning the price of grain and much of this concerned the use to which the buildings could be put for temporary storage of grain during harvest. I duly inspected the buildings as requested on this point and find that the access is very tight for grain machinery and prefer Mr Green's assessment as to the use which would be very temporary storage.
7.1.6 There was general agreement as to the level of fixed costs although they related to rather different systems. I have allowed the deduction of the Tenants normal Bank Charges at £500 per annum as part of the usual business outgoings.
7.1.7 I have considered the question of the claimed unreliability of Mr Horton and Mr Green. During the course of the hearing I did not find their evidence biased so that it affected my understanding of the case being put forward. As set out I have not accepted the whole of their evidence as set out elsewhere but as an overall view of the experts evidence I found all four taking a somewhat "partisan" approach.
7.1.8 From the evidence I would take a figure for the Productivity and Related Earning capacity at £64,700 giving a 50% share of £32,350."
"9. In coming to my decision I have taken into account all matters raised before me in the pleadings and at the hearing.
10. In summary I determine the rent as follows:-
Total Gross Margin | £156,750 |
Less Fixed Costs | £ 92,100 |
Net Margin | £ 64,650 |
Landlord and Tenant 50/50 | |
Share of Productivity and Related Earning | |
Capacity | £32,325 |
Farmhouse | £2,475 |
Total | £34,800" |
The requests for further reasons
(1) asked for reasons for the arbitrator's various decisions on the rules of evidence and on the admission of supplemental evidence;(2) asked for reasons for the arbitrator's decision to direct sequential disclosure of expert's reports; it was said that this request had been made "at the hearing";
(3) pointed out the discrepancy between the figures of £64,700 and £32,350 in one place and £64,650 and £32,325 in a later place in the award;
(4) asked for clarification of the arbitrator's decision in relation to the farmhouse;
(5) asked for clarification as to the comment in paragraph 6.2 of the award that the comparables were backing for Mr Horton's professional opinion;
(6) asked for the arbitrator's reasons for his decision in relation to marriage value;
(7) asked various questions in relation to productive capacity and related earning capacity; these included a question as to Mr Green's evidence, a question about the problem with the soil, a question about Mr Hollis' livestock system and a request for the calculation which led to the figure of £64,700;
(8) asked a large number of questions as to the arbitrator's assessment of each of the expert's witnesses in view, in particular, of the Claimant's contention that Mr Horton and Mr Green were said to be biased.
The challenges to the award
The arbitrator's further reasons
"2. I set out my replies, on the basis of s.57 The Arbitration Act 1996:-
2.1 The first question relates to the calculation of the productive and related earning capacity in that in paragraph 7.1.8 the figure is given at £64,700 whereas under paragraph 10 the figure is £64,650. I confirm that the latter figure is correct and amend the slip in that the figures in para 7.1.8 should be £64,650 and £32,325, I attach an amended page of the award showing this.
I set out the further detail showing how my figures were calculated:-
(rounded out as necessary)
Subventions
Single Farm Payment | £50,145 |
ELS &HLS | £ 8,610 |
Gross Margins | |
Livestock | £6,550 |
Wheat | £34,200 |
OSR | £27,500 |
Barley | £26,400 |
Beans | £ 3,345 |
Total Gross Margins | £156,750 |
Less Fixed Costs | |
Labour | £3,270 |
Power | £79,830 |
Property | £ 6,500 |
Bank Charges | £ 500 |
Overheads | £ 2,000 |
Sub-total | £92,100 |
Net Margin | £64,650 |
Split 50/50 | £32,325 |
Add Farmhouse | £ 2,475 |
Rent Properly Payable | £34,800 |
2.2 I am asked to clarify paragraph 6.2 of my award concerning "Land and Buildings". I confirm that I do not take any of the farm rent details produced by Mr Horton as comparables as such and only take note of them as background to his evidence.
2.3 Following on from this I also confirm I have not taken into account the detail of Mr Hortons evidence as to comparables save in connection with the farmhouse.
2.4 In relation to paragraph 8.7 of my award I am only wishing to confirm that I am not arbitrating on the question of Tenants Compensation for Tenants Improvements/Fixtures and am not pre-judging any such claim."
The application for leave to appeal
(1) whether the arbitrator was wrong in law to reject the evidence of Mrs Martin as to the rent properly payable in respect of the farm house on the basis that her valuation figure was "not a figure in accordance with the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986";(2) whether the arbitrator was wrong in law to rely on the "comparables" referred to in Mr Horton's evidence when determining the rent properly payable for the holding; and
(3) whether the arbitrator was wrong in law to hold that the rent properly payable in respect of the holding should not reflect any element of marriage value.
The grounds of the present claim
(1) the arbitrator failed to comply with the general duties of an arbitrator under section 33 of the 1996 Act;(2) he failed to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the procedure agreed by the parties;
(3) he failed to deal with the issues that were put to him;
(4) there is uncertainty and ambiguity as to the effect of the award;
(5) the arbitrator failed to comply with the requirements as to the form of the award, in particular, because the reasons for the award were inadequate.
The 1996 Act
"33 General duty of the tribunal
(1) The tribunal shall—
(a) act fairly and impartially as between the parties, giving each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his opponent, and
(b) adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the particular case, avoiding unnecessary delay or expense, so as to provide a fair means for the resolution of the matters falling to be determined.
(2) The tribunal shall comply with that general duty in conducting the arbitral proceedings, in its decisions on matters of procedure and evidence and in the exercise of all other powers conferred on it.
34 Procedural and evidential matters
(1) It shall be for the tribunal to decide all procedural and evidential matters, subject to the right of the parties to agree any matter.
(2) Procedural and evidential matters include—
(a) when and where any part of the proceedings is to be held;
(b) the language or languages to be used in the proceedings and whether translations of any relevant documents are to be supplied;
(c) whether any and if so what form of written statements of claim and defence are to be used, when these should be supplied and the extent to which such statements can be later amended;
(d) whether any and if so which documents or classes of documents should be disclosed between and produced by the parties and at what stage;
(e) whether any and if so what questions should be put to and answered by the respective parties and when and in what form this should be done;
(f) whether to apply strict rules of evidence (or any other rules) as to the admissibility, relevance or weight of any material (oral, written or other) sought to be tendered on any matters of fact or opinion, and the time, manner and form in which such material should be exchanged and presented;
(g) whether and to what extent the tribunal should itself take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and the law;
(h) whether and to what extent there should be oral or written evidence or submissions.
(3) The tribunal may fix the time within which any directions given by it are to be complied with, and may if it thinks fit extend the time so fixed (whether or not it has expired)."
"57 Correction of award or additional award
(1) The parties are free to agree on the powers of the tribunal to correct an award or make an additional award.
(2) If or to the extent there is no such agreement, the following provisions apply.
(3) The tribunal may on its own initiative or on the application of a party—
(a) correct an award so as to remove any clerical mistake or error arising from an accidental slip or omission or clarify or remove any ambiguity in the award, or
(b) make an additional award in respect of any claim (including a claim for interest or costs) which was presented to the tribunal but was not dealt with in the award.
These powers shall not be exercised without first affording the other parties a reasonable opportunity to make representations to the tribunal.
(4) Any application for the exercise of those powers must be made within 28 days of the date of the award or such longer period as the parties may agree.
(5) Any correction of an award shall be made within 28 days of the date the application was received by the tribunal or, where the correction is made by the tribunal on its own initiative, within 28 days of the date of the award or, in either case, such longer period as the parties may agree.
(6) Any additional award shall be made within 56 days of the date of the original award or such longer period as the parties may agree.
(7) Any correction of an award shall form part of the award."
"68 Challenging the award: serious irregularity
(1) A party to arbitral proceedings may (upon notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) apply to the court challenging an award in the proceedings on the ground of serious irregularity affecting the tribunal, the proceedings or the award.
A party may lose the right to object (see section 73) and the right to apply is subject to the restrictions in section 70(2) and (3).
(2) Serious irregularity means an irregularity of one or more of the following kinds which the court considers has caused or will cause substantial injustice to the applicant—
(a) failure by the tribunal to comply with section 33 (general duty of tribunal);
(b) the tribunal exceeding its powers (otherwise than by exceeding its substantive jurisdiction: see section 67);
(c) failure by the tribunal to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the procedure agreed by the parties;
(d) failure by the tribunal to deal with all the issues that were put to it;
(e) any arbitral or other institution or person vested by the parties with powers in relation to the proceedings or the award exceeding its powers;
(f) uncertainty or ambiguity as to the effect of the award;
(g) the award being obtained by fraud or the award or the way in which it was procured being contrary to public policy;
(h) failure to comply with the requirements as to the form of the award; or
(i) any irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings or in the award which is admitted by the tribunal or by any arbitral or other institution or person vested by the parties with powers in relation to the proceedings or the award.
(3) If there is shown to be serious irregularity affecting the tribunal, the proceedings or the award, the court may—
(a) remit the award to the tribunal, in whole or in part, for reconsideration,
(b) set the award aside in whole or in part, or
(c) declare the award to be of no effect, in whole or in part.
The court shall not exercise its power to set aside or to declare an award to be of no effect, in whole or in part, unless it is satisfied that it would be inappropriate to remit the matters in question to the tribunal for reconsideration.
(4) The leave of the court is required for any appeal from a decision of the court under this section."
"70 Challenge or appeal: supplementary provisions
(1) The following provisions apply to an application or appeal under section 67, 68 or 69.
(2) An application or appeal may not be brought if the applicant or appellant has not first exhausted—
(a) any available arbitral process of appeal or review, and
(b) any available recourse under section 57 (correction of award or additional award).
(3) Any application or appeal must be brought within 28 days of the date of the award or, if there has been any arbitral process of appeal or review, of the date when the applicant or appellant was notified of the result of that process.
(4) If on an application or appeal it appears to the court that the award—
(a) does not contain the tribunal's reasons, or
(b) does not set out the tribunal's reasons in sufficient detail to enable the court properly to consider the application or appeal,
the court may order the tribunal to state the reasons for its award in sufficient detail for that purpose.
(5) Where the court makes an order under subsection (4), it may make such further order as it thinks fit with respect to any additional costs of the arbitration resulting from its order.
… "
The court's approach to an application under section 68 of the 1996 Act
"280. Irregularities stand on a different footing. Here we consider that it is appropriate, indeed essential, that these have to pass the test of causing "substantial injustice" before the court can act. The court does not have a general supervisory jurisdiction over arbitrations. We have listed the specific cases where a challenge can be made under this Clause. The test of "substantial injustice" is intended to be applied by way of support for the arbitral process, not by way of interference with that process. Thus it is only in those cases where it can be said that what has happened is so far removed from what could reasonably be expected of the arbitral process that we would expect the court to take action. The test is not what would have happened had the matter been litigated. To apply such a test would be to ignore the fact that the parties have agreed to arbitrate, not litigate. Having chosen arbitration, the parties cannot validly complain of substantial injustice unless what has happened simply cannot on any view be defended as an acceptable consequence of that choice. In short, Clause 68 is really designed as a long stop, only available in extreme cases where the tribunal has gone so wrong in its conduct of the arbitration that justice calls out for it to be corrected."
The grounds of challenge reviewed
An arbitrator's duty to give reasons
"247. To our minds, it is a basic rule of justice that those charged with making a binding decision affecting the rights and obligations of others should (unless those others agree) explain the reasons for making that decision. This was also the view of the majority of those who commented on this.
248. It was suggested that having to give reasons would be likely to add to the cost of arbitrations and encourage applications for leave to appeal to the court.
249. We do not agree. The need for reasons is that which we have explained above and has nothing to do with the question whether or not a court should hear an appeal from an award. Further, we have introduced stricter conditions for the bringing of appeals in any event. As to cost, it is always open to the parties to agree to dispense with reasons if they wish to do so, though in the case of domestic arbitrations this can only be done after the dispute has arisen … ."
"The whole purpose of section 12 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958, was to enable persons whose property, or whose interests, were being affected by some administrative decision or some statutory arbitration to know, if the decision was against them, what the reasons for it were. Up to then, people's property and other interests might be gravely affected by a decision of some official. The decision might be perfectly right, but the person against whom it was made was left with the real grievance that he was not told why the decision had been made. The purpose of section 12 was to remedy that, and to remedy it in relation to arbitrations under this Act. Parliament provided that reasons shall be given, and in my view that must be read as meaning that proper, adequate reasons must be given. The reasons that are set out must be reasons which will not only be intelligible, but which deal with the substantial points that have been raised. In my view, it is right to consider that statutory provision as being a provision as to the form which the arbitration award shall take. If those reasons do not fairly comply with that which Parliament intended, then that is an error on the face of the award. It is a material error of form."
"All that is necessary is that the arbitrators should set out what, on their view of the evidence, did or did not happen and should explain succinctly why, in the light of what happened, they have reached their decision and what that decision is. That is all that is meant by a 'reasoned award'."
"We make the following general comments on the duty to give reasons.
(1) The duty is a function of due process, and therefore of justice. Its rationale has two principal aspects. The first is that fairness surely requires that the parties especially the losing party should be left in no doubt why they have won or lost. This is especially so since without reasons the losing party will not know (as was said in Ex parte Dave) whether the court has misdirected itself, and thus whether he may have an available appeal on the substance of the case. The second is that a requirement to give reasons concentrates the mind; if it is fulfilled, the resulting decision is much more likely to be soundly based on the evidence than if it is not.
(2) The first of these aspects implies that want of reasons may be a good self-standing ground of appeal. Where because no reasons are given it is impossible to tell whether the judge has gone wrong on the law or the facts, the losing party would be altogether deprived of his chance of an appeal unless the court entertains an appeal based on the lack of reasons itself.
(3) The extent of the duty, or rather the reach of what is required to fulfil it, depends on the subject matter. Where there is a straightforward factual dispute whose resolution depends simply on which witness is telling the truth about events which he claims to recall, it is likely to be enough for the judge (having, no doubt, summarised the evidence) to indicate simply that he believes X rather than Y; indeed there may be nothing else to say. But where the dispute involves something in the nature of an intellectual exchange, with reasons and analysis advanced on either side, the judge must enter into the issues canvassed before him and explain why he prefers one case over the other. This is likely to apply particularly in litigation where as here there is disputed expert evidence; but it is not necessarily limited to such cases.
(4) This is not to suggest that there is one rule for cases concerning the witnesses truthfulness or recall of events, and another for cases where the issue depends on reasoning or analysis (with experts or otherwise). The rule is the same: the judge must explain why he has reached his decision. The question is always, what is required of the judge to do so; and that will differ from case to case. Transparency should be the watchword."
" [17] … there was no duty on a judge, in giving his reasons, to deal with every argument presented by counsel in support of his case …
[19] It follows that, if the appellate process is to work satisfactorily, the judgment must enable the appellate court to understand why the judge reached his decision. This does not mean that every factor which weighed with the judge in his appraisal of the evidence has to be identified and explained. But the issues the resolution of which were vital to the judge's conclusion should be identified and the manner in which he resolved them explained. It is not possible to provide a template for this process. It need not involve a lengthy judgment. It does require the judge to identify and record those matters which were critical to his decision. …"
Later in the judgment, when dealing with a judge's assessment of competing expert evidence, it was said at [73]:
"It is legitimate, where there is a direct conflict of expert evidence, for the judge to prefer the evidence of one expert to the other simply on the ground that he was better qualified to give it, or was a more authoritative witness, if the judge is unable to identify any more substantial reason for choosing between them. This should not often be the case. If this is the basis for the judge's conclusion, he should make it plain."
"29 Lord Bridge then turned to consider how the court should approach a reasons challenge advanced under section 245 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 (now section 288 of the 1990 Act):
"There are in truth not two separate questions: (1) were the reasons adequate? (2) if not, were the interests of the applicant substantially prejudiced thereby? The single indivisible question, in my opinion, which the court must ask itself whenever a planning decision is challenged on the ground of a failure to give reasons is whether the interests of the applicant have been substantially prejudiced by the deficiency of the reasons given."
The burden of proof, Lord Bridge pointed out, at p168b, lies on the applicant "to satisfy the court that he has been substantially prejudiced by the failure to give reasons".
30 As to the circumstances in which a deficiency of reasons would cause substantial prejudice, Lord Bridge said, at p167:
"… I should expect that normally such prejudice will arise from one of three causes. First, there will be substantial prejudice to a developer whose application for permission has been refused or to an opponent of development when permission has been granted where the reasons for the decision are so inadequately or obscurely expressed as to raise a substantial doubt whether the decision was taken within the powers of the Act. Secondly, a developer whose application for permission is refused may be substantially prejudiced where the planning considerations on which the decision is based are not explained sufficiently clearly to enable him reasonably to assess the prospects of succeeding in an application for some alternative form of development. Thirdly, an opponent of development, whether the local planning authority or some unofficial body like Save, may be substantially prejudiced by a decision to grant permission in which the planning considerations on which the decision is based, particularly if they relate to planning policy, are not explained sufficiently clearly to indicate what, if any, impact they may have in relation to the decision of future applications."
31 The first of those three possible causes of substantial prejudice-the developer's (or, as the case may be, his opponent's) uncertainty, through the inadequacy of the reasons, whether or not the decision is properly open to a vires challenge-Lord Bridge elaborated, at p 168:
"If it was necessary to the decision to resolve an issue of law and the reasons do not disclose how the issue was resolved, that will suffice. If the decision depended on a disputed issue of fact and the reasons do not show how that issue was decided, that may suffice. But in the absence of any such defined issue of law or fact left unresolved and when the decision was essentially an exercise of discretion, I think that it is for the applicant to satisfy the court that the lacuna in the stated reasons is such as to raise a substantial doubt as to whether the decision was based on relevant grounds and was otherwise free from any flaw in the decision-making process which would afford a ground for quashing the decision."
32 Lord Bridge's final words on the subject, at pp 170–171, were that the requirement "is a salutary safeguard to enable interested parties to know that the decision has been taken on relevant and rational grounds and that any applicable statutory criteria have been observed", adding:
"But I should be sorry to see excessive legalism turn this requirement into a hazard for decision-makers in which it is their skill in draftsmanship rather than the substance of their reasoning which is put to the test." "
"The law summarised
35 It may perhaps help at this point to attempt some broad summary of the authorities governing the proper approach to a reasons challenge in the planning context. Clearly what follows cannot be regarded as definitive or exhaustive nor, I fear, will it avoid all need for future citation of authority. It should, however, serve to focus the reader's attention on the main considerations to have in mind when contemplating a reasons challenge and if generally its tendency is to discourage such challenges I for one would count that a benefit.
36 The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the "principal important controversial issues", disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not to every material consideration. They should enable disappointed developers to assess their prospects of obtaining some alternative development permission, or, as the case may be, their unsuccessful opponents to understand how the policy or approach underlying the grant of permission may impact upon future such applications. Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision."
"The obligation to provide reasons is an important part of the arbitrator's function. At para 21.16 of Arbitration Law (December 2004 update), by Professor Robert Merkin the learned editors say that, 'It is strongly arguable that unless a party knows the reasons for an award there is automatically substantial injustice to him', and the relevant footnote suggests that, 'This is indeed the very rationale of the requirement that arbitrators are to give reasons'. I respectfully agree with those comments. Accordingly, I reject [counsel's] submission that this ground of RBA's application under s 68 must fail because they have not been able to demonstrate any substantial injustice from the alleged absence of reasons. If there were no or insufficient reasons the substantial injustice would, in my judgment, be automatic."
Was there a serious irregularity in relation to the reasons for the award?
CLAIMANT | DEFENDANT | ARBITRATOR | |
WHEAT | £56,624 | £32,583 | £34,200 |
OSR | £20,782 | £26,597 | £27,500 |
BARLEY | £23,426 | £25,183 | £26,400 |
BEANS | NIL | £3,305 | £3,345 |
LINSEED | £7,770 | NIL | NIL |
TOTAL | £108,602 | £87,667 | £91,445 |
CLAIMANT | DEFENDANT | ARBITRATOR | |
LABOUR | £5,300 | £3,240 | £3,270 |
POWER | £81,970 | £79,828 | £79,830 |
PROPERTY | £5,700 | £9,500 | £6,500 |
BANK CHARGES | NIL | NIL | £500 |
OVERHEADS | £5,500 | £2,200 | £2000 |
TOTAL | £98,470 | £94,768 | £92,100 |
The other grounds of challenge
The result
Costs