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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> NHS Business Services Authority v Leeks & Ors [2014] EWHC 1446 (Ch) (19 March 2014) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2014/1446.html Cite as: [2014] EWHC 1446 (Ch), [2014] ICR 948

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CHANCERY DIVISION

		The Rolls Building 7 Rolls Buildings Fetter Lane London EC4A 1NL
		19 March 2014

MR JUSTICE SALES:

1. This is an appeal from the decision of the Pensions Ombudsman in this matter in a report dated 12 August 2013. Appeal from such a decision is available on a point of law.
2. The Pensions Ombudsman made findings of maladministration in respect of the conduct of the appellant (the Authority) and also in respect of the conduct of the second respondent (the Employer). This was in relation to the way in which pension entitlements of the first respondent (Mrs Leeks) and information about those entitlements were handled by it. The Authority is the scheme administrator for the NHS Pension Scheme. The Employer was the NHS Trust which employed Mrs Leeks at the relevant time.
3. The Pensions Ombudsman also made findings regarding injustice and loss suffered by Mrs Leeks. He directed the Authority to pay Mrs Leeks the sum of about £110,000 in respect of pension payments which he found she had lost in consequence of the maladministration by the Authority.
4. Although the Pensions Ombudsman found the Employer was also guilty of maladministration, he made no direction for it to make a payment to Mrs Leeks.
5. The Authority now appeals to this court, relying on a number of grounds. The Authority submits the Pensions Ombudsman erred in law as follows:

(1) in finding that there had been maladministration by the Authority; alternatively

(2) in directing the Authority to pay compensation for the maladministration found; alternatively

(3) in directing the Authority to pay compensation beyond March 2009; and further or alternatively

(4) in not directing the Employer to pay all or at least some of any compensation found to be due.

6. On the appeal, the Authority was represented by counsel, Mr Greatorex. The Employer chose not to appear or make representations. Mrs Leeks attended the hearing in person and made short points directed to the factual background. She was not represented.
7. The Pensions Ombudsman was joined as an interested party in the appeal in order to make written submissions on the first ground of appeal relied on by the Authority and on the meaning of the concept of "maladministration" in the context of sections 145 to 152 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

8. Mrs Leeks was born on 10 January 1947. She worked for the NHS from 1965 to 1979 and then again from 1988. She worked part-time for much of these periods as a mental health officer. She was a member of the NHS Pension Scheme (the Scheme) throughout this service. She is a nurse and has no expertise in or knowledge of pensions matters.
9. Within the context of the Scheme, the calculation of the pension benefits from time to time was complicated, particularly in Mrs Leeks' case. Her service accrued pension entitlements at a preferential rate because of special arrangements applicable to her as a mental health officer and also at modified rate because of her part-time work.
10. The Pensions Ombudsman reviewed the precise position regarding her pension entitlements under the rules of the Scheme with care. The relevant finding for present purposes is that when Mrs Leeks reached age 60 on 10 January 2007, her pension entitlements had accrued to the maximum extent possible. At that point, she would have been entitled to take her full pension without deduction. There was no good reason from that time on for her to continue to make contributions to the Scheme.
11. However, Mrs Leeks did not realise this. The Employer did not inform her that her pension entitlement was now fully accrued and did not cease deducting pension contributions from her pay. Similarly, the Authority did not so inform her and continued to accept and keep her contributions to the Scheme after that date.
12. The Pensions Ombudsman said this at paragraphs 13 to 23 of his report:

"13. On 23 March 2005, NHS Pensions sent a hand completed pro forma estimate of benefits as at 9 January 2006 to the Employer. The estimate included a handwritten note:

'Pensionable membership includes 9 yrs 219 days doubled membership for MHO service and 293 days additional membership bought. Member achieves 45 years calendar length membership on 9.1.2006.'

14. The estimate said it was based on 37 years and 77 days of 'pensionable membership' and that 'Any part time membership has been converted to the whole time equivalent.'

15. Though it is not at the centre of the complaint, the note was not accurate. As far as I can see, Mrs Leeks had achieved 45 years' calendar length membership several weeks earlier.

16. An estimate of benefits was also sent to Mrs Leeks on 23 March 2005, but this included no similar statement about 45 years' membership.

17. On 31 January 2007, in response to a request from Mrs Leeks, NHS Pensions sent a statement of her membership up to 31 March 32006, being, it said, the latest information supplied by the Employer. It showed a total of 32 years.

18. When Mrs Leeks reached age 60 on 10 January 2007 no steps were taken for payment of her contributions to cease. However, on 29 March 2007, and again on 21 May 2007, NHS Pensions sent her statements of her estimated benefits, stating that 'We are restricting your service to 45 years because the maximum qualifying service allowed is … 45 years overall. Contributions must cease once 45 years service has been achieved providing the member is at least 60'.

19. Mrs Leeks requested a further estimate of her benefits in 2009. In March 2009, NHS Pensions wrote to her, saying that it had identified that '…you should have ceased to be pensionable, as you have achieved the maximum pensionable membership under the scheme rules'. NHS Pensions explained the Method 1 and Method 2 calculations. Also in March 2009, NHS Pensions wrote to the Employer, saying the employer and employee contributions should be reclaimed.

20. Mrs Leeks replied on 23 March 2009. Her distress and anger are apparent from her letter and she points out that the error only became clear when she again enquired about her length of service and pension. She said that Method 2 was 'nonsensical' since without the doubled years she would only have about 30 years' pensionable service and would have to work to 70 to get to the number of years under Method 1.

21. On the subject of the consequences of what had happened, she said:

'In your letter you wish me to accept your apologies for misinforming and then not notifying me that I could have retired over two years ago (in January 2007) with a substantial pension. I worked on, increasing to full-time from part-time, in the mistaken belief that this would get me to a 40 year maximum pension. Those 27 months I could have spent with my husband (already retired) and my grandchildren. Never will I get those years back. [Original emphasis].'

22. After further correspondence, NHS pensions wrote a letter to Mrs Leeks dated 5 May 2009, confirming that it was writing to the Employer, asking it to refund her contributions deducted since 10 January 2007, and to close her online pension record with a date of termination of 9 January 2007.

23. Mrs Leeks' contributions of £5,622.17 were refunded to her in November 2009. She continued to work for the Employer, and did not bring her benefits into payment."

13. Meanwhile, Mrs Leeks raised a dispute under the Scheme's internal dispute resolution procedure. She maintained that, had she been given proper information about her pension position by 10 January 2007, she would have sought to retire at that point. Under the Scheme rules, she would have been entitled to retire at that point and take her full pension entitlement. After a short interlude, she would have been entitled to resume her salaried employment with the Employer. That is what she maintains she would have done if she had been properly informed about her position.
14. In support of that contention, she provided a letter in relation to the position of her manager within the Employer, to which the Pensions Ombudsman referred at paragraph 32 of his report as follows:

"In March 2011 the Employer's Director of Human Resources and Organisational Development wrote to Mrs Leeks' supporter [i.e. the person helping her with her complaint] saying:

'As the manager of Jean Leeks has stated that he would have supported a request for flexible retirement from Mrs Leeks in 2007, I can confirm that there is no reason to believe that the trusts would have opposed the manager's view. I say this as the trust is committed to flexible working arrangements where such arrangements are in the interests of both the trust and the employee.'"

15. Instead, Mrs Leeks says she was deprived of the opportunity to take her pension from January 2007. She simply continued working for the Employer. In March 2009, the Authority eventually informed her that her pension entitlement was complete and that she could retire and, indeed, could have done so in January 2007. It reiterated that information in later correspondence.
16. However, Mrs Leeks continued to work for the Employer down to the time of the Pensions Ombudsman's determination and beyond. Issues of causation in respect of the loss she claims she has suffered therefore arose for determination by the Pensions Ombudsman.
17. The Pensions Ombudsman made these findings of maladministration:

"54 NHS Pensions was aware that Mrs Leeks would achieve 45 years' Scheme membership (taking account of her period of double entitlement) before she reached age 60 on 10 January 2007. It stated this in its estimate in March 2005 (although by reference to 9 January, which appears to be wrong).

55 However, it did not identify until March 2009 that her contributions should have ended immediately before her 60th birthday, on 9 January 2007, as she had previously achieved the maximum calendar service under the Scheme rules. It agrees that its systems are inadequate for this purpose. I consider this to amount to maladministration. I realise that the calculation is potentially complex, but not so much so that it would be difficult for an automated check to be made when a person reaches age 60.

56 NHS Pensions refers to the very large numbers of people in the relevant age range and the significant numbers with mental health officer status, as an illustration of the challenge it faces in informing members of the relevance of reaching maximum service (and/or age 60). I should have thought that if there were potentially large numbers, that might have implied a stronger imperative for their systems to do the job. But anyway, the numbers are irrelevant to whether a computer system can or cannot identify individual cases - the algorithm for identifying them would be standard.

57 The Employer was also aware, from March 2005 at the latest, that Mrs Leeks would achieve maximum membership in March 2006, and age 60 on 10 January 2007. It had been notified of this by NHS Pensions. Nonetheless, it took no steps to address the position when she reached 60, and continued to deduct her contributions.

58 It considers it has a duty to liaise with staff in certain circumstances, such as when they approach age 65, face redundancy or leave on ill health grounds. In my view, this duty applies also in the circumstances in Mrs Leeks' case, bearing in mind particularly the warnings in the NHS Pensions Employer Guide. I find the Employer's failure to address the position also to amount to maladministration.

59 But I consider that the primary responsibility lay with NHS Pensions. It is the Scheme's administrator. As I have said, its systems ought to be capable of identifying when Mrs Leeks should have ceased contributing and clearly flagging the fact. Indeed NHS Pensions accepted that it ought to have told her, during the dispute resolution procedure. It says that it told employers of the vulnerability in its systems and asked them to refer relevant cases to NHS Pensions. That was obviously a sensible precaution intended to limit the risk of things going wrong, but I do not think it effectively shifted the burden of responsibility to the Employer when they did."

18. In relation to injustice and loss, the Pensions Ombudsman made these observations:

"61 In considering whether maladministration has caused injustice to Mrs Leeks, I need to determine the extent to which she has suffered loss. Her overpaid contributions have already been refunded, with interest, and so any loss in that regard has been remedied. I must also consider whether she could reasonably have recognised what choices were available to her at age 60, what she is likely to have done if she had been aware of these, and whether she has taken reasonable steps to mitigate the loss (if any) that she has suffered.

62 NHS Pensions has said that it is not for the Scheme to pro-actively encourage retirement nor present a member with instructions on how to maximise benefits from the Scheme. I agree. However, it is very much a responsibility of NHS Pensions to provide complete and accurate information to enable a member to make informed decisions regarding these matters.

63 Shortly after Mrs Leeks reached age 60, she was sent statements of her estimated benefits, which stated that her service was restricted to 45 years, and that contributions must cease once 45 years' service has been achieved providing the member is at least 60. This might have put her on notice of her changed circumstances, and she might reasonably have made further enquiries of the Employer or NHS Pensions.

64 However, these statements are not readily comprehensible. The one issued in March 2007, projecting membership to 31 March 2008, includes the information: 'Membership up to 31-Mar-2006: 27 years 85 days', 'Projected Membership to last day of Pensionable Employment: 1 years 236 days', 'Mental Health Office Doubled years entitlement: 10 years 328 days', 'Total Membership at last day of Pensionable Employment: 38 years 040 days', 'Total Calendar Length Membership at last day of Pensionable Employment: 45 years 000 days'. The relationship between the figures is not easy to understand, and only some of the terms used are explained. Because of the interaction between her part-time service and her doubled years' entitlement, the relevant calculations are unclear, and it is likely that Mrs Leeks, a non-specialist in pensions, would not have realised that the 45 year restriction had already bitten and, more importantly, that she would derive no further benefit from the Scheme.

65 On the other hand, it is clear that both respondents should have been aware of the position. As contributions were being deducted nonetheless it was reasonable for Mrs Leeks to conclude that all was in order. Mrs Leeks was not told that she had the opportunity to put her benefits into payment. I accept that she did not need to be told that by way of advice to retire. But she should have been told that she would no longer contribute or earn pension - which would in effect have told her that she could retire.

The consequences

66 Regarding what Mrs Leeks might have done if she had been aware of the position, I note NHS Pensions' suggestion that her failure to take her pension even now indicates that, whatever the circumstances, she would not have acted differently in 2007 or later. I do not think it does. There would have been two possible courses of action if Mrs Leeks had known she had would earn no further pension. Mrs Leeks would either have retired and ceased work, or she would have retired and restarted work. (I accept that restarting work was an option (a) on the evidence of her manager referred to above and (b) because she did in fact stay in post, so the work was evidently available.) The one thing that it would not have made sense to do in the circumstances was to stay in post without drawing her pension. There was no increase for 'late' payment, so nothing to be gained from leaving the pension unpaid.

67 In relation to returning to work, NHS Pensions has referred to Regulation S1. Regulation S1 applies where a normal retirement pension is payable to the member and "within one month of the pension becoming payable, the member enters NHS employment in which he is engaged for more than 16 hours per week". For the reasons given above I accept that it would have been possible for Mrs Leeks to leave and rejoin a month or so later. Also, as Mrs Leeks had reached her 60th birthday she would have been entitled to receive both her salary and full pension without abatement under the terms of Regulation S2.

68 NHS Pensions has referred to Mrs Leeks' letter dated 23 March 2009 as an indication that she would have retired immediately. (Making that reference is obviously completely at odds with the suggestion, referred to above, that her actual behaviour indicates that she would not have retired.) However, first, the context in which Mrs Leeks made the statement is that she had increased her hours thinking she had not yet reached the maximum service - so I do not think she is clearly saying that she would have retired completely, as opposed to retiring and continuing part-time. Second, even if she would have retired fully, I do not see how the fact she did not alters the position. She is no better off in pension terms than if she had retired and not worked. She has given work and time in exchange for pay (including, as it happens, sick pay), which is neutral for this purpose. Even if she would have retired fully, the loss to her has neither increased nor decreased as a result of her having continued working."

19. The Pensions Ombudsman also addressed questions of loss and mitigation of loss in the next section of his report. This section included the following, at paragraphs 75 to 86:

"75. Mrs Leeks' claim, by contrast, is for the same as her entitlement had there been no maladministration. She could reasonably have thought (as I have already said) that there was no additional cost as a result of her not retiring, either to the Scheme or NHS Pensions if she won her case.

76. Even if there were a duty to mitigate in the way NHS Pensions suggest, I do not consider Mrs Leeks' actions unreasonable. My reasons follow.

77. NHS Pensions has specifically referred to Mrs Leeks' letter of 17 September 2009 in which, it says, she acknowledged that she understood that she had the right to draw her pension. This letter was her submission to the Stage 1 IDRP process. I cannot agree that she has clearly said in that letter that she understands that she had the right to draw her pension. And even if I were persuaded that she had made such a statement this would be in the context of setting out the grounds for her complaint. At that time she had no indication of what the outcome of her complaint would be or whether her thoughts and views would be upheld.

78. NHS Pensions has also referred to letters to Mrs Leeks from the Pensions Advisory Service (TPAS) as further evidence of her knowledge that she could retire. But by 2010 Mrs Leeks was off sick. It might reasonably not have been uppermost in her mind to retire - particularly when she was disputing her pension entitlement.

79. Finally, I consider that it is not unreasonable for Mrs Leeks not to have taken her pension whilst her dispute with NHS Pensions and the Employer remained unresolved. In his letter dated 28 February 2012 to my office her representative made it clear that she had not done so because of a perceived risk that it would jeopardise her case. He said something similar to TPAS when the point arose in early 2011. NHS Pensions says now that the benefits could have been put into payment without prejudice to the outcome of the complaint. I am sure that is true, based on my office's experience in other complaints. Whilst NHS Pensions was under no obligation to advise Mrs Leeks, it would have strengthened their mitigation related arguments considerably if they themselves had told her at the time. So I do not take the fact that she has not taken her pension to be evidence that she would not have done.

80. In summary, I consider Mrs Leeks to have suffered injustice amounting to the loss of the benefits which she would have received since January 2007.

81. I consider that Mrs Leeks was denied the opportunity to retire and take her pension in January 2007 by the maladministration of NHS Pensions and the Employer.

82. The loss in pension terms amounts to the sum of the instalments of pension which would have been paid to Mrs Leeks since 10 January 2007, had she taken her benefits. Her pension will not be increased by any late retirement factor, and so there is no benefit which needs to be taken into account in assessing her loss. There is no loss of lump sum benefits, as the lump sum remains available to be taken now or whenever Mrs Leeks chooses to do so, and is a greater amount than in January 2007.

83. However, in order to receive her pension at age 60 Mrs Leeks would have had to resign her post and, after a 24 hour gap, not work more than 16 hours a week in the following month. It is not possible to require Mrs Leeks to now resign her post and seek re-employment. She may well do so - indeed my expectation is that she will. However, though the employment was available then, it may not be now. The Scheme is no worse off if she does not resign now (indeed it is better off as pension will not be immediately payable). But, in order to effectively return her to the financial position she would have been in, my direction below makes an adjustment for one month of her salary at the January 2007 level - on the assumption that she would not have worked at all in that month, since she would normally have worked more than the minimum 16 hours.

84. NHS Pensions has said that it is unable, under the Regulations, to pay benefits other than those to which Mrs Leeks is entitled. However, its maladministration has led to Mrs Leeks suffering a financial injustice for which she should be compensated. My direction below is that she be made a lump sum payment not as a benefit under the Scheme, but by NHS Pensions as compensation for the loss of the equivalent amount of benefit caused by maladministration.

85. I have considered whether the Employer should pay a share of the lump sum representing back payments. On balance I do not think that is appropriate. Although they may have been at fault, as I have said, the primary responsibility for the administration of the Scheme lies with NHS Pensions. Apportionment of compensation does not necessarily follow apportionment of 'blame' - though where the fault lay is material. However, had there been no maladministration, the pension would have been paid by the Scheme. It is right, in this case, for the cost of my direction to fall on the Scheme's administrator (and, if arrangements allow, on the Scheme as an administration expense). In effect it puts all parties as near as possible in the position they would have been in had there been no maladministration.

86. I do not consider that Mrs Leeks should receive compensation for lost pension beyond the date of this determination. As I have said, my expectation is that she will now take her benefits from the Scheme. Whether she does or not is a matter for her. But from this point on, her not taking her benefits will not be a consequence of maladministration by NHS Pensions."

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

20. Mr Greatorex's helpful skeleton argument sets out the relevant legal framework in a way which was not contentious for the purposes of this appeal, as follows:

"4. The statutory framework governing the [Pensions Ombudsman] is set out in sections 145-152 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993. The relevant provisions are as follows:

"146. Functions of the Pensions Ombudsman

(1) The Pensions Ombudsman may investigate and determine the following matters—

(a) a complaint made to him by or on behalf of an actual or potential beneficiary of an occupational or personal pension scheme who alleges that he has sustained injustice in consequence of maladministration in connection with any act or omission of a person responsible for the management of the scheme,

151. Determinations of the Pensions Ombudsman

…

(2) Where the Pensions Ombudsman makes a determination under this Part…he may direct any person responsible for the management of the scheme to which the complaint or reference relates to take, or refrain from taking, such steps as he may specify in the statement referred to in subsection (1) or otherwise in writing."

151A. Interest on late payment of benefit

Where under this Part the Pensions Ombudsman directs a person responsible for the management of an occupational or personal pension scheme to make any payment in respect of benefit under the scheme which, in his opinion, ought to have been paid earlier, his direction may also require the payment of interest at the prescribed rate.

5. "Maladministration" is not defined in the 1993 Act, although the meaning of this has been considered in R v Local Commissioner for Administration, ex parte Bradford Metropolitan City Council [1979] QB 287, where Lord Denning said (at 311) that Parliament had deliberately left it to the Ombudsman to interpret the word as best he could but indicated that it would cover "bias, neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude, perversity, turpitude, arbitrariness and so on.".

6. Some basic principles established by the case law are as follows:

a. Section 151 permits the [Pensions Ombudsman] in his determination to "afford the complainant compensation for the injustice which the Pensions Ombudsman finds that he has sustained in consequence of maladministration in connection with the relevant act or omission of the scheme trustees or managers": East Lancashire Primary Care Trust v Leach [2012] EWHC 3136 (Ch) at [36].

b. It is implicit in section 151(2) that the "steps" must be calculated to provide an appropriate remedy for the injustice found to have been sustained by the complainant and it is therefore necessary for the Pensions Ombudsman to identify the injustice in question and to determine whether it has been sustained in consequence of maladministration before considering what steps are required to remedy it: Westminster CC v Haywood [1998] Ch 377 at 410A-B.

c. Where the court is not satisfied that the [Pensions Ombudsman] has addressed the issue of causation properly then it is entitled to interfere: Westminster CC v Haywood [1998] Ch 377; Hogg Robinson v The Pensions Ombudsman [1998] OPLR 131.

d. The jurisdiction to award compensation is to be exercised with great caution, the remedy must be appropriate and proportional, not such as to risk creating some new injustice, and bearing in mind who is going to bear the cost of any compensation that is awarded: Seifert v The Pensions Ombudsman [1997] 1 All ER 214 at 225 (point not affected by the subsequent successful appeal) and Westminster City Council v Haywood [1996] Ch 377 at 392E, [1998] Ch 377, and Miller v Stapleton [1996] 2 All ER 449 at 466.

e. The jurisdiction of the [Pensions Ombudsman] exists only in respect of the complaint made to him so a finding which goes beyond the complaint is in excess of that jurisdiction and an error of law: Hamar v French [1998] PLR 321 at [73]; Glossop v Copnall [2001] OPLR 287, [2001] Pens. L.R. 263

f. It is no part of the Ombudsman's jurisdiction to put the complainant in a more favourable position than if the complainant had successfully taken the complaint to the courts: East Sussex County Council v Jacobs [2003] EWHC 3323 (Ch), [2004] OPLR 243 at [12].

g. Payment of the levels of benefits required by law cannot constitute maladministration: Westminster City Council v Haywood [1997] 2 All ER 84 at 95, East Sussex County Council v Jacobs [2003] EWHC 3323 (Ch), [2004] OPLR 243 at [15]."

21. In relation to questions of causation, Mr Greatorex also referred me to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Hibbert Pownall & Newton (a Firm) v Whitehead & Anor [2008] EWCA Civ 285. At paragraph [25] in the judgment, Laws LJ referred to general considerations of justice, which include as a principle:

"that the law should not speculate when it knows."

22. In support of this proposition, Laws LJ quoted a passage from the speech of Lord Macnaghten in Bwllfa & Merthyr Dare Steam Collieries (1891) Limited v Pontypridd Waterworks Company [1903] AC 426 at 431, as follows:

"The arbitrator's duty is to determine the amount of compensation payable. In order to enable him to come to a just and true conclusion it is his duty, I think, to avail himself of all information at hand at the time of making his award which may be laid before him. Why should he listen to conjecture on a matter which has become an accomplished fact? Why should he guess when he can calculate? With the light before him, why should shut his eyes and grope in the dark?"

23. The Pensions Ombudsman made written submissions in relation to the concept of maladministration in section 146(1)(a) of the Pension schemes Act. He points out that this term has been held to include:

"...faulty or incompetent administration falling short of the breach of any legal duty or obligation ..."

See Secretary of State for Health v Marshall [2008] EWHC 909 Ch

24. In Arjo Wiggins Limited v Ralph [2009] EWHC 3198 (Ch), Lewison J said:

"'Maladministration' is a broad concept which goes further than a violation of legal rights. There can be maladministration even if a person's legal rights are not infringed. I will call this 'pure maladministration'. This kind of maladministration will cover bias, neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude, perversity, turpitude, arbitrariness and so on; covering the manner in which a decision is reached or discretion is exercised; but not the merits of the decision itself: R v Local Commissioner for Administration for the North and East Area of England, ex parte Bradford Metropolitan City Council [1979] QB 287, 311 (per Lord Denning MR)."

25. The Pensions Ombudsman submits that as there is no statutory definition of maladministration and as the term is flexible, then given that pension schemes, particularly large ones, inevitably employ automated systems to assist in effective and accurate administration and that members rely on the information provided, in the pensions context it would be inappropriate and unduly restrictive if the meaning of the word could not apply to limitations inherent in automated systems.

DISCUSSION

26. The first ground of appeal is in relation to the Pensions Ombudsman's finding of maladministration in relation to the Authority. Mr Greatorex submits that even though the term "maladministration" is broad, it cannot be stretched to cover the limitations inherent in a scheme administrator's automated systems; in the alternative, even if that is not accepted, the finding in this case about what a scheme administrator's systems ought to be capable of and the conclusion that because they fell short of this there was maladministration was not properly open to the Pensions Ombudsman in this case. In particular, Mr Greatorex submitted that two particularly relevant considerations pointed away from any finding of maladministration and were not properly considered by the Pensions Ombudsman, namely identification of the precise limitations in the systems and, secondly, what would be required to correct them.
27. I do not accept these submissions. The Scheme is a complex pension scheme with complex rules. The Authority is the Scheme administrator and is, or should be, expert in understanding those rules. It deals with non-expert lay people who are members of the Scheme. It has or should have full, detailed information about their pensionable service for the purposes of the Scheme. It is reasonable to expect that a scheme administrator such as the Authority should be in a position to give accurate information to scheme members. In particular, it should tell them when their entitlements are complete and when no further contributions are due from them.
28. In this case, there was a background of a known deficiency in the Authority's systems, to which the Pensions Ombudsman referred at paragraph 39 of his report:

"NHS Pensions says that it does not have access to a member's payroll records, and that it is the responsibility of an employer to provide information about a member's pension. It advised the Employer in March 2005 that Mrs Leeks would achieve the maximum 45 years' membership by age 60. It is aware that its system does not always calculate restricted 45 year cases correctly, and is working on resolving this. In the meantime, employers were told to refer cases to NHS Pensions where statements were produced for members in these circumstances. The Employer failed to do this in Mrs Leeks' case."

29. In my judgment, in the circumstances of this case, the Pensions Ombudsman was well entitled to make the finding of maladministration which he did against the Authority on the basis that he did. In the circumstances of its special expertise and its particular responsibility as scheme administrator, the Authority's failure to inform Mrs Leeks and its continued acceptance of her contributions in respect of her pension were matters which I consider plainly justified the Pensions Ombudsman in making the finding of maladministration that he did. He did not have to make any more elaborate findings or rulings than he did.
30. I accept the submission of the Pensions Ombudsman that maladministration is a concept which can apply to unreasonable limitations inherent within automated systems operated by pension scheme administrators. Mr Greatorex submitted that even if defects in an automated system could constitute maladministration, the Pensions Ombudsman was under an obligation, before finding maladministration, to identify in detail with evidence in support what could and should have been done to rectify those inadequacies in the automated systems operated by the Authority and to consider the reasonableness of those steps.
31. I do not accept this submission of the Authority. In my view, the Pensions Ombudsman was entitled to have regard to the special position and responsibility of the Authority as scheme administrator and simply to find that the systems which the Authority had in place fell so substantially below being able to satisfy the reasonable expectations of members as to what they could look to the Authority to provide by way of important information for them as to constitute maladministration.
32. In that regard, it should be noted that, in the course of making submissions to the Pensions Ombudsman, the Authority did not submit that its systems were just too difficult and expensive to put into a state where they could actually provide accurate information of a kind of such importance to scheme members. The Authority just pointed out that the Scheme was large and complex with a large membership. One might think that in such a case there is all the more reason to ensure that the Authority, given its expertise, position and special responsibility for so many people, should have adequate systems in place to ensure that it could provide accurate information to members of the Scheme at appropriate points. If the Authority fails to ensure that it had effective automated or other procedures in place to perform that basic function and fulfil that basic responsibility, it is clearly going to be on risk of findings of maladministration by the Pensions Ombudsman in individual cases. The inference may be drawn that that is simply the risk that the Authority is willing to take. It is not something which disallows a finding of maladministration in a case such as this. I consider that the Pensions Ombudsman was fully entitled to make the finding of maladministration that he did.
33. Under this heading, Mr Greatorex made some further points. He referred to the finding by the Pensions Ombudsman at paragraph 63 that the Authority did send Mrs Leeks some relevant information in early 2007, shortly after she turned 60. He submitted that the Pensions Ombudsman's findings at paragraphs 63 to 65 that, despite this, she did not appreciate what her entitlements were at that stage were not sustainable.
34. This is in substance a perversity challenge in relation to the findings in that regard made by the Pensions Ombudsman. In my view, that challenge fails. I consider that there clearly was a proper evidential basis on which the Pensions Ombudsman could make the findings which he did, in particular at paragraphs 64 and 65 of his decision.
35. Mr Greatorex also made submissions referring to the responsibility of the Employer, as determined by the Pensions Ombudsman, for maladministration on its own behalf. However, as Mr Greatorex correctly accepted in the course of submissions, the fact that maladministration was found on the part of the Employer does not logically lead to the conclusion that there was no maladministration in the circumstances of this case on the part of the Authority. The Pensions Ombudsman was well entitled to make findings of maladministration against both the Employer and the Authority.
36. Mr Greatorex referred to the fact that the Pensions Ombudsman, at paragraph 59 of his decision, found that the Authority had made the Employer aware of the shortcoming in the Authority's systems and asked them to refer relevant cases to it and his comment that this was "a sensible precaution". Again, however, there is no inconsistency between these observations by the Pensions Ombudsman and his fundamental finding that there was maladministration on the part of the Authority. In the circumstances where maladministration in the form of non-provision of proper or accurate information was capable of occurring, it no doubt was a sensible precaution at the very least for the Authority to inform employers in this way. But the fact that the Authority took a precaution of this kind because of the defects in its information systems does not show that there was an absence of maladministration.
37. For these reasons, I dismiss the various points and grounds of challenge to the Pensions Ombudsman's decision made by Mr Greatorex under the heading of Ground 1.
38. Ground 2 is the submission to the effect that no compensation should have been awarded against the Authority. This is a causation argument. The substance of it is that Mr Greatorex submits that there was no proper basis on which the Pensions Ombudsman could find that, had Mrs Leeks been given proper information in January 2007, she would have retired from her employment and then, after a short interlude, would have resumed her employment.
39. In my judgment, this ground of appeal and the various aspects of it also fall to be dismissed. I consider that the Pensions Ombudsman was entitled to make the relevant findings on causation which he did at paragraphs 64 and 65 of his decision.
40. The Pensions Ombudsman was plainly conscious of causation issues relating to the fact that Mrs Leeks did not resign from her employment when, in March 2009, she was given proper information about her pension entitlements. He examined her reasons for doing that and found that she had appropriate grounds specific to the circumstances in which she then found herself for not retiring at that stage and acted reasonably in declining to do so: see paragraph 79 of his decision. There was evidential material before him, including in the complaint form lodged by Mrs Leeks, which provided a proper and lawful evidential foundation for him to make those findings.
41. For example, in her complaint form Mrs Leeks said:

"I continued working from March 2009 feeling that if I retired then and took the pension the Agency would have accepted a fait accompli and not given me the back pay. I had no confidence in them at all. I have had two and a half years of worry and stress resulting in a very serious illness requiring hospitalisation and one year away from work that I enjoy and that gives me great satisfaction."

42. On the basis of this statement by Mrs Leeks and other materials which were before him, I consider that the Pensions Ombudsman was entitled to make the findings relevant to causation that he did, in particular in paragraph 64 and 65 of his decision. There were particular reasons why Mrs Leeks did not retire in March 2009 which had no application in the circumstances which would have obtained in January 2007, had she been properly informed about her pension entitlements at that stage. In light of this, there was no inconsistency between Mrs Leeks' conduct in March 2009 and the Pensions Ombudsman's finding that she would have retired in January 2007, if given the correct information. There was a sufficient basis in the evidence before him to support his finding that this is what she would have done.
43. In light of the Pensions Ombudsman's findings in paragraphs 64, 65 and 79 of his report, he was entitled to find that Mrs Leeks did suffer injustice and loss in consequence of maladministration: see Westminster CC v Haywood [1998] Ch 377 at 410A-B. In summary, he found that by reason of the maladministration and the absence of proper information being provided to Mrs Leeks she was led to continue in her employment and lost the opportunity of retiring and then rejoining her employment. There were proper grounds on which the Pension Ombudsman could find this. There were also proper grounds on which he could find that there was no break in the chain of causation until the question of uncertainty and lack of trust in the Authority on the part of Mrs Leeks was finally dispelled by the Pensions Ombudsman's determination itself: see paragraph 82 of his decision, set out above.
44. It is in the context of this ground of appeal, in particular, that Mr Greatorex submits that the principle in Hibbert Pownall & Newtown referred to above, that the court should not speculate when it knows the position for a certainty, is relevant. In my view, however, the present case is not one in which the guidance in that judgment is germane. The present case is a case where different features of the evidence regarding how Mrs Leeks might have behaved if given proper information in January 2007 pointed in different directions. That evidence had to be assessed by the Pensions Ombudsman in the round, in the way which is usual when any judicial decision-maker assesses questions of fact and evidence.
45. This is not a case in which Mrs Leeks' behaviour in March 2009 shows for a certainty how she would have behaved in January 2007, had she been provided with proper information. The Pensions Ombudsman was called upon to make an evaluative judgment as to the likelihood of what would have happened had proper information been provided in January 2007, on the evidence available before him. The fact that Mrs Leeks did not promptly retire from her employment when informed of the true position in March 2009 does not show that there is any error in the assessment made by the Pensions Ombudsman. He fairly and properly addressed the reasons for her behaviour in March 2009, in particular at paragraph 79 of his decision, and gave reasons why the position confronting Mrs Leeks in March 2009 was materially different from that with which she would have been presented had she been given the proper information in January 2007. Again, this was an assessment which in my judgment the Pensions Ombudsman was entitled to make.
46. Mr Greatorex was also critical of the Pensions Ombudsman's reasoning at paragraph 66 of his decision, set out above. I do not consider that this criticism is sustainable either. In the light of the matters to which the Pensions Ombudsman referred, in particular the indication from Mrs Leeks' manager and the fact that she had in fact continued in employment with the Employer after January 2007 (so there was obviously work for her to do), the Pensions Ombudsman was entitled to find that she would have had a genuine opportunity to retire and then return to work promptly had she been informed about her entitlements properly in January 2007. Since the Pensions Ombudsman was entitled to find that she would have had such an opportunity, he was also in my view entitled to find that she would have taken advantage of it and behaved as she maintained she would have behaved.
47. Also under this ground of appeal, Mr Greatorex submitted that it was clear that, at the very least there was uncertainty about the position, and the Pensions Ombudsman should have taken this into account by reducing any compensation to reflect that uncertainty. He submitted, further, that this would avoid putting Mrs Leeks in a better position than if there had been no maladministration or she had successfully taken her complaint to court.
48. I do not accept these submissions. In my view, the Pensions Ombudsman was entitled to decide what the proper basis for assessing the extent of the injustice suffered by Mrs Leeks might be. He proceeded on the basis of making findings at relevant points in his decision on the balance of probability. In my judgment, this was a lawful approach for him to adopt in the circumstances of this case and does not give rise to any good ground of appeal.
49. The third ground of appeal is a challenge to the award by the Pensions Ombudsman of compensation for the period beyond March 2009. Mr Greatorex submits that, even if Grounds 1 and 2 are not accepted, the Pensions Ombudsman was wrong to award compensation to Mrs Leeks beyond March 2009, for two reasons. First, in her complaint to the Pensions Ombudsman she had not sought compensation beyond March 2009, so the Pensions Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to make an award beyond that date. Secondly, March 2009 was when she was provided with the correct information which she should have been given in 2007, so any maladministration ceased at that point and Mr Greatorex submitted, for reasons similar to those he advanced under Ground 2, that there was no proper basis for the Pensions Ombudsman to find that there was any continuing causative effect of the maladministration found by him beyond the time when proper information was given to her.
50. I reject both these submissions. As to the first, I do not accept that it is correct on the facts that Mrs Leeks' application form to the Pensions Ombudsman made it clear that her complaint of injustice arising from maladministration related only to the period until proper information was provided to her in March 2009. In the section of the form headed, "Please detail the injustice you have suffered", she included the following statement:

"I continued working from March 2009 feeling that if I retired then and took the pension the agency would have accepted a fait accompli and not given me the back pay."

In my view, on a fair reading of her complaint form, she was complaining of continuing injustice and loss suffered by her beyond March 2009 as a result of the maladministration about which she was complaining in respect of the earlier period. Accordingly, in relation to the first of the points made by Mr Greatorex, I consider that on a fair reading of her complaint she had sought compensation beyond March 2009 to meet the injustice that she had suffered and that the Pensions Ombudsman had jurisdiction to make the award that he did.

51. The second point is in substance the same argument based on the challenge to the findings made by the Pensions Ombudsman regarding causation which I have already addressed in the context of Ground 2. As I have explained, the Pensions Ombudsman was entitled on the evidence before him to make findings that had Mrs Leeks been properly informed about the position as she should have been in January 2007, she would have retired from her job but then, after a brief period, would have re-entered employment with the Employer. On the basis of those findings, the Pensions Ombudsman was entitled to make the findings that he did in relation to the continuing loss suffered by Mrs Leeks down to the date of his report.
52. I turn finally to Ground 4 (the submission that the Pensions Ombudsman erred in making a finding that the Authority alone should be liable for the compensation to be paid to Mrs Leeks). The precise legal position in relation to a situation in which two persons are both guilty of maladministration which causes the same loss to a complainant is obscure. I asked Mr Greatorex in the course of his submissions whether it is open to the Pensions Ombudsman to make rulings which in ordinary litigation terms might be described as findings of joint and several liability on the part of two bodies, both of which are responsible, as here, for relevant maladministration, and as a consequence of which a loss has been suffered by the victim of that maladministration. The relevance of the question in relation to joint and several liability is two-fold. First, from the point of view of a victim or claimant in a case where loss has been caused by two responsible parties who are jointly and severally liable for that loss, the effect is that the victim or claimant can recover the full amount of that loss from either of the responsible parties. This reduces the risk that might otherwise arise in relation to the possible of insolvency of one of those parties. In the present case, I have no information about the financial position of the Employer. Secondly, the relevance of a finding of joint and several liability is that in ordinary litigation a party which pays out to the claimant or victim in full will be entitled to claim contribution from the other responsible party and it would be for the court to work out what fair contribution should be made by the other wrongdoer. The working out of rights of contribution does not affect the ability of the victim or claimant to recover full compensation from one or other of the responsible parties, according to his choice and what suits him best.
53. Mr Greatorex had not had notice of this question and very fairly told me that he was not aware of the operation of joint and several liability in the Pensions Ombudsman context or of there being rights of contribution. If this were a matter which did not affect the rights of Mrs Leeks, it might have been a point which could have been explored further with the benefit of submissions not just from the Authority but from the Employer. However, the effect of this ground of appeal is that the Authority is seeking to use a right of appeal against the ruling of the Pensions Ombudsman in favour of Mrs Leeks, and against her objection and where she has no appeal of her own on foot to challenge the absence of a compensation award in her favour against the Employer, to secure some form of right of contribution against the Employer.
54. In my judgment, it would not be appropriate to allow the Authority's appeal on this Ground. As between Mrs Leeks and the Authority, there is no injustice in the decision of the Pensions Ombudsman. The Authority was guilty of maladministration which did indeed cause the loss suffered by Mrs Leeks. Further, it would be particularly inappropriate to allow the Authority's appeal in circumstances where, as here, the court has no information as to whether diminishing the right of compensation for Mrs Leeks against the Authority might give rise to a risk of under-recovery by reason of the financial position of the Employer. I can see no good reason why Mrs Leeks should be put into a worse position (by a reduction of the sum she is entitled to recover from the Authority) than she would have been in had the ordinary rules of civil procedure applied. I do not consider that it would be just or fair to allow the appeal in favour of the Authority against Mrs Leeks, in order to facilitate, in substance, the Authority in obtaining contribution from the Employer. That is a matter which is res inter alios acta; a point of relevance between the Authority and the Employer, but with no proper bearing on the rights of Mrs Leeks against the Authority. In my view, therefore, there was no error of law on the part of the Pensions Ombudsman in making the compensation ruling he did in favour of Mrs Leeks against the Authority.
55. Further and in any event, the Pensions Ombudsman did address the question of dividing up the compensation awards as between the Employer and the Authoroity, in particular at paragraph 85 of his report, set out above. In my view, the reasons the Pensions Ombudsman gives there disclose no error of law in his approach.
56. For all these reasons, I dismiss this appeal.