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England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> House of Fraser (Funding) Plc, Re [2018] EWHC 2663 (Ch) (25 July 2018) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2018/2663.html Cite as: [2018] EWHC 2663 (Ch) |
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BUSINESSS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
BUSINESS LIST (ChD)
7 Rolls Buildings Fetter Lane London EC4A 1NL |
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B e f o r e :
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IN THE MATTER OF HOUSE OF FRASER (FUNDING) PLC AND IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES ACT 2006 |
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1st Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP.
Telephone No: 020 7067 2900. Fax No: 020 7831 6864 DX 410 LDE
Email: [email protected]
Web: www.martenwalshcherer.com
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Crown Copyright ©
MR. JUSTICE HENRY CARR:
"The House of Fraser group is facing a liquidity crisis. The scheme is part of what has been described as an 'amend and extend' restructuring arrangement relating to the principal financial instruments issued by two entities within the group, with obligations which are cross-guaranteed by a number of other group companies. The intended effect of this part of the restructuring is first to extend the maturity dates for the relevant instruments, and any claims under the related guarantees, to a common date in 2020; second, to amend the security provisions to enable, if necessary, a further supersenior class of debt to be issued by the company or other group members; third, to implement amendments which relate to the change control provisions in the relevant financial instruments in order to facilitate a sale transaction and further investment in the group; and fourth, to make some other relatively minor amendments which bring the positions under the two principal financial instruments more closely aligned with one another."
"(1) If a majority in number representing 75% in value of the creditors or class of creditors or members or class of members (as the case may be), present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting summoned under section 896, agree a compromise or arrangement, the court may, on an application under this section, sanction the compromise or arrangement.
(2) An application under this section may be made by –
(a) the company,
(b) any creditor or member of the company,
(c) if the company is being wound up or an administration order is in force in relation it, the liquidator or administrator.
(d) if the company is in administration, the administrator.
(3) A compromise or arrangement sanctioned by the court is binding on –
(a) all creditors or the class of creditors or on the members or class of members (as the case may be), and
(b) the company or, in the case of a company in the course of being wound up, the liquidator and contributories of the company."
"20. The classic formulation of the principles which guide the court in considering whether to sanction a scheme was set out by Plowman J in Re National Bank Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 819 by reference to a passage in Buckley on the Companies Acts, which has been approved and applied by the courts on many subsequent occasions:
'In exercising its power of sanction the court will see, first, that the provisions of the statute have been complied with, second that the class was fairly represented by those who attended the meeting and that the statutory majority are acting bona fide and are not coercing the minority in order to promote interests adverse to those of the class whom they purport to represent, and thirdly, that the arrangement is such as an intelligent and honest man, a member of the class concerned and acting in respect of his interest, might reasonably approve.The court does not sit merely to see that the majority are acting bona fide and thereupon to register the decision of the meeting, but, at the same time, the court will be slow to differ from the meeting, unless either the class has not been properly consulted, or the meeting has not considered the matter with a view to the interests of the class which it is empowered to bind, or some blot is found in the scheme.'
21. This formulation in particular recognises and balances two important factors. First, in deciding to sanction a scheme under section 425, which has the effect of binding members or creditors who have voted against the scheme or abstained as well as those who voted in its favour, the court must be satisfied that it is a fair scheme. It must be a scheme that 'an intelligent and honest man, a member of the class concerned and acting in respect of his interest, might reasonably approve.' That test also makes clear that the scheme proposed need not be the only fair scheme or even, in the court's view, the best scheme. Necessarily there may be reasonable differences of view on these issues.
22. The second factor recognised by the above-cited passage is that in commercial matters members or creditors are much better judges of their own interests than the courts. Subject to the qualifications set out in the second paragraph, the court 'will be slow to differ from the meeting'."
"As regards the correct constitution of classes, I accept the point made by Mr. Dicker that if a judge has heard full argument at the Convening Hearing and has decided on the appropriate constitution of classes, it is not ordinarily appropriate for a different judge at the sanction hearing to take a different view of his own motion in the absence of any creditor appearing to contend that the classes were not correctly constituted."
"I can say now that, in common with many other schemes that have been promoted in recent years, I will approach the question of jurisdiction by making an assumption which many of my colleagues and indeed I have made in other cases. If I make the assumption that the relevant EU Regulation applies and that the scheme creditors are to be treated as defendants under the Regulation, then since there are UK-based scheme creditors, it follows that if the EU Regulation applies then the court does have jurisdiction."
"The court will not generally make any order which has no substantial effect and, before the court will sanction a scheme, it will need to be satisfied that the scheme will achieve its purpose …"