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England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Xie v Meng & Ors [2022] EWHC 1819 (Ch) (20 July 2022) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2022/1819.html Cite as: [2022] EWHC 1819 (Ch) |
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BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
COMPANIES COURT (ChD)
RE: ENNO CAPITAL LTD (crn.11887468)
AND RE: THE COMPANIES ACT 2006
Fetter Lane, London EC4A 1NL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
SHICHUANG XIE |
Petitioner |
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- and - |
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(1) QINGHENG MENG (2) YIJIAN GAO (3) SUNEET SINGH SACHDEVA (4) CT MANAGEMENT HOLDINGS LTD (5) ENNO CAPITAL LTD |
Respondents |
____________________
John McDonnell QC and Richard Bowles (instructed by Richard Slade and Company)
for the First to Fourth Respondents
Hearing dates: 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16 June 2022
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
ICC JUDGE PRENTIS :
"1. Was the £1.26 million [sic] paid by the Petitioner to the [Company] a loan repayable on demand or some other form of investment, and, if so, what were its terms?
2. What were the terms (if any) orally agreed in June 2019 between the Petitioner and the First Respondent?
3. What were the terms (if any) orally agreed in August 2019 between the Petitioner and the First to Third Respondents?
4. Are the Written Resolutions of August 2019 binding upon the Petitioner?
5. To whom does the brand "Bubble CiTea" belong?
6. Was the transfer of the EU trademark for "Bubble CiTea" to Bubble City Ltd valid and effective?
7. Were the Respondents entitled to remove the Petitioner as director of the [Company]?
8. Were the allotments of shares of the [Company] in 2019 and 2020 valid and effective?"
1.1 Without the Petitioner's knowledge or agreement, on 15 June 2020 the First Respondent removed him as a director of the Company, though he had no power to do so under s.168 of the Act or otherwise; and on the same date appointed Abdul Khader Mohammed Ismail, and on 18 June 2020 the Second Respondent, without power under regulation 17 of the Model Articles or otherwise; such removals and appointments being pursuant to the improper purpose of excluding the Petitioner from the Company and "diluting and destroying" his majority shareholding in favour of the Fourth Respondent (the "Purpose"), and contrary to the First Respondent's fiduciary obligation of good faith owed directly to the Petitioner, and his fiduciary obligations owed to the Company to act in accordance with its constitution, exercise his powers for the conferred purposes, and "act in the way he considered, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the Company for the benefit of its members as a whole". The Second to Fourth Respondents were aware of and agreed to each of these actions. The removal and appointments were void and of no effect.
1.2 Without the Petitioner's knowledge or agreement, on 15 June 2020 the First Respondent allotted 10,000 ordinary £1 shares in the Company to the Fourth Respondent; in pursuit of the Purpose; in breach of s.561 or s.549 of the Act; in breach of regulations 7(1), 8(1), 9(3), 11(1) and 11(2) in the decision being made at a non-quorate and improperly called meeting of directors, and of 8(3), which excluded the Petitioner from voting; contrary to those same fiduciary duties as immediately above and, in respect of the Company, also that to declare the nature and extent of his interest in the allotment to the Petitioner as co-director. The Fourth Respondent had notice of these breaches, as the First Respondent was a director and shareholder. The Second and Third Respondents were aware of and agreed to each of these actions. The allotment was void and of no effect.
1.3 Without the Petitioner's knowledge or agreement, on 12 August 2019 the First Respondent allotted 30 non-voting shares in the Company to the Fourth Respondent; to dilute the Petitioner's dividend rights; in breach of s.561 or s.549 of the Act, and the same regulations as immediately above; in breach of the same duties to the Petitioner and the Company as immediately above. Again, the Fourth Respondent had notice of these breaches, and the Second and Third Respondents were aware of and agreed to the action. The allotment was void and of no effect.
1.4 Without the Petitioner's knowledge or "approval" (nothing turns on that word being used, rather than the "agreement" of the other heads), on or about 25 August 2020 the Company transferred its interests in Bubble Citea Ltd ("Bubble Opco") to Bubble City, and Bubble City to the Third Respondent, who had no entitlement to such transfers; the transfers were contrary to the First Respondent's duty to the Petitioner, and his and the Second Respondent's duties to the Company to act in the ways alleged in sub-paragraph 5.1 above. The Third Respondent was aware of the lack of authority and breach of duty, as was Bubble City. The transfers were void and of no effect.
1.5 Without the Petitioner's knowledge or agreement, on 30 September 2020 the Company applied to transfer ownership of the EU trademark to Bubble City, which was effected on 6 October. Bubble City was aware of the lack of authority, through its directors', the Second and Third Respondents', awareness of the invalidity of the removal of the Petitioner and appointment of the Second Respondent as director of the Company. The transfer was invalid and of no effect.
5. "Unfairly prejudicial"
In section 459 Parliament has chosen fairness as the criterion by which the court must decide whether it has jurisdiction to grant relief. It is clear from the legislative history (which I discussed in In re Saul D. Harrison & Sons Plc. [1995] 1 B.C.L.C. 14 , 17–20) that it chose this concept to free the court from technical considerations of legal right and to confer a wide power to do what appeared just and equitable. But this does not mean that the court can do whatever the individual judge happens to think fair. The concept of fairness must be applied judicially and the content which it is given by the courts must be based upon rational principles. As Warner J. said in In re J.E. Cade & Son Ltd. [1992] B.C.L.C. 213 , 227: "The court … has a very wide discretion, but it does not sit under a palm tree"
Although fairness is a notion which can be applied to all kinds of activities its content will depend upon the context in which it is being used. Conduct which is perfectly fair between competing businessmen may not be fair between members of a family. In some sports it may require, at best, observance of the rules, in others ("it's not cricket") it may be unfair in some circumstances to take advantage of them. All is said to be fair in love and war. So the context and background are very important.
In the case of section 459, the background has the following two features. First, a company is an association of persons for an economic purpose, usually entered into with legal advice and some degree of formality. The terms of the association are contained in the articles of association and sometimes in collateral agreements between the shareholders. Thus the manner in which the affairs of the company may be conducted is closely regulated by rules to which the shareholders have agreed. Secondly, company law has developed seamlessly from the law of partnership, which was treated by equity, like the Roman societas, as a contract of good faith. One of the traditional roles of equity, as a separate jurisdiction, was to restrain the exercise of strict legal rights in certain relationships in which it considered that this would be contrary to good faith. These principles have, with appropriate modification, been carries over into company law.
The first of these two features leads to the conclusion that a member of a company will not ordinarily be entitled to complain of unfairness unless there has been some breach of the terms on which he agreed that the affairs of the company should be conducted. But the second leads to the conclusion that there will be cases in which equitable considerations make it unfair for those conducting the affairs of the company to rely upon their strict legal powers. Thus unfairness may consist in a breach of the rules or in using the rules in a manner which equity would regard as contrary to good faith.
I agree with Jonathan Parker J. when he said in In re Astec (B.S.R.) Plc. [1998] 2 B.C.L.C. 556 , 588:
"in order to give rise to an equitable constraint based on 'legitimate expectation' what is required is a personal relationship or personal dealings of some kind between the party seeking to exercise the legal right and the party seeking to restrain such exercise, such as will affect the conscience of the former."
This is putting the matter in very traditional language, reflecting in the word "conscience" the ecclesiastical origins of the long-departed Court of Chancery. As I have said, I have no difficulty with this formulation. But I think that one useful cross-check in a case like this is to ask whether the exercise of the power in question would be contrary to what the parties, by words or conduct, have actually agreed. Would it conflict with the promises which they appear to have exchanged? In Blisset v. Daniel the limits were found in the "general meaning" of the partnership articles themselves. In a quasi-partnership company, they will usually be found in the understandings between the members at the time they entered into association. But there may be later promises, by words or conduct, which it would be unfair to allow a member to ignore. Nor is it necessary that such promises should be independently enforceable as a matter of contract. A promise may be binding as a matter of justice and equity although for one reason or another (for example, because in favour of a third party) it would not be enforceable in law.
The Petitioner
The Respondents
70.1 "The Petitioner's role would be limited to finding investment capital for the Company but… he would have no management responsibilities".
70.2 "In return for making the investment in the Company, the Petitioner would be entitled to receive 60% of the net profits after tax from each outlet opened with the use of such investment capital".
70.3 "The entitlement to such profit share would be contingent upon the Company having a minimum of 100 new outlets".
70.4 "In order to allow the Petitioner to represent the Company for the purposes of raising investment capital, he would be allocated shares in the Company and be appointed a statutory director of the Company".
94.1 The First to Third Respondents would be shareholders in the Fourth, which would be the operational controller of the Company, with the First Respondent as managing director.
94.2 The Petitioner would have no management responsibility.
94.3 The Petitioner's position as shareholder and director was to assist him in raising investment capital for the Company.
94.4 "It was reiterated that any entitlement to profits in accordance with the [June Agreement] was contingent upon the Company having a minimum of 100 new outlets opened using the funds provided by the Petitioner".
94.5 The First Respondent had sole authority to appoint and remove directors, and issue and allocate shares, in the Company and the Fourth Respondent.
"1. Only [the First Respondent] has full director power in the company and has the right to represent the company to make decisions.
2. [The Petitioner] own 60% of the company's profits which generated by the fund that [he] invest into the company, or from another investors brought into the company by [him] ('Mr Shichuang Xie's profits').
3. Only [the First Respondent] has the right to issue shares in the company at any time as long as it does not violate 'Mr Shichuang Xie's profits'.
4. Only [the First Respondent] has the right to point or dismiss directors in the company.
5. Any one director or officer of the Company is authorised to sign all documents and perform such acts as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to the above resolution".
102.1 It does not purport to affect the Petitioner's rights as shareholder.
102.2 It contains no 100-outlet condition, in any form.
102.3 It links the 60% return to shareholding.
102.4 If shares are issued, it does not purport to override pre-emption rights.
102.5 It contemplates the Petitioner retaining certain directorial powers, albeit limited.