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England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions >> K Line PTE Ltd v Priminds Shipping (HK) Co, Ltd (Rev 1) [2020] EWHC 2373 (Comm) (07 September 2020) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2020/2373.html Cite as: [2020] EWHC 2373 (Comm), [2021] 2 All ER (Comm) 719, [2020] 2 Lloyd's Rep 419, [2020] WLR(D) 516, [2021] Bus LR 213 |
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BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London EC4A 1NL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
K LINE PTE LTD. |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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PRIMINDS SHIPPING (HK) CO., LTD. |
Defendant |
____________________
Alexander Wright (instructed by Penningtons Manches Cooper LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing date: 9 July 2020
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Andrew Baker :
Introduction
The Facts
"Demurrage at loading and/or discharging ports, if incurred, to bepaid at the rate ofdeclared by Owners upon vessel nomination but maximum USD 20,000 per day or pro rata / despatch half demurrage laytime saved at both ends.per day orfor part of a day and shall be paid by Charterers in respect of loading port(s) and by Charterers/Receiversin respect of discharging port(s). Despatch money to be paid by Owners at half the demurrage rate for all laytime saved at loading and/or discharging ports. Any time lost for which Charterers/Receivers are responsible, which is not excepted under this Charter Party, shall count as laytime, until same has been expired, thence time on demurrage."
(i) Eternal Bliss was detained at the discharge port beyond the contractual laytime, due to port congestion and a lack of storage.(ii) Priminds was therefore in breach of its obligation to complete discharge within the permitted laytime.
(Strictly, I observe, the breach would be failure to discharge at the rate specified in clause 18. The amount of laytime permitted under that clause is derived from the discharge rate and the facts, e.g. the weather actually experienced, rather than being expressed in the contract; but that does not affect the legal analysis.)(iii) The condition of the cargo deteriorated as a result of the detention beyond the laytime, and not due to any want of care by K-Line.
(iv) K-Line suffered loss and damage and incurred expense as a result of the detention beyond the laytime, including dealing with and settling the cargo claims brought by the cargo interests and insurers.
(v) The loss, damage and expense suffered by K-Line were:
(a) not caused by any separate breach of charter other than Priminds' obligation to discharge within the contractual laytime;(b) not caused by any event which broke the chain of causation; and(c) reasonably incurred.(vi) The loss, damage and expense suffered by K-Line were consequences of compliance with Priminds' orders to load, carry and discharge the cargo.
(The factual basis for K-Line's case about that in the arbitration, I add for completeness, is that the cargo was shipped with what K-Line will say was a high moisture content for the anticipated voyage length, averaging 12.52%; but it is not said that moisture content involved or resulted from any breach of contract by Priminds.)
The Question of Law
"Where a voyage chartered vessel has been detained at a discharge port beyond the laytime, and such delay has caused deterioration of the cargo and led to the vessel's owners suffering loss and damage and being put to expense (including in the form of liabilities to third parties), are the owners in principle entitled to recover from the charterers, in addition to any amounts payable as demurrage, such loss/damage/expense by way of:
(a) damages for the charterers' breach of contract in not completing discharge within permitted laytime; and/or
(b) an indemnity in respect of the consequences of complying with the charterers' orders to load, carry and discharge the cargo?"
"If the facts were as presently assumed [paragraph 17 above] in respect of the voyage charter of m.v. 'Eternal Bliss' in relation to the June 2015 laycan under the contract of affreightment between the parties dated 20 July 2014, is the charterer liable to compensate or indemnify the owner in respect of the loss, damage and expense referred to therein by way of:
(a) damages for the charterer's breach of contract in not completing discharge within permitted laytime;
(b) an indemnity in respect of the consequences of complying with the charterer's orders to load, carry and discharge the cargo?"
Discussion
Introduction
(i) The Gencon form, with its 'Part I / Part II' structure, Part I for details of the instant voyage, Part II the standard terms, calls for a demurrage rate and manner of payment to be inserted in Part I in a Box cross-referenced to clause 7 of Part II:(a) For Gencon 1976, Box 18 in Part I is for "Demurrage rate (loading and discharging) (Cl.7)"; and clause 7 provides, "Ten running days on demurrage at the rate stated in Box 18 per day or pro rata for any part of a day, payable day by day, to be allowed Merchants altogether at ports of loading and discharging";(b) For Gencon 1994, Box 20 in Part I is for "Demurrage rate and manner payable (loading and discharging) (Cl.7)"; clause 7 provides, "Demurrage at the loading and discharging port is payable by the Charterers at the rate stated in Box 20 in the manner stated in Box 20 per day or pro rata for any part of the day. Demurrage shall fall due day by day and shall be payable upon receipt of the Owners' invoice"; and clause 7 includes a right in the owner to terminate if there is a default in payment of demurrage unrectified for 96 hours following notice.(ii) The Asbatankvoy form, likewise adopting a 'Part I / Part II' structure, calls for "Demurrage per day" to be inserted in section I of Part I; and clause 8 of Part II provides, "Charterer shall pay demurrage per running hour and pro rata for a part thereof at the rate specified in Part I for all time that loading and discharging and used laytime as elsewhere herein provided exceeds the allowed laytime elsewhere herein specified." Clause 8 also contains partial and total demurrage exceptions, providing for demurrage to be at half-rate to the extent incurred by reason of various specified causes, e.g. fire, explosion or storm, and exempting the charterer from demurrage liability in respect of delay caused by various other specified causes, e.g. crew strike. The BPVOY4 Form adopts a similar approach and Part II language. The Exxonvoy 90 Form is similar: a demurrage rate, or basis for calculating it, to be inserted in Part I (section (J)); a provision in clause 8 of Part II that, "The rate for demurrage shall be" as specified or derived from Part I(J); then clause 13(c) in Part II "Charterer shall pay demurrage per running day and pro rata for a part thereof for all time by which the allowed laytime specified in Part I(I) is exceeded by the time taken for loading and discharging and for all other Charterer's purposes and which, under this Charter, counts as laytime or time on demurrage" with detailed laytime/demurrage calculation provisions, including some half-demurrage provisions and complete exclusions, in clause 14.
Reidar v Arcos
Can Owners Recover Beyond Demurrage? |
Claim other than for `detention of the vessel'? | ||
Yes |
No | ||
Separate Breach? |
Yes |
Recovery Possible (Reidar v Arcos - even if extra breach caused by failure to complete within laytime) |
Recovery Not Possible (Inverkip SS v Bunge; |
No |
? (The principal question arising in this case) |
Recovery Not Possible (Obviously; Inverkip SS v Bunge, a fortiori; Suisse Atlantique)
|
Type of Loss
Initial Analysis
(i) A range of factors supports the notion that a demurrage rate provides a pre-estimate of the (negative) value to the owner of the loss of use of the ship as a freight-earning instrument, such that "No reasonable person entering into a voyage charter would envisage that compensation for cargo claim liabilities would be addressed by a mere day rate for demurrage". Priminds' case, it was said, "defies common sense by providing windfall protection for losses which are entirely separate from any loss of use". Thus:
(a) A daily demurrage rate is given, to accrue day by day (and pro rata for part of a day), to reflect the fact that a cargo ship is an income-generating chattel, kept out of the market if the loading or discharging operation takes longer than has been promised so as to be taken to have been factored into the freight.
(b) It is obvious and well understood that the daily rate is a proxy for the loss of net daily revenue caused to the ship by the extra time taken to load or discharge. That is why it may be taken as prima facie evidence of the daily loss of revenue if there is a claim by the owner for damages for delay falling outside the laytime/demurrage calculation, e.g. for a breach of charter that prevents the ship from becoming an arrived ship so as to trigger the commencement of laytime. Noting and relying on the fact that the demurrage rate is in this way a proxy for the daily loss of revenue is not to beg the question, but does suggest that something more is needed than the existence of an agreed daily demurrage rate for a conclusion that demurrage excludes any remedy for loss beyond loss of earnings.
(c) Whether or not despatch is provided for (as it happens, it was in this case), commercially speaking despatch is the opposite of demurrage, even if in law they are different in nature because demurrage is classified as liquidated damages and despatch is not. The fact that the law classifies demurrage as damages does not detract from the fact that it is functionally an increase in the charterer's cost of freight for the voyage in question, just as despatch reduces that cost and is indeed by nature a rebate on the freight, as it is put in Schofield, "Laytime and Demurrage", 6th Ed. (2016) at 7.2, citing Compania de Navigacion Zita SA v Louis Dreyfus & Cie [1953] 2 Lloyd's Rep 472 at 475 (see paragraph 62(i) below).
(ii) To find for Priminds is to conclude that a typical demurrage clause is a partial exclusion or limitation clause, contrary to strong dicta in the House of Lords in Suisse Atlantique and though there is no language of that kind in the contract.
(iii) There is an asymmetry or clash of logic between the proposition that proving a breach other than the failure to load or discharge within the laydays does not result in recovery beyond demurrage for the detention of the ship after the expiry of the laytime (the Inverkip rule), and the proposition that proving loss beyond and different in kind from the detention of the ship does not result in recovery in the absence of a separate breach. Those should not both be good law, Mr Bird argued, because the essential and only reason for the first is that the number or nature of any breaches is for these purposes immaterial. That is to say, the reason for the Inverkip rule is, and so the existence of that rule shows, that demurrage is by nature liquidated damages for the detention of the ship after the expiry of the laytime; and that establishes the correctness of Bankes LJ's approach in Reidar v Arcos, for all he did was give that premise its logical consequence.
(iv) The Bonde aside, the consistent focus in judgments contemplating the recoverability of damages on top of demurrage for loss suffered by an owner where the ship has been detained beyond the laydays has been the nature of the loss, and its counterpart the particular nature of the loss intended to be quantified by the demurrage rate, rather than the question of separate breach.
(i) It is well settled that a demurrage clause is by nature a liquidated damages provision. It should be given the effect ordinarily given to such clauses, that is to say it should be treated as fixing (and limiting) the damages recoverable for the breach it covers.
(ii) The Inverkip rule neither says nor implies more than that demurrage additionally also liquidates the damages, so as to limit owners to the demurrage rate, where a separate breach results only in detention of the vessel at the loading port or discharge port beyond the expiry of the laydays.
(iii) The fixing of an agreed basis for assessing damages for all the consequences of the charterer's failure to load or discharge within the laydays promotes certainty. That is mutually beneficial; for example per Lord Upjohn in Suisse Atlantique at 420G, "An agreed damages clause is for the benefit of both; the party establishing breach by the other party need prove no damage in fact; the other must pay that, no less but no more ." This was expanded to a submission that K-Line's approach created uncertainty as to whether or not a particular loss fell within or outwith the scope of the demurrage provision, compounding the uncertainty created by the need to prove and quantify loss and the related potential for disputes over causation, remoteness, mitigation and the like.
(iv) K-Line's case did not work, or worked less well, with well-known elements of many demurrage regimes, even if they are not found in the Norgrain form, namely demurrage exceptions (full or partial, e.g. the Asbatankvoy half-demurrage regime) and demurrage time bars (usually calling for demurrage claims to be made, readily documented, within a relatively short period after completion of operations).
(i) His first and most general argument (paragraph 56(i) above) begs the question, as I noted at paragraphs 23 to 25 above.(ii) The reason given in Inverkip for the rule it established that owners are limited to the demurrage rate where, however many different breaches occur, the only result is a loss of time to the ship after the expiry of the laydays, is that demurrage is compensation for that loss of time. That is why, as Mr Bird submitted, K-Line's argument in the present case is harmonious with the Inverkip rule and Priminds' is not, or less so.
(iii) There is a sense in which giving demurrage provisions the wider embrace Priminds gives them promotes certainty to a greater extent than if K-Line is correct. But the sense in which that is true is only the sense in which it can be said that a clearly worded exclusion clause promotes certainty by making clear that a claim cannot be made. There is no language of that kind in the demurrage clause here (or typically), and, as Mr Bird noted, the approach of the House of Lords in Suisse Atlantique was that demurrage provisions are not exclusion clauses. There is nothing in the expansion of Mr Wright's certainty argument, since come what may the Inverkip rule and Reidar v Arcos mean that parties to voyage charters have to grapple with the question of whether or not a different type of loss has been suffered, or only loss compensated for by the demurrage rate, alongside questions of proof of loss, causation, remoteness, mitigation and so on, if the owner is able to allege that there has been a separate breach.
(iv) The other features of many demurrage regimes relied on by Mr Wright, for example demurrage exceptions and demurrage time bars, do not stand in the way of K-Line's argument at all. They do not clash with a view that the demurrage rate has no impact on a claim such as K-Line makes in this case, for loss that is different in kind from the 'time is money' measure of delaying the ship's being free for new employment. If such a claim is viable, as K-Line submits, it is by definition not a demurrage claim so as to be affected by a time bar provision for making demurrage claims or by the impact upon the calculation of the demurrage of charter exceptions, if there are any, that are clear enough to overcome the well-known rubric 'once on demurrage, always on demurrage'. If such a claim is not viable, as Priminds submits, that must be for other reasons, not because a demurrage claim might be affected by such provisions.
"They are contracts for the carriage of goods in consideration for the payment of freight. The freight covers the passage between the loading and discharging ports and an agreed conventional period of time for loading and discharging the cargo (the "laytime"). I say "conventional" because although this period may have some relation to the time which the parties expect to be spent in loading and discharging, no one would be more surprised than they if this estimate proved completely correct in the event. Almost all charter-parties go on to make provision for adjustment in the payment due from or to the charterers according to whether the processes of loading and discharging take more or less than the laytime. All the overhead and a large proportion of the running costs of a ship are incurred even if the ship is in port. Accordingly the shipowner faces serious losses if the processes take longer than he had bargained for and the earning of freight on the ship's next engagement is postponed. By way of agreed compensation for these losses, the charterer usually contracts to make further payments, called demurrage, at a daily rate in respect of detention beyond the laytime. If the processes of loading and discharging take less than the conventional period, the shipowner, in theory at least, reaps the advantage of being able to proceed earlier upon the ship's next freight earning engagement. In recognition of this advantage provision is usually made for the payment by the owners of a rebate of freight at a daily rate for all time saved. This rebate is known as "dispatch money", "dispatch rebate" or, more simply, "dispatch". "
The Dicta
(i) in Compania de Navigacion Zita, S.A. v Louis Dreyfus et Cie [1953] 2 Lloyd's Rep 472, in which the decision concerned the precise method for calculating the laytime allowed from a requirement to load "at an average rate of 150 metric tons per available workable hatch per weather working day (Sundays and Holidays excepted) provided vessel can receive at this rate", Devlin J, as he was then, noted at 475 rhc that "The shipowner's desire is to achieve a quick turn-around; time is money for him. The object of fixing lay days and providing for demurrage and dispatch money is to penalize dilatoriness and rewards promptitude", at 476 rhc that the object of the loading rate provision was "to penalize the charterers for wasting time and reward them for saving it" and at 477 lhc that it did not lay down a method of loading but set a standard, "drawing a notional line above which there will be a bonus and below a penalty"; and(ii) in The Nikmary [2003] 1 Lloyd's Rep 151, which mostly concerned the laytime/demurrage calculation in the case but also whether the cost of diesel consumed while the ship was on demurrage could be claimed in addition to the demurrage due on that calculation, Moore-Bick J, as he was then, noted at [47] that "demurrage, being liquidated damages for detention, notionally reflects the full cost to the owner of keeping his ship in port. As such it is deemed to cover all normal running expenses, including the cost of diesel oil required to run the ship's equipment." (There was an appeal to the Court of Appeal that did not touch that point, see [2004] 1 Lloyd's Rep 55.)
(i) per Greer J, 25 Ll L Rep at 33 rhc, the agreed demurrage rate "merely provides for damages due to the detention of the ship so much per day for the detention of the ship";
(ii) per Atkin LJ, [1927] 1 KB at 363, "The provisions as to demurrage quantify the damages, not for the complete breach, but only such damages as arise from the detention of the vessel", so that "If the charterer becomes unable to do that which he contracted to do namely, put a full and complete cargo on board during the fixed lay days, the shipowner may recover the loss that he has incurred in addition to his liquidated demurrage or his unliquidated damages for detention";
(iii) per Sargant LJ, at 366, expressing this as agreement with Greer J, the demurrage provision "merely assesses damages at 25l. a day for any detention of the ship due to a failure of the charterers to load at the prescribed rate", whereas "The loss inflicted on the owners and claimed by them is loss of another character namely, loss of freight caused by the breach by the charterers of their contract to load a full and complete cargo ".
(i) the loss suffered by the owner was to his mind "indistinguishable in principle from that suffered by a shipowner under a single voyage charter when his ship is detained beyond her lay days";(ii) the distinguishing feature in Reidar v Arcos was that the delay in loading affected the quantity of cargo that could be carried on the very voyage in which the delay arose, a loss for which the demurrage rate could not compensate as distinct from compensating, as it did, for the ship's loss of time;
(iii) the absence of such a loss meant the owner could not say that its claim "either in substance or in form, [was] one other than for damages for detention" so as to bring itself within the minority ratio in Reidar v Arcos, per Bankes LJ, accordingly "the general principle agreed by all members of the Court of Appeal must apply, namely that, for a claim for detention by a shipowner due to the laytime provisions in a charter being exceeded, the demurrage provisions quantify the damages recoverable".
"If laytime ends before the charterer has completed the discharging operation he breaks his contract. The breach is a continuing one; it goes on until discharge is completed and the ship is once more available to the shipowner to use for other voyages. But unless the delay is so prolonged as to amount to a frustration of the adventure, the breach by the charterer sounds in damages only. The charterer remains entitled to continue to complete the discharge of the cargo, while remaining liable in damages for the loss sustained by the shipowner during the period for which he is being wrongfully deprived of the opportunity of making profitable use of his ship. It is the almost invariable practice nowadays for these damages to be fixed by the charterparty at a liquidated sum per day and pro rata for part of a day (demurrage) which accrues throughout the period of time for which the breach continues."
That passage was quoted by Lord Brandon in The Lips as one source confirming the nature of demurrage as damages for breach rather than debt, so perhaps indicates that though his own dictum was in more general terms, Lord Brandon likewise understood demurrage to liquidate only the loss of profitable use claim (cf paragraph 26 above).
The Textbooks
"Case.A. chartered his ship to B. to load a full and complete cargo of timber for the United Kingdom. The charter provided for loading in a fixed time and for demurrage at a fixed rate per day thereafter. By default of B. the fixed time for loading was exceeded and demurrage became payable. If the ship had been loaded within the fixed time, the ship could have loaded and earned freight on a summer deck load. In fact, owing to the delay, she sailed with a winter deck load only. Held (1) that on expiration of the fixed lay-days B. was in breach; (2) that A., in addition to demurrage at the fixed rate, was entitled to recover the difference in freight between a summer and a winter deck load as damages for failure to load in the agreed time (m)." (my emphasis footnote (m) simply gave the case citation for Reidar v Arcos).
"Aktieselskabet Reidar v. Arcos, [1927] 1 K.B. 352 : per Bankes, L.J., as damages for failure to load in the agreed time; per Atkin, L.J, as damages for failure to load a full and complete cargo in the agreed time; and per Sargant, L.J, as damages for failure to load a full and complete cargo."
"See Note 2, post. See Navico A.G. v. Vrontados Naftiki Etairia P.E. [1968] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 379 for a discussion of the commercial basis of demurrage. A clause providing for an agreed sum by way of demurrage is not an exceptions clause: Suisse Atlantique ."
I referred above to the description of demurrage by Donaldson J in Navico v Vrontados to which this refers; as I noted, it favours K-Line.
"The provisions as to demurrage quantify the whole of the damages arising from the charterer's breach of contract in delaying the ship beyond the agreed time and the charterer's liability for such damages is limited to the amount of demurrage: cf. Chandris v. Isbrandtsen-Moller, where dangerous cargo was shipped in breach of contract and caused delay in discharge, but no damage to the ship. As the shipowner had not treated the charterer's conduct as repudiation, he was limited as regards delay in discharge to the demurrage figure. Similarly in Suisse Atlantique , where the charterer under a consecutive voyage charter deliberately delayed the ship beyond the agreed lay-days on a number of the voyages, thereby reducing the number of voyages which could be performed under the charter, the shipowner's claim for lost freight was limited to the amount of demurrage.
However, the delay may give rise to breaches of further obligations, e.g. to load a full and complete cargo, for which damages are recoverable, as in Aktieselskabet Reidar v. Arcos, the facts of which are given below.";
and that is how the Reidar v Arcos Case Note was now introduced.
The Bonde
(i) The defence was that the deadfreight clause was a liquidated damages clause. That did not seem right to Webster J, but he proceeded on an assumption in the charterer's favour that the deadfreight clause was to be treated as a liquidated damages clause like a demurrage clause.(ii) On that basis, the owner's argument was that the deadfreight clause "define[d] the damages payable for the loss of freight arising out of the breach, and not for any other consequence, in particular loss of demurrage because of the difference in rates." Webster J saw that as indistinguishable from the argument that a demurrage clause defines only the damages payable for the loss of freight caused by detaining the ship beyond the laydays.
(iii) There was in the instant case (see at 433 rhc) "undoubtedly only one breach", so that for Webster J the issue had become whether, "in a case of this kind, damages are only recoverable if a breach has occurred other than that which entitles the shipowner to the benefit of the liquidated damages clause". On Webster J's terms, he was correct, with respect, to say that there was only one (relevant) breach, although in the case as a whole there was both (a) a breach of the minimum load obligation and also (b) a breach of the obligation to load that which was in fact loaded within the laytime allowed. The latter did not cause the reduction in the demurrage rate; that resulted solely from the self-same breach, the short-shipment, that triggered the deadfreight clause that Webster J had chosen to assume was a liquidated damages provision to which he should give the same answer as he would give for a demurrage clause to the question whether a separate breach was necessary for damages to be recovered for a different type of loss.
(iv) In Reidar v Arcos, Atkin LJ decided the case on the basis that "the charterers had committed one breach failure to load a full cargo within the laydays", giving the owner "two distinct claims, one for detention of the vessel and one for loss of freight" (see at 435 rhc).
(v) That meant (ibid) that the ratio of Reidar v Arcos, binding Webster J, was that "where a charterer commits any breach, even if it is only one breach, of his obligation either to provide the minimum contractual load or to detain the vessel for no longer than the stipulated period, the owner is entitled not only to the liquidated damages directly recoverable for the breach of the obligation to load (deadfreight) or for the breach of the obligation with regard to detention (demurrage), but also , in the first case, to damages flowing indirectly or consequentially from any detention of the vessel (if it occurs) and, in the second case, to damages flowing indirectly or consequentially from any failure to load a complete cargo if there is such a failure."
(vi) Therefore, "the defendants' defence to the plaintiffs' claim for damages fails, either because the deadfreight clause is not a liquidated damages clause at all, or because, if it is such a clause, the point raised by their defence has been decided adversely to them by the Court of Appeal in Reidar v Arcos."
(i) The Altus was correctly decided, that is to say the claim for damages for the wrongfully reduced demurrage rate rightly succeeded, but on the simple basis that, whatever be the correct answer to the point about demurrage now before me, on no view did the deadfreight clause in that case have effect to preclude that claim.(ii) Webster J, with respect, was wrong to conclude that Reidar v Arcos decided (so as to bind him to decide) that unliquidated damages may be recovered, in addition to any demurrage payable under the charter, as damages for a voyage charterer's failure to load or discharge within the laydays where it causes loss to the owner additional to and different in kind from the loss of the use of the ship as a freight-earning vessel.
(i) As regards Reidar v Arcos, Potter J concluded, and I agree, that Atkin LJ, and therefore the majority, decided that there had been an additional and different breach, viz. a breach of the full load obligation, not only a breach of the loading rate obligation, and dismissed the appeal upon that premise. That was Potter J's own reading of Atkin LJ's judgment, fortified by the fact that it was also how that judgment had been understood by the Court of Appeal in Suisse Atlantique. He did not regard Devlin J in Chandris, reading the judgment in that case as a whole, as supporting the view that Atkin LJ was a 'one breach' man.(ii) However, as may now be repetitive, that does not mean, and Reidar v Arcos did not decide, that an additional and different breach was in law required before damages for a separate and different head of loss may be recovered.
(iii) Next, and critically, Potter J read Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Hodson and Lord Upjohn in Suisse Atlantique as saying that the effect of the majority judgments in Reidar v Arcos was "that it was necessary for a party to establish a breach of the charter-party other than by the detention of the vessel if damages are to be obtainable over and above the demurrage payments". As will be apparent from my discussion of Suisse Atlantique, with respect I disagree. To my mind, that is a plain misreading of the speeches in the House of Lords in Suisse Atlantique, and I agree with Mr Bird that it is explicable only on the basis of faulty reasoning to the effect that if Atkin LJ found there to have been two breaches, so that Bankes LJ was in a minority on that issue, that means or implies a majority ratio to the effect that if there had been only one breach, as Bankes LJ found, the claim should have failed and the appeal in Reidar v Arcos would have been allowed.
(iv) As regards The Altus, Potter J regarded Webster J's analysis of Reidar v Arcos as unreliable, because it took Atkin LJ as a 'one breach' man, and because, so Potter J concluded, Suisse Atlantique had not been drawn to the attention of Webster J. The latter point, if correct (the report of The Altus does not include a list of cases referred to the court but not mentioned in the judgment), does not take matters beyond the issue whether Bankes LJ was in the majority or in the minority in holding that there was only one breach in Reidar v Arcos, unless Suisse Atlantique is decisive or persuasive against the soundness in law of Bankes LJ's approach for a 'one breach' case. So again one finds that the critical element of Potter J's reasoning is his reading, in my view an incorrect reading, of the speeches in the House of Lords in Suisse Atlantique.
(v) Finally, noting that Evans J had expressed no concluded view in a passage that was obiter, Potter J said that The Adelfa "does not dissuade me from the opinion which I have formed upon analysis of the cases which is that, where a charter-party contains a demurrage clause, then in order to recover damages in addition to demurrage for breach of the charterers' obligation to complete loading within the lay days, it is a requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate that such additional loss is not only different in character from loss of use but stems from breach of an additional and/or independent obligation." However, no prior case decided that such a requirement existed; and apart from Potter J's misreading (as I think it was) of the speeches in the House of Lords in Suisse Atlantique there is no analysis of the prior authorities in The Bonde that could found the opinion that it did. That Potter J expressed himself as he did reinforces, I think with respect, the conclusion that his analysis was premised on the faulty reasoning that if the majority view in Reidar v Arcos was that it was a 'two breach' case, it followed that Bankes LJ's approach was wrong in law for a 'one breach' case.
(vi) The conclusion stated by Potter J also, with respect, misstates what would be the law if his premise were correct that the law requires an additional and different breach. Were that the law, it would have to be on the basis that a demurrage rate liquidates the damages recoverable, whatever the nature of the loss suffered, in respect of a breach of the obligation to load or discharge within the laytime. There would never be, as Potter J's conclusion has it, "damages in addition to demurrage for breach of the charterers' obligation to complete loading within the lay days" (my emphasis); rather, on Potter J's premise, the law would be that damages in addition to demurrage:
(a) may never be awarded for a breach of the obligation to load or discharge within the laytime;(b) may not be awarded for a breach of an obligation other than the obligation to load or discharge within the laytime in respect of the loss of the use of the ship due to detention after the commencement of laytime.
"In the context of my decisions on the terms of the contract, there is no basis on which [the buyer] can claim general damages for delay. The counter claim must be limited to demurrage (which is conceded). In The Bonde , Potter J held that, in order to advance such a claim for general damages for delay in an FOB contract, there had to be a breach additional to or separate from that of failing to load within the lay days and/or at an agreed rate of loading, so as to establish a separate right not circumscribed by the right to demurrage. Mr Bright [for the buyer] submitted that the demurrage clause in this agreement was unusual or to be construed as addressing only the case where [ship]owners did claim demurrage from [the buyer] and nothing more. I do not agree. The clause is, as it says it is, a "demurrage" clause, and uses the word in its ordinary sense. [The buyer], no doubt, regrets its limitations but that is no reason to give it a meaning it does not have."
Implied Indemnity
Conclusion
(i) It is possible, and appropriate as a matter of discretion, to answer part (a) of the question of law put to the court by the parties jointly pursuant to s.45 of the 1996 Act, concerning the demurrage clause; and it is to be answered in the affirmative. In that regard, it is my particular conclusion that The Bonde was wrongly decided, and that it is both open to me and right in the circumstances to depart from it, and so I have not followed it.(ii) I have not identified how part (b) of the question put to the court, on implied indemnity, will not be academic, and I prefer to leave that, and the question itself, to be considered within the arbitration, if K-Line pursues the implied indemnity claim although it has succeeded as to the scope of the demurrage clause.
(iii) The question of law as put to the court will therefore be answered: (a) Yes; (b) Not Answered.
(iv) For completeness, were I wrong about the demurrage clause, it would have been possible and appropriate to answer both parts of the question of law as put, and I would have answered: (a) No; (b) No.