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England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions >> A & B, Re (Children: Return Order: UAE) [2022] EWHC 2120 (Fam) (29 July 2022) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2022/2120.html Cite as: [2022] EWHC 2120 (Fam) |
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FAMILY DIVISION
Re: A and B (Children: Return Order: UAE)
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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C |
Applicant |
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- and - |
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D |
Respondent |
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Mark Jarman (instructed by JMW Solicitors) for the Respondent
Hearing dates: 28th to 29th July 2022
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Poole :
The Situation in E Before October 2021
"C would take the children to his parents' house on a few Friday afternoons until Saturday afternoons. Fridays are family days but there was no chance for me to spend lunch with them as C simply would not have it .
School holidays were chaos, as the children would spend only a few unscheduled days with their father. There was no schedule nor prior notification, he would just expect me to drop and collect the children at his convenience not mine or theirs."
The mother also complains about the way the father expected the children to telephone him and was not active or reliable in relation to such indirect contact. The children attended a fee-paying, English school where reports show that they were both excelling and achieving high grades. The father paid the school fees. There appears to have been no court involvement in the family arrangements and no professional interventions or assistance. There is no evidence that the children showed any signs of distress or behavioural issues during the period of separation prior to October 2021. Indeed their school reports suggest that they were well-adjusted children who fitted in well. The father has exhibited text exchanges with A which are funny and affectionate, and cordial exchanges with the mother, most of these being after the separation.
Allegations of Domestic Abuse
Arrival and stay in England
When I made plans in October 2021 to travel to England with the children to obtain my BPR, I had not planned to stay. Almost immediately, however I felt an enormous sense of relief and independence; the children and I left behind the toxic world that we had accepted as normal. No one shouted at us, we had independence
The life we had led in E was emotionally damaging for us all and I had pretty much given up on any real quality of life. With my arrival in England, everything changed. I felt the ability to be free and independent for the first time since our marriage and cannot contemplate being compelled to return to E.
Ms Hamade's Evidence
i) In the event of separation the mother has custody (or custodianship) of a child, the father is their guardian. Under sharia law the principle is that when a boy reaches the age of 11, the mother's custodianship terminates. The same happens when a girl reaches the age of 13. A father might waive his rights. However, if there is a dispute between the parents then a judge can determine whether the principles apply or not. In doing so the judge will have a discretion and will have regard to the best interest of the child. However, if the mother has re-married, Ms Hamade advised that whilst the children can remain with the mother if this was decided by the courts in E to be in their best interests, the mother would be "at serious risk of the children being taken away" when they reached the said ages.
ii) When considering the best interests of children the courts in E do not take into account the wishes and feelings of the children concerned. There is no concept equivalent to "hearing the voice of the child".
iii) A woman would not be able to establish allegations of domestic abuse unless there had been police involvement, abuse had been witnessed by reliable witnesses, there was clear medical evidence, or the court could see injuries for itself. Photographs or other evidence will not be relied upon to establish such allegations. Hence, in the present case the mother's allegations of past abuse will not be established in the courts in E.
iv) Allegations of abuse against children would be referred to the criminal justice system in E and would not be dealt with in the civil system.
v) The mother would have no chance at all of securing permission from the court to relocate with the children abroad if the father did not agree and he was living in the E. This would "never ever" happen.
vi) Visitation rights can be exercised in a way that safeguards children for example at contact centres or in public places.
vii) A settlement agreement could be reached by the parties which can then be entered as a judgment in the courts in E. It is binding and cannot be amended for one year. However, if there is a change of circumstances then a party can apply for an amendment even before the elapse of a year. Ms Hamade's experience is that these settlement agreements are honoured. Their terms can include custody, guardianship and visitation rights. The parties could agree that the mother shall have custody of the children with defined contact with the father. Settlement agreements can include pledges or undertakings including that the father will not instigate criminal proceedings against the mother. However there are no sanctions for breaching an undertaking although Ms Hamade's evidence was that a financial imbursement can be requested amounting to large amounts of money. Ms Hamade advised that rather than including within a settlement agreement a promise to withdraw the existing claim for custody in E which the father has made, she would advise any clients that it should be made a condition of return that the father has withdrawn his custody claim.
viii) Upon returning the children there would be no risk that the mother would face criminal charges or sanction so long as she is the custodian of the children. Therefore, if the father's application for custody were continuing upon return or determined in his favour prior to return there would be a risk that the mother could be arrested and the children removed from her care upon return to E. The father could withdraw his application at any time.
Ms Baker's Opinion
"I would be concerned that an accelerated emotional loss of meaning is likely to occur with regards to their relationship with their father. Additionally, they will continue to experience a significant disruption of their ties with people who are important to them, and a corresponding degree of stress is likely to occur.
It is difficult to be clear about the origin of A's views, who has now totally rejected her father. I highly doubt that the children remaining in England will bridge the huge emotional and psychological gulf that now exists and is increasing for her. Despite the strength of her current views and feelings about him, she is clearly too young to appreciate that if the correct steps are not taken to repair their relationship, this is likely to negatively impact her future developmental wellbeing. Consequently, time is of the essence for both children and arguably more so for A."
She noted that the children had suffered disruption in what had previously appeared to be stable home lives and education. They were out of the education system for a few months. Their family and social networks in England were very limited. Since coming to England the children had had very little contact with the father and their feelings towards him had clearly become hostile, particular in the case of A.
The Legal Framework
"[34] It is clear law that the court in this jurisdiction will determine an application for a summary return of a child to a non-Hague Convention country by reference to the child's best interests. My attention has been drawn to what Lord Wilson (in Re NY at [30]) and Baroness Hale (in Re J at [26]) both described as the "classic" observations, the "locus classicus", of Buckley LJ in his judgment in Re L (Minors) (Wardship: Jurisdiction) [1974] 1 WLR 250, (obviously a pre-1980 Hague Convention decision but with evidently enduring relevance and standing). He said this:
p.264F: "To take a child from his native land, to remove him to another country where, maybe, his native tongue is not spoken, to divorce him from the social customs and contacts to which he has been accustomed, to interrupt his education in his native land and subject him to a foreign system of education, are all acts (offered here as examples and of course not as a complete catalogue of possible relevant factors) which are likely to be psychologically disturbing to the child, particularly at a time when his family life is also disrupted. If such a case is promptly brought to the attention of a court in this country, the judge may feel that it is in the best interests of the infant that these disturbing factors should be eliminated from his life as speedily as possible. A full investigation of the merits of the case in an English court may be incompatible with achieving this. The judge may well be persuaded that it would be better for the child that those merits should be investigated in a court in his native country than that he should spend in this country the period which must necessarily elapse before all the evidence can be assembled for adjudication here. Anyone who has had experience of the exercise of this delicate jurisdiction knows what complications can result from a child developing roots in new soil, and what conflicts this can occasion in the child's own life. Such roots can grow rapidly. An order that the child should be returned forthwith to the country from which he has been removed in the expectation that any dispute about his custody will be satisfactorily resolved in the courts of that country may well be regarded as being in the best interests of the child."
p.265A-B: " judges have more than once reprobated the acts of "kidnappers" in cases of this kind. I do not in any way dissent from those strictures, but it would, in my judgment, be wrong to suppose that in making orders in relation to children in this jurisdiction the court is in any way concerned with penalising any adult for his conduct. That conduct may well be a consideration to be taken into account, but, whether the court makes a summary order or an order after investigating the merits, the cardinal rule applies that the welfare of the infant must always be the paramount consideration."
[37] I was then taken to the current definitive statement of the law pronounced by the House of Lords in Re J (A Child) (Child Returned Abroad: Convention Rights) [2005] UKHL 40. I have extracted from the speech of Baroness Hale the following 11 key quotes which I have borne firmly in mind in reaching my conclusions:
i) " any court which is determining any question with respect to the upbringing of a child has had a statutory duty to regard the welfare of the child as its paramount consideration" [18];
ii) "There is no warrant, either in statute or authority, for the principles of The Hague Convention to be extended to countries which are not parties to it" [22];
iii) " in all non-Convention cases, the courts have consistently held that they must act in accordance with the welfare of the individual child. If they do decide to return the child, that is because it is in his best interests to do so, not because the welfare principle has been superseded by some other consideration." [25];
iv) " the court does have power, in accordance with the welfare principle, to order the immediate return of a child to a foreign jurisdiction without conducting a full investigation of the merits. In a series of cases during the 1960s, these came to be known as 'kidnapping' cases." [26];
v) "Summary return should not be the automatic reaction to any and every unauthorised taking or keeping a child from his home country. On the other hand, summary return may very well be in the best interests of the individual child" [28];
vi) " focus has to be on the individual child in the particular circumstances of the case" [29];
vii) " the judge may find it convenient to start from the proposition that it is likely to be better for a child to return to his home country for any disputes about his future to be decided there. A case against his doing so has to be made. But the weight to be given to that proposition will vary enormously from case to case. What may be best for him in the long run may be different from what will be best for him in the short run. It should not be assumed, in this or any other case, that allowing a child to remain here while his future is decided here inevitably means that he will remain here for ever" [32];
viii) "One important variable is the degree of connection of the child with each country. This is not to apply what has become the technical concept of habitual residence, but to ask in a common sense way with which country the child has the closer connection. What is his 'home' country? Factors such as his nationality, where he has lived for most of his life, his first language, his race or ethnicity, his religion, his culture, and his education so far will all come into this" [33];
ix) "Another closely related factor will be the length of time he has spent in each country. Uprooting a child from one environment and bringing him to a completely unfamiliar one, especially if this has been done clandestinely, may well not be in his best interests" [34];
x) "In a case where the choice lies between deciding the question here or deciding it in a foreign country, differences between the legal systems cannot be irrelevant. But their relevance will depend upon the facts of the individual case. If there is a genuine issue between the parents as to whether it is in the best interests of the child to live in this country or elsewhere, it must be relevant whether that issue is capable of being tried in the courts of the country to which he is to be returned" [39];
xi) "The effect of the decision upon the child's primary carer must also be relevant, although again not decisive." [40]
Baroness Hale summarised her views
"These considerations should not stand in the way of a swift and unsentimental decision to return the child to his home country, even if that home country is very different from our own. But they may result in a decision that immediate return would not be appropriate, because the child's interests will be better served by allowing the dispute to be fought and decided here." [41]
[38] I was then taken to Re NY (A Child) [2019] UKSC 49, a case in which the Supreme Court set aside an order made by the Court of Appeal under the court's inherent jurisdiction in what are accepted to be very different circumstances to those obtaining here. Mr Khan argued that I should give (as the judgment suggests) "some consideration" ([55]) to the eight linked questions posed by Lord Wilson in that case:
i) The court needs to consider whether the evidence before it is sufficiently up to date to enable it then to make the summary order ([56]);
ii) The court ought to consider the evidence and decide what if any findings it should make in order for the court to justify the summary order (esp. in relation to the child's habitual residence) ([57]);
iii) In order sufficiently to identify what the child's welfare required for the purposes of a summary order, an inquiry should be conducted into any or all of the aspects of welfare specified in section 1(3) of the 1989 Act; a decision has to be taken on the individual facts as to how extensive that inquiry should be ([58]);
iv) In a case where domestic abuse is alleged, the court should consider whether in the light of Practice Direction 12J, an inquiry should be conducted into the disputed allegations made by one party of domestic abuse and, if so, how extensive that inquiry should be ([59]);
v) The court should consider whether it would be right to determine the summary return on the basis of welfare without at least rudimentary evidence about basic living arrangements for the child and carer ([60]);
vi) The court should consider whether it would benefit from oral evidence ([61]) and if so to what extent;
vii) The court should consider whether to obtain a Cafcass report ([62]): "and, if so, upon what aspects and to what extent";
viii) The court should consider whether it needs to make a comparison of the respective judicial systems in the competing countries having regard to the speed with which the courts will be able to resolve matters, and whether there is an effective relocation jurisdiction in the other court ([63])."
"If those courts have not choice but to do as the father wishes, so that the mother cannot ask them to decide with an open mind, whether the child will be better off living here or there, then our courts must ask themselves whether it will be in the interests of the child to enable that dispute to be heard. The absence of a relocation jurisdiction must do more than give the judge pause it may be a decisive factor. On the other hand, if it appears that the mother would not be able to make a good case for relocation, that factor might not be decisive. There are also bound to be many cases where the connection of the child and all the family with the other country is so strong that any difference between the legal systems here and there should carry little weight."
Oral Evidence from the Parties
Submissions
Conclusions
i) The children's home country is in E. They were born in England but otherwise have lived their whole lives in E.
ii) The children's connection to E is very strong. Not only have they lived there all their lives, but their four grandparents and most of their wider family on both sides live in E, and they had regular contact with them whilst living there. Indeed, from 2018 the children lived in the same house as their maternal grandparents. The children were fully engaged in the education system in E and were excelling at school.
iii) Following the parental separation in 2018 the family had worked out child arrangements for themselves without court involvement. The arrangements may not have always operated to each parent's satisfaction, but they had reached accommodations with each other.
iv) The evidence suggests that the children were well looked after, healthy, surrounded by family, well-adjusted, and excelling at school when living in E.
v) But for allegations of abuse by the father which have only fully emerged since the mother retained the children in England after October 2021, there would have been no grounds at all for considering that relocation to England would be in the children's best interests.
vi) Although they are British citizens and were born here, the children had no other substantial connection to England before they were retained here in October 2021. They rely on the father and the goodwill of others for their accommodation and financial support. They have started school in England and are doing well in their studies and they have a few members of the extended family living here, but otherwise the evidence tends to show that they and the mother are isolated here. The mother has no independent financial means with which to support the children. The home they live in is provided by the goodwill of the paternal grandparents, the grandfather being, I am told, very unwell. The children's situation in England is precarious.
vii) The allegations that the father has abused the mother in large part concern events before the separation in 2018 and the most recent allegation dates from 2019. Since then, even taking the evidence at its highest, there is no credible evidence of domestic abuse by the father against the mother. To be clear, there is no credible evidence of continuing coercive and controlling behaviour by the father, nor of physical or emotional abuse. The allegations therefore concern past events from well before the children were retained in England. The father's conduct in paying for return flights to England and then visiting in October and November expecting to return with the children but being unable to do so, and discussing schooling arrangements in England when he wanted the children to return to the UAE, is not suggestive of a man who was exercising coercion and control against the mother at that time.
viii) The allegations that the father has abused the children require some scrutiny. There is direct evidence, in the form of messaging, showing the father being petulant with his daughter. The children say that he would physically chastise them and they would become afraid of him. However, B still says that he misses his father. A's messaging with her father before coming to England shows affection between them. In my judgement, both children showed signs of having been subject to direct and/or indirect adult influence and the adult in question is very likely to be the mother. Ms Baker's observation that the origins of A's current hostility are uncertain belies the fact that it appears to have arisen, or at least deepened significantly, since October 2021 when A has been living only with her mother, the mother has been running a case that the father has been abusive, and A has seen very little of her father. There is no evidence that the children suffered injury as a result of chastisement by the father. Whilst they say they were afraid of him they do not appear to have shown any signs of emotional abuse there is no evidence from their school in E, or from any other independent source, to that effect. I have no witness evidence from family members or the mother's friends corroborating the children's allegations that the father abused them.
ix) I do not believe that further detailed investigation of the allegations of abuse by the father will assist the court in making the decision about return. Even assuming the allegations of abuse of the mother are all true, there are no incidents since 2019, and the mother would be in a more supportive environment in E that in England. On the mother's own case, there was not much contact between her and the father. I do not see her allegations as making out a case that the children were being significantly harmed by any ongoing abuse of her by the father after the separation. The extent and impact of the father's abuse of the children is also quite limited when objectively examined. Again, the mother says that they did not have very much contact with the father. Most of what A alleges is that the father is unkind to her and has smacked her by way of chastisement. B says he has been smacked too. They say the father has been nicer to them on calls recently but put that down to him being "fake". However, whilst not condoning physical chastisement, the father's treatment of his children is not so concerning that it would preclude return. If the allegations of abuse of the children are all true, then they do not give rise to a significant concern that return to E would in itself put them at risk of harm in the future. It has not been suggested that contact with the father should cease, indeed the mother complains through counsel that he has not visited England more often. The father will have contact with the children whether they are in England or E. Similarly, the father has accepted at the hearing before me that the children should continue to live with the mother. The allegations of abuse are an important element of this case but they are not so significant as to be determinative. Whilst the father disputes the allegations, I do not believe that making findings about the allegations is necessary.
x) I accept Ms Baker's analysis that the separation of the father from the children is damaging to them and that, as she put it in her oral evidence, reparative work is needed. That work needs to begin within the family and will be much more easily begun if the family are living in the same country.
xi) The children's relationship with the father, and the destabilising of what was a stable family, school and social life in E, has been caused by their retention in England for which the mother had neither the father's consent nor any permission from the courts in the children's home country. This the retention of the children has had consequences. The children have been uprooted. The mother has rationalised her decision by blaming the father. The children have adopted the same beliefs. The children have become wholly dependent emotionally on the mother. An emotional gulf with the father has opened up. The longer the children remain in their current situation, the more likely it is that the damage will deepen beyond repair.
xii) On the children's return to E, the mother accepts that she would return with them. Provided she retains custody of the children, they would be able to live in the home they were used to living in and to return to their excellent school. They would have the benefit of the protective care and support of their mother, of their maternal grandparents with whom they would live, and of the many wider family members who live in E. There is no evidence that the wider family have turned against the mother or the children.
xiii) The wishes of the children, particularly strongly expressed by A, are to remain in England. That is a significant factor but their views, however genuinely expressed, have undoubtedly been directly and/or indirectly influenced by the mother and by the circumstances of their retention and this litigation.
xiv) I take into account that return would be against the wishes of the mother as well as the children and that, at least in the short term, that would cause upset to the children, and, most likely for a longer period, to their primary carer. However, there is no evidence that the mother or children have had any mental health problems or would be prone to such problems caused by an undesired return to E.
xv) I accept the evidence of Ms Hamade that upon return, if a settlement agreement were in place and issued by the E court, some measure of protection of the best interests of the children would be offered by the legal system there. For that to be most effective the father will have to withdraw his custody application prior to the return and a settlement agreement including terms designed to secure the custody of the children with the mother and visitation rights to the father, will need to be entered into the court in E. It is concerning that the father has not yet withdrawn his custody application but these proceedings have been continuing and he has been trying to assert his rights. However, it is an essential condition for protecting the best interests of the children that prior to return his custody application is withdrawn and that a settlement agreement is entered into and issued by the E courts. One caveat to the reassurance such measures would bring, is the apparent lack of sanctions for breaches. Another is the evidential burden on a mother if there were further incidents of abuse, A third is the fact that the wishes and feelings of the children are not heeded in the E courts. A fourth is the fact that a change of circumstances can lead to amendment of a settlement agreement and the concern that the father could, if he chose, frame various disagreements or difficulties as changes in circumstances justifying amendment.
xvi) The effective inability of the mother to apply for relocation upon return to E does indeed do more than give the court reason to pause. It is a factor that weighs against summary return. However, in my judgement the mother's application would, even applying principles that would be applied in this jurisdiction, be very likely to fail. The children's strong connections in E, the relatively slight connections with England, the close family networks in E, the father's presence there, the mother's retention of the children against his will after October 2021, would all weigh against granting relocation in the children's best interests. Of more concern is that if circumstances changed so that it did appear to be in the best interests of the children to relocate, the E courts would still not countenance it if the father objected and lived in E.
xvii) The evidence provided to the court indicates that a settlement agreement, once reached, could be issued in the courts in E, so that it become binding there, within six weeks.
xviii) A welfare enquiry in the courts in England would be likely to take many months to resolve.
In my welfare evaluation I must have regard to the welfare checklist under s.1(3) Children Act 1989. I must have regard to all the circumstances including, in respect of each child,
(a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding);
(b) his physical, emotional and educational needs;
(c) the likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances;
(d) his age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the court considers relevant;
(e) any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering;
(f) how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs;
(g) the range of powers available to the court under this Act in the proceedings in question.
i) The father withdraws his custody application in E and provides documentary proof that the application has been withdrawn prior to return.
ii) A settlement agreement is reached and then issued by the E courts.
iii) The settlement agreement includes the following terms:
a) The father shall pay for the mother and children's economy flights to E.
b) Without prejudice to the divorce proceedings in the UAE the father will pay the mother child maintenance of AED 2500 (£566) per month per child until such time that the courts in E determine the appropriate level of maintenance.
c) The father agrees not to institute or support any criminal proceedings for the punishment of the mother arising out of her wrongful retention of the children in England.
d) The father agrees to the mother continuing to be the custodian of the children during their childhoods (until they are 18).
e) The parties agree indirect contact between the children and the father and direct contact on special occasions, during school holidays and during weekends. That agreement must be reached within two weeks of this judgment, and the terms included in the settlement agreement.
f) On a without prejudice basis and with no admissions the father shall undertake/pledge not to use or threaten violence against the mother or children and not to instruct or encourage any third party to do so.
g) The father shall not have direct or indirect contact with the mother save for as agreed.
iv) The settlement agreement shall be drafted by Ms Hamade or another lawyer with expertise in civil and family law in E. It must be confirmed to have been entered into a judgment in the court in E prior to the children's return.