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England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions >> Phillps & Ors v Francis & Anor [2010] EWHC B28 (QB) (24 March 2010) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2010/B28.html Cite as: [2010] 24 EG 118, [2010] EWHC B28 (QB), [2010] L & TR 28, [2010] 2 EGLR 31 |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
B e f o r e :
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DENNIS PHILLPS and ROYNA GODDARD (suing on behalf of themselves and other owners of 97 Holiday Chalets at Point Curlew, St. Merryn, Padstow, Cornwall) |
Claimants |
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and |
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(1) MARTIN FRANCIS (2) REBEKAH KATHERINE FRANCIS |
Defendants |
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Mr John Virgo (instructed by Meade King (Bristol)) for the Defendant
Hearing date: 3rd March 2010
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Crown Copyright ©
Justice Griggs:
"(1) An application may be made to a leasehold valuation tribunal for a determination whether a service charge is payable and, if it is, as to -
(a) the person by whom it is payable,
(b) the person to whom it is payable,
(c) the amount which is payable,
(d) the date at or by which it is payable, and
(e) the manner in which it is payable."
"(7) The jurisdiction conferred on a leasehold valuation tribunal in respect of any matter by virtue of this section is in addition to any jurisdiction of the court in respect of the matter."
"[Y]ou are to apply statutory words and phrases according to their natural and ordinary meaning without addition or subtraction, unless that meaning produces injustice, absurdity, an anomaly or contradiction, in which case you may modify the natural and ordinary meaning so as to sort out[?] such injustice etc but no further."
"I also reject the suggestion that there is any significant relationship between the service charge provisions and the Rent Acts. As the judgments in the Horford Investments case [1976) Ch 39 make clear ... the decision in that case was materially influenced by the underlying policy of the Rent Acts. The policy underlying the service charge provisions in the 1985 Act and earlier Acts is, however, a different policy in that its emphasis is not so much on protecting the tenant in his home as on providing him with a way of challenging unreasonable charges sought to be levied by his landlord. I can, for my part, see no reason why the policy considerations which led this court in the Horford Investments case to decide that a tenancy of a block of flats is not within the protection of the Rent Acts should lead to the conclusion that a tenant of a flat in a block who happens also to be a tenant of another flat (or flats) in the same block, and/or of the common parts in the building, is not, for that reason, within the protection of the service charge provisions. …"
"A building or part of the building occupied or intended to be occupied as a separate dwelling together with any yard, garden, outhouses and appurtenances belonging to it or usually enjoyed with it"
"Lease of a dwelling house" means a lease by which a building or part of the building is let wholly or mainly as a private residence, and "dwelling house" means that building or part of a building.
"The basic distinction between these two sets of authorities is that in some statutory contexts "dwelling" may imply use as a home, whereas in others there is no such implication. It is a matter therefore, of examining the statutory context and the policy behind the statutory provisions in order to see whether "dwelling" is used with or without the implication of use as a home."
"My conclusion, however, is that the answer to the point in issue is to be derived not from an examination of the detail of a language used in the provisions and the changes that have been made to them, but from a more general consideration. It is clear from Uratemp that "dwelling", where it appears in legislation conferring protection on tenants, will convey its ordinary meaning of the occupiers' home unless there is something that suggests that it should not be so limited. I can see nothing that would suggest that, in respect of sections 18 to 30, the protection conferred should be extended to premises that are not a person's home. It goes without saying that the planning cases, concerned as they are with legislation in a quite different field, provide no assistance."
"My conclusion, therefore, is that the LVT was right. There is no reason to give to the word "dwelling", as it applies to sections 18 to 30, any meaning other than the one it ordinary bears in legislation giving protection to tenants. It imports a requirement that the dwelling should be occupied as a home and it is therefore excludes from the operation of sections 18 to 30 these holiday bungalows because of their use is restricted to providing holiday accommodation. The appeal is dismissed."