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England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions >> Mohidin & Anor v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis & Ors [2015] EWHC 2740 (QB) (02 October 2015) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2015/2740.html Cite as: [2015] EWHC 2740 (QB) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
OMAR BARRAQ MOHIDIN BASIL KHAN and AHMED HEGAZY |
First Claimant Second Claimant Third Claimant |
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- and - |
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COMMISSIONER OF THE POLICE OF THE METROPOLIS and MARK JONES STEVEN WHITE WILLIAM WILSON NEIL BROWN |
Defendant Third Party Fourth Party Fifth Party Sixth Party |
____________________
Alison Gerry (instructed by Imran Khan and Partners inc Christian Khan, Solicitors) for the Third Claimant
John Beggs QC and Cecily White (instructed by Directorate of Legal Services, New Scotland Yard) for the Defendant
John Hardy QC and Stephen Morley (instructed by Slater and Gordon, Solicitors) for the Third to Sixth Parties
Hearing dates: 9th-12th, 15th-18th, 23rd-24th, 26th and 30th June 2015
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
MR JUSTICE GILBART :
A Introduction [2]
B Preliminary Matters
(a) Position of Mr Mark Jones [8]
(b) Other proceedings relating to this incident, and their relevance if any [11]
(c) Similar Fact Evidence- ruling of Sir David Eady [26]
(d) The evidence before me and the position of PC Onwugbonu [29]
(e) Ruling on the admissibility of evidence about the Claimants' activities [39]
C The Claimants and the TSG officers on the van - background, character etc
(a) The Claimants [42]
(b) The officers on the TSG carrier including PC Onwugbonu [53]
D The TSG carrier [74]
E Events as the carrier travels south and then returns north [75]
F Edgware Road events –
(a) evidence of the Claimants [96]
(b) evidence of PC Amechi Onwugbonu [127]
(c) evidence given and called by the Third to Sixth Parties [136]
K Events at the Police Station [207]
L Hearsay Evidence called about the Claimants [239]
M Similar Fact Evidence [245]
N My assessment of the witnesses and their evidence [263]
O Findings of fact on liability, and conclusions on liability [301]
P Evidence, submissions and conclusions on injuries and on issues relevant to damages [318]
Q Contribution and indemnity [393]
R Order [400]
A Introduction
i) Omar Mohidin alleges that he was taken into the van and there assaulted by the Third Party PC Mark Jones, who also swore at him and abused him verbally;
ii) Ahmed Hegazy alleges that he was unlawfully searched while on the pavement, and then wrongfully arrested by the Sixth Party PC Neil Brown, handcuffed by and put on the floor of the van by PC Brown and the Fourth and Fifth Parties PC Steven White and Sergeant William Wilson with unreasonable force, where he was further assaulted. He says that at the Police Station he was strip searched unnecessarily. Ahmed Hegazy also asserts that PC Brown swore at him, and that he was racially abused;
iii) Basil Khan alleges that he was wrongfully arrested, whereupon he was handcuffed and then, when placed in the van, was assaulted by both PC Jones and Sergeant Wilson. He was sworn at and abused. He was then forced to the floor, and then made to kneel within the van in handcuffs, both during the journey to the Police Station and then for some 20 minutes while he waited to be taken from the carrier into the custody suite. He was strip searched, which it is alleged was in breach of the relevant PACE code as he was then only 16 years old.
iv) Each claims damages, including exemplary damages, for false imprisonment and assault. In addition Ahmed Hegazy claims damages for direct discrimination under section 1 of the Race Relations Act 1976 and for breaches of Articles 3, 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (" ECHR")
i) One or more of a group of Arab youths had been seen making gestures and mouthing obscenities across the road at the TSG carrier, and the decision had been made to speak to them. Once the carrier caught up with them, PC Jones formed the suspicion that Omar Mohidin was in possession of controlled drugs, and decided to search him. He went into the van voluntarily to be searched. Nothing untoward occurred;
ii) In the case of Ahmed Hegazy, PC Brown suspected that he was in possession of controlled drugs. He started the procedure for a search under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. Ahmed Hegazy became violent, made serious threats of violence, was arrested and handcuffed, and was then placed in the van on the floor by PC Brown, PC White and Sergeant Wilson. He was never assaulted;
iii) As the van moved off with Ahmed Hegazy inside it, Basil Khan approached it and made threats. He was arrested by PC Jones and put in the van. There is a conflict within the Third to Sixth Parties' case as to exactly what happened in the van, but it is common ground that he was not assaulted. It is accepted that he was at some point put to the floor while handcuffed, and accepted that he was required to kneel in handcuffs on the way back to the Police Station and after arrival. That was justified because of his violent conduct, including his striking PC Jones.
B Preliminary Matters
(a) Position of Mr Mark Jones
(b) Other proceedings relating to this incident, and their relevance if any
i) the IPCC managed an investigation by DPS, which concluded in June 2008 that all six officers in the van (save PC Onwugbonu) had a case to answer on both the civil and criminal standard;
ii) on 22nd March 2010 the IPCC decided not to institute misconduct proceedings;
iii) in January 2010, the solicitors for Omar Mohidin and Basil Khan made a complaint that a witness called Inspector Davis had given evidence for PC Jones at the trial, to the effect that he had not seen him misconduct himself on other occasions, when he had been present during the arrest of Babar Ahmad (of which more below). In due course the IPCC rejected the complaint;
iv) meanwhile in December 2009, the families of the officers who had been prosecuted made complaints to the IPCC about the conduct of the original secondary investigation, which it was said was biased, about the evidence of PC Onwugbonu, which was said to be false and dishonest, and the late disclosure at trial of CCTV evidence from the Police Station;
v) on 12th August 2010, four officers, including PC Jones, were charged with assaulting a man called Babar Ahmad during an arrest. They were acquitted at Southwark Crown Court on 3rd June 2011;
vi) in July 2010 all six officers from the TSG van in this incident (apart from PC Onwugbonu) issued proceedings in the Employment Tribunal against the Defendant Commissioner, alleging racial discrimination, harassment and victimisation;
vii) in July 2011 the IPCC concluded that the central complaint of the families about the investigation should be upheld. PC Onwugbonu's evidence should have been investigated for its accuracy and honesty, and the investigating officers lacked necessary investigative experience and should be subject to management action. However while there were mistakes in PC Onwugbonu's written and oral evidence, which justified management action, he had not been guilty of any criminal offences or of gross misconduct;
viii) on 6th September 2011 the IPCC concluded that there was a case of gross misconduct against two officers, and misconduct against one, for failures to review and manage over 2000 hours of CCTV film, or disclose it on time. Written warnings were given in March 2013;
ix) after the Part 20 proceedings had been issued in this action, the Additional Parties brought additional claims in the Employment Tribunal alleging that the issue of the proceedings constituted further acts of race discrimination and victimisation. All Employment Tribunal proceedings have been stayed until this action has been heard;
x) on May 8th 2013, the IPCC upheld appeals by the families against the findings of the DPS into their complaints. The IPCC directed DPS to hold a further investigation in the light of further enquiries;
xi) that reinvestigation was published on 5th September 2014. It recommended that no further action be taken, and upheld the original DPS conclusions that management action was adequate to deal with the complaints against the officers involved, including PC Onwugbonu;
xii) in January 2015 an appeal was submitted against the conclusions of the DPS reinvestigation.
i) the tribunal determining the claims for damages was myself, and that I would determine it on the basis of admissible evidence placed before me. I had received witness statements, and also hearsay notices of other evidence;
ii) evidence of what conclusions others had reached about the issues which I had to determine was inadmissible and irrelevant;
iii) the only potential relevance of what happened at the trial at Kingston or in other proceedings or investigations was if some reference were made to what a witness in this trial said for the purpose of showing inconsistency, a lack of reliability, or under s 5(2) Civil Evidence Act 1995, or to establish an admission against interest, or to rebut allegations of recent fabrication or similar. Even then, its admissibility was not automatic.
(d) Similar Fact Evidence- ruling of Sir David Eady
i) an incident relating to the arrest of Babar Ahmad by PC Jones and others on 2nd December 2003;
ii) an incident relating to the arrest of a Mr Mohammed El-Kholti by PC Jones and others in March 2007;
iii) an incident relied on by Ahmed Hegazy and known as OG1/07/2999, involving the stopping by PC Brown and another officer of a black man called Barnes in Kennington Road on 26th June 2007.
(e) The evidence before me and the position of PC Onwugbonu
i) medical evidence of the examination of Ahmed Hegazy by Dr Frazer;
ii) the notebook and parts of the witness statement of PC Onwugbonu. I shall say more of this in the ensuing paragraphs;
iii) evidence of Mohammed Ahmed;
iv) evidence from Inspector Terry Banks, who was on duty at the police station, and from other officers there (Abdul-Salam and Reid)
v) similar fact evidence, as already described.
i) the evidence of a solicitor's clerk, Millie Guest, who was present at the Police Station. She was to have been called, but all parties agreed to her evidence being admitted under the hearsay notice provisions;
ii) the notebook and parts of the witness statement of PC Onwugbonu. I shall say more of this in the ensuing paragraphs;
iii) evidence from a DC Bates about a statement written by PC Onwugbonu;
iv) evidence from Inspector Terry Banks, who was on duty at the police station, and from other officers there (Abdul-Salam and Reid);
v) evidence from PCs Everett and Mackay about events at the Police station. PC Everett also gave evidence orally when called by the Third to Sixth parties.
i) oral evidence from PC Kitchener and PC Prout (both of whom were also on the van);
ii) oral evidence from PC Everett (about events at the Police Station);
iii) oral evidence from PCs Bond-Vaughan, Mullen and James –Bowen on the similar fact incidents, as described above;
iv) evidence given by hearsay notice from an Inspector Allmey denying a remark he was said to have made;
v) PC Ryan Davis, a Sergeant Burger, a PC Thomas, PC Arno and another PC Brown, about dealings some time after the incident with Omar Mohidin and with Basil Khan, and remarks they were said to have made about the case.
i) Ms Kaufmann QC and Ms Gerry did not do so because the First and Second Claimants' solicitor had been told in an email of 30th January 2015 by his solicitor, Mr Richard Conley, a partner in Messrs Taylor Haldane Barlex of Chelmsford that
ii) "I have discussed our conversation with my partner Russell Haldane who is litigating all matters connected with this case on behalf of PC Onwugbonu. I regret to say that it will not be possible for him to offer you the assistance that you seek, because, following an appeal against the initial finding of the IPCC, a decision is pending which could potentially result in proceedings against him.
iii) Until the conclusion of the IPCC investigation we will not be in a position to comment."
iv) It is to be noted that the email in question never refers to his instructions or wishes. Further, it seems to confuse two principles. One is whether a witness can decline to give evidence (which he cannot in the event of a witness summons being in place under CPR Practice Direction 34A), and the other is whether, once called, he may decline to answer questions on the grounds of avoiding self-incrimination;
v) Mr Beggs QC did not do so because he said that the Commissioner had to remain neutral when serving officers gave conflicting accounts;
vi) Mr Hardy QC did not want to call him as part of his case, pointing out that his clients did not accept the veracity of his evidence. However they had also decided not to require him to attend for cross examination pursuant to CPR 32.7 and section 3 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995. He chose to rely on what he said were concessions made at the trial in the Crown Court, which, submitted Mr Hardy, affected his reliability. I shall deal with those submissions below.
(f) Ruling on the admissibility of evidence about the Claimants' activities
C The Claimants and the TSG officers on the van- background, character etc
(a) The Claimants
(b) The officers on the TSG carrier including PC Onwugbonu
i) Sergeant Wilson was said to have a wealth of experience and expertise, who was a good solid supervisor who would not take any nonsense;
ii) PC Brown was a very professional officer who was very good at his job. He was very bright with a good work ethic and huge ability as a police officer. They were friends;
iii) PC Mark Jones was "without doubt one of the best police officers I ever worked with." He was extremely professional, highly motivated and committed to his work as a police officer;
iv) PC Steven White was a very thorough police officer and competent.
D The TSG Carrier
E Events as the Carrier travels south and then returns north
F Edgware Road events
(a) Evidence of the Claimants
(b) evidence of PC Amechi Onwugbonu
(c) Evidence given and called by the Third to Sixth Parties
- Grounds – "I have seen your hands thrust into your waistband"
- Object – "Suspicion of drugs"
- W – Warrant Card if not in uniform.
- Identification – "I am PC Brown, PC 1678U"
- Station – Paddington Green.
- Entitlement – The form which has a copy underneath and gives the statutory basis for search.
- Legislation relied on – Misuse of Drugs Act 1971
- Y – "you are detained for the purposes of search."
K Events at the Police Station
Other evidence about events at the Police Station
The mobile telephones issue
The visit to Basil Khan's cell by Inspector Cruickshank
Inspector Cruickshank: "Basil, still awake? …………..The sergeant is just here to be a witness to this, did anything happen to you in the back of that police van tonight?
Inspector Cruickshank: "What?"
Basil Khan: "I got beaten."
Inspector Cruickshank: "Tell me what happened?"
Basil Khan: "First the Sergeant came up to me and said "where's your bottles" right cos you know how it is yeah."
Inspector Cruickshank: "That was the Sergeant?"
Basil Khan: "He slapped me across my face."
Sergeant: "And then?"
Basil Khan: "I remember that name was PC Jones. PC Jones came up the back and he strangled me."
Inspector Cruickshank: "Who did, PC Jones?"
Basil Khan: "yeah, and I was strangled yeah and he pushed my hand back so both my arms were unfolded, yeah man it was then after he told me to get back in the chair then he grabbed me again. I don't know how to describe …I don't know if you will ever believe me but I was telling you what happened."
(pause)
Inspector Cruickshank: "If I didn't believe you I wouldn't be here Basil. Ask the Sergeant, we have a witness that sees you strangled in the (inaudible) also I am recording all you tell me for the purpose of once you are in the van."
Basil Khan: "I was standing there and then… he was doing that to my head like."
Inspector Cruickshank: "Who is this, PC Jones?"
Basil Khan: "PC Jones did it like three times to me. Then I started crying. …..
Basil Khan: "…PC Jones came up to me and started kneeing again over here and hitting me on my head I was just covering my face hitting, hitting me so then afterwards (it felt like it was so bad) I really felt just like crying….."
L Hearsay Evidence called about the Claimants
M Similar Fact Evidence
N My assessment of the witnesses and their evidence
"(1) In estimating the weight (if any) to be given to hearsay evidence in civil proceedings the court shall have regard to any circumstances from which any inference can reasonably be drawn as to the reliability or otherwise of the evidence.
(2) Regard may be had, in particular, to the following—
(a) whether it would have been reasonable and practicable for the party by whom the evidence was adduced to have produced the maker of the original statement as a witness;
(b) whether the original statement was made contemporaneously with the occurrence or existence of the matters stated;
(c) whether the evidence involves multiple hearsay;
(d) whether any person involved had any motive to conceal or misrepresent matters;
(e) whether the original statement was an edited account, or was made in collaboration with another or for a particular purpose;
(f) whether the circumstances in which the evidence is adduced as hearsay are such as to suggest an attempt to prevent proper evaluation of its weight."
(a) I do consider that he could have been produced as a witness. Equally, the Third to Sixth Parties could have required him to attend;
(b) the statements relied on were made contemporaneously;
(c) the statement does not involve multiple hearsay;
(d) I do not consider that he had any motive to conceal or misrepresent matters. I deal at length with this matter in the succeeding paragraphs;
(e) it was not an edited account, nor made for any purpose other than that of a police officer setting out in his notebook and in a draft witness statement his recollection of the events that had occurred a few hours before;
(f) For the reasons I have given, I do not consider that the Claimants sought to avoid calling him to prevent a proper evaluation of weight. I do consider that the Third to Sixth Parties' approach sought the tactical advantage of depriving it of weight by keeping him from the witness box. However I have received a large amount of material about him, and a large amount of evidence from others who were involved in these events. That being so, there is nothing in the circumstances which prevent the court from making a proper evaluation of weight.
i) he had admitted at the Crown Court trial that he had wrongly said that a man I shall refer to as D was beaten up by officers, including PC Jones on 31st May 2007;
ii) he had wrongly said at first that Ahmed Hegazy was handcuffed to the rear;
iii) he had been "possibly wrong" to say that PC Brown had been swearing;
iv) he had been wrong to say at first that PC Prout was in the rear of the van:
v) he had been wrong to record that it was PC Kitchener and Sergeant Wilson who brought Basil Khan on to the carrier, when it was Pc Jones and Sergeant Wilson;
vi) he had been wrong to have an impression that PC Brown removed his vest as he was offering to fight Ahmed Hegazy, and that he accepted that he could simply have been removing it because he was hot and uncomfortable;
vii) he was wrong to maintain that PC Jones kept punching Basil Khan after the carrier arrived at the Police Station;
viii) he was wrong to say that he did not visit Basil Khan in custody, when he visited both him and Ahmed Hegazy;
ix) he was wrong to recall that PC Prout told him that he had also seen wrongdoing;
x) he had not told DPS officers about the matter of the premises search in 2006;
xi) his notebook and WORD draft contained differences.
i) I have addressed the previous complaint already. I shall treat it as untrue;
ii) this is an error in recollection. It has no effect on credibility at all;
iii) he had been "possibly wrong" to say that PC Brown had been swearing. In any event, I would not regard evidence that PC Brown swore in the situation he was dealing with as in any sense blameworthy, albeit perhaps unwise;
iv) this is an error in recollection. It has no effect on credibility at all. Indeed his concession was properly made and led to PC Prout's acquittal on the charge of misconduct in public office;
v) this is an error in recollection. It has no effect on credibility at all;
vi) at most it was an impression, which he conceded could have been wrong. It has no effect on credibility at all;
vii) I agree that PC Onwugbonu is wrong about this matter. I agree that it is necessary to look at his evidence in the light of it. However I conclude that the other parts of his evidence relating to Omar Mohidin and Basil Khan are true;
viii) this is not a proper allegation by the Third to Sixth Parties. It became quite apparent from the CCTV film, as Mr Hardy accepted, that the most he did was to go to the doors of their cells. There is no evidence at all of his ever having spoken to them;
ix) this was his error in recollection. PC Prout was undoubtedly sympathetic to him. It has no effect on credibility at all;
x) this is another aspect of (i);
xi) this is a frankly desperate point. None of the differences are of any real significance in the context of the case.
O Findings of fact on liability, and conclusions on liability
"2 Provisions relating to search under section 1 and other powers.
(1)……………………………
(2) If a constable contemplates a search, other than a search of an unattended vehicle, in the exercise—
(a) of the power conferred by section 1 above; or
(b) of any other power…………………..—
(i) to search a person without first arresting him; or
(ii) to search a vehicle without making an arrest,
it shall be his duty, subject to subsection (4) below, to take reasonable steps before he commences the search to bring to the attention of the appropriate person—
(i) if the constable is not in uniform, documentary evidence that he is a constable; and
(ii) whether he is in uniform or not, the matters specified in subsection (3) below;
and the constable shall not commence the search until he has performed that duty.
(3) The matters referred to in subsection (2) (ii) above are—
(a) the constable's name and the name of the police station to which he is attached;
(b) the object of the proposed search;
(c) the constable's grounds for proposing to make it; and
(d) ………………………………………………………………….
"9 It is therefore clear from the statute that it is the duty of the constable, if he is not in uniform, before he commences the search to take reasonable steps to bring to the attention of the appropriate person documentary evidence that he is a constable. A search conducted in breach of this duty cannot be a lawful search, and therefore resistance to such a search would be lawful and cannot constitute the offence of obstruction of a constable in the execution of his duty.
10 The justices found in their case that the search was lawful, but in their recitation of the evidence, they did not record any evidence of an attempt to produce evidence that was frustrated by the appellant's actions.
11 Miss Stevens, who appears for the respondent……., submitted that Parliament has not required that the warrant card, or indeed any other documentary evidence, be produced in every case, and it is sufficient if the officer has taken reasonable steps to produce it. I accept that submission. There may be cases when physical resistance from the appellant prevents the process of production of documentation being complete before there is a physical taking hold of a person in order to search them.
12 However, I reject (1) any submission that it can be inferred on the present facts that the officer was about to produce the warrant card but had been prevented from so doing, and (2) generally that performance of the duty for uniformed officers, namely informing a person to be searched of the name of the officer and police station concerned, was a sufficient part-performance of the separate and additional duty for plain clothed officers. In my judgment, that distinct duty is the more important duty when an officer is in plain clothes. The uniformed officer has his uniform to speak for him or her as the source of his or her authority and status as a constable. The plain clothed officer needs to produce the warrant card to start in the same position as the uniformed officer.
13 Although there is no reference in the statute to which order the duties are to be performed in, this consideration would lead me to believe that, in the normal case, the card should be produced before or at least at the same time as the verbal introduction in order to found a legitimate search. It is notable that the authors of the Codes of Practice, who are well experienced in the practical realities of policing, provide as follows:
"Code of Practice A 3.9.
3.9 Officers not in uniform must show their warrant cards ..."
14 It is also notable that in the case of Mustapha Osman v Southwark Crown Court [1999] 163 JP 735 (1 July 1999) in the judgment of Sedley LJ there has been the suggestion that a convoluted oral explanation might take longer and might be more likely to interfere with the duties of preventing crime and searching, and that a convenient alternative would be the production of a piece of paper with the requisite information contained on it.
15 In the present case, there was no evidence, or certainly no evidence recited in the justices' case, as to the following matters: (1) why the card was never produced or attempted to be produced; (2) that PC Townsend ever intended to produce the card but was prevented from doing so; (3) that he explained at any time that he was intending to do so when his hands were free; (4) that he did so when the appellant had been restrained and handcuffed with the assistance of other officers. It was equally plain from the facts found that before and during the search the officer was able to give a lot of oral information about who he was and what he was intending to do.
16 It is clear from the line of authorities, beginning with the case of Osman and continuing through to the case of R v Christopher Bristol [2007] EWCA Crim 3214 (4 December 2007), as well as the plain words of the statute, that compliance with the statutory requirements is a precondition of a lawful search. It makes no difference that the constable is said to have been known to the person being searched. The earlier decision in the case of Forde [1985] 81 Crim App R 19, to which reference was made by Miss Stevens, preceded the statutory language with which we are concerned. It cannot assist in the kind of case that is concerned with whether those preconditions have been complied with. Of course, as already acknowledged, where the evidence demonstrates that the constable did take reasonable steps to produce the documentary evidence but was prevented from doing so, the duty may have been complied with, but there is no evidence to that effect in this case.
17 In my judgment, the justices have misunderstood the mandatory requirements for a lawful exercise of the power of search, and on the facts found by them, could not have concluded that the power had been lawfully exercised. The consequence is that the search was unlawful, the officer was not acting in the execution of his duty when conducting it, and the appellant was entitled to use reasonable force to resist the search.
18 The justices posed three questions for the opinion of the High Court:
"(1) Was the court entitled to find that notwithstanding the failure of PC Townsend to produce documentary evidence to the appellant, that he had taken all reasonable steps to comply with his duty as provided by section 2(2)(b)(i) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and the Code of Conduct?"
The answer is "no", in my judgment.
"(2) If not, did that failure render the search unlawful?"
In my judgment, the answer is "yes".
"(3) If the search and use of force on the appellant were unlawful, can the appellant properly be convicted of an offence pursuant to section 4(1) (a) of the Public Order Act 1986?"
In my judgment, the answer is "yes", but only if the conduct used in resisting any unlawful force was excessive. (My italics)
19 Applying those answers to the facts of this case, it must follow that the conviction for obstruction of the police must be quashed and an acquittal substituted. The appellant was entitled to use reasonable force to resist the search, and conviction for threatening words or behaviour could be founded on reasonable force or threat of force to resist such a search. Since the justices appear to have included the appellant's resistance to the search as at least part of the basis of the conviction for threatening words, the conviction cannot stand. However, the case stated also recites that the justices found that the appellant threatened to stab the officer with a knife. It is strongly arguable that use of such words could be excessive force and constitute the offence of threatening words and behaviour, irrespective of whether the officer was acting in the execution of his duty or not. It is therefore common ground that we should quash the conviction of the public order offence as well, but in the case of that offence, and that offence only, remit the charge to the justices for further consideration of this issue. Of course, it will be open to the CPS to review whether this is a prosecution they would wish to pursue in all the circumstances of the case. But to this extent, this appeal is allowed."
"24 Arrest without warrant: constables
(1) A constable may arrest without a warrant—
(a) anyone who is about to commit an offence;
(b) anyone who is in the act of committing an offence;
(c) anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be about to commit an offence;
(d) anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be committing an offence.
(2) If a constable has reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence has been committed, he may arrest without a warrant anyone whom he has reasonable grounds to suspect of being guilty of it.
(3) If an offence has been committed, a constable may arrest without a warrant—
(a) anyone who is guilty of the offence;
(b) anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be guilty of it.
(4) But the power of summary arrest conferred by subsection (1), (2) or (3) is exercisable only if the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that for any of the reasons mentioned in subsection (5) it is necessary to arrest the person in question.
(5) The reasons are—
(a) to enable the name of the person in question to be ascertained (in the case where the constable does not know, and cannot readily ascertain, the person's name, or has reasonable grounds for doubting whether a name given by the person as his name is his real name);
(b) correspondingly as regards the person's address;
(c) to prevent the person in question—
(i) causing physical injury to himself or any other person;
(ii) suffering physical injury;
(iii) causing loss of or damage to property;
(iv) committing an offence against public decency (subject to subsection (6)); or
(v) causing an unlawful obstruction of the highway;
(d) …………………………
(e) ………………………….
(f) …………………………...
(6) ……………………………......."
i) Omar Mohidin was forced into the van, and thus the subject of a battery, and falsely imprisoned for a few minutes, during which time he was abused verbally by PC Jones, including racist abuse;
ii) Ahmed Hegazy was lawfully arrested. Any injuries he sustained were as a result of his unlawfully resisting arrest. He was not assaulted. He was not falsely imprisoned. Ms Gerry expressly conceded that the claim under the Race Relations Act stood or fell with the claims for assault and false imprisonment. I find in any event that he was not the subject of racist abuse;
iii) Basil Khan was not lawfully arrested, as he had not uttered threats to kill. He did not make any threats to PC Jones, or assault him, but was abused and struck by Sergeant Wilson, and then struck and abused by PC Mark Jones, who also grabbed him round the neck, causing difficulties in breathing. He was then forced by PC Jones to kneel with his hands in handcuffs behind his back, both within the van en route to the Police Station for about 5 minutes, and then thereafter for about 20 minutes without any justification whatever, but for the purposes of humiliation. Sergeant Wilson chose to allow PC Jones to behave as he did in the van, and was also a party to Basil Khan's continued humiliation in having to kneel handcuffed in the van. It follows that he was falsely imprisoned until his release the following day. I find that PC Jones used racist abuse towards him. His being strip searched only came about because PC Jones had given false information about the reasons for his arrest. I accept that the Desk Sergeant genuinely thought that he was old enough to be strip searched.
P Evidence, submissions and conclusions on injuries and on issues relevant to damages
i) a summary of the claims made
ii) the evidence of physical injuries
iii) the evidence on the claimed subsequent effects
iv) the effect of the Crown Court trial of the officers on the Claimants
v) Damages for personal injury, false imprisonment, aggravated and exemplary damages.
vi) Other claimed heads
(i) a summary of the claims made
(ii) the evidence of physical injuries
(iii) the evidence on the claimed subsequent effects
i) Omar Mohidin :
a) For First Claimant: Dr Adrian Lord MBBS MRCPsych: Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist : 29 March 2011
b) For Third to Sixth Parties: Dr Christopher M B Jarman, MA (Oxon) BM, B.Ch., LRCP, MRCS,M.Phil, MRCPsych; Consultant Psychiatrist; 23 November 2014
c) Joint Report by Drs Lord and Jarman: 28th April 2015
ii) Basil Khan :
a) For First Claimant: Dr Adrian Lord MBBS MRCPsych: Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist : 29 March 2011
b) For Third to Sixth Parties: Dr Christopher M B Jarman, MA (Oxon) BM, B.Ch., LRCP, MRCS,M.Phil, MRCPsych; Consultant Psychiatrist; 23 November 2014
c) Joint Report by Drs Lord and Jarman: 28th April 2015
iii) Ahmed Hegazy:
a) For Third Claimant: Dr Piyal Sen MBBS, DPM, FRCPsych, Dip Forensic Psych, PGCAP; Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist; 31st May 2011, 28th November 2014
b) For Third to Sixth Parties: Dr Christopher M B Jarman, MA (Oxon) BM, B.Ch., LRCP, MRCS,M.Phil, MRCPsych; Consultant Psychiatrist; 8th January 2015
c) Joint Report by Drs Sen and Jarman; 8th May 2015.
"Mr Ahmed Hegazy remembered being arrested a few times before the incident of 1st June 2007. After the incident, he had been involved in a few incidents like fights on the streets, one fight in a hotel with another hotel worker. He remembered being a bit drunk at the time and was charged with common assault. He has also been charged with possession of cannabis…….he also has a conviction for robbery of a mobile phone, for which he received a Community Order and had to have contact with the youth offending team. He has not yet been in prison."
" the prolonged nature of his mental health symptoms as well as other aggravating features like the increase in the pattern and quantity of his cannabis use and the escalation in the pattern of the offending leading to prison sentences, which would act as further traumatisation experiences, leads me to be more guarded about Mr Ahmed Hegazy's prognosis."
(iv) The effect of the Crown Court trial of the officers on the Claimants
v) Damages for personal injury, false imprisonment, aggravated and exemplary damages.
i) Basic: this will include damages for false imprisonment and for the physical effects of any assault ;
ii) Aggravated damages;
iii) Exemplary damages.
i) while Omar Mohidin was not detained for long, I place weight on the fact that it is the initial shock that attracts the higher rate of award, but it was still a very short period. The Claimant and Defendant's counsel submitted that I should value the basic award for false imprisonment at £ 200. I agree.
ii) Basil Khan was detained for a substantial period. I must have regard to the fact that he was strip searched. It was common ground that it was a breach of the PACE Code of Practice C (Annex A paragraph 11) to strip search a 16 year old, but as noted already, the custody sergeant mistakenly but reasonably believed that he was older. Ms Kaufmann put the figure at £4500, Mr Beggs QC at £ 4200, and Mr Hardy put it at £ 4000 for the whole period of detention. I agree with Ms Kaufmann's suggested valuation. I value his basic award at £ 4500. He is also entitled to damages for assault. I have found that he suffered some minor injury, described above, which would not have affected him after 7 days at most. Applying the Judicial College Guidelines to his injuries I value his award for pain suffering and loss of amenity at £ 250.
iii) So far as Ahmed Hegazy is concerned, were I to have found his claim proved, I would have valued it as follows. He was detained for 10 hours, which included a search. I value his basic award at £3000. As to his injuries, they were painful, but the effects would have worn off within 7 days. Applying the Judicial College Guidelines to his injuries I value his award for pain suffering and loss of amenity at £500.
"(8) If the case is one in which aggravated damages are claimed and could be appropriately awarded, the nature of aggravated damages should be explained to the jury. Such damages can be awarded where there are aggravating features about the case which would result in the plaintiff not receiving sufficient compensation for the injury suffered if the award were restricted to a basic award. Aggravating features can include humiliating circumstances at the time of arrest or any conduct of those responsible for the arrest or the prosecution which shows that they had behaved in a high handed, insulting, malicious or oppressive manner either in relation to the arrest or imprisonment or in conducting the prosecution. Aggravating features can also include the way the litigation and trial are conducted. [The aggravating features listed take account of the passages in the speech of Lord Reid in the case of Broome at 1085 and Pearson LJ in McCarey v Associated Newspapers Limited [1965] 1 QB 86 at 104.
(9) The jury should then be told that if they consider the case is one for the award of damages other than basic damages then they should usually make a separate award for each category. [This is contrary to the present practice but in our view will result in greater transparency as to the make up of the award].
(10) We consider that where it is appropriate to award aggravated damages the figure is unlikely to be less than a £1,000. We do not think it is possible to indicate a precise arithmetical relationship between basic damages and aggravated damages because the circumstances will vary from case to case. In the ordinary way, however, we would not expect the aggravated damages to be as much as twice the basic damages except perhaps where, on the particular facts, the basic damages are modest.
(11) It should be strongly emphasised to the jury that the total figure for basic and aggravated damages should not exceed what they consider is fair compensation for the injury which the plaintiff has suffered. It should also be explained that if aggravated damages are awarded such damages, though compensatory are not intended as a punishment, will in fact contain a penal element as far as the defendant is concerned.
(12) Finally the jury should be told in a case where exemplary damages are claimed and the Judge considers that there is evidence to support such a claim, that though it is not normally possible to award damages with the object of punishing the defendant, exceptionally this is possible where there has been conduct, including oppressive or arbitrary behaviour, by police officers which deserves the exceptional remedy of exemplary damages. it should be explained to the jury:
(a) that if the jury are awarding aggravated damages these damages will have already provided compensation for the injury suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the oppressive and insulting behaviour of the police officer and, inevitably, a measure of punishment from the defendant's point of view;
(b) that exemplary damages should be awarded if, but only if, they consider that the compensation awarded by way of basic and aggravated damages is in the circumstances an inadequate punishment for the defendants.
(c) that an award of exemplary damages is in effect a windfall for the plaintiff and, where damages will be payable out of police funds, the sum awarded may not be available to be expended by the police in a way which would benefit the public. [This guidance would not be appropriate if the claim were to be met by insurers].
(d) that the sum awarded by way of exemplary damages should be sufficient to mark the jury's disapproval of the oppressive or arbitrary behaviour but should be no more than is required for this purpose.
(13) Where exemplary damages are appropriate they are unlikely to be less than £5,000. Otherwise the case is probably not one which justifies an award of exemplary damages at all. In this class of action the conduct must be particularly deserving of condemnation for an award of as much as £25,000 to be justified and the figure of £50,000 should be regarded as the absolute maximum, involving directly officers of at least the rank of superintendent.
(14) In an appropriate case the jury should also be told that even though the plaintiff succeeds on liability any improper conduct of which they find him guilty can reduce or even eliminate any award of aggravated or exemplary damages if the jury consider that this conduct caused or contributed to the behaviour complained of."
"It is now generally recognised that an award of aggravated damages is essentially compensatory in nature, notwithstanding the fact that it may have a punitive effect by increasing the overall amount the defendant is ordered to pay. That was explicitly acknowledged by Lord Woolf M.R. in Thompson as one can see from the passages cited earlier. Whether damages awarded to compensate the claimant for distress, humiliation and injury to feelings are treated as part of the basic damages (as Thomas L.J. suggested in Richardson v Howie [2004] EWCA Civ 1127, (unreported, 13th August 2004)) or are separately identified by the name of aggravated damages, the important factor to bear in mind is that they are primarily intended to be compensatory, not punitive. It follows that any injury for which compensation has been given as part of the award of basic damages should not be the subject of further compensation in the form of an award of aggravated damages. However, the distinction between basic and aggravated damages will continue to have a part to play as long as the right to recover for intangible consequences such as humiliation, injury to pride and dignity as well as for the hurt caused by the spiteful, malicious, insulting or arrogant conduct of the defendant attaches to some causes of action and not others."
"Outline Facts
7. Ms Vento was born on 15 February 1967. She had a long held ambition to join the police force, but she was unable to do so before the height requirements were relaxed in 1995. On 11 December 1995, at the age of 28, she joined the police force as a probationary constable and began training to be an ordinary police constable. At that time she was married with 3 children. Initially she had the support of her husband, though he did not expect her to succeed in combining her responsibilities as a mother with those of a trainee police officer. The couple separated in 1996 and they were divorced in 1999.
8. In general, Ms Vento made good progress during her first year in her paperwork and in her work relationships. But in the first half of 1997 a series of incidents occurred when fellow police officers criticised her conduct, her personal life and her character in an unwarranted, aggressive and demoralising manner. The treatment was found to be less favourable than a hypothetical male officer would have received in the same circumstances. The tribunal inferred that the less favourable treatment was on the ground of her sex.
9. At first she coped well with the situation and with the effects of the recent breakdown of her marriage. On 12 May 1997, however, she was diagnosed as clinically depressed. She was given medication. She continued working until July 1997. She then went off work sick and was absent for 3 months. Although still on medication, she returned to work in October 1997. Further incidents of discrimination occurred following which she suffered suicidal impulses. The discriminatory treatment of her contributed to her depression and affected her ability to form relationships. On 8 December 1997 she was dismissed on the ground of alleged lack of honesty and lack of performance.
10. The Employment Tribunal found that Ms Vento did not have a vulnerable personality, which would increase the risk of failing to complete a full career in the police force to the retirement age of 55. It found that she would have successfully completed her probation and qualified as a police constable. It also found that she had limited career prospects. She was only likely to engage in clerical work in the future."
"Guidance
65. Employment Tribunals and those who practise in them might find it helpful if this Court were to identify three broad bands of compensation for injury to feelings, as distinct from compensation for psychiatric or similar personal injury.
(i) The top band should normally be between £15,000 and £25,000. Sums in this range should be awarded in the most serious cases, such as where there has been a lengthy campaign of discriminatory harassment on the ground of sex or race. This case falls within that band. Only in the most exceptional case should an award of compensation for injury to feelings exceed £25,000.
(ii) The middle band of between £5,000 and £15,000 should be used for serious cases, which do not merit an award in the highest band.
(iii) Awards of between £500 and £5,000 are appropriate for less serious cases, such as where the act of discrimination is an isolated or one off occurrence. In general, awards of less than £500 are to be avoided altogether, as they risk being regarded as so low as not to be a proper recognition of injury to feelings.
66. There is, of course, within each band considerable flexibility, allowing tribunals to fix what is considered to be fair, reasonable and just compensation in the particular circumstances of the case.
67. The decision whether or not to award aggravated damages and, if so, in what amount must depend on the particular circumstances of the discrimination and on the way in which the complaint of discrimination has been handled.
68. Common sense requires that regard should also be had to the overall magnitude of the sum total of the awards of compensation for non-pecuniary loss made under the various headings of injury to feelings, psychiatric damage and aggravated damage. In particular, double recovery should be avoided by taking appropriate account of the overlap between the individual heads of damage. The extent of overlap will depend on the facts of each particular case."
?63. In our judgment, taking account of the level of awards undisturbed on recent appeals to the Appeal Tribunal and of the JSB Guidelines, the fair, reasonable and just award in this case for non-pecuniary loss is a total of £32,000, made up as to £18,000 for injury to feelings, £5,000 aggravated damages and £9,000 for psychiatric damage, which took the form of clinical depression and adjustment disorder lasting for 3 years (and against which there was no appeal). We also bear in mind that there was no finding by the Employment Tribunal that the injury to Ms Vento's feelings would continue after the psychiatric disorder had passed. During the period of psychiatric disorder there must have been a significant degree of overlap with the injury to her feelings.
64. It should be understood that the reduction in the amount of compensation is made solely to bring the global award more into line with conventional wisdom on levels of compensation for non-pecuniary loss generally. The reduction does not mean that this Court takes a less serious view than the Employment Tribunal did of the persistent unlawful discrimination suffered by Ms Vento at the hands of her colleagues in the Police Service, which is expected to set an example of abiding by the law, including the law governing all forms of discrimination."
"………We do not think it is possible to indicate a precise arithmetical relationship between basic damages and aggravated damages because the circumstances will vary from case to case. In the ordinary way, however, we would not expect the aggravated damages to be as much as twice the basic damages except perhaps where, on the particular facts, the basic damages are modest."
Other claimed heads
"8 Judicial remedies.
(1) In relation to any act (or proposed act) of a public authority which the court finds is (or would be) unlawful, it may grant such relief or remedy, or make such order, within its powers as it considers just and appropriate.
(2) But damages may be awarded only by a court which has power to award damages, or to order the payment of compensation, in civil proceedings.
(3) No award of damages is to be made unless, taking account of all the circumstances of the case, including—
(a)any other relief or remedy granted, or order made, in relation to the act in question (by that or any other court), and
(b) the consequences of any decision (of that or any other court) in respect of that act,
the court is satisfied that the award is necessary to afford just satisfaction to the person in whose favour it is made."
Q Contribution and indemnity
R Order
a) Within 2 weeks of the date of handing down, the First, Second and Third Claimants must make submissions in writing on;
i) the terms of any orders arising from this judgement;
ii) any claims for costs by them against the Defendant or any of the Third to Sixth Parties .
b) Within 3 weeks of the date of handing down, the Defendant must make submissions in writing on any orders it seeks,
i) including any orders under CPR Part 20 against the Additional Parties Mark Jones and William Wilson,
ii) and including any orders for costs which the Defendant seeks against any of the Claimants, and against any of the Third to Sixth Parties;
and setting out any objections the Defendant has to the orders sought by the First, Second or Third Claimants;
c) Within 4 weeks of the date of handing down, the Third to Sixth Parties must make submissions in writing on any orders any of them seeks
i) relating to the CPR Part 20 claims made against each of them by the Defendant;
ii) against any of the First, Second or Third Claimants, including any relating to any Orders to be made, and including any application for costs;
and they must set out any objections to any Orders sought against any of them, or awards for costs sought against them, by any of the First, Second and Third Claimants, or by the Defendant.
d) Within 6 weeks of the date of handing down
i) the First, Second and Third Claimants must file any submissions made in response to those made by the Defendant or any of the Third to Sixth Parties
ii) The Defendant must file any submissions made in response to those made by any of the Third to Sixth Parties.
Note 1 Territorial Support Group [Back] Note 2 Directorate of Professional Standards [Back] Note 3 Smirnoff Ice is a drink consisting of vodka and mixer drink . It has an alcohol content of about 5% [Back] Note 4 A briefing document with names of those suspected of criminality, information about crime in the area and so on. [Back] Note 5 Not that there is any reason to think that injuries in the Premier League are any different in nature or extent from those sustained at any level of professional football [Back] Note 6 i.e. unmixed vodka with an alcohol percentage of c 37.5% [Back]