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England and Wales High Court (Technology and Construction Court) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Technology and Construction Court) Decisions >> Phaestos Ltd & Anor v Ho & Ors [2012] EWHC 1375 (TCC) (23 May 2012) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/TCC/2012/1375.html Cite as: [2012] EWHC 1375 (TCC) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
PHAESTOS LIMITED MINDIMAXNOX LLP |
Claimants |
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- and - |
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PETER HO |
Defendant |
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(1) IKOS CIF LIMITED (2)PHAESTOS LIMITED (3) MINDIMAXNOX LLP |
Claimants |
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- and - |
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TOBIN MAXWELL GOVER |
Defendant |
____________________
Nigel Tozzi QC (instructed by Wragge & Co LLP) for the Defendants
Hearing date: 18 May 2012
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Akenhead:
The Background
"Upon considering the position in the context of the Defendants' admitted willingness to download and retain confidential information to which they are not entitled (and the failure to admit to such actions until required to do so upon application to the Court) and the background set out more fully in the Amended Particulars of Claim and the RFI Response, the Claimants and IKOS AM believe that the terms of the Order as currently drafted (i.e. that the answers are to remain confidential to the parties and their legal advisers and are not to be referred to in open Court without the prior permission of the Claimants or the Court), do not provide adequate protection to safeguard IKOS against the Defendants' future direct or indirect use of that information (in particular, their potentially contacting individual clients who would not otherwise be exposed to an approach by Altiq).
The Claimants and IKOS AM have very serious concerns that any information provided about the identities of investors will be used by the Defendants for their own benefit and/or for the benefit of Altiq and/or for the benefit, directly or indirectly, of Martin Coward and in any event to the detriment of the Claimants and IKOS AM.
We will be applying to vary the Order, such that investor names are not provided and that all other information is provided on an anonymous basis."
The Further Information
"As a result of the matters set out above, some investors have partly and/or completely redeemed their investments in IKOS hedge funds, some investors have decided not to invest further monies in IKOS hedge funds, and some potential investors have decided not to invest monies is in IKOS hedge funds."
"Not entitled. This is a request for evidence. Notwithstanding that see the table of redemptions attached hereto."
The attached did not provide much useful information. This was amended on 5 April 2012 by deleting the above and adding the following:
"As to request [154, 155 and 156], please see the letter of 5 April 2012 from Herbert Smith".
"By consequence of the above, the Claimants have suffered loss and damage, to be assessed."
Further Information on this was supplied pursuant to the Order of 8 March 2012 at Answer 165. The loss is now identified under five heads: Loss of fees paid per investor due to redemptions, Loss of fees due to potential investors not investing, Wasted management time and in-house resources, Expert and forensic costs and Damages as a result of use of confidential information and the Code. The first of these heads is predicated on the basis of 90 investors redeeming their investments in IKOS in full leading to a loss of fees of some $11.5m and the second head on a loss of fees (some $8.9m) in respect of investors who would have invested but did not, this being based on the estimated number of investors (266) as at 31 December 2011.
These Applications - The Law
"I will proceed on the basis (without deciding the point) that CPR 3.1(7) applies to paragraph 10 of the order of 23 January 2003. I would accept that the court should accede to an application for variation where it is just to do so, but in my judgment one of the aspects of justice is that a bargain freely made should be upheld. Mr Weston clearly obtained benefits under the order of 23 January 2003. It may well be that those benefits are not as great as he thought, but that is not a matter for this court. In those circumstances I do not consider it would be right for this court to exercise its discretion to vary the order as sought. …"
"In my view the weight to be given to the consideration that an order is agreed will vary according to the nature of the order and thus the agreement. Where the agreement is the compromise of a substantive dispute or the settlement of proceedings, that factor will have very great and perhaps ordinarily decisive weight, as it did in Weston v Dayman, which was not in any event concerned with an application to extend time. Where however the agreement is no more than a procedural accommodation in relation to case management, the weight to be accorded to the fact of the parties' agreement as to the consequences of non-compliance whilst still real and substantial will nonetheless ordinarily be correspondingly less, and rarely decisive. Everything must depend on the circumstances, and CPR 3.9(1) prescribes that on an application for relief from a sanction for a failure to comply with a court order the court will consider all the circumstances, including those enumerated in the following sub-paragraphs. Beyond noting that where an order is made by consent, that is one of the circumstances which the court will take into account, it is not I think necessary to impose any further gloss on the Rules, which are already adequately drafted so as to ensure that all proper considerations must be taken into account."
"34. In my view it should now be clearly recognised that the sanction embodied in an "unless" order in traditional form takes effect without the need for any further order if the party to whom it is addressed fails to comply with it in any material respect. This has a number of consequences, to three of which I think it is worth drawing particular attention. The first is that it is unnecessary, and indeed inappropriate, for a party who seeks to rely on non-compliance with an order of that kind to make an application to the court for the sanction to be imposed or, as the judge put it, "activated". The sanction prescribed by the order takes effect automatically as a result of the failure to comply with its terms. If an application to enter judgment is made under rule 3.5(5), the court's function is limited to deciding what order should properly be made to reflect the sanction which has already taken effect. Unless the party in default has applied for relief, or the court itself decides for some exceptional reason that it should act of its own initiative, the question whether the sanction ought to apply does not arise. It must be assumed that at the time of making the order the court considered all the relevant factors and reached the decision that the sanction should take effect in the event of default. If it is thought that the court should not have made an order in those terms in the first place, the right course is to challenge it on appeal, but it may often be better to make all reasonable efforts to comply and to seek relief in the event of default".
35. The second consequence, which follows from the first, is that the party in default must apply for relief from the sanction under rule 3.8 if he wishes to escape its consequences. Although the court can act of its own motion, it is under no duty to do so and the party in default cannot complain if he fails to take appropriate steps to protect his own interests. Any application of this kind must deal with the matters which the court is required by rule 3.9 to consider.
36. The third consequence is that before making conditional orders, particularly orders for the striking out of statements of case or the dismissal of claims or counterclaims, the judge should consider carefully whether the sanction being imposed is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case. Of course, it is impossible to foresee the nature and effect of every possible breach and the party in default can always apply for relief, but a conditional order striking out a statement of case or dismissing the claim or counterclaim is one of the most powerful weapons in the court's case management armoury and should not be deployed unless its consequences can be justified. I find it difficult to imagine circumstances in which such an order could properly be made for what were described in Keen Phillips v Field as "good housekeeping purposes".
Discussion
(a) The Claimants have had the RFI since August 2011 and supposedly were working on it in the autumn of last year. Their response on quantum in early March 2012 was vestigial and wholly inadequate.
(b) Their response by the time of Herbert Smith's letter of 5 April 2012 was as accepted by their Counsel again inadequate. Having agreed that investors' names were to be provided but subject to a reasonable and agreed level of confidentiality the Claimants for no good reason reneged on that agreement. Their given reason that they had concerns that the Defendants would use information about the investors for their or Martin Coward's benefit does not seem a good one. This is because they obviously did not feel any such concern when they agreed the consent order only three weeks before that the Defendants would misuse the investor information and because the Defendants and Mr Coward must have fairly good recall as to who at least many of the investors were at least up to 2008. This reason was not effectively advanced by the Claimants as justifying the non-compliance.
(c) The Claimants did not act with any expedition to vary the consent order as their solicitors suggested they would and indeed have never done so.
(d) Whilst Mr Constantinides described concern about the possible breach of Cayman criminal law being raised on 11 April and advice being reasonably promptly secured from Appleby on such law by 18 April, nothing happened for another nearly four weeks. It was hinted by the Claimants' Counsel that Appleby was or might have been retained only by IKOS AM and the IKOS Fund but not by CIF, but that is not what Mr Constantinides has actually said; it is not credible that IKOS AM and the IKOS Fund would not release that advice to IKOS CIF. Effectively, it is said that the Appleby advice was "under active consideration" after its receipt but the only proper inference is that the consideration was either inactive or lacking in any urgency.
(e) The Claimants knew that the Defendants' "unless" application was due to be heard on 18 May 2012 but only discovered that Appleby would not provide a letter about Cayman law on 15 May 2012; that suggests a wholly non-urgent approach.
(f) Their latest reason for being unwilling to comply with the consent order (potential breach of Cayman criminal law) forms the basis for their own application in effect to have until 15 June 2012 to see if they might be able to amend their quantum claim to plead a basis of loss which does not need to rely upon lost investors. The Court has now on at least three occasions in February and March 2012 made it absolutely clear that the Claimants needed to get a "move-on" in a number of respects, not least of which was the effective quantification of their money claims.
(g) As Mr Constantinides has said, it was only on 9 May 2012 that the Claimants instructed quantum experts, NERA, although the claim against Dr Ho has been proceeding since 2009 and that against Dr Gover for about a year. I specifically mentioned in February 2012 the concern felt by the Court that such experts had not then been retained and yet it took about three months for such experts to be instructed. The difficulties experienced by the Claimants in terms of concerns over revealing the identities of investors would have been revealed many months ago if the Claimants had proceeded with reasonable expedition and planning many months ago.
(a) The Claimants have effectively now had about nine months to answer the RFI and even more than that properly to quantify their money claims relating to the breaches of contract pleaded against the Defendants in Paragraphs 25 to 33 of the Amended Particulars of Claim.
(b) They have failed to comply with the order of 14 March 2012; this breach runs now to some six weeks over and above the three weeks which they themselves agreed was sufficient.
(c) This was a consent order, agreed to by the Claimants, who should have been alive to not only what was practicable but also to what they were prepared to do.
(d) The Claimants have repeatedly been warned by the Court that they needed "to get their act together" in relation to their quantum claim; this warning has seemingly been neglected if not ignored.
(e) The Claimants have made it clear that they have no intention now of complying with the order. Whilst I understand the commercial reasons given, this is on analysis only indirectly related to the position under Cayman law. Although the law prescribes arguably the divulging of investors' names, there is under that law a procedure to secure such a course of action which would stand a good chance of succeeding. However, the Claimants have made the commercial decision not to do so.
(f) There is no point in reality therefore refusing the application because, not only do the Claimants intend not to provide the requisite information which they have undertaken and been ordered to provide, but also they are intending to abandon the claims to which the unrequited part of the order relates and possibly seek to substitute some alternative claim. It is not a case in which the Claimants could or should be granted the indulgence of a mere "final" order.
"The cumulative effect of these issues has contributed significantly to the negative performance of the IKOS Equities Strategy "-10%" for the IKOS Equity Too USD "Fund Class". This resulted in direct losses of management and performance fees for 2008 which arose from a reduction of over 50% in assets under management for the IKOS Equity Too USD Fund Class in 2008 and over 35 per cent for the Equity Hedge USD Fund Class in the same year; losses of fees in subsequent years due to investor redemptions made during 2008 and continued loss of investor confidence due to the losses suffered in 2008."
Decision