BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you
consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £5, it
will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free
access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!
[New search]
[Printable RTF version]
[Help]
Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Ltd. / Various Agreements [2000] IECA 580 (28th January, 2000)
COMPETITION
AUTHORITY
Competition
Authority Decision of relating to a proceeding under Section 4 of the
Competition Act, 1991.
Notification
No CA 1048-1050/92E, CA/26/96 - Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Ltd. /
Various Agreements
Decision
No. 580
Price
£2.10
£2.80
including Postage
Notification
Nos. CA/1048-10503/92E, CA/26/96 - Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Ltd. /
Various Agreements
Decision
No. 580
Introduction
1. Notification
was made by Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Ltd. (PPI) on 30 September,
1992, with a request for a certificate under
Section 4(4) of the
Competition
Act, 1991 or, in the event of a refusal by the Competition Authority to grant a
certificate, a licence under
Section 4(2), in respect of six sets of
arrangements involving (a) members of PPI on the one hand, (b) users of
copyright sound recordings, on the other. A further Notification was received
on 12 September, 1996.
The
Facts
(a) Subject
of the notification
2.1 A
total of seven arrangements were notified to the Authority by PPI; six on 30
September 1992 and the seventh on 12 September 1996. Three of these comprised
the assignment by a number of member record companies of performing rights in
sound recordings to PPI, with related forms of assignment mandate, while the
remainder were between PPI and different categories of users of copyright in
sound recordings, for which PPI acts as a royalty-collecting society on behalf
of its members. A full list of the arrangements notified is below.
Agreements
notified
2.2
CA/1048/92E
- PPI/Assignment of Performing Right in Sound Recordings
CA/1049/92E
- PPI/ Music Videogram Mandate
CA/1050/92E
- PPI/ Dubbing Mandate
CA/1051/92E
- PPI/ Copyright Licence
CA/1052/92E
- PPI/ Standard Music Videogram Licence
CA/1053/92E
- PPI/ Dubbing Licence
CA/26/96
-
PPI/ Independent Radio Stations.
Scope
of this Decision
2.3 This
Decision is concerned with Notification Nos. CA/1048/92E - CA/1050/92E and
CA/26/96. The remaining three cases are the subject of separate consideration
by the Authority.
(b) The
Parties Involved
Phonographic
Performance (Ireland) Ltd.
3.1 PPI
was incorporated on 9 December 1968, and is a company limited by guarantee.
PPI was established in order to collect revenues for the public performance,
broadcast and diffusion of its members’ sound recordings in the Republic
of Ireland and to restrain and recover damages for any infringement of the
copyright subsisting therein. It is the sole body established in Ireland for
that purpose. PPI altered its Memorandum and Articles of Association on 7
August 1996, and the Authority has taken account of these changes in this
Decision.
PPI
- member Record Companies
3.2 PPI
had, at the time of notification, two classes of member record companies (full
and associate members), but it advised the Authority on 22 July 1999 that,
following the Revision of its Articles of Association in 1996, this distinction
no longer applies. Accordingly, PPI currently has 360 members
[1];
these include sole traders and companies incorporated in the State and
worldwide.
Other
Parties
3.3 Notification
No. CA/26/96 concerns three identical agreements between PPI and (a) Radio 2000
Ltd. t/a Classic Hits 98FM, (b) Capitol Radio Productions Ltd. t/a FM104, and
(c) Radio County Sound Ltd t/a Cork 103 and 96FM, respectively.
(c) The
Products and the Markets
4.1.1 The
“products” involved here are the performing rights in sound
recordings and music videograms made by PPI Members. “Performing
right”, in relation to phonograms, is defined in PPI’s Articles of
Association as follows -
“All
or any of the following rights namely the exclusive or the sole right (whether
a record embodying a sound recording is utilised directly or indirectly) in the
Republic of Ireland to cause, or authorise, or permit or forbid, any sound
recording to be heard in public or to be broadcast or to be transmitted to
subscribers to a diffusion service”.
4.1.2 In
relation to music videograms, “Performing Right” is defined thus -
“All
or any of the following rights namely the right in the Republic of Ireland to
cause, or authorise or permit or forbid any videogram insofar as it consists of
visual images, to be seen in public or, insofar as it consists of sounds, to be
heard in public, to broadcast any videogram and to cause or authorise or permit
or forbid any videogram to be transmitted to subscribers to a diffusion
service.”
4.1.3 The
agreements with radio stations grant the right to use the whole of the PPI
repertoire for a specified purpose. The royalty payable is set out in each of
the separate agreements, and the terms of each agreement are identical.
4.2 Copyright,
in relation to an original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, is the
exclusive right to do, or to authorise other persons to do, certain acts in
relation to that work. Such acts include reproducing the work in any material
form, publishing it, performing it in public, broadcasting it, causing it to be
transmitted to subscribers to a diffusion service or making any adaptation of
it. The authorisation of other persons to use copyright material is normally by
way of licence in return for payment of royalties to the copyright owner.
4.3 In
the case of a single musical work, several copyrights may exist. For example,
the owner of copyright is the
author
in relation to the musical work, the
maker
in relation to film and sound recordings, the
broadcaster
in relation to broadcasts and the
publisher
in relation to published editions.
4.4 PPI’s
primary activity, as the record industry’s collecting society, is
collecting equitable remuneration on behalf of its members from various
categories of users in connection with the broadcasting and other “public
performance”, of members’ sound recordings.
Collecting
Societies
4.5.1 Separate
societies exist to administer different rights in musical works or recordings.
The
Irish
Music Rights Organisation
(IMRO) is the collecting society that deals with
performing
rights
for composers and publishers and licenses the public performance, broadcast and
cable transmission rights in the musical works and associated lyrics of its
members and the members of affiliated societies with which it has reciprocal
representation contracts.
Mechanical
Copyright Protection Society (Ireland) Ltd. (MCPSI)
is
the collecting society for
mechanical
copyright,
which is the restriction on reproducing the work in any material form, while
PPI
is the corresponding collection society in relation to copyright in
sound
recordings.
PPI is not aware of any other sound recording
copyright
collection society operating in Ireland at present.
4.5.2 The
rationale for collecting societies originates in industries such as the music
industry where, due to the nature of the market, the copyright holder might
otherwise be unable to enforce his copyrights at all. Collecting societies
have an intermediation role, in that they facilititate users of music and sound
recordings in using music legally through the payment of fees, which are then
re-distributed back to their members, the copyright owners.
4.5.3 Collective
enforcement of copyright in relation to musical works is common throughout the
world, wherever copyright is enforced, and the
Copyright Act, 1963, recognises
the role of collective
societies
in Ireland. Further detail on the 1963 Act is given in paragraph 5.1 of this
Decision.
4.5.4 Even
though the various collecting societies, both here and abroad, are separate
entities, there are considerable overlaps, and close connections, between them,
at least at operational level. PPI has advised the Authority, however, that,
while alliances and other similar mechanisms may be necessary for the operation
of composers’ and publishers’ collecting societies, this is not the
case with collecting societies reprenting record companies, e.g. PPI. The
latter collects royalties for Ireland only.
Direct
Collection
4.6.1 While
PPI represents most record companies whose material is being actively exploited
via
public broadcasting in Ireland, there is no obligation on such companies to
join any collecting society, and no
legal
impediment to the direct collection by them of copyright royalties.
4.6.2 Direct
Collection, however, can involve copyright owners in considerable
administrative and policing work in order to maximise the value of their
copyrights. It involves them having to establish separate arrangements with
each broadcaster exploiting their copyrights in each of the territories of the
world. Direct Collection also involves record companies in the expensive
process of advertising their contact addresses to all potentional users
throughout the world, and of verifying use of their material. A potential user
will value ease of contact and negotiation with copyright owners and will
potentially be deterred from use of copyright material if the owner is
difficult to contact.
Market
Data
4.7 PPI’s
total annual fee income (FI) for the year ended 31 December 1998 was c.
£7.5m.
The biggest single source was from radio stations (48% of FI from 26
licences), followed by nightclubs (30% from 286 licences), music video
broadcasting (9% from 6 licences) and shops (5% from 1358 licences).
(d) Copyright
Law
5.1 Copyright
law in Ireland is governed by the
Copyright Act, 1963, which covers literary,
dramatic, musical and other works. Copyright lasts during the lifetime of the
creator and for 50 years after his/her death. The 50-year period was generally
extended to 70 years by the
European Communities (Term of Protection of Copyright) Regulations, 1995
(SI 158 of 1995).
However, the 20-year extension was not a blanket amendment, and does not apply
to,
inter
alia
,
sound recordings.
5.2
The
particular
copyright in the sound recordings of PPI members is derived from
Section 17 of
the Act, which creates a separate copyright in the sound recording (as opposed
to the music itself) for the producer; it is thus a
neighbouring
right
,
separate from the so-called
first
copyright
of the author of original work created by
Section 8 of
the Act. The acts of
users restricted by
section 17 are as follows -
“(a)
making a record embodying the recording;
(b)
in the case of a published recording, causing the recording or any reproduction
thereof to be heard in public, or to be broadcast, or to be transmitted to
subscribers to a diffusion service,
without
the payment of equitable remuneration
to the owner of the copyright subsisting in the recording;
(c)
in the case of an unpublished recording, causing the recording or any
reproduction thereof to be to be heard in public, or to be broadcast, or to be
transmitted to subscribers to a diffusion service.”.
5.3 Under
Section 47(1) of the 1963 Act, copyright is transmissible by assignment,
testamentary disposition or by operation of law, as personal or movable
property. Assignments must be in writing, and can be partial, having
restrictions on what the work can be used in, the form of reproduction, the
territory and the period of the assignment. The owner of copyright can - short
of assignment - license certain acts to be done in relation to the copyright
work which would normally be an infringement of the copyright concerned. These
licences may be exclusive under
Section 25(10) of
the Act, and they authorise
the licensee, to the exclusion of all others (including the copyright owner) to
exercise rights which would normally be exercisable only by the holder of the
copyright.
5.4 Part
V of the 1963 Act (sections 29 to 42) recognises the existence of copyright
collection societies;
section 29 defines a licensing body as “
a
society or other organisation which has as its main object or one of its main
objects the negotiation or granting of licences in literary dramatic or musical
works or sound recordings or television broadcasts either as owner or
prospective owner of copyright or as agents for the owners or prospective
owners thereof
”.
Sections 30
et
seq
of
the Act give a wide jurisdiction to the Controller of Industrial and
Commercial Property in determining disputes between licensing bodies and
persons requiring licences. In particular, in the event of dispute as to what
constitutes “equitable remuneration”, Part V of
the Act vests an
adjudication function in the Controller of Industrial and Commercial Property.
Legislative
Reform
5.5 The
Copyright
and Related Rights Bill, 1999
was published in April 1999. The aim of the Bill is to update copyright law,
which now falls far behind modern international and European standards. The
Bill represents, by any yardstick, a very extensive set of legislative reform
proposals, and should be enacted this year.
EU
Approach
5.6 EU
case law imposes certain restrictions on the freedom of collecting societies in
respect of their terms of membership and activities. This is because such
societies usually operate as
de
facto
monopolies in Member States; they consequently occupy a dominant position
within a substantial part of the EU within the meaning of Article 86 of the EEC
Treaty and any abuse of this position is prohibited under EU law. The EU
Commission has investigated the practices of a number of European collecting
societies under Article 86 of the Treaty
[2]
and there have been many EU Court of Justice judgements
[3]
in respect of such societies.
5.7 The
Court of Justice made it clear, in
BRT v. SABAM
and
FONIOR
,
that collecting societies, in drawing up internal rules, must take account of
all relevant interests in such a way that a balance is ensured between “
the
requirement of maximum freedom for authors, composers, and publishers to
dispose of their works and that of the effective management of their rights
”.
5.8 In
a 1996 document entitled “
Follow-up
to the Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society
”,
the EU Commission recognised that, in some situations, Community law stipulated
mandatory rights administration by collecting societies and, indeed, in several
cases, the relevant Directives referred to collecting societies as an accepted
way of rights management. The Commission agreed with “a large number of
interested parties” that issues such as rights management and the role
and development of collective licensing should be “left to the
market”, at least for the time being, but that the issues involved should
continue to be analysed and refined.
The
United Kingdom
5.9 The
legislative background to copyright protection in the UK is broadly similar to
that in Ireland, although State structures for dealing with it vary slightly
from the Irish model. The competition functions of the UK
Competition
Commission
and
the
Director
General of Fair Trading
broadly reflect those of the Competition Authority in Ireland. The main
function of the
Copyright
Tribunal
is to provide impartial settlement of disputes over copyright licences, usually
those offered by collecting societies. However, most of the cases before the
Tribunal have tended to be concerned with royalty rates.
5.10 The
Monopolies
and Mergers Commission
(the Competition Commission’s predecessor) published a document in 1988
entitled
Collective
Licensing : A report on certain practices in the Collective Licensing of Public
Perormance and Broadcasting Rights in Sound Recordings
.
That Report was concerned primarily with the effect on the public interest of
the collective licensing system operated in the UK by Phonographic Performance
Ltd., a similar (but unrelated) collecting body to PPI. The Report concluded,
in general, that (a) collective licensing bodies were the best available
mechanism for licensing sound recordings provided they could be restrained from
using their monopoly unfairly - for example, the body should be obliged, as the
price of its monopoly, to permit the use of its repertoire in return for
equitable remuneration, (b) whether the copyright was
assigned
to the body, or the body acted as an
agent
or
licensee,
did not significantly affect users’ interests, (c) the practice of
calculating royalty rates under common tariffs did not appear adverse to the
public interest.
Recent
international developments
5.11
The
Australian Competition Tribunal has recently
[4]
reviewed an earlier decision by the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission in relation to the Australasian Performing Right Association (APRA).
5.12 APRA
operated on the basis of exclusive assignment of rights, although after a long
dispute with broadcasters, they proposed to modify this somewhat. The
Association notified eight arrangements to the Commission, incorporating these
modifications (including the membership agreement, users’ agreements, fee
distribution arrangements and overseas schemes). The Commission’s main
concerns were with a ban on users dealing directly with composers, and the
existence of blanket licences which allowed for no fee adjustment. The
Commission had licensed the overseas arrangement, but refused all the others,
although it did make it clear that it would accept an opt-out clause, among
other matters.
5.13 The
Tribunal ruled (disagreeing with the Commission) that the public benefits
deriving from APRA’s role were the key to the right approach,
particularly from the viewpoint of indispensability of particular terms. It
also said that blanket licensing was sensible, indeed essential; the problem
was the way the fees were set, and the fact that licences did not distinguish
on the basis of the actual amount of repertoire used. It also remarked on the
extent to which the Commission wanted to go beyond what Competition Authorities
in both the UK and Ireland had required in earlier similar cases.
5.14 The
Tribunal concluded generally that authorisations should be granted, but on
terms that modified anti-competitive potential. In this context, a general
opt-out system should not be required, but it did recommend a restricted one,
i.e. a non-exclusive licence for a specific work(s) (although it was unsure of
the “practical utility” of this).
5.15 Ultimately,
however, the Tribunal adjourned the case for nine months, to allow APRA to
design a non-exclusive opt-out system (as well as an alternative dispute
resolution system for smaller cases). In the meantime, it granted temporary
authorisations to the notified arrangements.
(e) The
Notified Arrangements
6. Notification
Nos CA/1048-1050/92E - Arrangements involving PPI Members
6.1.1 The
arrangements entered into between PPI and each of its members by which it acts
as agent, are contained and defined in (a) the PPI Memorandum and Articles of
Association
[5],
(b) standard forms of assignment of the performing right in sound recordings
from its member record companies, and (c) standard letters of mandate by
members. While a large amount of material was included in the documentation
accompanying the various notifications, the specific arrangements originally
notified to the Authority by PPI
in
relation to its membership
[6]
were specimen examples of four slightly varying forms of Assignment; the object
of these was the assignment to PPI of the performing right in all sound
recordings in respect of which the member record company involved was, or would
in the future be, either the owner or exclusive licensee of the copyright
therein. However, PPI advised on 22 July 1999 that only two forms of standard
assignment are now used, relating to sole traders and companies, respectively,
and submitted copies to the Authority; it also assured the Authority that the
specimen assignments originally notified had all been updated accordingly. The
Authority has, therefore, dealt with these in this decision.
6.1.2 PPI’s
Memorandum and Articles of Association also form part of the notified
arrangements.
Memorandum
of Association of PPI
6.2 The
objects for which the company is established include the following:
“(a) To
exercise and enforce on behalf of members of the Company, being producers of
phonograms and/or videograms, and/or owners of or otherwise entitled to the
performing right therein (hereinafter called the proprietors) all rights and
remedies of the proprietors by virtue of the
Copyright Act 1963 or otherwise in
respect of broadcasting and causing to be heard and/or seen in public and
causing to be transmitted via a diffusion service phonograms and videograms and
otherwise to act on behalf of members of the Company in matters relating to the
proprietors’ copyright and ancillary rights.
(b) In
the exercise and enforcement of such rights and remedies as aforesaid to
authorise others under licence or agreement or other arrangement and to
make,.......... rescind, alter or vary any such ...........arrangements with
respect to the broadcasting, the causing to be heard and/or seen in public and
the causing to be transmitted to subscribers to a diffusion service of
phonograms and videograms.......and to collect and receive.......all royalties,
fees and other moneys payable..............by all necessary actions or other
proceedings ..................and to restrain and recover damages for any
infringement of the copyright..... of the proprietors or of the company on
their behalf..............
(c) To
obtain from the proprietors such assignments, sub-licences, licences,
assurances, powers of attorney...................as may be deemed necessary or
expedient for enabling the Company to acquire all or any rights and remedies in
respect of the copyright........and.........to acquire the legal
estate...........in the copyright and to exercise and enforce in its own name
or otherwise all such rights and remedies................
(d) To
make and from time to time alter or vary any rules for regulating (1) the
manner in which the period or periods for which, and the conditions under which
the proprietors shall authorise the Company to exercise and enforce the rights
and remedies aforesaid of the proprietors in respect of such phonograms and
videograms as aforesaid; (2) the method and proportions by and in which and the
times at which the net moneys received by the Company .......................
shall be divided and apportioned among the members of the
Company..............”.
Articles
of Association of PPI
6.3 Provisions
for access to membership are set out in Articles 4 to 6 of the company’s
Articles of Association. Essentially, any owner of the performing right in
phonograms and/or videograms and any person entitled to the benefit of such
performing right is eligible for membership.
6.3.1 Article
6 requires a member, on election and from time to time thereafter, if and when
requested by the Directors in writing so to do, to assign to the Company his
existing and future performing right in any existing or future phonogram,
and/or all or part (to the extent to which he shall elect) of such right in any
existing or future videogram, then in existence or thereafter to be created,
and requires him to grant to the Company the sole power and authority:-
(a) To
authorise, permit or forbid the exercise of all his performing rights in
respect of phonograms, and/or the exercise of all or part (to the extent to
which he has elected or shall elect to assign to the Company) of such right in
respect of videograms;
(b) To
grant licences on his behalf for the use of any such performing right and to
refrain therefrom.
6.3.2 However,
Article 5 (which was added in 1996) allows the Directors, in their absolute
discretion and without prejudice to any assignment already made or to the
Articles, to re-assign to the member any part of the Performing or other Right
vested in or controlled by the Company.
6.3.3 Article
7 provides that membership has the effect of authorising the company to collect
broadcasting and public public performance fees on his behalf or take legal
action on his behalf in default, and generally to represent the member and
protect his interests in all matters concerning his performing rights.
6.3.4 Article
8 provides for termination of membership in the event of death of a member,
liquidation of a member company and expiry of copyright. It also prohibits a
member from transferring his membership to anyone else or from exercising the
rights himself directly.
6.3.5 Article
10 provides that a member may terminate his membership at any time on at least
six months previous notice in writing to the Company or on such shorter notice
period as the Directors may in their absolure discretion agree; however, while
the Company’s rights cease on such termination, any licences granted by
the Company on the member’s behalf continue until their expiry or, if
subject to termination by the Company, are terminated as soon as practicable.
On the other hand, Article 11 allows the Directors to terminate a
member’s membership on 21 days notice, subject to his right to require
the convening of an EGM to consider the matter.
Standard
Forms of Assignment
6.4.1 The
substance of the standard form of assignment is in paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof,
and is identical in the case of both
Sole
Traders
and
Companies,
as follows -
“2.
The
Grantor
HEREBY
ASSIGNS
to the Company
ALL
THAT
the performing right in the territory in each and every sound recording owned
(either legally or beneficially) by the Grantor at the date hereof and during
its membership of the Company which has not already been assigned to the
Company pursuant to any earlier assignment
AND
by way of present assignment of future copyright all that the performing right
in the territory in each and every sound recording hereafter created the
copyright in which shall be owned by the Grantor (either legally or
beneficially)
TO
HOLD
the same unto the Company for the full period of copyright and thereafter in
perpetuity subject only to the provisions affecting the same contained in the
Articles of Association of the Company.
3.
Subject
to any previous existing exclusive licence [which] the Grantor may have granted
to the Company, the Grantor
HEREBY
GRANTS
to the Company the sole and exclusive licence (to the exclusion of all persons
including the Grantor) to exercise the performing right in the territory in
each and every sound recording which was, is or becomes exclusively licensed to
the Grantor for the Territory during the Grantor’s membership of the
Company (regardless of whether such sound recordings are now in existence or
hereafter created)
TO
HOLD
the same unto the Company for the full period of the Grantor’s licence in
respect of each such sound recording subject only to the provisions affecting
the same contained in the Articles of Association of the Company.”.
6.4.2. The
purpose of the Assignment in this format is effectively to place PPI in the
shoes of each of its members for the purposes of collecting revenues for the
public performance and broadcasting of that member’s sound recordings in
the State and to restrain, and recover damages for, any infringement of the
copyright subsisting therein.
Specimen
Mandates
6.5.1 PPI
also notified two specimen mandates which its record company members sign
[7].
The first of these - signed by EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd., and relating to
music
videograms
- is as follows -
“We
hereby confirm that as members of Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Limited we
authorise and wish you to control and license as our agent in the Republic of
Ireland our rights in music videograms including the reproduction,
broadcasting, public performance and transmission to subscibers to diffusion
services of our music videograms. This mandate is to remain in force until
withdrawn by us in writing.”
6.5.2 The
second specimen mandate notified - signed by A&M Records Ltd., and relating
to
reproduction
of sound recordings by background music suppliers -
is as follows -
“We
hereby confirm that as members of Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Limited we
authorise and wish you to control and license as our agent in the Republic of
Ireland our legal rights in relation to the dubbing (i.e. the reproduction) by
background music suppliers of all our sound recordings including those sound
recordings wherein the copyright is controlled by us. This mandate is to
remain in force until withdrawn by us in writing.”
7. Notification
No. CA/26/96 - Radio Station Agreements
7.1 In
addition to the assignment arrangements described above, PPI also notified
three separate, but identical, agreements
with
the three largest privately-owned radio stations operating in the State,
licensing the use by them of sound recordings, from the start-up date of each
station to 31 December 2003. Essentially, they provide for rates of equitable
remuneration to be paid by the stations (as a sliding percentage of Net
Advertising Revenue
[8]),
for calculation and payment of any arrears, for projections each year of the
next year’s income, for estimated monthly actual payments in arrears, for
logging of records played, and for inspection of the station’s books and
records.
(f) Arguments
in Support of Issuing a Certificate
Assignment
Arrangements - Notification Nos. CA/1048-1050/92E
8.1 PPI
submitted that the arrangements between it and its members, whereby the members
assigned the performing right, did not have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in relation to the use of
the members’ repertoire in the State. The concept of normal competition
as understood in relation to, for example, the Sale of Goods could not be
sensibly applied to the use of copyright material. Copyright was of value only
if there was an effective means of protecting it, and PPI represented the best
means of protecting the copyright of its member record companies. The nature
of the market was such that some special mechanism had to be devised to enable
rights-holders and users to deal efficiently with each other, and that was
PPI’s function. In other words, the collective administration of PPI
members’ rights was indispensable, as producers’ rights in sound
recordings could only be satisfactorily exercised and protected through an
appropriate collective licensing scheme.
8.2 PPI
stated that no record company was obliged to join it, or to remain a member.
PPI, as a statutorily-recognised licensing body, existed because it gave its
members the most efficient and low cost means of licensing the rights in
question, while giving users instant and immediate access to the widest
possible repertoire by the issue of one copyright licence.
8.3 PPI
submitted that it would be impracticable for members to negotiate individually
with users and, as an economic proposition, individual negotiation would only
be economically suitable for five of its members, i.e. the five largest who
could afford to maintain a copyright licensing department employing a number of
suitably qualified staff. The nature of the market was such that some special
mechanism had to be devised to enable rights-holders and users to deal
efficiently with each other. Due to the high cost of individual transactions,
and the time factor involved, a collective licensing body such as PPI was the
natural solution - not for any monopolistic reason, but because it was the
natural and sensible way to conduct transactions in the market place.
8.4 PPI’s
activities could only assist competition between record companies by making
available to all companies, large or small, an efficient means of exploiting
their public performance and broadcasting rights. In particular, PPI reduced
the high barriers to market entry which would otherwise exist for new companies
if they were faced with the need to negotiate these rights individually. It
was claimed that major difficulties of administration and enforcement would
occur if individual licensing was allowed, and monitoring of licensing terms
and conditions would be virtually impossible by the rights-holders. Also,
mounting infringement actions to restrain copyright infringement would become
much more complicated and difficult than it was at present. Therefore, it
concluded, the system of copyright enforcement would be seriously weakened and
as a consequence copyright as an intellectual property right would be greatly
diminished.
8.5 PPI
added that the main benefits which a member derived from entering into a
standard form of assignment in favour of PPI were as follows -
(a)
PPI
acted as a centralised collective licensing body for the member record company
in respect of its repertoire - past, present and into the future. It was open
to any member to restrict the number of recordings in its repertoire which were
covered by the standard form of assignment but, for obvious and practical
purposes, each member chose to assign to PPI its full repertoire at any given
time.
(b)
The
ongoing costs of collecting royalties from users in the State were obviously
much lower for the member who assigned his/her/its full repertoire to PPI.
(c)
The
valuable intellectual property of the member record company, i.e. the copyright
in its sound recordings, was protected by PPI’s activities in ensuring
copyright infringement was kept to a minimum. The member record companies thus
protected were the makers of the sound recordings who invested in the
performance of such music, so fostering music to the greater benefit to the
community and, obviously, themselves.
(d)
The
member record company did not have to establish a self-contained licensing
department in its premises - which would not be economically viable unless the
company was licensing an enormous amount of product.
(e)
Regular
annual distributions of royalties were made by PPI to its member record
companies, with deduction only of a nominal administrative charge.
Radio
Station User Agreements - Notification No. CA/26/96
8.6 In
addition to the arguments advanced by PPI in the context of its membership
arrangements, it also submitted a number of extra arguments in support of the
granting of certificates to its agreements with the three named radio stations
- 98FM, FM104 and Cork 103/96FM.
8.7 PPI
submitted that, without PPI, broadcasters would have to apply directly to each
record company for permission to use particular sound recordings. This would
result in substantial costs to broadcasters and only the larger ones could fund
such activities, thus eliminating the smaller stations from the market.
8.8 According
to PPI, the suggestion that the existence of a number of collection societies
offering different repertoire would give users a wider choice was illusory.
From a broadcaster’s point of view, the convenience of a one-stop-shop
approach to the record industry via PPI ensured that listeners and patrons
could listen to all such repertoire.
8.9 PPI
further stated that, in its Judgement in
Ministere
Public v Tournier
and
Lucazeau
& Others v. SACEM
[9],
the European Court of Justice had stated that -
“...copyright
management societies pursue a legitimate aim when they endeavour to safeguard
the rights and interests of their members vis-a-vis the users of recorded
music. The contracts concluded with the users for that purpose cannot be
regarded as restrictive of competition for the purposes of Article 85 unless
the contested practice exceeds the limits of what is necessary for the
attainment of that aim...”.
PPI
submitted that its agreements with the three broadcasters did not, in this
context, exceed the limits of what was necessary to safeguard the rights and
interests of its members.
8.10 In
agreeing and accepting a certain level of equitable remuneration from each of
the three broadcasters concerned, PPI was granting permission to the
broadcasters, on behalf of its various member record companies, to use sound
recordings. This was simply a permission by PPI to broadcast sound recordings
which would otherwise be unlawful and did not amount to an agreement which had
as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition in the State or in any part of the State.
8.11 The
function of the Controller of Industrial and Commercial Property under
Section
31 of the
Copyright Act, 1963, ensured that PPI’s arrangements with users
of sound recordings could not prevent, restrict or distort competition in the
State or in any part of the State. The mechanism in
Section 31 allowed any
user of sound recordings to refer to the Controller the fairness of PPI’s
tariffs. The Controller could hear this reference himself or he could appoint
an Arbitrator. In other words, PPI could not charge the highest price and
expect to go unchallenged.
8.12 Additionally,
PPI was constrained by market conditions not to set unreasonable fees as
otherwise an optimum number of uses and users would not be guaranteed to
PPI’s members. The rates charged by PPI were uniform as it did not apply
different charges to radio stations with similar turnover levels.
(g) Arguments
in Support of Issuing a Licence
9.1 In
addition to the arguments advanced in
paragraph
8 above, PPI also brought forward additional argumentation in support of their
application for a licence.
The
arrangements contribute to improving the provision of services
9.2 PPI
submitted that collecting societies were borne out of necessity, and were
formed to reduce the costs of individual negotiations and of monitoring
copyright use and policing infringements. PPI, as a statutorily recognised
licensing body, existed because it gave its members the most efficient and
low-cost means of licensing the rights in question, while giving users instant
and immediate access to the widest possible repertoire by the issue of one
copyright licence. Copyright was of value only if there was an effective means
of protecting it, and PPI represented the best means of protecting the
copyright of its member record companies. From those companies’ point of
view, PPI represented the most efficient cost-effective means of exploiting the
rights in question and, for almost all record companies, the only practicable
way of doing so. The only alternative was a system whereby individual
copyright owners administered their own rights, which would result in
significantly slower access to copyright material by broadcasters and other
users.
9.3 It
was universally accepted that there was public benefit and cost saving in the
collective administration of copyrights, and that such benefit outweighed any
detriment to competition. In this context, PPI acknowledged that, in several
cases, its members’ repertoire was made available by means of a common
tariff and this was, prima facie, a restriction on competition. However, it
reiterated that the advantages for users, as well as rights-holders, outweighed
the disadvantages.
The
arrangements allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit
9.4 PPI’s
blanket licence system was established as much in response to the requirements
of users as in the interests of PPI members. It reflected the fact that most
users wanted a blanket licence, and any attempt to be selective as to
repertoire licensed would lead to increased administrative costs without
producing a material saving in the licence fee.
9.5 PPI,
as a central licensing body, also benefited users in that all public
performance users and broadcasters did not have to engage in individual
negotiations with individual rights-holders to secure use of a wide repertoire
of music. Such a task would be out of all proportion to the value such music
users could derive from the use of such repertoire. The number and
circumstances of users, and the number and variety of sound recordings used,
made it practically impossible for users to identify rights holders in due
time, ask for their authorisation and negotiate their remuneration and other
conditions of use and also pay the fees on an individual basis.
9.6 In
the absence of PPI, there would be a much more restricted, and slower, access
to record industry repertoire by users.
9.7 Finally,
PPI submitted that collective licensing was the only practical way in which
users could trace the appropriate copyright owner for permission to use a sound
recording or music videogram.
The
arrangements do not impose on the undertakings concerned terms which are not
indispensable
9.8
PPI
stated that there was no obligation on a record company to join PPI, or to
license all its repertoire to PPI and, therefore, such companies could deal
directly with radio stations and other users. However, they had decided that
it was in their best interests to be members of a collecting society and, even
if they wished to opt out of PPI, they could give six months notice in writing,
or such shorter period of notice which the Board in its absolute discretion
could accept. PPI’s Memorandum and Articles of Association contained no
terms which were not indispensable.
9.9 All
PPI’s tariffs were structured to take account of the commercial
exploitation and use of the repertoire licensed. While it was confident that
none of the arrangements contained terms that were not indispensable,
nevertheless all such terms were, in any event, under the jurisdiction of the
Controller of Industrial and Commercial Property.
The
arrangements do not afford the possibility of eliminating competition
9.10 PPI
stated that its member record companies were free at any time to leave PPI
and/or license all or part of their repertoire to another new collection
society or indeed to license the repertoire directly to users themselves.
9.11 Moreover,
PPI pointed to the powers of the Controller which, it suggested, were designed
to ensure that PPI did not act in such a way as to eliminate competition.
Competition
and Copyright
9.12 Finally,
PPI could not choose the highest price and expect to go unchallenged. Under
section 31 of the
Copyright Act, the Controller (of Industrial and Commercial
Property) had the function of determining, in cases of dispute, the amount of
equitable remuneration payable. The mechanism of
section 31 allowed any user
to refer the fairness or otherwise of PPI’s tariffs to the Controller.
Furthermore, PPI could not stop anyone from using its members’ material.
They were entitled to use it, subject to the Controller determining what was
equitable remuneration.
(h)
Other
arguments
10.1 PPI
stated that the European Court of Justice had, in its Decision in
Case
127/73
,
BRT
v. SABAM,
held that, in practice, rights holders could not avoid joining a licensing
body, as exploitation of rights by the individual concerned was in fact
impracticable, as it presupposed various substantial resources, but undoubtedly
entailed enormous expense.
10.2 PPI
also referred to the
GEMA
Statutes
Decisions
[10],
in which the European Commission also strongly supported the case for
collective licensing bodies, holding that -
“collecting
societies membership is above all necessary in relation to communication to the
public and broadcasting rights where copyright holders are up against powerful
users of music on the demand side, i.e. the listener can exert only a very
limited influence on these uses. Only through collecting societies can the
copyright holder obtain the fair compensation due for their intellectual
labour.”.
10.3 PPI
also referred to a Report by the (UK) Monopolies and Mergers Commission in 1988
on the activities of the equivalent UK body to PPI, namely Phonographic
Performance Limited (PPL, and no direct connection to PPI), pointing out that
the Commission’s main finding was that collective licensing of sound
recordings, as practised by PPL, was in the best interests of both the
rights-holder and the user.
(i) Subsequent
Developments
11.1 On
19 November, 1999, the Authority published notice of its intention to issue a
licence in respect of the all seven arrangements originally notified to it, and
invited any observations within two weeks from the date of publication of the
notice. Arising from that, the Authority received one submission on 2
December, 1999, in the joint names of the Irish Hotels Federation (IHF), the
Irish Nightclub Industry Association (INIA) and the Vintners Federation of
Ireland (VFI).
11.2 IHF/INIA/VFI
represent one distinct “public” category of users of copyright in
sound recordings, and are affected only by some of the arrangements originally
notified to the Authority, i.e. Notification Nos. CA/1051/92E - CA/1053/92E.
The submission raised a series of objections to these arrangements which the
Authority wishes to study and consider in more detail. For example, the
submission drew the Authority’s attention to a Supreme Court Judgement in
1995, which IHF/INIA/VFI maintained was very relevant to the notified
arrangements concerned.
11.3 In
the circumstances, this Decision now relates only to four of the cases
originally notified, i.e. Notification Nos. CA/1048/92E, CA/1049/92E,
CA/1050/92E (the Membership Agreements) and CA/26/96 (the Radio Station
Agreements); the remaining three cases will be the subject of a separate
decision at a later stage.
Assessment
(a) Applicability
of Section 4(1) to Arrangements Notified
12.1
Section
4(1) of the
Competition Act, 1991, states that “
all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices, which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition in goods or services in the State or
in any part of the State are prohibited and void
”.
The
Undertakings and the Arrangements
12.2
Section
3(1) of the
Competition Act defines an undertaking as “
a
person, being an individual, a body corporate or an unincorporated body engaged
for gain in the production, supply or distribution of goods or the provision of
a service
”.
PPI is engaged for gain in acting as a collecting society for public
performance rights and is, an undertaking. The members of PPI are engaged for
gain in making sound recordings and music videograms that are to be
commercially exploited and are, therefore, undertakings. The three named radio
stations are engaged for gain in the broadcast of sound recordings.
T
he
relevant agreements are agreements between undertakings, and they have effect
within the State.
The
Membership Arrangements
12.3.1
The
assignment agreements notified are formal written agreements in standard form
constituting categories of agreement between undertakings for the purpose of
the
Competition Act, and the Specimen written Mandates notified simply carry
those assignments into effect. The Authority also takes into consideration the
Articles of Association of PPI, since the assignment/mandate arrangements alone
would have no life of their own, i.e. the assignment is in pursuance of the
assignor’s membership of PPI, with membership a precondition to the
administration by PPI of the performing right on their behalf.
12.3.2 In
the case of sound recordings, what is assigned is the exclusive or the sole
right to cause, authorise, permit or forbid any such recording to be heard in
public or broadcast. The essential feature of the assignment arrangements is
that they involve a transfer of ownership of property (the performing right)
from the record company to PPI, thereby granting PPI the exclusive right
necessary to exploit the right for the period of the agreement. As such, the
arrangements ordinarily preclude the member from administering the performing
right himself, e.g. by granting an individual right to individual users, or
from engaging the services of any other collecting organisation.
12.3.3 The
cumulative effect of the network of similar agreements established between the
many Irish record company members of PPI creates a restriction on the freedom
of rights users to purchase the global performing right from any supplier other
than PPI. They also have the effect of restricting competition in the supply
of performing rights between individual members and they involve the
establishment and maintenance of uniform rates of royalty and other conditions
in relation to the exploitation of the performing right thereby eliminating
price competition. In effect, the arrangements, taken in their collective
context, constitute an exclusive collective copyright enforcement system
involving independent undertakings and, as such, are restrictive of competition
within the State and, in the opinion of the Authority, contravene
Section 4(1)
of
the Act.
The
Radio Station Agreements
12.4.1 As
noted at paragraph 7.1, PPI negotiated three separate agreements with the then
three largest privately-owned radio stations operating in the State, licensing
the use by them of sound recordings, from the start-up date of each station to
31 December 2003. The three agreements were notified together to the Authority
as one arrangement (being described by PPI as “the standard
agreement”), and are identical in every respect (except, obviously, the
identity of the radio station involved). Thus, the rates to be paid to PPI are
identical in each case, as are the various monitoring arrangements and
indemnities, and the agreements each have a termination date of 31 December,
2003.
12.4.2 It
is clear that these agreements involve horizontal price-fixing. Such
agreements are regarded by all competition authorities as a serious breach of
competition law. In the opinion of the Authority, such agreements contravene
Section 4(1) of
the Act.
(b)
Applicability
of Section 4(2) to arrangements notified
13.1 Under
Section 4(2) of the 1991 Act, the Authority may grant a licence in the case of
any agreement, decision or concerted practice which -
“having
regard to all relevant market conditions, contributes to improving the
production or distribution of goods or provision of services or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the
resulting benefit and which does not -
(i)
impose
on the undertakings concerned terms which are not indispensable
to
the attainment of those objectives;
(ii)
afford
undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of
a
substantial part of the products or services in question.”
Collective
enforcement of rights
13.2 The
Authority’s reasoning in relation to collective copyright enforcement
systems has been comprehensively set out on a number of previous occasions,
most recently in its
Decision
569
of 8 October, 1999 -
MCPS/MCPSI/Various
Agreements
.
13.3 In
summary, the Authority’s opinion is that, having regard to all the market
conditions, the existence of collecting societies in the musical copyright
area, and the appointment by a great many rightsowners of a single intermediary,
promotes
the production and distribution of services in the State
,
benefiting both owners and users. In the absence of collecting societies, most
rightsowners would not, in the opinion of the Authority, be in a position to
vigorously enforce the copyright in their work.
13.4 In
the opinion of the Authority, the role that collecting societies play confers
real benefits on the “intermediate” users who exploit the rights
involved, and these benefits carry through to ultimate consumers of musical
works. In the absence of a clear structure of rights and of mechanisms for
users to safely use rightsowners’ work, many products which ultimate
consumers want would not reach them, as there would always be the overhanging
possibility that someone who felt his right had been infringed would injunct
the user.
13.5 It
could be argued that the exclusivity arrangements enjoyed by PPI and other
collecting societies might afford them the possibility of
eliminating
competition in respect of a substantial part of the services in question
.
The concern would be that exclusive appointment for the vast bulk of the
relevant market, characterised as it is by network externalities, might
represent a significant, if not insurmountable, barrier to entry into the
market for intermediation of the rights concerned. However, the Authority
considers that, while there may be other barriers to entry in these markets,
the most important of them is the network externality (most rightsowners and
users have large incentives to use a single firm). The Authority recognises
that, while there is no legal barrier to the introduction of a competing
society in the sound recording rights area, such an entrant would find it
difficult to attain sufficient rightsowners to ensure viability. Nevertheless,
if one such did exist, it would be open to an individual record company to be a
member of it by having his rights reassigned to him by PPI, or indeed by
terminating his membership altogether.
Assignment
of Rights
13.6 As
regards the specific issue of assignment of rights in relation to collecting
societies, the Authority’s reasoning was clearly set out in its
Decision
326
Performing
Right Society and individual creators/publishers (Assignment of Copyright)
and
the subsequent related
Decision
445
IMRO/Writers,
IMRO/Publishers(Non corporate), IMRO/Publishers (Limited Company).
In
those cases, PRS, and later IMRO, operated a system of assignment of rights
similar to PPI. In the PRS case, the internal rules of the society provided
that, although initial assignment was compulsory, the society could then
“decline to exercise the whole or any part of the performing right in any
particular work” of a member, on the latter’s request. The
Authority took the view that, although the concept of assignment was reasonable
and necessary (and indeed was provided for by the
Copyright Act, 1963), the
manner in which it was operated in practice was not. In
Decision
326
the Authority stated that -
“Article
7(f) [of the Articles of Association] empowers PRS to return to the member all
or part of the performing right which he originally assigned to the Society.
On the face of it, this provision appears to be pro-competitive. It
represents a derogation from the restrictive ties of the assignment agreement.
It is necessary, however, to consider how the provision operates in practice.
It
is clear ................. that the provision is actually operated in a very
restrictive way. Derogations are permitted only in very restricted
circumstances. Applications from creators/performers to license their own
concerts are invariably refused. Even if a request is granted, two further
restrictions, which do not appear in the Article itself, are imposed. These
require that the appropriate PRS tariff be respected and that an exclusive
licence only be granted. PRS may also withdraw the derogation at any time. The
manner in which Article 7(f) is operated reinforces the view that the
assignment arrangements generally are indeed restrictive of competitive
activity. In the Authority's view Article 7(f), as operated at present,
offends against
Section 4(1).”,
and
the Authority refused to certify or license the arrangement.
13.7 The
arrangement was subsequently re-notified to the Authority by IMRO (by then a
fully-independent company), and the offending Article was ultimately re-worded
by IMRO as follows -
“Any
Member may (subject to compliance by the Member with the Rules), require the
Company to grant to the Member a non-exclusive licence to permit the Member to
exercise all or part of the Performing Right in respect of any particular work
or works, the Performing Right in which has been assigned to the Company
...............”.
This
amendment satisfied the Authority that all the terms of
Section 4(2) of the
1991 Act had been fulfilled, and the arrangement was licensed (
Decision
445
).
13.8 The
assignment arrangements operated by PPI are slightly different to those of
IMRO. In the IMRO case, a member can require IMRO to
license
back
,
on a
non-exclusive
basis, all or part of any performing right he has already assigned to the
company. In the PPI case, a member can
request
a full or partial
re-assignment
to him, such reassignment being at the absolute discretion of PPI. As
described in paragraph 13.6, however, IMRO’s practice had previously been
to refuse any such request. PPI has stated, on the other hand, that none of
its members has ever requested a re-assignment, and Authority has no reason to
believe that any such request would be refused. The Authority notes, in this
context, that no member of PPI has expressed any concern to Authority on this
issue.
PPI
has further pointed out that, while it would be understandable that an artist
giving a live performance might want to control that aspect of his work, it
would make no economic sense for a record company member of PPI to do the same
thing vis-a-vis its sound recordings. Indeed, they added, the extra
administration costs necessary to segregate repertoire into that which it would
allow PPI to administer and that which it wanted to administer itself would
make the record company less, not more, competitive. They concluded that any
apparent benefits of self-administration would increase member company costs
while damaging PPI’s ability to collect on their behalf. On balance,
therefore, the Authority accepts that assignment of copyright is, in principle,
licensable, and is of opinion that the variations in the PPI assignment
arrangements, compared with those previously approved in the case of IMRO, are
not such as to cause it to take a different approach in the case of PPI.
The
Authority has taken the absence of refusals to grant reassignments into account
as a factor in reaching its decision on this case. If PPI were to refuse such
requests, the Authority would regard this as a material change in circumstances
in the context of the award of a licence.
Payment
of fixed fees
13.9 The
Authority is of the opinion that, in the vast majority of cases, horizontal
price-fixing arrangements would not meet any of the conditions for the grant of
a licence. By their very nature, such arrangements tend to lower production
(and consumption) of the good or service in question and raise prices. Thus,
it is clear that horizontal agreements on the terms and conditions of sale
(including price) do not normally allow consumers a fair share of the resulting
benefit.
13.10 The
Authority does, however, recognise the very peculiar nature of this particular
market. In the absence of an intermediary such as PPI, there would be
considerable transactions costs to be incurred (on the part of
both
users and record companies) along with a concomitant risk of litigation if all
copyright was not fully respected.
If
PPI was to revert to the record company in each instance as to what rates to
charge, this would impose considerable transaction
costs
on both the companies and the users - in the absence of a collecting society,
the market would be characterised by frequent, costly litigation, as record
companies attempted to exercise their rights over their recordings. With this
in mind, the Authority is satisfied that collecting societies fill an
indispensable intermediary role between rightsowners and users. Such a regime
benefits both record companies (who can rely on PPI to act on their behalf) and
users (who can legally use copyright material in a legally safe and
uncomplicated manner).
13.11 The
Authority considers, therefore, that the setting of fixed rates in this
particular case allows users - and ultimately consumers -
a
fair share of the resulting benefit
.
Finally,
in the opinion of the Authority, the arrangements do not afford the
undertakings the possibility of
eliminating
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question
.
The collecting society, with its crucial intermediary role, ensures that
copyright can be exploited by users in a manner which increases the use of
copyright material (in a manner which simultaneously gives sufficient incentive
for companies to produce it). Furthermore, in the opinion of the Authority,
having regard to all the relevant market conditions, the role of the collecting
society
does
not impose on the undertakings terms which are not indispensable
.
As argued earlier, for PPI to act as intermediary but at the same time having
to revert to the record company to establish the fees to be charged would
defeat the purpose of the intermediation. Finally, having regard to the
relevant market conditions, where for the market for performing rights in sound
recordings to exist in a workable form (given the large network externality) it
appears necessary that the collecting society must have the bulk of record
companies on its books, the possibility of eliminating competition does not, in
the opinion of the Authority, arise.
13.12 Finally,
the Authority has taken into account the fact that the Oireachtas has
recognised, via Part V of the
Copyright Act, 1963, the existence of central
collecting societies such as PPI. In doing this, the Oireachtas obviously
satisfied itself that the existence of such collecting societies was in the
best interests, not just of composers and other rightsowners in musical works,
but of a rational and efficient distribution of the rights to use these works.
While the Authority is of the view that both the full ambit of the Competition
Acts and its own functions vis-a-vis competition apply as much to the area of
copyright protection as to any other sector of the economy, it has, in reaching
its conclusions, also taken into account the considerable jurisdiction of the
Controller of Industrial and Commercial Property to hear disputes arising from
licensing schemes, particularly those in relation to what constitutes
“equitable remuneration”.
(c)
Legislation
14. Reference
was made earlier to the publication of the
Copyright
and Related Rights Bill, 1999
.
The Bill amounts to a thorough overhaul of copyright law in Ireland in
general, the first such effort since 1963. As might be expected, the detailed
provisions of the Bill are both complex and very extensive and will, among
other matters, amend the law in many respects as regards the statutory position
of owners of copyright in musical works. While the Authority is conscious that
the provisions of the Bill could, if enacted in their present form, have an
impact on the factors underlying this decision, it is not possible to say when
the Bill may be enacted. At all events, the Authority considers that, as far
as copyright law is concerned, it must have regard solely to that law as it
currently stands.
The
Decision
15. In
the Authority’s opinion, Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Ltd. and its
members, and the radio stations the subject of this Decision, are undertakings
and the notified agreements are agreements between undertakings. The Authority
considers that the notified agreements contravene
Section 4(1) of the
Competition Act, 1991. The Authority further considers that the notified
agreements satisfy the conditions of
Section 4(2) of
the Act. It has,
therefore, decided to grant a licence in respect of the agreements concerned.
It considers that the licence should operate for a period of 10 years from the
date of this Decision. The licence therefore applies from such date until 27
January, 2010.
The
Licence
16.1
The
Competition Authority has issued the following licence:
The
Competition Authority grants a licence under
Section 4(2) of the
Competition
Act, 1991, to the following agreements on the grounds that, in the opinion of
the Authority, all the conditions of
Section 4(2) of
the Act have been fulfilled:
CA/1048/92E
- PPI/Assignment of Performing Right in Sound Recordings
[notified
on 30 September, 1992]
CA/1049/92E
- PPI/ Music Videogram Mandate
[notified
on 30 September, 1992]
CA/1050/92E
- PPI/ Dubbing Mandate
[notified
on 30 September, 1992]
CA/26/96
-
PPI/ Independent Radio Stations.
[notified
on 12 September, 1996]
16.2 The
licence applies from the date of this Decision until 27 January, 2010.
For
the Competition Authority,
Declan
Purcell
Member
28
January 2000
[1]
These include most, if not all, of the “majors”, e.g. Sony,
Universal, EMI etc.
[2]
Among them, the
GEMA
Decisions, OJ L 134/15 (20/6/71), OJ L166/22 (24/7/72), OJ L94/12 (8/4/82), and
the
GVL
Decision, OJ L370/49 (28/12/81)
[3]
Among these are
Case 127/73
,
BRT
v. SABAM and FONIOR
,
1974 ECR 313,
Case 395/87
,
Ministere
Public v. Tournier
,
1989 ECR 2521,
Cases 110/88, 241/88 and 242/88
,
Lucazeau,
Debelle
and
Soumagnac
,
1989 ECR 2811, as well as a series of cases involving
GEMA
and
GVL. [4]
Re
Australasian
Performing Right Association Ltd. [1999]
ACompT,
16 June 1999.
[5]
These were revised on 7 August 1996, and a copy has been provided to the
Authority.
[6]
Notification No. CA/1048/92E
[7]
Notification Nos. CA/1049/92E and CA/1050/92E.
[8]
NAR is defined as gross audited on-air income less an all-in reduction of [
23]%.
“On-air income” includes gross advertising sales invoiced and
gross sponsorship income.
[10]
OJ L 134/15 (20/6/71), OJ L166/22 (24/7/72), OJ L94/12 (8/4/82),
© 2000 Irish Competition Authority
BAILII:
Copyright Policy |
Disclaimers |
Privacy Policy |
Feedback |
Donate to BAILII
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IECompA/2000/580.html