Doyle & Ors v. Croke & Ors [1988] IEHC 32 (6 May 1988)

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JUDGMENT DELIVERED BY THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE DECLAN COSTELLO ON 6TH MAY 1988

Eighty-three members of the Irish Transport and General Workers Union have brought these proceedings claiming a declaration that all union members of the former work force of Irish Meat Producers Limited at the company's meat processing factory at Barnhall, Leixlip, County Kildare, are entitled to share equally in a sum of £360,000 paid to the union in settlement of an official strike called in the early part of 1986. The Plaintiffs say that their union received this sum as trustee for all its members (amounting in all to about 270 former employees of the company). The Defendants, the branch secretary and members of the strike committee involved in the dispute, say that the money is held in trust for only 150 members because of decisions taken at meetings of members of the union held in June and November 1986. The validity of the decisions taken at those meetings is an important, but not the sole, issue in the case. Adequately to explain the issues of fact and law involved I must briefly outline the history of the strike and in doing so consider the proceedings at the two important meetings to which I have referred.

Irish Meat Producers Limited experienced severe financial difficulties in 1985 and began letting off its staff. By the beginning of 1986 it was only operating with a small labour force and on the 30th January declared most of its employees redundant and sent them their statutory RPI forms terminating their employment. But about 20 employees in the cannery department remained in employment and in respect of these twenty workers strike notice was served by the union. No ballot required by Rule 128 of the union's rules was held, but nonetheless the strike was an official one and an all-out picket in respect of it was authorised by the Irish Congress of Trade Unions. It was believed that the strike could be an effective weapon for two reasons: firstly, the company had contracted to sell its premises to a firm called Bayzana Limited, and the strike could hold up the closing of the sale; secondly, there was a valuable consignment of meat in cold storage in the premises owned by a firm called Hibernia Meats Limited, and as long as an effective picket could be maintained the release of the consignment could be stopped.

The union made clear to the Manager of the Employment Exchange in Dublin in a letter of the 13th of February that the dispute, which related in the main to a claim for extra statutory redundancy payments, only involved certain named employees from the cannery department and not the entire company's work force and as a result those of the labour force who remained unemployed obtained social welfare payments during the strike. But it is perfectly clear, and on this point there is no dispute, that the strike was called not only to obtain benefits for the 20 employees of the cannery department but for the entire work force. And so negotiations began by the union on behalf of all their 270 members (which comprised almost the entire of the company's work force) for the payment to them of extra statutory redundancy payments, What was sought was the payment of a lump sum (not individual sums relating to length of service) which would then be divided by the union equally amongst its members, and at the initial stage of the negotiations the union had quantified its claim at £1.6M.

The strike was organised by a strike committee and the branch secretary. Rule 131 of the union's rules provides that the "Section Committee" referred to in the rules is to become the "Strike Committee" and that the strike committee is to be "responsible to the branch official in respect of the pursuance of the strike." The rule went on to provide that "no decision or action shall be taken by the strike committee without consulting with and obtaining the approval of the branch official concerned". The branch official concerned in this case was the branch secretary of the Lucan Branch of the union, a full-time official of the union. Although he was given a crucial and decisive role in the conduct of the strike, the strike committee was also involved in the decision-making processes - a factor in the case to which I will later return.

But for the strike to be effective the picket which the union had placed on the company's plant had to be manned for twenty-four hours a day for seven days a week, as otherwise the meat in cold storage might be moved and one of the principal weapons available in the dispute rendered useless. Not unreasonably, as the union was negotiating on behalf of all its members and not just those technically on strike, support for the picket from the entire work force was sought. By a letter written to all members on the 19th February 1986 (signed by the branch secretary and the chief shop steward) each member was informed that the "dispute was concentrated on the issue of payment of redundancy agreements and the right of employment in a transfer situation" and that it was imperative that every member should take part in the picket line and contribute £3 per week to supplement the dispute benefit of £36 per week which was being paid to the cannery workers. The letter added:

'if you do not attend for picket duty or contribute to the fund it will be accepted that you are not interested in either the dispute or its outcome and we shall act accordingly."

I have underlined the word "or" in this letter to draw attention to the fact that members were being required to take part in picket duty or to contribute to the strike fund. Whilst the Defendants do not claim this letter had any legal consequences it is indicative of the view which at an early stage in the strike the branch secretary had formed as to the obligations of members in relation to it.

Negotiations on the union's claim for a lump sum in respect of extra statutory redundancy payments for its members took place under the aegis of the Labour Court who issued a recommendation that the claim be settled by payment by the company of £400,000. It was decided to call a meeting of the union's members to consider this offer. But instead of giving notice of this meeting to all members by letter or by press advertisement it was decided merely to post a notice in the hut erected for members on picket duty at the factory premises at Leixlip. This notice informed members that a general meeting of the union would be held in the "Hitching Post" at Leixlip on 10th June, but it made no reference to the business to be transacted and in particular no reference that a resolution would be discussed affecting members' rights in relation to any negotiated settlement. It was explained in evidence that notice of this meeting was not posted to all members because when the factory was in operation union meetings were convened by notice pinned up in the factory premises and that it was considered that a notice pinned in the hut at the picket line would suffice. But the evidence satisfies me, and I so hold, that whilst a large number of members either saw the notice or learnt of the meeting by word of mouth a significant number did not know that it was to be held. In this connection it is relevant to point out that it transpired quite late in the case that an earlier meeting of members had been held in the previous March which had been convened in a similar way but none of the witnesses who gave evidence were asked about this meeting and I accept counsel's statement that they knew nothing about it. Furthermore, it is clear from the evidence that not all the union's members lived in the Leixlip area and that a number, for various reasons, had not been attending regularly for picket duty and so it is reasonably probable that a number outside Leixlip would not have seen any notification or otherwise have learnt of the proposed meeting.

The meeting approved the acceptance of the recommendation for settlement proposed by the Labour Court. But it was known that either this recommendation had not been or would not be approved by the company and it was fully appreciated that the strike was far from settled. Strong criticism was expressed at the meeting at the lack of support for the picket and after a full discussion a resolution was proposed and seconded and then adopted unanimously by those present (including some of those who are Plaintiffs in these proceedings) in the following terms:

"That people who are not doing picket duty or who_ henceforth do not attend for two (2) six hour picket shifts per week shall not be deemed to be in dispute and the union officials and committee is directed not to seek or represent such persons in pursuance of extra statutory redundancy entitlements."

As this resolution (referred to throughout the strike and these proceedings as "the June mandate") is the sheet-anchor of the Defendants' defence it is necessary clearly to understand what it meant. It was a decision that the union was to represent in any future negotiations for extra statutory redundancy payments only those members who in future attended for two six-hour periods of picket duty per week and that only those members who in future attended for two six-hour periods of picket duty were to be entitled to participate in any lump sum which the union might obtain from the company in any future negotiations.

Whilst a copy of this resolution was placed in the hut at the picket line the evidence established that compliance with its terms was never demanded by the strike committee nor was proof of compliance made a condition for inclusion in the list of those entitled to share in the settlement of the union's claim which was drawn up by the strike committee and the branch secretary at the end of the strike. The reasons for this were not made clear at the hearing. It may have been because the necessity of maintaining a twenty-four hour picket on every day of the week made it very difficult for members of the strike committee to ascertain whether those on picket duty in fact did a six-hour shift; or it may have been because the strike committee considered that the obligation to do two six-hour shifts per week was too stringent a requirement. For whatever reason, those on picket duty were merely asked to sign their names on a sheet of paper to establish their attendance at the picket but were not required to state the length of time during which they did duty. And in a letter written shortly after the meeting to those members who it was considered were not supporting the picket no copy of the resolution was sent and no reference was made to the need to do two six-hour periods of picket duty per week. The letter dated 18th June reads as follows :

A general meeting of our Irish Meat Producers Workers was held on Tuesday, 10th June, 1986 in the Hitching Post, Leixlip. At this meeting many of the members expressed anger at the number of members who were not turning up for picket duty. Accordingly it was formally proposed and agreed to mandate the strike committee not to negotiate redundancy payments on behalf of members who were not attending at that picket line.

A register of picketers has now been kept since that meeting and your failure to attend for your share of picket duty has been noted. We must now inform you that in accordance with the mandate of the members we will have no choice but to drop your name from the list of those seeking extra redundancy unless (a) there is an immediate effort by you to make up lost picketing time, or, (b) there is a genuine explanation for your absence."

It will be noted that the letter (a) requires immediate attendance for picket duty but does not specify that two six-hour periods per week are required; (b) indicates that if a genuine explanation for non-attendance is available the union will continue to act for the member in the claim for redundancy payment, and (c) that no reference is made in it to the necessity to contribute to the strike fund.

The evidence adduced on the Plaintiffs' behalf (which was not contradicted) established that very imprecise records of those attending for picket duty were maintained; that some who signed the register left immediately thereafter; that some did picket duty but did not bother to sign. It is clear that although members of the strike committee attended for some period of every day during the period of the strike, it would not have been possible to draw up an accurate list of those members of the union who attended twice per week for a six-hour period of duty. In fact, the list drawn up at the end of the strike by the strike committee and branch secretary of those members entitled to share in the settlement was not compiled in accordance with the June resolution. The 150 members chosen by the strike committee and branch secretary to participate in it were the members who in their opinion had supported the strike by attending for picket duty to an extent which the committee and the branch secretary considered adequate in all the circumstances and who had contributed to the strike fund and also those members who had contributed to the strike fund but whose non-attendance at picket duty was excused by the strike committee and the branch secretary for reasons which they considered genuine. This method of compiling the list cannot, in my judgment, be regarded as compliance with the June resolution. By their June resolution the members present laid down clear conditions for participation in any negotiated settlement, and the resolution cannot be construed as permitting the strike committee and branch secretary to ignore those conditions and as conferring on them the wide discretionary adjudicative powers they in fact exercised.

There is another finding of fact in relation to the compilation of the list which I must record. None of the nine members of the union who gave evidence on the Plaintiffs' behalf had any prior notification of their exclusion from the list of participants and I think I can conclude that, as a matter of probability, the procedures adopted by the strike committee and branch secretary did not involve prior notification to members proposed to be excluded. I was impressed by their evidence and I think it is highly probable that if it was given to an impartial committee compiling a list in accordance with the criteria employed by the strike committee and branch secretary in this case, the names of each of these nine witnesses would have been included.

Irish Meat Producers Limited was a member of a group of companies of which Cork Marts Limited was parent. Mr Declan Collins was group chief executive and in September of 1986 he was appointed acting chief executive of Irish Meats. The company was then hopelessly insolvent, although it had not gone into liquidation. He set about trying to settle the strike. He was aware that a claim for a lump sum payment in respect of extra statutory redundancy had been made on behalf of 270 members of the ITGWU and the first thing he did was to obtain authorisation from the parent board for payment of £270,000, being £1,000 per employee. He then sought a contribution towards a settlement from Hibernia Meats Limited (whose meat was strike-bound in the factory) and Bayzana Limited (who had purchased the factory premises). Early in November he made an offer of £270,000 plus the proposed contributions from the other two companies, which brought the settlement offer to £380,000, but he made it clear that this was a conditional offer and that the contribution had not been finalised. He also offered to make arrangements to ensure payment of statutory redundancies to all former employees. A general meeting of the union was called for the 20th November (which I will consider in greater detail in a moment). It approved the settlement. The branch secretary wrote on the 26th November confirming that the settlement proposal "has been accepted by our membership in full and final settlement of any claims which we may have on your Company in respect of redundancy payments" and that the official dispute had been terminated. In fact the settlement figure had to be amended to £360,000 and of this £310.000 was sent to the union on 2nd February 1987 and a further £50.000 was sent after the meat had been released to Hibernia Meats. Mr Collins made it clear in evidence that when payment was made in February he was aware of the dispute that had broken out in the union about those entitled to participate in the settlement but that at that time he did not care how the money was distributed as long as the picket was called off and the strike ended.

Notice of the meeting of 20th November was not sent to all members. Prior to the meeting the branch secretary and the strike committee had drawn up a list of 150 members of the union to whom it was proposed to distribute the settlement of £380,000. The list was prepared on the basis to which I have already referred and only those members on this list were notified that the meeting was to be held. Other members of the union learnt of the meeting and attended but were informed that they would not be permitted to vote at it. A vote was taken at the meeting on the settlement proposals and they were approved by a large majority of those voting. No decision was sought or obtained from the meeting confirming the June resolution, and no decision was sought or obtained from the meeting confirming the validity of the manner in which the branch secretary and strike committee had prepared the list of participating members.

I must now come to a consideration of the legal consequences which flow from the facts of this case.

The Plaintiffs claim a declaration that the sum of £360,000 is held in trust by the Defendants for the entire former work force of Irish Meat Producers Limited who were members of the union. The Defendants do not deny that the relationship between the members of the union and the union itself could result in the creation of a trust in respect of monies received by the union on its members behalf but claim that in this case they are held in trust only for those members entitled to it in pursuance of the terms of the resolution of 10th June 1986.The Defendants' case therefore depends on the validity of the June resolution and on establishing that the division of the settlement was in accordance with it.

Before turning to consider these issues there is one aspect of the Plaintiffs' claim to which I should briefly refer. There could be circumstances in which an employer pays a lump sum to a union so as to impress it with a trust of his creation. But that did not happen in this case. It is true that Mr Collins negotiated with the union a lump sum payment in respect of claims to extra statutory redundancy payments which had been made, as far as he knew, on behalf of all its members. But when the sum was actually paid he was aware that a dispute had broken out in the union and that it was proposed that only some of its members were to participate in it. He explained that he paid it over on the basis that the union would call off the strike and that once that was done he was not concerned how the sum was divided. I do not think that anything the employer may have intended by the payment had any bearing on the legal situation arising from the relationship which existed between the Plaintiffs and their union and resulting from the facts of the case which I have outlined.

In so far as the defence depends on the plea that the union is acting in accordance with the June resolution it must fail because of the finding I have made that the list of participants was not in fact drawn up in accordance with it and because it would now be impossible to prepare a list in accordance with it, no records of picket duty being available to enable this to be done. But issues relevant to the validity of the June resolution also arise in relation to the November meeting and so I think I should consider whether, in any event, the June resolution was a valid one.

lt is accepted by the union's counsel that arising out of the contract between each member of the union and the union itself a lump sum negotiated by the union in respect of extra redundancy payments for all its members would normally be held by the union in trust for equal distribution amongst all its members. It is accepted by the Plaintiffs' counsel that this situation could be altered by the union's members but he urges

(a) that each member has as a matter of law the right to require that fair procedures be adopted in the convening and conduct of any meeting which might decide to limit participation in the settlement in the manner attempted at the meeting on 10th June;

(b) that the proceedings adopted for convening and conducting the June meeting were not fair because (i ) no proper notification that a meeting was to be held was given to the members and (ii) no prior notice was given to members that the resolution limiting members' participation in the settlement was to be proposed at the meeting, and

What falls for determination firstly, therefore, is whether as a matter of law the members had the right to fair procedures as claimed on their behalf and if so whether this right was denied them.

I think the Plaintiffs are correct in their contention that they are entitled to fair procedures in the conduct of their union's affairs which materially affect their interests. This right is derived from three different sources. Firstly, it arises under Article 40(6)(l)(iii) of the Constitution by which the State guarantees liberty for the exercise, subject to public order and morality, of the right of citizens to form associations and unions. The effect of that Article was considered by the President of the High Court, Mr Justice Finlay, in Rodgers v. I.T.G.W.U. (unreported, 15th March 1978). That was a case relating to a decision of the Dockers Section, No.5 Branch, Cork, of the Defendant union to retire compulsorily members of the section reaching the age of 65. Some days prior to 25th June 1976 a notice was posted in the usual place used for convening meetings of members that a meeting would be held on that day, at the bottom of which it was indicated that the terms of the national wage agreement were to be considered. A resolution was proposed at the meeting and adopted that a scheme of compulsory retirement at 65 with a pension should be introduced. The Plaintiff arrived late at the meeting after the resolution had been adopted. He had no idea that the subject of compulsory retirement at 65 was to be discussed. The Plaintiff objected to being compulsorily retired and instructed a solicitor to write on his behalf to the union. As a result, another meeting was summoned for 3rd August 1976. The Court found as a fact that the Plaintiff was aware that the question of compulsory retirement would be discussed at it. However, he did not attend this meeting. At it a ballot vote was taken to confirm the resolution of the 25th June meeting. Subsequently the Plaintiff tried to continue to work but was informed that the rest of the men would not work with him and he then instituted proceedings against the union. A number of issues were raised. That which is relevant to these proceedings was his claim that in relation to meetings of the section of his union he was entitled to fair procedures. He asserted that a basic requirement of natural justice would be that for any important matter which might be decided by a meeting he should have explicit notice of it and given an opportunity of expressing his point of view, and that in respect of both meetings he did not receive fair or proper notice that the question of his compulsory retirement would be discussed- The President rejected the argument that a right to fair procedures arose because the resolution amounted in effect to the imposition of a penalty on him so that the proceedings at the meeting could be regarded as quasi-judicial. But he held that the right to fair procedures arose from the provisions in the Constitution relating to the trade unions. He pointed out that the constitutional right to the formation of trade unions involves the right to join or not to join existing trade unions and went on (page 14):

"It is, in my view, a necessary corollary of the right to join and become a member of a trade union that the right must extend to taking part in the democratic processes provided by it and in particular to taking part in the decision-making processes within the rules of the trade union. It would clearly be open to a trade union so to formulate its rules so that in regard to certain matters or even in regard to all matters that decision-making would be in the hands of delegates or elected officers and specified members of the unions...It is quite clear from the rules of the defendant union that they envisaged the making of a decision of this description by the particular Section which would be affected by it and that ultimately it could only be made in accordance with the rules by the popular will of the members of the section. It follows from this, in my view, that the Plaintiff had both a right under the rules and as part of the exercise of his constitutional right to take part, if he so wished, in the decision-making process" (page 15).

The President held that the Plaintiff did not know that the meeting of the 25th June was to discuss compulsory retirement and he held that

"having regard to the right of the plaintiff to reasonable notice of the topic to be discussed so as to afford him a reasonable opportunity of taking part in the decision, the notice of the meeting of 25th June was inadequate and the decision affecting him reached at that meeting was for that reason invalid."

He held, however, that with regard to the second meeting of the 3rd August the Plaintiff knew that the question of compulsory retirement would be discussed at it (even though it was not specifically referred to in the notice convening it), that he had fair and reasonable notice of it, and that the resolution passed at it was therefore valid.

That decision established that a member of a trade union has a right to require that in the conduct of the affairs of the trade union fair procedures will be adopted, and that in certain circumstances the failure to give notice of a proposed resolution could amount to a breach of fair procedures and be a ground for invalidating it. It has been suggested (see "Irish Trade Union Law", Kerr and Whyte, p.26) that whilst a member of a union would certainly have a common law right to natural justice which would include the right to fair procedures the suggested constitutional right to participate in the decision-making processes of a union does not exist because citizens do not have a constitutional right to join an established trade union (except possibly where membership is a prerequisite to obtaining employment in a particular firm). But I do not find this criticism persuasive because it seems to me that if the constitutional right of citizens to form associations and unions is to be effective the Article in which it is to be found should not be construed restrictively as the right would be of limited value if it did not protect individual members against procedures which might be unfair to them. I have no difficulty, therefore, in respectfully following this decision and in holding that the Plaintiffs and all the members of their union had a constitutional right by virtue of Article 40(6) (1) (iii) to fair procedures in the conduct of the strike and the negotiations leading to its settlement.

They also derived this right from another Article of the Constitution. It had been established in In re Haughey (1971) I.R. 217 at 264,- that Article 40(3) of the Constitution contains a guarantee to the citizen of basic fairness of procedures, and in Glover v. B.L.N. Ltd (1973) I.R. 388, Walsh J. pointed out that that decision implied that statutes, regulations or agreements setting up machinery for taking decisions which may affect rights or impose liabilities should be construed as providing for fair procedures (page 425) and he implied into a contract of employment from that Article a term that fair procedures would be adopted. So it seems to me that there should be implied into the contract between the union and each of its members by virtue of this Article a provision that fair procedures will be adopted when any decision materially affecting the members' rights is to be taken.

The right can also be derived from another source. In Breen v. A.E.U. 1971 2 Q.B. 175 the Court of Appeal in England was concerned with a case in which a district committee of the defendant union had failed to approve the election of the plaintiff as a shop steward. One of the important points in the case related to the power of the court to review the committee's decision. In the course of his judgment Denning M.R. made certain observations with which I respectfully agree, he pointed out that courts had in the past juris¬diction to review decisions of bodies carrying out judicial or quasi-judicial functions, that this jurisdiction had been extended to cover statutory bodies entrusted with discretionary powers, but that it also extended to committees of private associations such as trade unions. He pointed out that even though the rules of a union might provide committees with wide discretionary powers that that discretion was not an unfettered one: that the contract between the members should be construed as containing an implied term that the discretion would be exercised fairly (p. 190). Although his was a minority judgment, the views which I have just summarised were approved by other members of the Court of Appeal and it seems to me that they cogently express an important principle, namely, that derived from common law principles the court will imply a term into the contract of membership of a union that fair procedures will be adopted in relation to decisions taken by committees of trade unions which materially affect the rights of any of its members.

What next must be considered is whether the rights of the Plaintiffs to fair procedures have been respected. No hard and fast rules can be laid down as to what procedures should be adopted in a given case. But it seems to me that the procedures which the learned President concluded should have been adopted in the Rodgers case should have been adopted here. In the Rodgers case the resolution which was adopted had the effect of requiring the plaintiff to retire at the age of 65 and it was held that fair procedures required that notice that such a resolution would be moved should have been given to him prior to the first meeting which adopted it. Here less serious consequences for union members were involved in the June resolution but nonetheless important rights of each union member were affected by it, namely, the contractual right to require the union to represent them in negotiations with their former employers and the prima facie right to participate in any settlement that negotiations might produce. he courts must not interfere officiously in the affairs of private associations such as trade unions and must only do so in clear cases to prevent or remedy some manifest injustice. And when considering what procedures can properly be regarded as fair it must consider procedures which would be appropriate to the type of organisation or association which is to adopt them and the nature and scope of the decision to which they relate. Whilst bearing in mind these considerations it seems, nonetheless, clear to me that before a decision was taken to deprive members of the union of the rights to which I have referred proper notice should have been given to each member (a) that a meeting was to be held and (b) of the terms of any resolution to be proposed at it which might have the effect of depriving members of rights which they could reasonably believe they enjoyed in order to ensure that every member who wished to could attend and avail of the opportunity of influencing the meeting's decision as he or she thought proper. As these procedures were not adopted I must hold that the June resolution was invalid.

The conclusions relating to the right to fair procedures which I have just expressed apply with equal force to the November meeting. It follows, then, that the November meeting cannot be relied on as impliedly validating the June resolution by the approval it gave to the settlement or as impliedly approving the steps taken by the strike committee and the branch secretary in relation to it. Notice of that meeting was only given to those 150 members on the list of participants and even though non-listed members were permitted to speak at the meeting they were not entitled to vote. This means that fair procedures were not adopted in the convening and conduct of that meeting and so the Defendants cannot rely on it to defeat the Plaintiffs' claim.

Even if the June resolution had been properly adopted and even if the Defendants were correct in the way they interpreted it, their defence would fail. The procedures actually adopted by them in drawing up the list of 150 members infringed the first basic principle of natural justice, the rule against bias. All the members of the strike committee were former employees of Irish Meat Producers Limited and as such had a financial interest in the settlement and, accordingly, a financial interest in the actual number of persons who would participate in it. It has not been suggested that they in fact allowed this interest to influence the decisions in which they were involved but the test to be applied is an objective one and a reasonable person could conclude that there was a risk that an even-handed decision might not be taken by a committee all of whose members had a financial interest in its outcome. So it seems to me that even if it could be said that the June resolution had been adopted in accordance with fair procedures and that the procedures adopted by the strike committee and branch secretary were in accordance with it, the Defendants' defence would fail because those authorised procedures were themselves in breach of natural justice. Secondly, the procedures actually adopted gave no opportunity of a hearing to those against whom adverse decisions might be taken and thereby infringed the second basic rule of natural justice. It seems to me that if a committee proposes to deprive a member of a union of a substantial sum of money and his or her contractual right that the union will act on his or her behalf in a dispute because of an allegation that the member has not in its opinion adequately performed picket duty or has in its opinion no genuine excuse for failure so to do an opportunity to be heard on the allegation should be afforded. In its absence the decisions are invalid.

I must conclude, therefore, that the Plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration and injunctive relief they seek. I will discuss with counsel the terms of the Order which are appropriate in this case.

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	High Court of Ireland Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Doyle & Ors v. Croke & Ors [1988] IEHC 32 (6 May 1988) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/1988/1988_IEHC_32.html Cite as: [1988] IEHC 32

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