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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Mehigan v. Duignan [1996] IEHC 18; [1997] 1 IR 340; [1997] 1 ILRM 171 (8th October, 1996) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/1996/18.html Cite as: [1996] IEHC 18, [1997] 1 ILRM 171, [1997] 1 IR 340 |
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1. Mantruck
Services Limited (herein called "the Company") was incorporated on 11th August,
1988: its registered office is at Farnbeg, Strokestown, County Roscommon. The
registered shareholders of the Company are John Duignan (the Respondent) and
one John Dooley. Its directors are the Respondent and his wife Mary Duignan.
The main business of the Company was the supply of tail lift units and
refrigeration units for commercial vehicles. It had distribution agreements
with suppliers of refrigeration units and a supplier of tail lift units, Zepro
Lyften Produkpion AB (herein called 'Zepro'). On the 2nd July, 1993 the
Company's creditors resolved that the Company be wound up, and Michael Butler,
an insolvency practitioner was appointed as its liquidator. Subsequently, on
29th July, 1993, on the petition of Zepro, the company was ordered to be wound
up by the Court and the applicant (Mr. Mehigan) was appointed Official
Liquidator. The Company was then insolvent and unable to pay all of its debts.
2. On
9th July, 1993, an employee of Mr. Butler, Paul O'Brien, visited the Company's
premises at Roscommon and collected certain book and records of the Company
which were in a room on the premises. He filled his car with these and
intended, he says, to "return to collect other things he saw there". He
confirmed that he had not been given, or shown, any books of the Company which
throughout this hearing were referred to as "red Cathedral books". Mr. O'Brien
prepared a list of the books and records he removed on the 9th July, 1993 and a
list of the books and records ultimately delivered by him to the Applicant's
Solicitors on 30th July, 1993. On 20th August, 1993, Murphy J. ordered the
directors of the Company to hand up to the Official Liquidator "all books
records and documents and all of the stock and assets of the Company" in their
or their agents respective possession power or procurement. Following his
appointment as liquidator, Mr. Mehigan examined the books and records as
delivered to his Solicitors by Mr. O'Brien on 30th July, 1993 as a result he
believed there were, as he said, "significant and extensive" omissions in the
Company's records. He was of the view that these omissions resulted in
substantial uncertainty as to the assets and liabilities of the Company and
substantially impeded the orderly winding up of the Company. His belief that
the records were incomplete led him to apply for the Order granted by Murphy J.
on 20th August, 1993. On 18th November, 1994, two invoices of the Company were
furnished by the voluntary Liquidator to the Applicant's Solicitors. Save for
these two invoices no other documents books or records were received from the
Respondent on foot of the Order of 20th August, 1993. From the commencement of
the liquidation, the Official Liquidator had been in regular contact with the
Respondent. He had met him on 29th July, 1993 at Strokestown where the
Company's premises was: the Respondent told him he had no business being there
and that the voluntary Liquidator had removed all the books and records of the
Company. There then followed lengthy correspondence relating to what the
Official Liquidator saw as gaps, inaccuracies or deficiencies in the records he
had been given. By letter of
16th
August, 1993
,
he was assured by the Respondent that "with regard to the records again I have
advised on a number of occasions that the previous Liquidator had collected all
books and records of the Company". In an affidavit, filed on 17th November,
1994 (which Murphy J. ordered to be admitted in evidence on the hearing of this
motion), the Respondent exhibited the list of the records taken by the
Voluntary Liquidator (Mr. Butler) and asserted that:-
3. The
correspondence between the Official Liquidator and the Respondent continued,
somewhat inconclusively, during the years 1993 and 1994. In November 1994, the
Applicant Liquidator brought a motion for certain declarations pursuant to
Sections
150
and
204
of the Companies Act 1990
,
and Murphy J., on 21st November, 1994, ordered that the motion be heard on
Affidavits filed on the 4th July, 1994 (by the Applicant) and 17th November,
1994 (by the Respondent) and on oral evidence. By a further Order made on 20th
November, 1995 by Murphy J. the Respondent was directed to be examined on oath
before the Master in relation to the promotion, formation, trade dealings,
affairs and property of the Company. That examination took place on 7th
February, 1996. During the course of that examination, the Respondent told the
Master that when recording purchases, sales and receipts of the Company they
were written up into "a temporary record book" and, after being "input" into a
computer, the books were "scrapped", "disposed of " or "thrown out". The
Respondent also said that at the end of 1992, the Company was told by the VAT
Inspector to keep manual records and that they then ceased to use the computer
and reverted to a manual system at which time the "original temporary books"
were thrown out. Although the Respondent signed this transcript of evidence
taken before the Master he did so adding in writing on the transcript:-
4. At
the hearing of this motion the Respondent accepted the accuracy of the
transcript of evidence but objected to its admissibility - an objection which I
disallowed having regard to the provisions of Section 245(6) of the Companies
Act 1963 and the decision of O'Hanlon J. in
In
re Aluminium Fabricators Limited, 1984 ILRM 399.
5. The
hearing of this motion commenced on 18th day of June, 1996. The Official
Liquidator, Mr. Mehigan, was the first witness. Thereafter, Christopher
Chisholm, a partner in Grant Farrell Sparks, Auditors and accountants, and Paul
O'Brien of Michael Butler & Co. were called as witnesses. On the morning
of 20th June, 1996, it was indicated to the Court, on behalf of the Respondent,
that there might be certain books, papers and records of the Company either at
the Company's old premises, or at a farm owned by the Respondent at Kilgrass,
Strokestown in County Roscommon. An Order was made on that date for the
purpose of providing for the delivery up of such books and records to the
Official Liquidator and the hearing of the motion was adjourned until the 16th
day of July, 1996.
6. The
Motion resumed on the 16th day of July, 1996: the Official Liquidator then
resumed his evidence. He gave evidence of having visited the Roscommon
premises on 20th June, 1996 and that he recovered 28 computer discs and five
red Cathedral books. These books comprised a Sales Book, a Purchases Book and
two Cash Books and a Wages Book. The Sales Book contained details of sales
invoices for the period April 1991 to March 1993: in addition, at the back of
the book, it had a record of credit notes issued by the Company for the same
period. The Purchases Books had details of purchase invoices for the period
June 1991 to March 1993. The Cash Books recorded cheque payments and cash
receipts of the Company and were in two separate books - one covered a Bank of
Ireland account for the period 17th January, 1992 to 15th August, 1992 and the
other a National Irish Bank account for the period 15th October, 1991 to 26th
June, 1993. There was also a Wages Book covering the period April 1991 to
March 1993. The 28 computer discs, according to the Official Liquidator, were
of no assistance to him in his examination of the books and records of the
Company.
7. Following
receipt of the red Cathedral books, the Official Liquidator outlined in
evidence the position in relation to the books and records of the Company. The
following basic information and records were missing, according to Mr. Mehigan:-
9. Mr.
Mehigan expressed the view that the failure of the Company to keep books of
account (so as to properly record the above matters, and enable the financial
position of the Company be determined with reasonable accuracy and its accounts
readily and properly audited) had resulted in substantial uncertainty as to the
assets and liabilities of the Company and had substantially impeded its orderly
winding up. The uncertainty as to
assets
arose because
11. These
uncertainties as to assets and liabilities, according to Mr. Mehigan, could be
traced back to gaps or deficiencies in the records of the Company. In his
evidence he detailed a litany of error or failure to record: among these were
the facts that 149 invoices were not recorded in the Sales Book; there were
also 304 cases where sales invoice copies could not be located. There were
unrecorded credit notes and sales invoices for refrigerated units were missing;
the Purchase Book was unreliable in showing entries where goods with VAT paid
at point of entry were analysed as net purchases. A gross profit analysis done
by Mr. Mehigan disclosed a gross margin of 8.71% for the two years to 31st
March 1993 compared with a gross margin for the year ending 31st March, 1991 of
34.65%.
12. Mr.
Mehigan estimated that some 80% of the time spent by him and his staff (and the
outlay expended) related to his efforts to overcome deficiencies in the books
and records of the Company. The professional fees and outlay for all the
Liquidators work on the Liquidation to date was £94,256 plus VAT at 21%.
80% of that sum is £91,239.80. Mr. Mehigan expressed the view that in his
search for the books and records of the Company Mr. Duignan had not been in any
way co-operative with him.
13. George
Chisholm was an audit manager with Farrell Grant and Sparks who audited the
accounts of the Company for the 17 months ending 31st March, 1990. He last did
work on the books of the Company in the month of July 1991. He gave evidence
that there was a manual record of sales, purchases, cheque payments, cash
receipts, wages and salaries when the accounts were audited for the period of
17 months to 31st March, 1990.
14. Declan
Hogan, a fellow of the Institute of Chartered Accountants, gave evidence. He
is a former member of the Council of the Institute and of the Auditing
Practices Review Committee. In addition, he is a member of the Consultative
Committee of Accountancy Bodies. He gave evidence of having received all the
records that were before Mr. Mehigan (including the books obtained on 20th
June, 1996). In his opinion these books and records did not contain a record
of the assets and liabilities of the Company. He drew attention to the failure
to record stocks for February 1992 and thereafter; the failure to list
creditors after March 1992 and the failure to record fixed assets after March
1991. Because of such deficiencies, he was of the opinion that one could not
properly prepare a balance sheet, or indeed, a set of accounts for the Company.
He said that he would have expected to see copies of all credit notes and
copies of any leases so as to properly explain the transactions of the Company.
Eugene Finneran is a Higher Grade Tax Officer and an Inspector of Taxes who in
the years 1990 to 1993 was involved in VAT inspections of the Company. In July
or August 1990 he met the then Company book-keeper for the purpose of checking
on a VAT reclaim the Company had made. He did not see at that time any red
Cathedral books. On 1st March, 1991, his office wrote to the Company seeking
17. Between
July 1990 and October 1992, Mr. Finneran paid eight or nine visits to the
Company premises to inspect the records of the Company. He never saw or was
shown any red Cathedral books. During this period manual listing of sales,
purchases and credit notes were prepared by the Company on sheets with a
"Zepro" heading (herein called 'the Zepro listings'). These listings purported
to show figures for sales, purchases, credit notes and related VAT figures.
Revised VAT returns were prepared on foot of these Zepros Listings for the
period July 1988 to August 1992 which did not coincide with the original
returns. Throughout the period of his visits Mr. Finneran was never told there
was a manual system (his last visit was in October 1992) of recording sales and
purchases and credit notes. Indeed he had been told the contrary in March
1991. Further, the fresh preparation by the Company of the Zepro Listings for
sales, purchases and credit notes ostensibly "downloaded" from the Company's
computer served to underpin the representation that there was not in existence
any similar or colourably similar manual record of purchases, sales or credit
notes.
18. John
Duignan is an engineer by profession and holds the degree of Bachelor of
Engineering. In relation to the list of information and records which Mr.
Mehigan said was missing. Mr. Duignan gave evidence that all of the following
information could be obtained from the computer system used by the Company:-
19. He
said there was an opening stock figure for 1st April, 1992 and that all sales
and material purchases could be derived from the computer.
22. These,
said Mr. Duignan, were listed at the back of the Sales Book. Mr. Finneran had
copies of eight of the notes; he could not explain the absence of other copies
for the particular quarter.
23. Again,
all data in relation to the factoring of invoices was capable of being derived
from the computer.
24. The
Liquidator had suggested that carrier refrigerated units had been sold for
which there was no sales invoice the Sales Value of which amounted to
£87,914 or £106,375 inclusive of VAT. Mr. Duignan produced a series
of 17 invoices which he alleged represented invoices for the units the
Liquidator said had no invoices.
25. Mr.
Duignan asserted that such ledgers could be derived from some of the 28 discs
obtained by Mr. Mehigan on 20th June, 1996 and that it would only take a couple
of days for this information to be "downloaded" from the computer discs. The
basis for this assertion was the opinion of a software expert who had written
to the Respondent's Solicitors but who was not called to give evidence.
26. Mr.
Duignan said that the finance houses did not use lease agreements in duplicate
and accordingly, the Company had no records of such agreements.
27. Mr.
Duignan refused to classify the red Cathedral books as comprising "a manual
system". Taking the Sales Book as an example, he said that it was not a manual
book because there were computer references in it both identifying, by number
code, VAT rates and equipment type. Accordingly, he says, he was correct in
pointing out to Mr. Finneran by letter of 21st March, 1991 that there was no
manual system operated by the Company. The Sales Book differed from the Zepro
Listings (as to sales) in that there was a computer number in lieu of a VAT
rate. The manual books that he referred to in evidence before the Master were
1st March, 1991 books and these were not in fact destroyed - they could still
exist on the premises repossessed by the ICC Bank in Roscommon. Mr. Duignan
said he had copied the Cathedral Books in June 1993. He said that Mr. Mehigan
had never told him what records he had and he did not believe he had any
records the Liquidator did not have. He believed that Mr. Mehigan had the
Cathedral Books and he only became aware that he did not have them on 20th
June, 1996. The five red Cathedral books were found along with the computer
discs on 20th June, 1966 in a crate in Mr. Duignan's house in Roscommon.
28. In
his evidence before the Master (Q.109) Mr. Duignan had noted that the Company
had stopped using the computer in August 1992.
29. Michael
Butler an insolvency Practitioner gave evidence of having been appointed on 2nd
July, 1996, Voluntary Liquidator of the Company. He first got the papers on
9th July, 1993 and did not look at them until 12th July, 1993. Although he
did not inspect the records until 12th July he felt able to write to Mr.
Finneran on 9th July saying
30. He
expressed the view that the books and records of the Company were more than
adequate to facilitate the orderly winding up of the Company and that the
absence of copy credit notes was not a bar where Third Party verification was
possible.
31. Counsel
for the Liquidator, Mr. Mehigan, submits that there is evidence before me which
establishes:-
32. It
is worth noting that before any liability can be imposed on any officer, or
former officer, of a company, the Court must be satisfied that a contravention
of the provisions of Section 202 of the 1990 Act has been committed by the
Company.
33. In
other words, the Court must be satisfied that a criminal offence has been
committed by the Company. Section 202(10) make it an offence for a company to
contravene the section. Section 202 details the nature and extent of the
accounting records which a company is obliged to keep. It is clear from the
words of the section that the obligation of a company to "keep" proper books of
account is not an obligation to act as a mere passive custodian of books and
papers but rather the positive obligation to create books and records in a
particular form with specified contents. It is also clear from the wording of
the section that the obligation to keep proper books of account is necessarily
a continuing obligation: they should be kept on a "continuous and consistent
basis" and must be such that they "will at any time enable the financial
position of the Company to be determined with reasonable accuracy" (S.
202(1)(b)) and books of account shall contain entries "from day to day" of all
sums of money received and expended by the Company (S. 202(3)(a)).
34. Before
any liability can be declared under Section 204 the following matters must be
established in evidence.
35. Where
the foregoing matters are established in evidence, the Court may, if it thinks
it proper to do so, declare that such officer or officers be personally liable
without any limitation of liability for all or such part as may be specified by
the Court of the debts and other liabilities of the company. As is clear from
paragraph (d) above, "officer" of the company is not restricted solely to
executives of the company but may, in certain circumstances, embrace the
auditors of the company and any person convicted of providing false information
in purported compliance with the Companies Acts. While therefore the scope of
Section 204 is sufficiently wide to catch members of a company if they are
"Officers in default", it also applies to person who are not members of the
company. Any suggestion therefore that the section has as its object the
removal of the benefit of limited liability and the placing of the person (on
whom liability is to be imposed) in the same position as if he were a sole
trader is erroneous. As Murphy J. noted in relation to Section 297 of the
Companies Act 1963 in
O'Keefe
-v- Ferris
,
1993 3I.R. 165 at pp 173-4.
36. The
observations of Murphy J. are equally appropriate in relation to Section 204,
which, as I have noted, may, depending on the circumstances, result in the
imposition of liability on persons who are not shareholders in or proprietors
of the company.
37. Where
the foregoing is established (along with the other four matters listed above)
the Court may if it thinks proper declare an officer in default liable for all
the debts of the company. The section, on its face, does not require that
there be any causal relationship between the Section 202 contravention and the
liability declared under Section 204. Nor does the section, on its face, make
any allowance for different degrees of blameworthiness which might attend
contraventions of Section 202. As to the absence of a causal connection
between a contravention of S. 202 and the liability imposed under Section 204,
there may well be a significant number of situations where the contravention
bears little or no relationship to the amount of the debts of the insolvent
company. For example, where the insolvency is the direct result of unwise
foreign exchange transactions and it is discovered that the auditors and
directors have knowingly and consistently
undervalued
the assets of the company (thereby resulting in a contravention of Section 202)
such that, while insolvent, the company's indebtedness is less than it would
have been had the assets been properly valued. Where such an undervaluation
results in substantial uncertainty as to the assets of the company or
substantially impedes the orderly winding up of the company liability under S.
204 is established, yet it would be clearly unjustifiable in principle to
impose liability for all the debts of the company (caused by injudicious forex
dealings) on the auditors and directors responsible for the company's
contravention of Section 202. On the other hand, where a particular
contravention of section 202 can be seen to have a particular financial
consequence resulting in a particular debt of the insolvent company, it is
difficult to see how it could be argued that imposing liability for such a debt
works any injustice.
38. It
is quite clear that contraventions of Section 202 may take many forms: the
contravention may for example comprise a failure to properly records goods
sold, or it may comprise the maintenance of false records for the purposes of
tax evasion. Where Section 204 is involved in relation to such contraventions
it is clear that the Court should not view both contraventions in the same
light but rather be disposed to regard the false accounting example as a basis
for the imposition of greater personal liability. However, on its face,
Section 204 appears to allow that a Court, in the exercise of its discretion,
can impose unlimited liability on an officer of a company in respect of all the
debts of a company where the S. 202 contravention has not in itself resulted in
any loss to the company, but has substantially impeded the orderly winding up
of the company, or resulted in substantial uncertainty as to its assets and
liabilities. There may be circumstances where, if the Courts discretion is
exercised in this way, the result achieved would be so harsh, unfair and
disproportionate, having regard to the wrong committed, as to constitute an
unjust attack on the personal rights of the affected officers.
39. The
Companies Act, 1990 is a post 1937 Statute and as such enjoys a presumption of
constitutionality. Thus, where the Act makes provision for the exercise by a
Court of a discretionary power, that power must be exercised in such a way as
to respect the provisions of the Constitution. As Murphy J. said in
O'Keefe
-v- Ferris
,
supra, at page 174 (in relation to Section 297(1) of the 1963 Act)
40. The
discretion, given by section 204 to the Court, must be exercised, as Murphy J.
notes (in relation to S. 297), in a "responsible but also in a constitutional
fashion". In my view, the Court in the exercise of this discretion must have
regard to (but not necessarily exclusively) the extent to which the
contravention of S. 202 resulted in financial loss and, if it did, whether or
not such losses were reasonably foreseeable by the officer as a consequence of
the contravention.
41. In
New Zealand, their Companies Act 1955 contains almost identical provision to
Sections 202 and 204 of the Irish Companies Act, 1990, and Counsel for the
Liquidator sought to rely on the New Zealand case of
Maloc
Construction Limited (In Liquidation) -v- Chadwick & Others, 1986 3NZ CLC
99, 794
in which Tompkins J. in the High Court, suggested that three factors were
relevant to the exercise of the discretion given by the Act to the Court,
namely, causation, culpability and duration. As to causation, he suggested
that there must be a causal relationship between the contravention of Section
202, the officers contribution to that contravention, and the losses of the
company resulting therefrom. As to culpability, Tompkins J. said that the less
blame attaching to an officer for a Section 202 contravention the less
liability should be imposed. As to duration, Tompkins J. believed that it was
relevant to consider whether debts were being incurred when the contravention
was taking place. It seems to me that the three elements identified by
Tompkins J. are relevant to the principles which should guide the exercise of
discretion under Section 204 and that in assessing liability under Section 204,
the Court should have regard to the extent to which the officer's involvement
in the S. 202 contravention resulted in financial loss and, if it did, whether
such loss was reasonable foreseeable by the officer as a consequence of the
contravention and that, save in exceptional circumstances, liability should
not be imposed for contraventions not resulting in loss, or for losses not
reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the contravention.
42. No
argument was addressed to me to the effect that Section 204 created a criminal
offence or was other than a civil wrong. Accordingly, in considering the issue
of the standard of proof, I am considering it in the context of the proof a
civil wrong.
43. The
approach adopted by Denning LJ. and approved of by Tompkins J. in the
Maloc
case has not been followed in our Courts. In
Banco
Ambrosiano -v- Ansbacher & Co.,
1987 ILRM 669 Henchy J. said at page 701
44. Accordingly,
in considering whether to impose liability under Section 204 no higher degree
of probability of a contravention of Section 202 is required then in any other
civil matter.
46. I
am satisfied that the books of account of the Company made available to the
Official Liquidator both before and on 20th June, 1996 did not contain:-
47. While
Mr. Duignan contended that the computer of the Company could using the discs
discovered on 20th June, 1996 produce a debtors and creditors ledger (and a
nominal ledger), such records were not produced and the basis on which Mr.
Duignan expressed this contention appears to have been his reliance on the
views of a software expert (Mr. Desmond McLaughlin) who had expressed such an
opinion to the Respondent's Solicitors but who was not called to give evidence.
I therefore do not attach any weight to the contention that a debtors and
creditors ledger could be "downloaded" or retrieved from the discs. In
particular, little weight can be attached to this contention where Mr. Duignan
himself swore to the Master that the Company stopped using the computer in July
or August of 1992 (see pages 10 and 11 of Transcript of evidence before the
Master). Even if the discs retrieved on 20th June, 1996 could achieve the
results Mr. Duignan stated in his evidence, the fact is that in the period from
the commencement of the Court winding up (on 30th July, 1993) to 20th June,
1996 the absence of a debtors and creditors ledger rendered it impossible for
the Liquidator to determine with any accuracy (let alone reasonable accuracy)
the financial position of the Company or to ascertain from the records, the
assets and liabilities of the Company. Thus, even if one were to accept Mr.
Duignan's evidence that the computer discs and the red Cathedral books between
them (together with the earlier records provided to the Liquidator) provided
records sufficient for the purposes of Section 202 of the 1990 Act there was,
nonetheless, clearly a period of time when the absence of the discs and the
books - and the consequent deficiencies in the Company's records - meant that
the Company was during that period in contravention of Section 202 of the 1990
Act.
48. I
should say that I have some concern as to whether or not Mr. Duignan is
accurate in stating that he believed the Liquidator at all material times had
the "red books" and that it was only when he realised, in Court, that the
Liquidator had not those books that he disclosed where they might be. It is
worth recalling that in his Affidavit filed on 11th November, 1994 Mr. Duignan
states that
49. Exhibit
B is a copy of the list of records taken by Mr. Butler. The red Cathedral
books are not on the list. What is on the list is what Mr. Duignan was aware
was given to Mr. Mehigan by the Voluntary Liquidator's staff. It is difficult
therefore to understand how he believed the Liquidator had the red Cathedral
books. It is also difficult to understand why the red Cathedral books were
never produced to Mr. Finneran whom he knew was anxious to see purchase and
sales day books and who paid the Company some 8 or 9 visits between July 1990
and October 1992. The sales books recorded sales for the period from 1st
April, 1991 onwards and the purchases book recorded purchases from June 1991
onwards.
50. I
have already indicated that I was satisfied that the books of account given to
the Liquidator both before and on 20th June, 1996 were deficient in six
material respects. These deficiencies were such that the financial position of
the Company could not at any time be determined with reasonable, or indeed any,
accuracy or enable the Company to be readily and properly audited. I am
satisfied further that the deficiencies were such that the assets and
liabilities of the Company could not be recorded and that there was not a
sufficient recording or proper record of goods purchased and sold or of the
purchasers and sellers of those goods or of invoices relating to all purchases
and sales. Equally, the records of the Company do not contain statements of
stock held by the Company for the years ending March 1992 and 1993. Finally, I
am satisfied that the books of account were not kept in a continuous and
consistent basis and are deficient in failing to enter daily all sums of money
received and expended by the Company and the matters in respect of which such
took place. Because I am satisfied as to the foregoing, I conclude that there
have been contraventions by the Company of Section 202 1(a), (b), (d), 202 (2),
202 (3) (a), (b) and (c) of the Companies Act, 1990.
51. I
am also satisfied that the Company, having contravened Section 202, was unable
to pay its debts at the date of its winding up; equally, the contraventions of
Section 202 were such as to result in substantial uncertainty as to the assets
and liabilities of the Company and also substantially impeded the orderly
winding up of the Company. Mr. Duignan was an officer of the Company who I
find knowingly and wilfully authorised and permitted the Section 202
contraventions and cannot avail of any defence under Section 204.
52. I
am also satisfied that, while the Company is unable to pay all its debts, it is
not possible to separate out liabilities of the Company prior to its winding up
which result from any contravention of Section 202. However, there is evidence
from the Liquidator that some 80% of his time was occupied in seeking to
overcome deficiencies in the books and records of the Company. The losses
which flowed from this expenditure of time (£91,239.80) were reasonably
foreseeable by Mr. Duignan as a consequence of the contraventions of Section
202. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 204 I declare John Duignan to be
personally liable to the Company in the sum of £91, 239.80.
53. Finally,
having regard to the mandatory words of Section 150 of the 1990 Act (in
relation to which See
In
Re Business Communications Limited Murphy J. 21st July, 1995
)
I am satisfied that I have no discretion but to impose the 5 year restriction,
contained in the section, on Mr. Duignan: he does not bring himself within any
of the three exceptions of subsection 2 (of Section 150).
54. Where
a company is being wound up, is unable to pay all its debts and has contravened
Section 202 of the 1990 Act - Section 204 provides that the Court may if it
thinks it proper to do so declare that an officer of the company who is in
default
55. The
first point to note in relation to Section 204 is that the Court is given a
discretion as to whether or not is makes the declaration in question and if it
does whether it should related to all or only some of the Company's debts. The
second point to note is that, on its face, Section 204 appear to allow the
Court declare a person liable for losses that person did not necessary cause.
As to the exercise by the Court of its discretion Tompkins J. in the
Maloc
Construction Limited case
,
supra, at p. 99, 809, suggested that three factors were relevant to the
exercise of discretion, namely, causation, culpability and duration. As to
causation, he suggested that there must be a casual relationship between the
contravention of Section 202, the officer's contribution to the contravention
and the losses of the Company resulting therefrom. As to culpability ,
Tompkins J. suggested that the loss blame that attached to an officer for
contravention of Section 202, the loss liability should be imposed. As to
duration, Tompkins J. suggests that it is relevant to consider whether debts
were being incurred when the contravention was taking place. In my opinion,
there three factors, enumerated by Tompkins J., may be said to be elements of a
general principle which appears entirely sensible namely that a Court, in the
exercise of its discretion under Section 204, will wish to be satisfied that
there is a casual relationship between the officer's involvement in the
contravention and the personal liability imposed on him. It seems to be that
if the Court's discretion is exercised by an application of such a principle
the section will not be open to attack. On the ground that it offends any
principle of constitutional justice. In
East
Donegal Co-operative -v- Attorney General
1970 I.R. 317 Walsh J. said at page 341:
56. If
a Court in its discretion was not to have regard to any casual relation ship
before imposing personal liability under Section 204 then it seems to one that
a constitutionally questionable consequence and an absence of proportionality
might follow where for minor contraventions of Section 202 personal liability
of millions of pounds could be imposed. Accordingly, it seems to me that I am
bound to exercise the discretion given to me under Section 204 in such a way as
to ensure that there is some casual nexus between the loss occasioned by the
Section 202 contravention, the blameworthiness of the officer in question for
such contravention and the liability declared under Section 204.