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High Court of Ireland Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> P. (L.) v. P. (M.N.) [1998] IEHC 151 (14th October, 1998)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/1998/151.html
Cite as: [1998] IEHC 151

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P. (L.) v. P. (M.N.) [1998] IEHC 151 (14th October, 1998)

THE HIGH COURT
1996 No. 568 Sp

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILD ABDUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF CUSTODY ORDERS ACT 1991
AND IN THE MATTER OF E. P. AN INFANT
BETWEEN
L.P.
PLAINTIFF
AND
M.N.P.
DEFENDANT

JUDGMENT of Mrs Justice McGuinness delivered the 14th day of October 1998

1. In these proceedings the Plaintiff father sought the return to Italy of the child E. who had been brought to Ireland by her mother, the Defendant. The proceedings were commenced by Special Summons issued on the 18th November, 1996 and on the 12th February, 1997 this Court ordered the return of the child to Italy, subject to certain undertakings given both by the father and by the mother. As is the normal procedure in cases under the Child Abduction and Enforcement of Custody Orders Act, 1991 and the Hague Convention, the proceedings were handled through the Central Authorities appointed under the Convention in both jurisdictions.

2. The factual background may be briefly summarised. The husband, who is Italian, and the wife, who is Irish, were married in Italy in 1983. E., the only child of the marriage, was born on the 19th July, 1990 at Turin. Both the husband and the wife were at all material times in employment in Italy and the family home was in that country. It was agreed by all parties that the habitual residence of the child was in Italy.

3. Unhappy differences arose between the husband and the wife and on the 2nd May, 1996 the wife sought a decree of judicial separation in the Italian Courts. Interim negotiations took place between the parties within the framework of the Court proceedings but these did not lead to any agreement. It appears that in or about August, 1996 the wife raised her suspicions with regard to sexual abuse of the child by the husband. The husband at around the same time alleged that the wife was suffering from some form of psychiatric instability. The local Social Services became involved and a proposal was made that the child should be placed in the custody of the husband's elderly parents.

4. On the 1st October, 1996 the wife left the family home with the child, without giving any notice to the husband. She stayed for two nights with a friend locally and on 3rd October, 1996 she travelled by car to Switzerland and thence by air to Ireland. She and the child went to live with her relatives in the Cork area.

5. On 2nd October, 1996 the husband made an application to the Italian Court and an Order was made granting custody of the child to the paternal grandparents and directing that the child should not be removed from Italy. There is some conflict as to whether this Order was served on the wife but it is acknowledged that she was informed of its contents.

6. As soon as the wife arrived in this jurisdiction she made an application to this Court pursuant to the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964 and on 7th October, 1996 an Order was made granting her interim custody of E.. This Order was served on the husband by post by a letter from the wife's Solicitors dated the 10th October, 1996.

7. The husband then issued his proceedings under the Hague Convention and the 1991 Act. The matter came on for hearing before me in February, 1997. During the course of the hearing the wife, through her Counsel, acknowledged that under the terms of the 1991 Act and the Convention, her removal of the child to Ireland was a wrongful removal. In her defence the wife relied on Articles 13 and 20 of the Hague Convention, which allow the Court to refuse to Order the return of a child which has been wrongfully removed if it is held that there is a grave risk that the return of the child will expose her to psychological harm, that the return of the child would otherwise place her in an intolerable situation, or that the return of the child should be refused by reason of the fact that it would not be permitted and should not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. As is to be expected in such cases there was a high level of conflict on the evidence and allegations and counter allegations were made. Under the principles of the Convention it was not necessary for this Court to resolve most of these conflicts. However, on the evidence I accepted firstly that the child E.'s primary and most constant relationship was with her mother; secondly, that no final decision on the custody of the child would be reached by the Italian Court for some considerable time; and thirdly that no appeal lay from the various interim Orders in regard to the child which had been made or might be made in the future by the Italian Court. I also had very considerable concerns with regard to the nature of the Affidavit evidence produced to the Court by the husband. These purported Affidavits by third parties had not been notarised and appeared to have been sworn in a somewhat irregular manner. Fortunately the content of the purported Affidavits was not such as to influence my decision one way or the other.

8. During the course of the hearing my chief concern, bearing in mind the constitutional rights of the child as a "fundamental principle of the State" was that if she was returned to Italy she would for an indefinite and lengthy period, and without possibility of appeal, be removed from the custody of her mother with whom she had an extremely close relationship. The medical reports produced in evidence before me did not bear out any allegation of psychiatric or psychological difficulties on the part of the mother.

9. However, on the final day of the hearing, Senior Counsel for the mother informed me that the situation had changed, in that the Italian Court had varied its interim Custody Order and granted custody to the mother. This entirely altered the context in which this Court had to make its decision and indeed removed the chief obstacle to the child's return.

10. There remained the practical questions of accommodation and maintenance for the child and the mother pending further and final decisions by the Italian Court. Both the husband and the wife through their Counsel offered to give undertakings to cover the period of the child's return and the immediate aftermath. Bearing in mind the decision of the Supreme Court in P -v- B [1995] ILRM 201 (to which I shall refer later) I accepted that the giving of undertakings was a suitable means of dealing with the situation. In the light of the undertakings given by both the husband and the wife I felt able to make an Order returning the child, in the company of her mother, to Italy.

11. The husband gave the following undertakings:

1. Mrs P. and the child were to be provided with accommodation at
an apartment at a given address until the matter of the family and the accommodation of the parties was decided by the Italian Court.
2. Mr P. was not to attend at or enter or otherwise watch or beset the apartment in which Mrs P. was residing and he was not to approach Mrs P. or interfere with her in any way.
3. Mr P. was to pay maintenance to Mrs P. for herself and her child in a sum equivalent to £400 per month, the first payment to be made in advance to Mrs P.'s Solicitor on 12th February, 1997.
4. Mr P. was to pay the airfares from Ireland to Italy to enable Mrs P. and the child to return to Italy on the 20th February, 1997.
5. Mr P. was to permit his wife to collect her personal effects and those of the child from the family home by appointment on the 21st February, 1997.

12. The wife undertook as follows:

1. Mrs P. was to hand in the child's passport to the Italian Court for the period of transition until the Italian Court took up the case.
2. Mr P. was to have access to E. on three evenings each week and also at the weekends at times which were specified in the undertaking. The access was to take place in the presence of, and under the supervision of either or both of Mr P.'s parents at their home.

13. Both parties also undertook to co-operate in ensuring the prompt disposal of the proceedings in the Italian Courts.

14. In addition at my request and on account of my concerns as to the admissibility of the purported Affidavit evidence, the husband undertook to arrange for the notarisation of the un-notarised Affidavits which had been filed in the proceedings.

15. In giving Judgment ex-tempore on the 12th November, 1997 I stated


"Under the Hague Convention the only basis on which this Court can refuse to return the child is under Article 13, where there is a grave physical or psychological risk if the child is returned. The Article also provides that in suitable cases the child's own view should be taken into account. That, of course, would depend on the child's own maturity, intelligence and ability to understand matters. This child is a very young child and I feel there is nothing to gain in the Court interviewing her.
Under Article 20 of the Convention the return of the child may be refused where this is necessary in the interests of the protection of human rights and fundamental principles. If, as was hitherto the case, this little girl was to be deprived of the care and society of her mother if she was returned to Italy, it might well be argued that her fundamental rights were affected, but now that it appears that under the latest Order of the Italian Court she will be in the care of her mother I do not think that Article 20 comes into effect.
As I have said the situation has now changed with regard to this young child from what it was at the start of this hearing. Otherwise this Court would have had some concerns under Articles 13 and 20 of the Convention. This is not a criticism of the grandparents in whose the custody the child was to be according to the original Order of the Italian Court. I am sure that they love their granddaughter dearly. However, under the Constitution of Ireland the parents have inalienable and imprescriptable rights and the child has a concomitant right to be brought up in the family of a parent. Under the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964 the grandparents would have no locus standi to apply for custody, although in certain situations under the Child Care Act 1991 the child could be placed by the Court in the grandparents' care, but only if both parents were found to be totally unfit to care for the child.
In the simultaneous Italian Court proceedings the application which was made on Mrs P.'s behalf by her legal representatives resulted in a change of circumstances from that which obtained at the commencement of the hearing in this Court. The child is now to remain in the de facto custody of the mother. There is therefore no longer a prejudice under Articles 13 and 20 which would prevent the return of the child. There is time for arrangements to be made for the child to return to school. The parties should return to Italy on the 20th February, 1997 to allow for the weekend as a period of settling down so that the young child can return to school on the Monday."

16. Subsequent to the making of this Order a number of brief applications were made to the Court as to the exact effect of the undertakings and a number of rulings on these were made. The child and the mother then returned to Italy. As far as this Court was concerned that should have been the end of the matter.

17. However, this proved not to be the case. From time to time during the following months Counsel for the wife made applications to the Court concerning the virtually complete failure of the husband to abide by the various undertakings given by him. Even more serious was the fact that the Order granting de facto custody to the wife made by the Italian Court shortly before the 12th February, 1997 had been varied on the 4th March, 1997, some two weeks after the child's return. This new Order removed the child from the custody of both parents and placed her in an institution, with minimal access to her mother and father. This Order was apparently based on a report from the Social Services. According to Counsel for Mrs P., she has neither been served with this report at any time nor been informed of its contents. It was also submitted by Counsel for Mrs P. that it appeared that the Italian Court was unaware of the undertakings given to this Court by the husband and that, in any event, no mechanism existed in the Italian legal system for the enforcement of undertakings.

18. While these events, in particular the removal of a six year old almost entirely from contact with her family, could not but cause concern, the matter of the custody of the child was now in the hands of the Italian Court and it would be neither desirable nor possible for this Court to attempt to intervene at the behest of the mother. Mr P.'s undertakings had, however, been given to this Court, and he had given the undertakings voluntarily and with full legal advice from his Senior Counsel, Miss Dunne. His Solicitors also remained on record in this Court.

19. Accordingly, I permitted the bringing of a motion in December 1997 to enforce the husband's undertakings. This motion was served on his Solicitors, and by courtesy on the Solicitors for the paternal grandparents who had been represented at the original hearing. The response of both firms of Solicitors was to bring motions to come off record in the proceedings since they could obtain no instructions from their respective clients. Miss Gallagher, Solicitor for Mr P., also exhibited in her Affidavit correspondence she had sent to his Italian lawyers requesting that the Affidavits to which I have referred earlier be properly sworn and notarised. To this correspondence she received no satisfactory response. There was clearly no alternative but to permit both firms of Solicitors, who were not themselves at fault, to come off record as and from 10th February, 1998. At this point I was also informed that on 13th January, 1998 Mr P. had been charged in the Italian Criminal Courts with offences in connection with the sexual abuse of the child E..

20. At the hearing before me on 10th February, 1998 Counsel for the mother, Miss Baker, submitted that this Court should make use of the procedure set up by the Hague Convention and should request the Central Authority for Italy to inform the Court as to the procedures that were invoked to ensure the performance by Mr P. of the undertakings which he gave to this Court and further to request an explanation from the Central Authority for Italy as to the delay in dealing with the custody application in respect of the child E. P. in the Italian Courts. Miss Baker pointed out that by virtue of Section 8 of the 1991 Act the Central Authority for Ireland has the powers and obligations set out in Article 7 of the Hague Convention. In particular under this Article Central Authorities are required to co-operate with each other and promote co-operation among the competent authorities of their respective States inter alia to achieve the objects of the Convention. Under Article 7 sub paragraphs (a) to (i) specific functions are set out which include an obligation to take all appropriate measures to prevent further harm to the child or prejudice to interested parties by taking or causing to be taken provisional measures; to secure the voluntary return of the child or to bring about an amicable resolution of the issues; to provide information of a general character as to the law of their State in connection with the application of the convention; and to keep each other (Central Authorities) informed with respect to the operation of the convention and as far as possible to eliminate any obstacles to its application.

21. Miss Baker also referred the Court to the Judgment of the Supreme Court in

P -v- B [1995] ILRM 201. In that case the Supreme Court accepted that a party to proceedings under the Child Abduction and Enforcement of Custody Orders Act, 1991 might be requested by a Court to give undertakings which are for the welfare of the child during the transition from one jurisdiction to the other. The Supreme Court accepted that the Court is entitled to accept those undertakings which are consistent with the objectives of the 1991 Act and the Convention. These undertakings are also in accord with the constitutional protection of the child and its welfare and may also act to protect parents in the exercise of their rights under the Constitution. Miss Baker also referred the Court to the Judgment of Butler-Sloss L J in the English Court of Appeal in the case of Re M (Abduction: Undertakings) 1 FLR [1995] 1021. In her Judgment Butler-Sloss L J quoted with approval the previous decision of Waite L J in the Court of Appeal in Re M (Abduction Non-Convention Country) [1995]
1 FLR 1989 where the learned Lord Justice had said the following

"Judges in one country are entitled and bound to assume that the Courts and welfare services of the other country will all take the same serious view of a failure to honour undertakings given to a Court (of any jurisdiction), failure to maintain financially, failure to afford contact, and so forth. It is to be assumed that the Courts in every country will not hesitate to intervene to enforce what ever Orders or to direct what ever enquiries are called for in the children's best interests. In that process every judge is bound to take into full and careful account what his or her colleagues have already ordered in antecedent proceedings in another jurisdiction."

22. It appeared to me that the whole question of the giving and receiving of undertakings and their enforcement was one of very considerable importance in cases arising under the 1991 Act and the Hague Convention. As had been stressed both by the Supreme Court and by the English Court of Appeal the use of undertakings to cover an interim period could be of great practical advantage. Its use, however, depended on there being legal procedures for the recognition and enforcement of undertakings in the Courts of the country to which the child was returned.

23. Accordingly, I accepted the submission of Counsel for the mother and requested the assistance of the Central Authority for Ireland in making enquiries of the Italian Central Authority. On 10th May, 1998 Senior Counsel for the Central Authority for Ireland appeared before me and most helpfully expressed the willingness of the Central Authority to carry out all necessary enquiries. I therefore made an Order directing the Central Authority for Ireland to take or cause to be taken all steps to obtain answers from the Central Authority for Italy to questions with regard to E. P. and to report to the Court on or before the 2nd day of July, 1998. The questions which were to be put by the Central Authority were agreed by Counsel and approved by the Court. As regards the matter of undertakings the questions were as follows:

1. When was the Irish High Court Order brought to the attention of the Italian Court? Which Italian Court was involved? When was the translated version of the Irish High Court Order dispatched to the relevant Italian Court?
2. What was done to enforce the obligations of the parties pursuant to undertakings given to the Irish High Court?
3. What procedures are available in Italian Law for the enforcement of undertakings given to a foreign Court?
4. Is there a procedure in Italian law for the requiring of undertakings by a party to proceedings? If so, what procedure is available for enforcement?

24. A number of other queries were raised in regard inter alia to the time scale of the Italian custody proceedings and the lack of access by the child to her mother, but I consider that these questions, and the replies to them, in essence deal with matters properly within the jurisdiction of the Italian Court.

25. The matter was listed before me again on the 2nd July, 1998, at which time the replies provided by the Italian Central Authority had become available. As far as the matter of undertakings was concerned the replies were as follows:


1. The Irish High Court Order was brought to the attention of the Italian Court on 23rd April, 1997. The Turin Civil and Criminal Court was involved and the translation of the above Order was forwarded to them on May 5th, 1997. It is hereby pointed out that the Italian Judge had granted the child's custody to the father's parents on 2nd October, 1996 and the latter had filed an application for return on 15th November, 1996 under the Hague Convention of 25th October, 1980.
2. & 3. In order to enforce the obligations of the parties pursuant to the Irish Order, the Italian Court has to recognise the legal enforceability of the Order in Italy. Such recognition (exequatur) must be applied for by legitimately concerned people.
4. The Italian procedural law provides for the parties to undertake obligations which are defined in the "conciliation report", which is self-executing (Article 185 Code of Civil Procedure).

26. It is not clear from these replies whether the common law concept that a party may give undertakings to the Court and that the failure to abide by such undertakings constitutes a contempt of Court is a normal part of the Italian legal code. It may well be that this also applies to many other non-common law jurisdictions. In the instant case an additional complication is that the content of the Order of this Court made on the 12th February, 1997 was not conveyed to the Italian Court until the 23rd April, 1997 and even then not translated until the 5th May, 1997. The child E. had already been removed from the custody of her mother on the 5th March, 1997. Clearly this Court cannot know the reasons for the lengthy delay in conveying the content of the Order of 12th February, 1997 to the Italian Court and of having it translated. Nor can it know whether any attempt was made by the legal representatives of the mother to have the Order legally enforced in Italy. The answer given by the Central Authority for Italy does not in fact make it clear whether it is the Order itself which may be recognised as enforceable or whether the undertakings as apart from the Order may be recognised as enforceable. Unfortunately it appears to me that the situation is now such that there is no useful further action that this Court can take in the matter.

27. As has already been stated, the giving of undertakings was accepted as being a useful and practical measure in abduction cases by the Supreme Court in P -v- B [1995] ILRM 201. In that case the mother had wrongfully removed the child from Spain to Ireland without notice to the father. During the trial the husband gave undertakings that if the child was returned to Spain he would provide weekly maintenance for the wife and the child and would lodge five months maintenance in the bank account in the wife's name. He also undertook to provide appropriate accommodation for her and the child. It will be seen that these undertakings were very similar in nature to those given by Mr P.. In her Judgment the learned Denham J (with whom Hamilton C J and Egan J concurred) stated (at page 210)


"I am satisfied that undertakings may be given by a party to proceedings under the 1991 Act and accepted by the Court. They are entirely consistent with the 1991 Act and the Hague Convention; they are for the welfare of the child during the transition from one jurisdiction to another. Undertakings may be of particular relevance to very young children.
Undertakings in this situation are compatible with the Act and international law which have as their objectives the desire to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal from the country of their habitual residence and the establishment of procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of access.
Furthermore, undertakings which are for the welfare of the child are in accord with the constitutional protection of the child and its welfare."

28. The learned Judge went on to say (at page 211)


"I am satisfied that such undertakings are reasonable in the circumstances of this case to protect the young child on her return from this jurisdiction to the jurisdiction of the Spanish Courts. These undertakings are for the benefit of the child who will remain in the care of her mother on returning to Spain from Ireland pending the Spanish Court hearing the case. In view of the fact that the child is still of tender years, and has at all times been in the care of the Respondent, who has indicated that she will return with the child to Spain, the undertakings ensure a secure situation for the child and mother on their return to Spain. The undertakings do not in any way usurp the jurisdiction of the Spanish Courts to determine the questions of custody and access."

29. This Judgment of the Supreme Court is clear authority for the acceptance by this Court of undertakings of the type given by Mr P.. It does not, however, deal with the question of enforcement of the undertakings by the foreign Court.

30. That question has been discussed at some length by Singer J. In the English High Court case of Re O (Child Abduction: Undertakings) [1994] 2 FLR 349. In that case the habitual residence of the family was Greece. The mother left the father in 1993, when she took the children and flew to England. The father brought proceedings under the Hague Convention. He offered various undertakings with regard to the provision of accommodation and maintenance for the wife and children, pending the final decision of the Greek Court. It is of interest to note that in Re O the question of the length of time which might be taken by the Greek Courts to decide the issues concerning the children also arose. In the circumstances of the case the learned Judge attached considerable importance to the undertakings to be given by the husband and to whether in fact such undertakings would be upheld and enforced by the Greek Courts. During the course of the trial he sought the assistance of an amicus curiae, and he also, as I have done in the instant case, sought information and assistance from the Central Authorities in both jurisdictions pursuant to Article 7 of the Convention.

31. At page 366 of the Report the learned Singer J. states:


"One aspect of the difficulties in this case is that upon the basis of the evidence before me no such mechanism as an undertaking has evolved in Greek jurisprudence. Thus it is not clear to see (upon the basis of the expert evidence which I have summarised) whether, if at all, effect might be given to the undertakings in Greece, should the father's performance of his undertakings prove less than reliable in that interim period before the appropriate Greek Court will be in a position to deal fairly between the parents with issues relating to the children, and thus be in a position to alleviate any hardship effecting them.
The question does therefore arise, in evaluating the effective undertakings which are properly regarded as a pre-requisite to return, how far it is permissible or may in some cases be obligatory for an English Court to investigate and to form what inevitably amounts to a value Judgment upon the legal procedures of a co-signatory to the Convention, for differences there will be inevitably be between one domestic jurisdiction and another."

32. At page 367 the learned Judge continued:


"The Hague Convention operates as between Contracting States. The provisions of the Convention set out in Schedule 1 to the Child Abduction and Custody Act, 1985 have effect given to them in English Law between the UK and other Contracting States for the time being specified in an Order in Counsel made under Section 2 of the Act. Greece became a Contracting State for that purpose and by that process with effect from 1st June, 1993.
Should the fact that the Convention thus applies mean that is not open in an appropriate case for the English Court to consider the domestic law of the requesting State, whereas in an non-Convention case it is clear that it may need to do so?
This is a question of difficulty and delicacy, the resolution of which led me in December, 1993 to invite the assistance of an amicus curiae.... The essence of the submission of the amicus to me was that if a point seemingly requiring investigation of the domestic law of a Contracting State is raised by the party resisting return, and if the English Court considers that investigation necessary for the determination of an Article 13 defence to summary return, then such an investigation should and could properly take place, notwithstanding well recognised principles of comity.
In a case where the Court finds, as I have here, that an Article 13(b) grave risk would be established unless alleviated by undertakings offered or required, and honoured or enforced, it is reasonable.... for this Court to consider whether the undertakings will be adequately enforceable in the requesting State.
The best practice where such issues arise would be for general information concerning its available processes of enforcement of undertakings to be requested from the Central Authority of the home State pursuant to the provisions of Article 7(e), and consistent with the relaxation upon the reception of evidence as the foreign law which Article 14 provides. However if, as here, sufficient information cannot be derived from that source then it may well be necessary to direct the parties to file expert evidence in the more conventional manner.
If in relation to any particular Contracting State that process revealed the absence of machinery adequate to give backing to undertakings the observance of which the English Court relied upon to relieve the children of risk of an intolerable situation, then it would be relevant to consider whether the parent proffering the undertakings genuinely intended to honour them."

33. In summing up his discussion of the issues at the end of his Judgment the learned Singer J concluded (at page 372)


"Mis-interpretation and mis-understanding of another country's system of law and their approach to the resolution of delicate questions, such as those which can arise under Article 13(b), can easily develop. That risk exists between any two States, but must be higher when their jurisprudence has developed down different paths, their language may not be shared, and their concepts may not even be readily translatable.
Article 7 requires Central Authorities to co-operate with each other and to promote co-operation amongst the competent authorities in the Contracting States. That can include (see Article 7(b)) taking appropriate measures to prevent further harm to the child or prejudice to interested parties by taking or causing to be taken provisional measures. That may be as apt in the requesting State to secure the welfare of a child when returned there as plainly it is in the requested State before an Order can be made for that return. Similarly under Article 7(c) measures to bring about an amicable resolution of the issues are encouraged, which undertakings or some other form of commitment intended to be binding in a proper case may promote rather than hinder. And under Article 7(i) the Central Authorities are to take all appropriate measures to keep each other informed with respect to the operation of this Convention and as far as possible to eliminate any obstacles to its application.
These provisions prompt me to volunteer the suggestion that there may be some scope for developing, probably on a bi-lateral basis at least to start with, communication and discussion between Central Authorities so that each may have the opportunity of explaining and, it may be, justifying the approach their domestic Courts take to issues which commonly arise in Convention cases. Such an issue may well be these Courts use of undertakings designed to smooth the speedy passage home and to the door of the proper Court of children who should never have been taken from its jurisdiction. By such discussions and the exchange of views and information it may be that comity would be strengthened, and an understanding achieved that neither country wishes to cause any offence to the Courts of the other, nor to seek to interfere with or to influence what that Court then does.
Moreover, it may well be that if such opportunity for the exchange of views does assist to promote co-operation, it should be possible in an appropriate case for the Central Authority of the requested State to liaise with its counterpart in the requesting State to put in place measures agreed by the parties or reasonably required as a proper pre-condition of return."

34. In the context of the instant case I find the discussion of the issue of undertakings contained in Re O both helpful and enlightening and I would readily concur with the conclusions of the learned Singer J in that case. Unfortunately, in the present case it seems to me that it is not open to this Court to make any effective Order at present. Nevertheless, Counsel for Mrs P. has specifically requested that I should set out, as far as possible, the factual and legal reasons which have precluded the making of any Order. I gladly accede to this request, and in doing so express the hope that the further communication and discussion between Central Authorities on these issues will take place as suggested in

Re O , and that such discussions will produce fruitful results in the interests of the welfare and protection of children.


© 1998 Irish High Court


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URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/1998/151.html