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1. This is an appeal by way of case stated from a decision of Judge Garavan, a judge of the District Court, sitting at the District Court at Galway on 19th March, 1997 whereby the Appellant was convicted of the offence of driving a mechanically propelled vehicle in a public place while there was present in his body a quantity of alcohol such that within three hours after so driving the concentration of alcohol in his blood exceeded a concentration of 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to Section 49(2) and (6)(a) of the Road Traffic Act, 1961, as inserted by Section 10 of the Road Traffic Act, 1994, as amended.

2. The Case Stated recited the usual necessary proofs but it is stated in paragraph 3 that the certificate issued by the Medical Bureau of Road Safety under Section 19 of the 1994 Act included the following comment by the Chairman/Director of the Medical Bureau of Road Safety:-

3. The Case Stated goes on to recite that on the conclusion of the prosecution case the Accused's Solicitor asked for a dismiss by way of direction on the basis that the prosecution had not established that the provisions of Section 18, subsections 1-4 of the 1994 Act had been complied with in that the prescribed form referred to in Section 18(1) of that Act had not been completed by the designated doctor in compliance with the statutory provisions as the doctor did not attach a label to the "container" with the name of the person and the date of the taking of the sample stated thereon. It was further argued on behalf of the defence that it was essential that the provisions of the Act be strictly complied with and that in particular the prescribed form to be completed by the doctor be completed as prescribed. It was pointed out that Section 21(2) of the 1994 Act refers to "a duly completed form under Section 18" and provides that such a form shall until the contrary is shown be sufficient evidence in any proceedings under the Road Traffic Acts, 1961 to 1994 of the facts stated therein. It is further provided that without proof of any signature on it or that the signatory was a proper person to sign it, the form shall until the contrary is shown be sufficient evidence of compliance by the designated doctor concerned with the requirements imposed on him by or under that part of the Act. It was submitted that as a duly completed form was not forwarded to the Bureau, the certificate issued by the Bureau was inadmissible in evidence and that consequently the prosecutor failed to prove his case.

4. The learned District Judge did not accept these submissions as the name of the Accused was on the specimen bottle enclosed in a sealed cardboard container forwarded in a sealed box to the Medical Bureau of Road Safety. Specifically, the judge asked was he correct in law in holding that as the Accused's name was on the "specimen bottle" and not on the "container" that this was sufficient to satisfy the requirements laid down in Sections 18, 19 and 21 of the 1994 Act in that the prescribed form had been duly completed by the designated doctor.

5. To determine the case stated, it is necessary to subject the relevant Sections in the 1994 Act to close analysis. The statutory offence with which the Appellant was charged is precisely as set out in the charge already cited above and it can be noted in passing that Section 49(2) of the 1961 Act, as inserted by Section 10 of the 1994 Act makes no reference one way or another to bottles or containers or to the filling up of forms or labelling, etc. If that subsection stood on its own, the prosecution would have to prove the case by calling all relevant witnesses who ever handled the sample and of course appropriate witnesses from the Bureau to prove the carrying out of and the result of the analysis, etc. To save the necessity for all of that in every case, the Oireachtas has provided in the 1994 Act for prima facie documentary proof of certain matters without the necessity of calling witnesses. It is, however, a condition precedent to the evidential validity of such documents that certain statutory procedures be complied with. The relevant statutory procedures regarding the taking of specimens of blood are contained in Section 18 of the Road Traffic Act, 1994. Subsection (1) of that Section provides as follows:-

6. It is to be noted that neither in the Section itself nor in any other part of the Act is the word "container" defined. But it obviously has to be the type of container which would hold blood. On the face of it, there would seem to be no reason why the bottle would not be a "container" within the meaning of the subsection. That bottle has to be sealed and the prescribed form has to be filled up. But it is further provided in subsection (4) of Section 18 that "in a prosecution for an offence under this part or under Section 49 or 50 of the principal Act, it shall be presumed until the contrary is shown that subsections (1) to (3) have been complied with".

7. At the hearing of this prosecution, therefore, there would have been a prima facie presumption that each bottle was sealed and that the prescribed form was completed.

8. The form is prescribed by the Road Traffic Act, 1994 (Part III), Regulations, 1994 (S.I. No. 351 of 1994). The form as filled up in this case was in accordance with the prescribed form and contained the following sentence which is in the prescribed form:-

9. A bottle to receive the specimen of blood would clearly seem to be a "container" within the meaning of the prescribed form. Section 21(2) of the 1994 Act provides as follows:-

10. The purpose of sealing and labelling of course is to ensure proper identification of the sample in question and also to prevent any deliberate or accidental contamination of it. The learned District Judge in this case had evidence before him which was not rebutted that the doctor had divided the specimen into two parts, had placed each part in a container which he had sealed forthwith and that he had labelled each container with the name of the person and the date. The certificate from the Medical Bureau, however, makes it clear that the name was on the specimen bottle itself and that there was no name on what the certifier describes as the "container". There is no dispute that what the certifier was referring to as "container" was an outer box in which the bottle would have been placed. But if, as appears to be the case, the specimen bottle itself was labelled there was for the reasons indicated proper compliance with the Act. Under Section 21(3) the Bureau Certificate is itself sufficient evidence of any facts stated in it until the contrary is shown as well as being sufficient evidence of compliance by the Bureau with the requirements on it.

11. There is no evidence set out in the Case Stated as to whether there is a regular practice of having the bottles placed in boxes or as to what the normal practice as to labelling is and indeed it was suggested at the hearing before me that the practice may vary depending on whether the sample is posted or not. But I am not and cannot concern myself with any of that. I am satisfied that the District Judge was correct in the view he took in this particular case that once the bottle was labelled, that was sufficient.

12. I, therefore, dismiss the appeal.