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High Court of Ireland Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Nguyen v. Minister for Justice [1998] IEHC 189 (5th May, 1998) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/1998/189.html Cite as: [1998] IEHC 189 |
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1. This
is an application for Judicial Review brought pursuant to an Order granting
leave by Mr. Justice McCracken. The application is for an interlocutory
injunction restraining the Respondent from removing the Applicants who are
Vietnamese nationals from the jurisdiction pending the determination of asylum
proceedings which they want processed and an Order of Mandamus and a
Declaratory Order, the effect of which would be to compel the Respondent to
consider applications for refugee status. As in the
Lomidze
case,
judgment in which I have just delivered, the essential complaint being made is
that the principles of the von Arnim letter which regulates asylum applications
in this country were not complied with.
2. The
application is grounded on an affidavit of Michael Lynn, solicitor of Moran
& Ryan Solicitors who are acting for the Applicants. It is alleged in the
affidavit that on the 10th July, 1995 the Applicants arrived into Ireland from
Germany where an application for refugee status had been refused but that they
wished nevertheless to apply for asylum in Ireland and had instructed
solicitors for this purpose. The instructions were given on the 22nd November,
1995 and on that date Mr. Lynn contacted the Department of Justice and spoke to
an official in the Aliens Section, informed the official of the above matters
and that the Applicants wished to apply for refugee status in Ireland. Mr.
Lynn was told that he could submit an application for refugee status on behalf
of his clients without full details for the time being. On the 23rd November,
1995 Mr. Lynn attended personally at the Department of Justice with the
Applicants and met the same official. He handed the official a letter of the
23rd November, 1995 and an application form seeking refugee status. The
official then informed him that the application for refugee status would not be
accepted and that the Applicants could either leave the State voluntarily or
that steps would be taken to return them to Germany. The reasons given for the
refusal to accept the application was the fact that the Applicants had already
been refused refugee status in Germany. On the 24th November, 1995 Mr. Lynn
wrote to Mr. Brian Ingoldsby, Acting Principal Officer of the Department of
Justice concerning the events which had taken place on the previous day. A
further letter was sent to the Department on the 28th November, 1995 there
having been no response to the earlier letter and application. On the 1st
December, 1995 Mr. Lynn received an acknowledgement from the office of the
Minister which advised him that his recent letter was receiving attention. On
4th December a further holding letter was faxed. Finally, on the 6th December,
1995, Mr. Lynn received a telephone call from an official in the Department of
Justice requesting him to attend a general meeting to discuss the position of
the Applicants and other clients of Mr. Lynn who had and/or who wished to make
applications for refugee status in Ireland. Mr. Lynn was advised that the
purpose of the meeting would be to discuss why such applications should be
processed. Mr. Lynn subsequently refused to attend such a meeting but entered
into correspondence again with Mr. Ingoldsby. On the 8th December, 1995, Mr.
Lynn received a telephone call from Mr. Ingoldsby who informed him that he
wished to hold such a meeting so as to enable the Minister for Justice to make
a decision in respect of the Applicants' bona fides concerning their
application for refugee status. Mr. Lynn informed Mr. Ingoldsby that his
principal concern was that no application in respect of refugee status had been
accepted on behalf of the Applicants by the Department of Justice and that
until such an application was accepted that he failed to see what purpose any
meeting could have. Mr. Lynn further informed Mr. Ingoldsby that the
Applicants' position at all times had been and remained that they would attend
whatever interview or meeting which the Department of Justice wished to hold
and would supply whatever information the Department of Justice required from
them in connection with their application but only subsequent to the acceptance
by the Department of an application for refugee status.
3. At
this point and before considering the replying affidavits, it is I think
relevant to refer to a passage in the judgment of the Supreme Court delivered
by Murphy J. on the 28th November, 1997 in
Anisimova
-v- The Minister for Justice
at p.11. The passage reads as follows:-
4. I
interpret this passage as implying that in considering whether the Minister has
entertained a preliminary application or not it is the real facts which are to
be considered and not any technical form of words nor need it involve the
filling up of some prescribed form of application. It would seem to me that on
Mr. Lynn's own affidavit and without considering any of the rest of the
evidence, the Department of Justice in this case, unlike in the
Lomidze
case,
acted impeccably and agreed to a meeting to discuss the Applicants' bona fides
concerning their application for refugee status. But that approach was turned
down. In those circumstances, I am firmly of opinion that the Applicants are
not entitled now to complain about the procedure. It would be premature to
determine what clauses of the von Arnim letter would be relevant here or not
and the extent to which they were complied with because that stage has never
been reached. The Applicants have refused to co-operate with the Department's
procedures for dealing with a preliminary application.
5. I
do not find it necessary to paraphrase in any detail the affidavits of Colette
Morey, Higher Executive Officer in the Asylum Section of the Immigration and
Citizenship Division of the Department of Justice and Brian Ingoldsby, Acting
Principal Officer in the Department sworn in reply. The general effect of
those affidavits is to corroborate and expand upon the details contained in Mr.
Lynn's affidavit. The general thrust of Mr. Ingoldsby's affidavit in
particular is that because of the earlier application for asylum in Germany and
its refusal, the Minister could not immediately at least entertain a
substantive application for asylum and this was explained through an
interpreter to the Applicants themselves. On the other hand there appears to
have been a clear willingness to discuss the applications on a preliminary
basis with a view to establishing whether a substantive application could be
admitted having regard to all the surrounding circumstances. This was a
reasonable view for the Department to adopt and I cannot find any fault in it.
I might add that in paragraph 6 of Mr. Ingoldsby's affidavit it is explained
that the United Nations High Commission for Refugees was asked for its comments
on the propriety of Ireland entertaining applications for asylum by Vietnamese
citizens where the question of qualification as a convention refugee had
already been heard and determined by Germany. The reply was to the effect that
"a country is under no obligation to consider substantively an application from
an asylum applicant who arrived in the country from another country which is
party to the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention where that other country
has already considered and rejected an application on substantive grounds."
6. In
short, therefore, I believe that the Department was correct in not immediately
entertaining a substantive application. I believe that they were willing to
entertain a preliminary application with a view to establishing the bona fides
of the application or whether there could be conceivable grounds that would
justify a substantive application. As that latter invitation was turned down,
the question of applying the von Arnim principles did not arise. In my view,
therefore, the application for Judicial Review must be refused.