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High Court of Ireland Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> C.H.A. Ltd., Re [1999] IEHC 90; [1999] 1 IR 437; [1999] 2 ILRM 76 (25th January, 1999) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/1999/90.html Cite as: [1999] 2 ILRM 76, [1999] IEHC 90, [1999] 1 IR 437 |
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1. By
Order of this Court made on 21st September, 1988 it was ordered that C.H.A.
Limited (the Company) be wound up by the Court and that F. J. Grey be appointed
Official Liquidator for the purposes of the said winding up. At the time of
the winding up order the Company was in occupation of certain premises as
tenant to Triple D Warehouses Limited (the Applicant) and the Liquidator
continued to occupy the premises after the commencement of the winding up. On
the failure of the Liquidator to pay post liquidation rent claimed by the
landlord, the Applicant, in respect of post liquidation occupation of the
premises in question, by Order of this Court made on 21st October, 1991 the
Applicant was given leave to institute proceedings against the Company for
recovery of the rent.
2. The
proceedings were brought in the Circuit Court in Cork and on 7th February, 1996
an Order was made in the Circuit Court by His Honour Judge Moran that the
Plaintiff should recover the sum of £5,000 together with the costs of the
proceedings when taxed and ascertained. A sum of £2,000 had been lodged
in Court by the Liquidator with the leave of this Court and it was ordered that
that sum be paid out to the Plaintiff in part discharge of the decree.
3. The
costs of the Circuit Court proceedings and witnesses' expenses were
subsequently taxed in the sum of £2,644.34.
4. On
this application the Applicant claims the sum of £3,000, being the balance
due on foot of the order of the Circuit Court, as "costs, charges and expenses
incurred in the winding up" within the meaning of Section 244 of the Companies
Act, 1963 (the Act of 1963) and claims that it is entitled to be paid the taxed
costs of the proceedings in priority to all other claims in the liquidation.
5. I
will deal with the question of the taxed costs first. In support of his
contention that the Applicant is entitled to be paid the taxed costs in
priority to all other claims in the winding up, Mr. Hunt relied on the decision
of the Supreme Court in
Comhlucht
Paipear Riomhaireachta Teo -v- Udaras na Gaeltachta
(1991) I.R. 320. In that case, the Court was concerned with an application by
the defendants against the plaintiff, a company in voluntary liquidation, for
security for costs under Section 390 of the Act of 1963. It was held by the
Supreme Court that where an action is brought by a company after liquidation
the costs of a successful defendant rank in priority to all other claims and,
as there were sufficient funds available to liquidator in that case to pay the
costs of the successful defendant, the application for security for costs
failed in limine. In his judgment, McCarthy J. reviewed the authorities and he
also quoted the following passage from Halsbury's
Laws
of England
(4th Edition), Volume 7 (2) at paragraph 1803:-
6. Having
commented that a number of the cases to which he had already referred are cited
in the footnote to the foregoing paragraph, McCarthy J. went on to state as
follows:-
7. It
was submitted by Mr. Collins, on behalf of the Liquidator, that the instant
case is distinguishable from
Comhlucht
Paipear Riomhaireachta Teo -v- Udaras na Gaeltachta
in that the Applicant is a successful plaintiff who, with the leave of the
Court, commenced an action against the Company after the commencement of the
winding up, and is not a successful defendant to an action brought by a company
in liquidation after the commencement of the winding up. That this distinction
exists cannot be gainsaid but, in my view, it is an immaterial distinction.
8. The
quotation from Halsbury in the judgment of McCarthy J. does not give the full
text of paragraph 1803, the remainder of the paragraph being in the following
terms:-
9.
As authority for the foregoing proposition, the editors of Halsbury cite
Bailey
and Leetham's Case
(1869) L.R. 8 Eq. 94 and
Re:
Wenborn & Company
(1905) 1 Ch 413. In his judgment in the latter case, Buckley J. stated as
follows at page 417:-
10. Accordingly,
on the authority of the decision of the Supreme Court in
Comhlucht
Paipear Riomhaireachta Teo -v- Udaras na Gaeltachta
,
I am satisfied that the Applicant is entitled to be paid in full the taxed
costs of the Circuit Court proceedings amounting to £2,644.34 in priority
to all other claims in the liquidation and I will make an Order for payment of
the said sum by the Liquidator to the Applicant.
11. In
relation to the balance of £3,000 due to the Applicant on foot of the
Circuit Court Order in respect of post liquidation rent, it was properly
conceded by Mr. Collins that, on the authority of the decision of Murphy J. in
Re:
GWI Limited
,
in which judgment was delivered on 16th November, 1987, that the sum of
£3,000 owing in respect of post liquidation rent falls to be regarded as a
debt contracted for the purpose of the winding up of the Company and to be paid
in full like any other debt or expense properly incurred by the liquidator for
the same purpose. Accordingly, I will make a declaration that the sum of
£3,000 represents "costs, charges and expenses incurred in the winding up"
within the meaning of Section 244 of the Act of 1963.
12. The
Court has been apprised that the liquidator has in hand a sum in the region of
£8,000 to meet, in addition to the Applicant's claim, the Liquidator's own
legal expenses and his remuneration and the other claims against the Company.
The Court was also apprised that the Liquidator will shortly be bringing an
application for final directions in the winding up. I propose adjourning the
question of the Applicant's entitlement to be paid the balance of the sum due
to it on foot of the Circuit Court Order and the priority of that claim vis a
vis the other costs, charges and expenses incurred in the winding up until the
hearing of the Liquidator's application, which should be on notice to the
Applicant. I accept Mr. Collins submission that the Court's discretion under
Section 244 overrides the order of priority stipulated in Order 74, Rule 128 of
the Rules of the Superior Courts, 1986, which provision, by its terms, is
"subject to any order of the Court".